Thomson on the Moral Specification of Right

Authors

William A. Parent
William J. Prior, Santa Clara Univeristy

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-1996

Publisher

International Phenomenological Society / John Wiley & Sons

Abstract

In this paper we offer a limited defense of the "moral specification" view of rights in response to criticisms of Judith Jarvis Thomson. The defense is limited in that we do not attempt to demonstrate the overall superiority of this view to others, including the view currently advocated by Thomson. We only attempt to show that the advocate of moral specification (MS)' has a plausible response to two objections she raises.

Recommended Citation

Parent, W. A., & Prior, W. J. (1996). Thomson on the Moral Specification of Rights. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56(4), 837–845. https://doi.org/10.2307/2108283