Psychopathy, Moral Reasons, and Responsibility
Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2013
Publisher
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Abstract
In popular culture psychopaths are inaccurately portrayed as serial killers or homicidal maniacs. Most real-world psychopaths are neither killers nor maniacs. Psychologists currently understand psychopathy as an affective disorder that leads to repeated criminal and antisocial behavior. Counter to this prevailing view, I claim that psychopathy is not necessarily linked with criminal behavior. Successful psychopaths, an intriguing new category of psychopathic agent, support this conception of psychopathy. I then consider reactive attitude theories of moral responsibility. Within this tradition, psychopaths are thought to be blameless as a result of their pronounced affective deficits. Psychopaths are considered morally blind because they lack the moral emotions that make us sensitive to moral reasons. I argue that, even if they are morally blind, psychopaths remain open to forms of blame stemming from non-moral reactive attitudes. These reactive attitudes remain appropriate because psychopaths can express hateful, disgusting, or contemptible non-moral values in their judgments.
Chapter of
Ethics and Neurodiversity
Editor
Alexandra Perry
C.D. Herrera
Recommended Citation
Ramirez, E. (2013). Psychopathy, moral reasons, and responsibility. In Alexandra Perry and C.D. Herrera (Eds.) Ethics and Neurodiversity. Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 217-237
