Document Type


Publication Date



Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.


Infinite games with incomplete information are common in practice. First-price, sealed-bid auctions are a prototypical example. To solve this kind of infinite game, a heuristic approach is to discretise the strategy spaces and enumerate to approximate the equilibrium strategies. However, an approximate algorithm might not be guaranteed to converge. This paper discusses the utilisation of a best response algorithm in solving infinite games with incomplete information. We show the constraints of the valuation distributions define the necessary conditions of the convergence of the best response algorithm for several classes of infinite games, including auctions. A salient feature of the necessary convergence conditions lies in that they can be employed to compute the exact Nash equilibria without discretising the strategy space if the best response algorithm converges.


Copyright © 2007 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. Reprinted with permission.



To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.