Theorizing the Diaspora

John C. Hawley
Santa Clara Univeristy, jhawley@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/engl

Part of the English Language and Literature Commons

Recommended Citation

Copyright © 2006 Rodopi. Reprinted with permission.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in English by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Theorizing the Diaspora

John C. Hawley

In his provocative essay on the place of the committed writer in contemporary western society ("Inside the Whale"), George Orwell makes a passing observation about the effects of exile, self-imposed or otherwise, on the scope of a writer’s subject and purpose: “[L]eaving your native land,” he suggests, “[...] means transferring your roots into shallower soil. Exile is probably more damaging to a novelist than to a painter or even a poet, because its effect is to take him out of contact with working life and narrow down his range to the street, the café, the church, the brothel and the studio.”

He has in mind Henry Miller in France, and thus one assumes the felt sense of marginalization has a great deal to do with having to deal in a language other than one’s own. Still, anyone who has traveled abroad, let alone lived there for some time, will acknowledge the central insight that ‘exile’ can shock the sensitivities of most artists and, until they become true cosmopolitans who are equally at home in two or more cultures, arguably shrink their expressive abilities. Orwell is describing a certain sort of expatriate -- the ‘artist’ -- but there is plenty of evidence that the experience he describes for Henry Miller rings true for migrants of whatever social, educational, or economic class: what is lost in the translation may be one’s self.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the quest for a home, a return to one’s native homeland, has been a constant in world literature, but it has taken on a greater sense of urgency in recent decades. After all, in 1990 there were 80 million international migrants, and in 1997 there were 31 million refugees. Nikos Papastergiadis notes that this is “the greatest number of stateless people in history,” yet even this high number does not include “the 24 million people displaced

---

2 For current statistics, see: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/migration/index.htm>
by violence and persecution and who have become homeless within their own countries” (Papastergiadis 54).³ As Sri Lankan poet Jean Arasanayagam writes,

I have no country now but self
I mark my boundaries extend demesnes
Even beyond the darkness of those regions
Still to be explored.⁴

The ironies connected to the use of a word such as ‘demesnes’ in this context underscore the narrowing, rather than extension, of one’s world -- the willy-nilly regression to an interior search when the world beyond one’s body becomes irretrievably foreign.

We should begin by distinguishing between two types of migrants: those who have little or no choice in the matter, and those privileged few who have more agency. We must also distinguish between those whose reasons for moving are principally financial, and those who are what we might call cultural migrants -- intellectuals, artists, etc.⁵ Regarding the financial migrants a distinction must be made between the unskilled and the skilled. At one end of the spectrum are the manual workers in service industries who are heavily exploited, generally alone, without the benefit of social services and welfare, and forced to live in national or ethnic ghettos. Such individuals may ‘lapse’ into far more fundamental forms of religion or nationalism as a means of undergirding a sense of self in an indifferent and dehumanizing new world. This is by far the larger of the two groups, its members often leading entire lives in transition, fear, and confusion. The skilled, on the other hand, are often recruited from diverse backgrounds but trained to communicate across national distinctions in favor of corporate identity. As Papastergiadis puts it,

The formation of this transnational class is committed to a degree of homogenization among its members and to long-term processes of denationalization through the deregulation and diversification of economic production. Knowing how to speak local is part of the discourse of the new global elites. They perceive of themselves as

³ Nikos Papastergiadis. The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity. (Malden, MA: Polity, 2000): 54. “It has been estimated that the number of self-defined peoples exceeds the number of nation-states by a proportion of five to one [...]. The modern use for the word ‘homeland’ is predicated on the existence of a nation-state [...]. However, this overlooks the vast number of people [... whose] homeland was never constituted as a nation-state.”
⁵ In Of Hospitality Jacques Derrida lists “exiles, the deported, the expelled, the rootless, the stateless, lawless nomads, absolute foreigners” (87-88) as different kinds of foreigners; in reflecting on this, Gayatri Spivak reflects at some length on “the colonizer as guest” (“Resident” 54). See John A. Armstrong’s important economic distinctions.
belonging to a social space whose symbolic repertoire and political sphere do not confine themselves to the boundaries of a particular nation-state. 6

Members of this class typically belong to multiple communities that are partially overlapping, sometimes bolstering their sense of new freedoms, sometimes underscoring their consequent rootlessness. Both the unskilled and skilled demonstrate that “the mobility and complex affiliations of people today mean that the dream of a ‘pure race’ or a culture bound to a given territory is no longer possible.” 7 In other words, globalization may or may not be setting the stage for a world community, but in any case it has uprooted cultural anchors and, with widely differing urgencies, pushed all of us into literal or intuited diasporas.

One of the effects of globalization on postcolonial theory has been a confusion of the borders between the victimizers and the victimized, markedly evident in the often conflicted reflections of migrant intellectuals. 8 Referring to W. E. B. DuBois’s discussion of double consciousness, Ali Behdad notes that exile can be used as a form of cultural resistance in which “the voluntary move away from home helps the exilic writer to gain a broader perspective about history and culture, thus allowing him to act as the agent of social transformation. 9 But Behdad ultimately criticizes this valorization of the “oppositional, redemptive, and transformative possibilities of displacement” because it “conflates the privileged experiences of writers and intellectuals with those of the less fortunate immigrants.” 10 Behdad also suggests that displacement does not, per se, lead to “originality of vision or the breaking of intellectual and cultural barriers.” Indeed, many immigrants find their new location more enslaving, on several levels, than the one they escaped.

The sense of increased agency that comes with the mobility of migrant intellectuals echoes in a minor key in the transnational circuits of migrant labor of whatever economic class (Rouse; Behdad; Knerr)—migrant farm laborers in the southwest United States, oil workers in the Gulf

6 Papastergiadis, 88.
7 Papastergiadis, 89.
9 Behdad, 399.
10 Behdad, 401-402.
states, computer workers from India in Silicon Valley, etc., but it is obviously naïve to simplify their various complex and locally-determined experiences. As Behdad notes, “transnational circuits are appearing throughout the world, but their formations are always sociohistorically contingent and culturally specific.”\footnote{Behdad, 407.}

The mechanisms for the ‘rewiring’ of this circuitry are controversial, to say the least. In his interesting book, Many Globalizations, co-edited with Samuel P. Huntington, Peter L. Berger notes that, “though the United States does have a great deal of power, its culture is not being imposed on others by coercive means.”\footnote{Peter L. Berger, Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford UP, 2002): 3.} Some might respond that this depends on how one defines coercion; many intellectuals in the United States, for example, would argue that noxious components of American culture are being inflicted on its own citizens, let alone those beyond its borders who are financially dependent upon American commerce. Be that as it may. Berger goes on to agree with Huntington that “the emerging global culture is diffused through both elite and popular vehicles [whose] basic engine is international business.” This expresses itself through “a sort of yuppy internationale, whose members speak English and dress alike and act alike, at work and at play, and up to a point think alike,”\footnote{Berger, 4.} but who also may lead “personal lives dominated by very different cultural themes.” But there is another elite sector of the emerging global culture dominated by “Western intelligentsia” who use “academic networks, foundations, nongovernmental organizations.” “It too,” writes Berger, “seeks and actively creates markets throughout the world, but the products it promotes are not those of multinational corporations but the ideas and behaviors invented by Western (mostly American) intellectuals, such as the ideologies of human rights, feminism, environmentalism, and multiculturalism, as well as the politics and lifestyles that embody these ideologies.”\footnote{Berger, 4.} (Are these complex movements American products? How many Americans line up with enthusiasm behind each of them?) As Berger and Huntington see it, whereas the financial engines of globalization have many centers (New York and London, but also Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, Bombay, and Shanghai), “the ‘metropolis’ of the globalized intelligentsia is much more exclusively western, indeed American. Thus,” they write, “when the term ‘cultural imperialism’ is used, it is probably more applicable...
to East 43rd Street, where the impressive headquarters of the Ford Foundation are located, than to the corporate bastions of Wall Street and Madison Avenue.”

At this point it is appropriate to consider migrant intellectuals who are not western, but who may well operate in the west -- as native informants, if you will. What role are they playing in the negotiation between postcolonial resistance and globalization in their one-time homes? As various speakers in the “Writing Diasporas -- Transnational Imagination Conference” in Swansea (20-23 September 2000) noted, and as B. Chandramohan suggests in a recent article, “these writings [in fact] often operate against a current of assimilation and powerful structures of the monolingual nation-state.” But to what effect? Are they perhaps dismissed (or simply not heard) in their countries of origin? In their adopted countries, particularly in the United States (where any sort of liberal cultural critic must struggle to find a forum), are they relegated to hermetically sealed classrooms? And what of the impact their diasporic status surely has on them and the channeling of the topics they are allowed to address? Judging from the questions that dominate contemporary fiction from India, the countries of Africa and the Caribbean--issues of identity, deracination, the role of heritage, the persistence of historical injustices, the authorization of a voice – ‘the diaspora,’ for all its national particularities, shares a striking family resemblance across cultures.

But how these questions are approached, and by whom, does set some theorists apart. In her important discussion of ‘flexible citizenship’ Aihwa Ong writes that “in the United States, the conjuncture of postcolonial theory and diaspora studies seems to produce a bifurcated model of diasporan cultures [. . . in which] the unified moralism attached to subaltern subjects now also clings to diasporan ones, who are invariably assumed to be members of oppressed classes and therefore constitutionally opposed to capitalism and state power.” This naïve liberal reading of migrants overlooks the economic considerations that brought many of them to the west (or to the north). Ong notes that “[t]he cultural-studies focus on diasporan cultures and subjectivities then seeks in the off-shore experiences of labor migrants, and in the worldly ruminations of intellectuals, the birth of progressive political subjects who will undermine or challenge

15 Berger, 5-6. One can only imagine how a Francocentric Europeanist like Pascale Casanova might respond to these two Americentric theorists. See La république mondiale des lettres (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1999): 179-281.
oppressive nationalist ideologies (and global capitalism)"\(^{18}\) -- but the Republican party has demonstrated in recent years that this “traditional Democratic base” has certain financial and family-based concerns that make rootedness in the American dream very appealing. Similarly, the Hoover Institute and other conservative think-tanks have successfully recruited diasporic intellectuals who may well, in fact, eschew such labels. In Ong’s view, “What is missing from these accounts are discussions of how the disciplining structures -- of family, community, work, travel, and nation -- condition, shape, divert, and transform such subjects and their practices and produce the moral-political dilemmas, so eloquently captured in these studies, whose resolutions cannot be so easily predetermined.”

This is where theories of globalization appear to have greater cogency than those of postcolonialism: the latter tend to focus too fixedly on cultural phenomena to the relative exclusion of political and economic issues. Ong characterizes anthropologically inclined critics for too simply “celebrat[ing] cultural difference, hybridity, and the social imaginary, which display ‘native’ inventiveness, and sometimes resistances, to homogenizing trends” without “an attempt to analytically link actual institutions of state power, capitalism, and transnational networks to such forms of cultural reproduction, inventiveness, and possibilities.” In her view, “the diasporan subject is now vested with the agency formerly sought in the working class and more recently in the subaltern subject.”\(^{19}\)

For Ong, claims that “diasporas and cosmopolitanisms are liberatory forces against oppressive nationalism, repressive state structures, and capitalism” are vastly overstated:

\[
\text{while [ . . . ] tensions and disjunctures are at work between oppressive structures and border-crossing flows, the nation-state—along with its juridical-legislative systems, bureaucratic apparatuses, economic entities, modes of governmentality, and war-making capacities—continues to define, discipline, control, and regulate all kinds of populations, whether in movement or in residence.}^{20}\]

If Ong is correct in her analysis of the weaknesses of postcolonial idealistic readings of diasporic (or subaltern, or working class) agency, others suggest that critical cosmopolitans are on firmer footing when reflecting on their \textit{own} experience. R. Radhakrishnan, for example, writes that “the diasporic location is the space of the hyphen that tries to coordinate, within an evolving relationship, the identity politics of one’s place of origin with that of one’s present

\(^{18}\) Ong, 14.  
\(^{19}\) Ong, 15.  
\(^{20}\) Ong, 15.
home.” This may sound like a simple celebration of hybridity, but it is analysis from within, rather than from outside. The diasporic subjectivity he reports is, therefore, not necessarily empowering; it is, rather, “necessarily double: acknowledging the imperatives of an earlier ‘elsewhere’ in an active and critical relationship with the cultural politics of one’s present home, all within the figurality of a reciprocal displacement.” Rather than a cause for liberatory agency, “home” becomes “a mode of interpretive in-betweenness,” “a form of accountability to more than one location.” In fact, Radhakrishnan emphasizes the threat to the “organic solidarity of the postcolonial subject” that this internationalization poses, because in their negotiation of “here” and “there” the diasporic individual encounters the expectations of both audiences. In the West, for example,

the very fact that the postcolonial scholar teaches, rather than how or with what critical perspective she teaches, has taken on an almost fetishistic significance in the academy [. . . and this] is ample testimony to the reality of the ongoing psychological and internal impact of colonialism. For if one were truly postcolonial, it would not matter what one taught or thought about: Shakespeare, Jane Austen, Chinua Achebe, or Bessie Head.

From this Janus-like position, the diasporic individual potentially may offer a double-sided critique of the here and the there, but this is a difficult negotiation when the “here” (the West) has already positioned and practically dictated the potential critique (as it had done in its expectations for the supposedly ‘liberatory’ and ‘Marxist’ subaltern consciousness). Even if this were not the situation in which such potential critics find themselves, other disciplinary questions present themselves. Radhakrishnan asks, for example, whether Caliban can and should “use Prospero’s erudition against Prospero.” But beyond such questions are others, such as the potential for diasporic critics to turn their attention to the “there” from which they have come (one thinks, for example, of the reception given to V. S. Naipaul’s acerbic and apparently mean-spirited assessment of the Caribbean or India, etc., or even of Salman Rushdie’s assessment of Indian literature written in languages other than English). In Radhakrishnan’s words, “the road not taken by postcolonial intellectuals and leaders is that of the indigenous critique, that is, a critique that will not pit belonging and progress as adversarial terms.”

---

22 Radhakrishnan, xvi.
23 Radhakrishnan, xx.
24 Radhakrishnan, xix.
diasporic intellectual has a three-fold movement: “away from one’s tradition, the intermediate
detour, and the need to return critically to one’s tradition.” Who can do this? Can anyone
‘return’?

Radhakrishnan and Ong are arguing for the freedom to accept one’s life and identity as a
process rather than a fixed and essentialized donnē. In Radhakrishnan’s view “[i]t is futile and
counterfactual to contend that ideas and movements are rooted and monolocalional.”25 In a
similar vein, Arjun Appadurai suggests that “what is new is that this is a world in which both
points of departure and points of arrival are in cultural flux [. . . ] and the invention of tradition
(and of ethnicity, kinship, and other identity-markers) can become slippery [. . . ] Culture
becomes less what Bourdieu would have called a habitus (a tacit realm of reproducible practices
and dispositions) and more an arena for conscious choice, justification, and representation.”26
Radhakrishnan uses the language of movement; Appadurai speaks of “the configuration of
cultural forms in today’s world as fundamentally fractal [. . . ] overlapping [. . . ] [sharing in]
chaos theory” -- though one cannot overlook Appadurai’s phrase “conscious choice,” which
certainly pertains only to a small segment of the diasporic population.

The shifting social stability of those who do have the option of choice is surely not the sort
that easily undergirds a suasive identity politics, and that is perhaps why such cosmopolitans are
sometimes criticized as having forgotten their roots.27 On the other hand, diasporic intellectuals
who are truly Janus-faced may demonstrate that globalization can finally be less obsessed with
one’s roots, and more creatively focused on one’s full flowering. The question that haunts many
such individuals, of course, is how individualistic such an enterprise must remain.

Returning to George Orwell’s essay on the role of exile in the life of a writer, we might at
this point note the intricate etiology of its central image. Orwell is writing a retrospective
comparative review of Henry Miller, offering the startling assessment of the controversial writer

25 Radhakrishnan, xxv. “The hypenation of identity into Asian-American and African-
American points up the reality that India, Asia, and Africa are not unchanging ontological
conditions, but politically necessary and accountable inventions. In other words, authentic
Kenya, or India, is a matter of contested political acts of representation, and not a mere article of
faith to be divinely or immaculately appropriated by any one privileged group. Which India?
Which Nigeria? These are rich and resonant questions that cannot be foreclosed in the name of
monothetic solidarity” (Radhakrishnan xxv).

26 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota
P, 1997): 44.
as “the only imaginative prose-writer of the slightest value who has appeared among the English-speaking races for some years past.” The reasons for this judgment are labyrinthine and a bit unlikely, but suggestive enough that they may be worth our patiently following Orwell on his hunt. They have something to do with reasons paralleling Thomas Carlyle’s in his choice of so-called heroes: heroes for Carlyle and writers for Orwell represent a Zeitgeist (even if they are not in all ways admirable). For our purposes, diasporic writers represent such a Zeitgeist. In Henry Miller’s case the spirit being represented is that of Jonah and the whale, interpreted in a rather tendentious way by Orwell. First Orwell notes that the image itself occurred to him from reading Max and the White Phagocytes (1938), in which Miller refers to Aldous Huxley’s comment that the characters in El Greco’s The Dream of Philip the Second “look as though they were in the bellies of whales,” a “‘visceral prison’” that Huxley finds quite horrible. Miller apparently finds their condition more attractive, noting that Anaçs Nin, author of “the only true feminine writing that has ever appeared,” is much like Jonah in the whale’s belly because, in Orwell’s words, she is “evidently a completely subjective, introverted writer.” Orwell notes that this tells us far more about Henry Miller than it does about Anaçs Nin (or Huxley or El Greco, for that matter), suggesting that Miller himself valorizes this so-called feminine form of writing—a form both Miller and Orwell identify with varying shades of passivity.

Here is where Orwell makes his long-awaited point. Sounding a great deal like Walter Pater and the “art for art’s sake” school of thought, he inveighs against those who seek to reconnect writing to politics. “That does not mean that [the writer] cannot help to bring the new society into being,” he assures us, “but that he can take no part in the process as a writer. For as a writer he is a liberal, and what is happening is the destruction of liberalism” —a strange assumption, is it not, this one of the writer as liberal? — but similar to that made nowadays of the diasporic subject and writer. But to return to Orwell: “It seems likely, therefore, that in the remaining years of free speech any novel worth reading [. . .] will be more consciously passive than before” — more consciously “feminine,” perhaps?

Throwing in the towel, Orwell finally offers this advice to the aspiring writer: “Get inside the whale -- or rather, admit you are inside the whale (for you are, of course). Give yourself over

---

28 Orwell, 251.
29 Orwell, 244.
to the world-process, stop fighting against it or pretending that you control it; simply accept it, endure it, record it.” Orwell feels he has demonstrated “the impossibility of any major literature until the world has shaken itself into its new shape” — and that new shape will be well on the other side of 1984 and the totalitarian systems that swirl outside the whale, or that, indeed, are the whale. And jumping decades ahead to our own day, one wonders if the whale of globalization poses similarly daunting problems for the diasporic writer in the West.

This Orwellian cadenza on an image may seem a diversion from the central concerns of this paper, but Salman Rushdie will show us its relevance. In “Outside the Whale” he begins, as Orwell did, by offering a critique of contemporary writing, though in Rushdie’s case the argument is directed against orientalization in recent filmic and novelistic portrayals of India. He turns his attention to Orwell’s essay to provide a context for his assertion that “works of art, even works of entertainment, do not come into being in a social and political vacuum.” For Rushdie, the rise of what he calls Raj revisionism (in which Thatcherite England reassures itself that it did a good and generous thing in its colonies), shows itself in the popularity of “the big-budget fantasy double-bill of Gandhi and Octopussy” and the “blackface minstrel-show of The Far Pavilions in its TV serial incarnation,” the “overpraised Jewel in the Crown,” the “alleged ‘documentary’ about Subhas Chandra Bose, Granada Television’s War of the Springing Tiger,” and David Lean’s A Passage to India. Rushdie describes these as “the artistic counterpart of the rise of conservative ideologies in modern Britain.” It is ironic, intentionally so, that Rushdie writes his own essay in 1984.

We need not, here, rehearse Rushdie’s full argument. Let it suffice to say that his contention, against Orwell, is that “politically committed art can actually prove more durable than messages from the stomach of the fish.” But the reason for this durability, in Rushdie’s view, is that

There is no whale. We live in a world without hiding places; the missiles have made sure of that. However much we may wish to return to the womb, we cannot be

---

30 Orwell, 250.
31 Orwell, 252.
33 Rushdie, 92.
34 Rushdie, 96.
35 Just 20 years after Rushdie’s essay, missiles have receded as vehicles of globalization (ironic though they may have been) and replaced far more effectively by such technologies as the internet. An example of the intersection of technology and global identity politics is at the heart of Sandip Roy’s “From Khush List to Gay
unborn. So we are left with a fairly straightforward choice. Either we agree to delude ourselves, to lose ourselves in the fantasy of the great fish [. . .] or we can do what all human beings do instinctively when they realize that the womb has been lost for ever—that is, we can make the very devil of a racket [. . . .] Outside the whale the writer is obliged to accept that he (or she) is part of the crowd, part of the ocean, part of the storm, so that objectivity becomes a great dream, like perfection, an unattainable goal for which one must struggle in spite of the impossibility of success.36

The image of Jonah is replaced here by something a bit closer to Noah -- we’re all in this ocean together, sink or swim. Contentions such as Rushdie’s bring us full circle, for in a world “without hiding places” globalization has rendered diasporic situations less marginalized. In fact, they are central to the contemporary experience. Making “the very devil of a racket” in such a brave though soggy new world suggests the enduring value of identity politics, even their inevitability, since we toss and turn and only rarely catch sight of land.

Santa Clara University

Works Cited


Bombay: Virtual Webs of Real People.” But Olu Oguibe notes that “as this community broadens in spread and significance, we are effectively implicated in the relativization of the rest who remain on the outside of its borders” (175).

Rushdie, 99.


