Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-2024
Publisher
Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association
Abstract
While most scholars understand Nietzsche as a full-throated proponent of power, I argue that his attitude toward power is far more ambivalent. Nietzsche’s critical attitude toward power is most apparent in his analysis of mimicry—the process whereby one organism (the mimic) gains an evolutionary advantage through superficially resembling another (the model). Nietzsche’s analysis of mimicry shows how power makes the strong not only indifferent but also actively hostile to adaptation and novelty. In contrast, the weak, precisely because of their weakness, are incentivized to understand, adapt to, and exploit the psychology of the strong. Nietzsche reveals that mimicry is the means by which the weak were able to achieve a revolution in values through persuasion rather than force. Ultimately, I argue that Nietzsche’s analysis of mimicry provides a compelling account of social change, and reveals how power is maladaptive, in that it blinds and ossifies the powerful.
Recommended Citation
Meredith, T. (2024). Nietzsche’s Critique of Power: Mimicry and the Advantage of the Weak. American Political Science Review, 118(1), 291–303. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422001472
Comments
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.