Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-2015
Publisher
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Abstract
Since the development of the Internet, thousands of manufacturers have been referring consumers visiting their websites to some or all of their retailers. Through a model with one manufacturer and two heterogeneous retailers, we investigate whether it is an equilibrium for the manufacturer to refer consumers exclusively to a retailer or nonexclusively to both retailers. Our analysis indicates that nonexclusive referral is the manufacturer's equilibrium choice if the referral segment market size is sufficiently large; otherwise, exclusive referral is the equilibrium choice. In exclusive referral, the manufacturer would refer consumers to the more cost-efficient and smaller retailer. In the presence of infomediary referral, it is less likely for both exclusive and nonexclusive referrals to be an equilibrium, as the infomediary referral segment grows. We also show our qualitative results are robust even if there were price discrimination among consumers, referral position disparity, local consumers, and asymmetric referral market sizes.
Recommended Citation
Wu, H., Cai, G. (George), Chen, J., & Sheu, C. (2015). Online Manufacturer Referral to Heterogeneous Retailers. Production and Operations Management, 24(11), 1768–1782. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12363
Comments
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Wu, H., Cai, G. (George), Chen, J., & Sheu, C. (2015). Online Manufacturer Referral to Heterogeneous Retailers. Production and Operations Management, 24(11), 1768–1782. , which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12363. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.