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Historical Perspectives

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“Another Call From Africa” (2009), Turgo Bastien,
[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Imported_Photos_00010](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Imported_Photos_00010.JPG)
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***The Historical Perspectives* Peer Review Process**

Historical Perspectives is a peer-reviewed publication of the History Department at Santa Clara University. It showcases student work that is selected for innovative research, theoretical sophistication, and elegant writing. Consequently, the caliber of submissions must be high to qualify for publication. Each year, two student editors and two faculty advisors evaluate the submissions.

Assessment is conducted in several stages. An initial reading of submissions by the four editors and advisors establishes a short-list of top papers. The assessment criteria in this process, as stated above, focus on the papers' level of research innovation, theoretical sophistication, and elegance of presentation. No one category is privileged over the others and strengths in one can be considered corrective for deficiencies in another. The complete panel of four editors and advisors then votes on the final selections. Occasionally, as needed, authors may be asked to shorten or edit their original submissions for re-submission.

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Introduction

Every year, the Phi Alpha Theta chapter at Santa Clara University publishes a selection of outstanding essays in the History Department's journal, *Historical Perspectives*. Written by students in advanced seminars and who have completed research projects, these essays represent the highest levels of achievement in the department. This year, a number of excellent research papers were submitted for review. We would like to express our gratitude to all the students who submitted their work for consideration as well as to the faculty members who helped them with their projects. We are pleased to present to you the 2018 edition of *Historical Perspectives*.

This year's edition includes essays that explore a wide variety of topics related to the themes of gender, political, and cultural histories spanning the past four centuries. Many of these essays explore similar topics as they are shaped by the courses offered at Santa Clara University, including classes on the French Revolution, Genocide in the Twentieth Century, and the History of Sexuality. This year's submissions demonstrate clearly the intersection between Ethnic Studies, Gender Studies, and History. These works demonstrate that our student writers utilize critical interpretation, insight, and creativity in order to analyze the events of the past and recognize their lasting presence in the today's ongoing narrative. These writers are rewriting and reclaiming history.

Due to the political undertones of many of the papers included in this year's journal we felt that the cover art should reflect those sentiments. The piece we chose for the cover is titled *Another Call from Africa* created by Turgo Bastien, an artist of Haitian descent. We felt this especially appropriate as several of this year's pieces explore cultural and spiritual aspects of Haitian identity. The artist focuses on "painting for peace," believing that art has the power to bring communities together, thus finding light in the ultimate darkness. The artist's belief that art has the power to

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heal the world goes hand in hand with our belief as historians that the study of the past can change the future.

While the journal itself remains distant from any explicit political commentary, we believe that this year's submissions not only reflect Santa Clara University students' growing sense of political urgency but also their passion for education, social justice, and their intention to create change.

Acknowledgments

We congratulate the student authors who submitted their essays for their dedication and exemplary work. We would also like to express our gratitude to Professors Amy Randall and Naomi Andrews, the faculty advisors, and Melissa Sims, the History Department Office manager. Without them, this publication would not have been possible. On behalf of the History Department we would like to thank the faculty, staff, and students who contributed to the department this year. As we reflect on our time at Santa Clara University, we are grateful for the impact the History Department has had on us as burgeoning historians. We are honored to have represented the History Department, and we hope you enjoy this year's edition of *Historical Perspectives*.

Maggie Debrovner and Bailey Fairbanks
Student Editors

Speaking Out from the Home: Women and Political Engagement in the Salons of the French Revolution

Brandon Schultz

Returning from a strenuous day of fierce, partisan debate, clusters of weary Frenchmen gather in a bustling room to discuss philosophy, religion, and above all—the fate of France. The hostess of the house, a wife of one of the prominent debaters, greets the tired men and provides refreshments to encourage the ensuing, friendly deliberations. As the men strategize their future votes and proposals in the National Assembly, the pleased hostess retires to the edge of the room and listens to the complicated legislative plans, adding her own insight to the discussion. In the National Assembly, the hostess wields negligible influence, but in the comfort of her successful salon, she finds the remarkable opportunity to argue her own perspective. With the summoning of the Estates-General and the start of the French Revolution, the citizens of France began to accept the notion that they deserved input in matters relating to governance. Historically confined by their domestic roles as homemakers and thus barred from voicing political opinions, women especially capitalized on the nation's revolutionary spirit to unleash their policy views previously silenced by their patriarchal society. In particular, the French salons of the Revolutionary period expanded the public discourse to include these new, female voices—such as Madame Roland's—offering women an unprecedented level of civic engagement and hastening a reactionary backlash.

Amidst the increasingly-public debates of the French Revolution, salons offered politicians the opportunity to refine their ideas through new perspectives and excessive deliberation, improving the success of their proposals. Following the revolutionary zeitgeist of the political moment, French citizens began to feel entitled to input in their political governance, shifting the realm of policy discussion from the exclusivity of the King's courts to the unobscured streets and homes of the citizenry. With

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these newly public political deliberations receiving unprecedented attention, salons became crucial sites for focused and fruitful conferences. In *French Salons: High Society and Political Sociability from the Old Regime to the Revolution of 1848*, historian Steven D. Kale notes that during the Revolution, “[c]lub-based parties,’ associations linked to politicians, and a ‘politically oriented press’ [were] the instruments of the new public sphere. But the list should also include salons.”¹ Breaking from the rigidity of the established club parties and partisan press, the popular salons—and their more-fluid guest lists—presented new and varied venues for governmental discussions. Naturally, this expansion of sites for public discourse enabled more citizens to participate in the exchange of the Enlightenment ideals that informed the Revolution, thus boosting French civic engagement.

The radical Jacobin Club especially benefited from these salon discussions to consolidate power early in the French Revolution. Describing the aftermath of the collapse of the Breton Club—an organization focused on the abolition of feudal rights—Jacobin scholar Michael L. Kennedy reveals that less than a month later, “fifteen or twenty of [the Breton Club’s] former members...had founded a “Société de la Révolution” in the new capital. The infant organization was inspired, in part, by the Revolution Society of London, which had captured the hearts of patriotic Frenchmen.”² Expanding the Breton Club’s already-radical ideas of abolishing feudal rights, the Jacobin Club became the primary faction in favor of complete political overhaul in France, and members of the organization often aggressively championed progressive policies. Due to the radical nature of their beliefs, the Jacobins needed to organize quickly to gain a

¹Steven D. Kale, *French Salons: High Society and Political Sociability from the Old Regime to the Revolution of 1848* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 47.

²Michael L. Kennedy, “The Foundation of the Jacobin Clubs and the Development of the Jacobin Club Network, 1789-1791,” *The Journal of Modern History* 51, no. 4 (1979): 701.

substantial foothold in the National Assembly, and the salons of the time enabled the Jacobins' success. Praising the benefits of the salons' impassioned discussions for the Jacobin Club, the politician Alexandre Lameth admitted that "This preliminary consideration shed a great deal of light upon the discussions in the Assembly. The resolve to decide within the society itself, by preliminary ballots...proved a great advantage to the popular party."³ By planning proposals and votes in advance at the salons, the Jacobins became a cohesive and intimidating force at the National Assembly, securing early political victories. The presence of the salons actually increased the amount of time available for politicians to debate pressing issues together, allowing more perspectives and ideas to advise and strengthen faction decisions. For the Jacobins in particular, the salons allowed the faction's radical thinkers to discuss and refine their seemingly outlandish proposals in relative privacy in order to present their progressive proposals convincingly at the Assembly. Overall, the salons offered more space and more opportunities for politicians to deliberate their decisions at the National Assembly, thus advancing civic engagement during the French Revolution.

While the French salons aided the male politicians in improving their output, they also shifted public dialogue into the realm of women, enhancing the Revolution's ideals of liberty and citizen participation in government. In his description of the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, an anonymous soldier related the popular opinion that held women as subservient, for he recalled "Those without arms threw stones at me, and women grimaced their teeth at me."⁴ Even after the people of France invoked liberty to justify storming the Bastille, this detail asserts that the female attackers simply frowned at the soldiers instead of

³Alexandre Lameth, "Origin of the Jacobin Club, 1789," in Jennifer Popiel, Mark Carnes, and Gary Kates, *Rousseau, Burke and Revolution in France, 1791*, ed. 2. (W. W. Norton & Company, 2015): 124.

⁴Anonymous Soldier, "A Defender of the Bastille Explains His Role," *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, accessed December 29, 2018, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/383>.

taking up arms, revealing both society and the male spectators' perception of women as inherently inept at fulfilling traditionally-masculine roles. Unfortunately, French women continuously and often-unsuccessfully fought against traditionalist categorizations during the Revolution, with one unnamed woman informing the citizen legislators, "you have given men a Constitution; now they enjoy all the rights of free beings, but women are very far from sharing these glories...we now demand the full exercise of these rights for ourselves."⁵ Encouraged by the public appeals to universal rights and the developing enfranchisement of the male citizenry, women began utilizing the developing political platforms of their Revolutionary France to advocate for their own rights—often employing the same impassioned language leveraged by prominent members of the National Assembly. Alas, despite the appeals to the rights of the Revolution, these stirring pleas failed to spark consequential action from legislators, but French women retained their new platform in the public sphere even with these legal losses.

In terms of civic engagement, women faced severely-limited options for political action. However, the bourgeois André Amar noted that women "can illuminate their husbands, communicate to them precious reflections...and the man, illuminated by informal and peaceful discussions in the midst of his household, will bring back to society the useful ideas that an honest woman gives him."⁶ Since women in Revolutionary France failed to gain support for their ideas when acting as their own agents, they could influence their brothers, husbands, and fathers to advocate on their behalf. With the popularity of the salons, women gained unprecedented access to respected male leaders within the confines of their own

⁵Jane Abrey, "Feminism in the French Revolution," *The American Historical Review* 80, no. 1 (1975): 43-62.

⁶André Amar, *Recueil complet des débats législatifs et politiques des Chambres françaises*, in *Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860* (Paris: P. Dupont, 1867, 1990), 50.

homes, enabling women to exercise a newfound influence on civic discussions. Salon hostesses capitalized upon the residential settings of the meeting sites in order to vouch for their personal agendas, expanding civic engagement to a new populace.

Curiously, the ideals of the Revolution and the female-hosted salons coalesced in the considerable figure of Madame Roland—who championed the civil participation of the nuanced Girondin faction. Writing in her private memoirs about the time she and her husband first learned of the Revolution, Madame Roland reflects:

The Revolution ensued and inflamed us; friends of humanity, adorers of liberty, we believed that it would regenerate the species, and destroy the disgraceful misery of that unfortunate class at whose lot we had so often been affected; we received the intelligence with rapture.⁷

Evidently, Madame Roland and her husband—Jean-Marie Roland—welcomed the news of political upheaval and hoped the Revolution would restore a sense of order to the messy and unstable Pre-revolutionary France. This goal, combined with her politically-conscious diction such as “inflamed” and “adorers of liberty,” signified an inclination toward political activism, which Madame Roland would pursue with her friends in her own salon. In fact, in her examination of Madame Roland’s patriotism, Susan Dalton finds that “It was here [in Madame Roland’s salon] that friendship was forged into ideology, and it was here that Roland had unmediated access to politics. She hosted a salon for the Brissotins [Girondins], and she attended the debates of the National Assembly, the Jacobin club, and the Cercle Social.”⁸ Tirelessly, Madame Roland participated in a plethora of

⁷Jeanne Manon Roland, *The Private Memoirs of Madame Roland* (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1901), 358.

⁸Susan Dalton, *Engendering the Republic of Letters: Reconnecting Public and Private Spheres in Eighteenth Century Europe* (Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2003): 57.

Revolutionary engagements, and she also managed her own salon for the Girondins. With such a bevy of primary experience and access to prominent Revolutionary thinkers, Madame Roland almost-certainly developed a politically-strategic intellect to inform the discussions at her own salon, solidifying her stature as a woman who employed French salons in order to secure her own civic engagement.

Building on the ideologies of the Revolutionary factions she frequented, Madame Roland's salon became a platform for her to pursue both liberating policies and her own political success. In exploring the intersection of female and philosophic aspirations in 18th century salons, Dena Goodman divulges that, "These salons and the women who led them actively asserted the idea that nobility could be acquired, and that the salonnières were instrumental in helping the initiate to do so."⁹ Goodman argues that salon hostesses—possibly emboldened by their rising prominence in society—played a crucial role in convincing citizens born without the privileges of the nobility that they could still attain equivalent statuses through legislation, radically shifting the citizenry's preconception of the nobility as a class protected by birthright. In accordance with the Revolution's disillusionment with feudalism and its lack of social mobility, this position argues that lower-class individuals deserve the same treatment as their noble counterparts, rejecting the previously-held idea that the claim to nobility only transfers through birthright.

Intriguingly, this logic mirrors the rationale used by Madame Roland and the other salon hostesses to justify their own ascent in society, for they sought to earn the advantages associated with active citizenship. To further her influence, Madame Roland also sought to attract prominent political leaders to her salons. In one case, she wrote a letter to the radical Maximilien Robespierre—a prominent and outspoken member of the Jacobin Club (and

⁹Dena Goodman, "Enlightenment Salons: The Convergence of Female and Philosophic Ambitions," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 22, no. 3 (1989): 331.

eventual leader of the totalitarian Reign of Terror)—confessing “the masses everywhere are good . . . but they are seduced or blind,” and academic Peter McPhee claims this “letter would have confirmed Robespierre’s judgement about the precarious road the Revolution had to travel before it would reach secure ground in the provinces.”¹⁰ Madame Roland’s revelation regarding the uncertain loyalties of rural France expertly appealed to Robespierre’s paranoid nature, hastening his radicalization, and it also served to encourage the Jacobin celebrity to visit the salon to further discuss these pressing concerns, boosting the stature of Madame Roland’s salon.

After learning how to counterfeit her husband’s signature, Madame Roland further exercised civic influence from her salon by editing correspondence with his name, such as the letter he wrote to Louis XVI calling for war with Austria. Boldly, the letter proclaims, “The Declaration of Rights became a political gospel, and the French constitution has become a religion for which the People are ready to perish.”¹¹ While researchers cannot undoubtedly attribute this text to Madame Roland, it strikingly demonstrates the monumental significance of the types of correspondence she accessed while her husband served as a minister to the King. The letter to the King echoed the Girondin calls for liberty, and Madame Roland certainly maximized her position as salon hostess to advocate for the civic abilities of the French people.

Unfortunately, after the formation of the Republic in 1792, a schism within the Revolutionary factions led to the end of Madame Roland and her salon of civic engagement. Based on the Girondins slight reluctance to abandon the monarchy, Robespierre and his Jacobin supporters “saw their enemies as ‘the most educated, the

¹⁰Peter McPhee, *Robespierre: A Revolutionary Life* (Yale University Press, 2012), 110.

¹¹Jean-Marie Roland, *Jean-Marie Roland to King Louis XVI, June 1792*. Letter. Paris: Dupont, 1879–1913. From *Exploring the French Revolution* Project Staff, *Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860*, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/423/> (accessed December 6, 2017).

most scheming, the cleverest,’ who, Robespierre declared, ‘favor with all their power the rich egoists and the enemies of equality.’”¹² Caught in the crosshairs of the paranoia she helped instill in Robespierre, Madame Roland suddenly and violently found both herself and the Girondin faction the enemy of the Revolution she originally supported. In his biography of Madame Roland, John S. C. Abbott reveals “Great efforts had for some time been made, by his [Jean-Marie Roland’s] adversaries, to turn the tide of popular hatred against him, and especially against his wife, whom Danton and Robespierre recognized and proclaimed as the animating and inspiring soul of the Girondist party.”¹³ Due to the immense stature Madame Roland established for herself through her Girondin salon, Robespierre and Danton devised a complicated conspiracy to strip her of her clout—a testament to her influence—which eventually culminated in her execution.

Ironically, the civic engagement she actively pursued in order to contribute to the development of the new France ultimately warranted her execution in the minds of the Jacobins. In his description of the coup against the Girondins, witness Louis-Marie Prudhomme announced, “A good woman and citizen is far removed from those women who run through the streets under a banner that is not one of decency and civic responsibility”¹⁴ Threatened by the increasing influence of liberated and increasingly independent women such as Madame Roland and other salon hostesses, the ruthless, paranoid Jacobin faction launched a bloody offensive with the violent Reign of Terror in order to consolidate power. Betraying the aspirations of the original French Revolutionaries who aspired to increase civic

¹²Roland N. Stromberg, “The Philosophes and the French Revolution: Reflections on Some Recent Research,” *The History Teacher* 21, no. 3 (1988): 330.

¹³John S. C. Abbott, *Madame Roland, Makers of History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1904), 174. <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/28445/28445-h/28445-h.htm>.

¹⁴Louis-Marie Prudhomme, “Prudhomme’s Description of the Coup against the Girondins (31 May–2 June 1793),” *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, accessed December 29, 2018, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/394>.

engagement, the Jacobins murdered influential women in order to secure their own government.

Most notably, this Jacobin attack against the Girondins triggered a major backlash against women in general, dramatically hindering their newfound capacity for civic engagement. Following the notion that women and politics must remain separate, one official decree from October 1793 stated, “The clubs and popular societies of women, under whatever denomination, are prohibited.”¹⁵ With this decree, women lost their primary mode of exercising civic influence, for the salons offered women their first chance to actively learn from current political leaders and exchange ideas openly with them. Cruelly, this rule imposed isolation on women, gravely crippling their ability to engage with society.

Less than one month after this decree, politician Pierre-Gaspard Chaumette delivered a speech condemning female activists, in which he threatened “Remember that haughty wife of a foolish and treacherous spouse, the *Roland woman*, who thought herself suited to govern the republic and who raced to her death...Is it for women to make motions?”¹⁶ Citing the politically-motivated execution of Madame Roland, Chaumette hoped to frighten a group of women wearing red liberty caps into submission. This position marked a concerted effort to expunge women from the public sphere—a sinister development of the Terror. Examining the social factors contributing to the French Revolution, Jack R. Censer solemnly reflects that the new, individualistic society of the French Revolution “allowed women to compete for political attention in the Revolution and beyond. To

¹⁵Fabre d’Eglantine, “Discussion of Women’s Political Clubs and Their Suppression, 29–30 October 1793,” *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, accessed December 29, 2018, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/294>.

¹⁶Pierre-Gaspard Chaumette, “Chaumette, Speech at City Hall Denouncing Women’s Political Activism (17 November 1793),” *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, accessed December 29, 2018, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/489>.

be sure, in the end, disapproval from men—oppression—pushed women out of public debate (as well as from holding positions).”¹⁷

Although the liberating ideals that fueled the Revolution led more women to participate in political discussions and maneuvers, leaders of the Revolution ultimately betrayed these values. These oppressive men—fearful of the new potentials for female authority and eager to preemptively silence voices potentially critical of their political goals—aggressively undermined the female-hosted salons, dismantling women’s primary mode of learning and engaging with civics. Despite the ceaseless toil of salon pioneers such as Madame Roland, the growing presence of women in the public sphere frightened the men in power into significantly crippling women’s capacity for civic engagement.

Ultimately, the French Revolution offered women the unprecedented opportunity to actively engage with civic life through the popularity of their salons, and Madame Roland’s influential career captures the tempestuous spirit of civic engagement during the political upheaval of the Revolution. With the impassioned discussions of universal human rights prevalent in the public sphere at the beginning of the Revolution, inspired French women—with the aid of their recently enhanced public platforms—began joining the general citizenry in advocating for the expansion of political rights. Furthering this trend, at the start of the National Assembly, French hostesses transformed their salons into invaluable gathering sites for politicians planning legislative proposals and votes, securing women’s role in legislative deliberations. Soon, the hostesses of these salons realized they could exercise a certain degree of influence over the men in attendance, thus expanding women’s role in facilitating the public dialogue and political action. Madame Roland exemplified these salon hostesses by providing a meeting space for the Revolutionary Girondin faction and manipulating her husband’s

¹⁷Jack R. Censer, “Amalgamating the Social in the French Revolution,” *Journal of Social History* 37, no. 1 (2003): 148.

correspondence in effort to influence public policy. Disastrously, this progress of female participation in civic life triggered a massive retaliation, with women achieving enough prominence in society to make the once-supportive Jacobins—who benefitted from the female-hosted salons to secure power—fear their political influence. In response to this paranoid fear, the paranoid Jacobins—whilst retaliating against their opposition groups (and outright executing the Girondins)—banned women from organizing to protest, stunting women’s political development and severely hindering women’s newly accessed public influence. However, despite these significant setbacks, the French Revolution proved to women that they possessed the same aptitude for civic engagement as the noteworthy men in their salons, setting the stage for their continued progress in French society.

Haitian Spirituality: Breaking the Cycle

Matthew Gill

Introduction

TOUSSAINT: Some day men will know one another, they will weep for the same sorrows! No one alive has a monopoly on suffering; martyrs are scattered throughout the earth, like ashes in the forest.

MACAYA: But today! ... See how they take advantage of you, Toussaint. They plant in your humanity the tree of their inhumane domination. Give in to their idea of generosity and they will use it to crush you. Oh! You earn only their contempt by consenting!

TOUSSAINT: Go away! Your work is done....

MACAYA (*turning to Mackandal*): Tell him he betrayed us as surely as if he himself opened the gates for the dogs.

TOUSSAINT: I cry out for human brotherhood. May it soon fill the earth. Lord, pardon me for my wrongdoings, for I was only fighting for my people.¹

Excerpted from Édouard Glissant's 1961 play *Monsieur Toussaint* — a fantastical re-imagining of Toussaint Louverture's final moments as Governor-General of the revolutionary colony of Saint Domingue — these lines involve Toussaint along with Macaya, the spirit of an insurgent leader, and Mackandal, the spirit of Saint Domingue's most infamous Vodou priest and maroon. While the image of spirits critiquing and advising Louverture may seem entertaining in relation to the artistic medium, the purpose of Glissant's cosmology treads further. In this living-dead dialogue,

¹ Édouard Glissant and J. Michael Dash, *Monsieur Toussaint: A Play* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 96.

and throughout the play, Glissant — a native of another French-Caribbean colony, Martinique — provides a testament to those topics that are gripping for Haitians: spirits and savants. As a work meant to be viewed by Haitians and other Caribbean blacks, *Monsieur Toussaint* suggests that religion and spirituality are not just topics that Haitians can intellectually grapple, but that also appear in areas of regular Haitian life.

Foremost, as shown in the excerpt, Glissant's use of Toussaint — whose extensive and impactful involvement as a military and political leader throughout the last ten years of the Haitian Revolution can't be understated — implicates the insurgent leader's spirituality; by involving Toussaint with returned-spirits, Glissant implies the Governor-General's Vodou roots; by having Toussaint ask forgiveness of the one Lord, Glissant reveals his Christian faith.^{2,3} But as a representation of the Haitian people, Louverture's spirituality means more; the effortless blending of the two faiths mimics the same blending that defines real-life Haitian spirituality, highlighting its extension into the goings-on of the country. Vodou's facets in Haitian spirituality appear to have a stronger relationship with moral decision-making in daily life than with religious symbolism, while Christianity's facets focus exactly on the symbolism of salvation and redemption, shown via Toussaint's dual role: as "papa" of the Haitians and as a sacrificial lamb for their Revolution. And with both faiths acting as driving forces behind the Governor-General's decisions, their political involvement is indicated.

In the end, Toussaint, the follower of a "universal" Christian faith, sacrifices himself for the betterment of his subordinate (Jean-Jacques Dessalines) and the Haitian people within a context of discernment rooted in Vodou values. Ultimately then, Glissant

² Virginia W. Leonard, "Haitian Revolution," in *Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450*, ed. Thomas Benjamin, vol. 2 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 538-542. *Gale Virtual Reference Library* (accessed June 15, 2018).

³ Sharon Guynup, "Haiti: Possessed by Voodoo," *National Geographic News*, July 7, 2004 (accessed June 12, 2018).

shows Vodou and Christianity, despite their differences and amidst political engagement, working together for a net “positive” result for Haitians. Although this result resides in a fictionalized context, it encompasses truths of Vodou-Christianity in the Caribbean whilst pivoting an opinion of Glissant’s that this paper shares – Haiti’s unique spirituality, connected favorably with politics, might be the best means for the people of Haiti to achieve their own beneficence.

This paper’s analysis will begin with a historical overview of religious developments in Haiti, starting with pre-revolutionary Saint Domingue. Citing examples of both domestic (slave- and *colon*-based) and foreign influence, this brief recounting will argue the systemic and necessary connection between religion and politics in Haiti, as the two are intertwined by Vodou and Christianity, acting both separately and as one. Afterwards, an argument for the use of Haiti’s unique spirituality — a mixed Vodou-Christianity — as a political force for systematic change, by and for *all* the people of Haiti, will be made. Given the widespread poverty, sickness, sexism and racism, and internal fighting that have plagued Haiti’s past and present, a change is necessary to save the lives of the Haitian people and their nation.

Conceptualizing Haitian Politics

Before delving into Haiti’s political roots, however, it is necessary to define “politics” as it relates to the island nation and its most heavily represented people: the peasantry — which, when extended to include the urban lower class, encompasses 90% of Haiti’s population.⁴ In the past, some Haitian academics have focused on the political exodus of Haiti’s peasantry over the course of the nation’s post-revolutionary governmental development. With no means of participating in urban “politics,” these historians argue that Haiti’s peasantry hasn’t been significantly involved in

⁴ David Nicholls, “Rural Protest and Peasant Revolt, 1804-1869,” in *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, ed. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall (New York: Routledge, 2013), 193.

the political sphere beyond insurgency.⁵ However, Haitian politics cannot be constricted to purely government involvement (e.g. voting) *because* political involvement has had a different history — one continuously defined by subjectivity to despotic, paternalistic leaders and responding revolutions. As will be shown in the next section, the manifestation of religion in Haiti's politics has been due, in large part, to the lower class. If the “political” designation is stripped from this religious history, then a fundamental connection is lost. Haiti's politics would not be the same without the Haitian faith — the faith of the peasantry.

The History of Haiti's Political Faith

Pre-Revolution

Beginning in the late 1780s and lasting through the 1790s, the slave-plantation colony of Saint Domingue — the Pearl of the Antilles — was the wealthiest European colony in the Caribbean, cherished by the French colonists and absentee-planters that made their fortunes from the “free” labor of their enslaved blacks. By the start of the French Revolution, the slave population — composed mostly of African-born blacks — dwarfed the free population by about seven times (the free population encompassing approximately 30,000 *gens de couleur* and 40,000 white *colon*, both *petit blanc* and *grand blanc*).⁶ In this pre-revolutionary period, Vodou and Christianity (French Catholicism) were well-established and practiced by both slaves and *gens de couleur*, however their political associations differed.

The politicization of Vodou at this time nourished the roots of its most consistent political occurrence: as a consolidator for fraternal coalescence and revolt against mistreatment — a stimulant for revolution. The most prevalent form of slave resistance was marronage, and because most maroon leaders were Vodou priests (and many slaves were aware of Vodou, if not

⁵ Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (New York: Monthly Review, 1990), 86.

⁶ Leonard, “Haitian Revolution.”

already active practitioners), Vodou was able to survive as a cultural “glue,” aiding mistreated blacks by directing them towards like-minded communities that also served as a form of political revolt against the establishment of slavery. This movement is best personified by Mackandal (mentioned in the excerpt), who traveled throughout the colony, using the mutual faith and principles of Vodou to entice slaves into not only marronage, but gradual, tangible revolt against the colonists (e.g. through fear of poison).⁷ With tones of fear, pro-slavery colonists and visitors noted his dual role as a spiritual and political force; his ability to evoke tones and actions of resistance, together with his Vodou-based supernatural capabilities, ironically made him a Christian-like messianic figure upon death.⁸ Regardless, Vodou’s political position was set, and if a colonist’s translation of a Vodou chant is accurate — “we swear to destroy whites and everything they possess” — some practitioners were eager to put political thought into action.⁹

When it comes to Christianity’s involvement in the slave population, some analysts say that Catholic slaves existed in great numbers merely because they were forced through Baptism by their white masters, while others mistakenly report black Christianity to be mostly restricted to poorly represented creole slaves and *gens de couleur*.¹⁰ These reports are too narrow, however, ignoring other sources of Christian influence — namely Kongolese culture and the French Revolution. By the start of the Haitian Revolution in 1791, approximately one-half of new slaves entering Saint Domingue were from West/Central Africa, most

⁷ Carolyn E. Fick, “Slave Resistance,” in *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, ed. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall (New York: Routledge, 2013), 57-58.

⁸ Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Description topographique...de Saint-Domingue* [Philadelphia, 1797-1798], 1:46-51, in *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*, ed. David Geggus (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), 20.

⁹ Louis Marie César Auguste Drouin de Bercy, *De Saint-Domingue* [Paris, 1814], 175-178, in *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*, ed. David Geggus (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), 23-24.

¹⁰ Trouillot, *Haiti, State against Nation*, 36; David Geggus, *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), xii.

from the Kingdom of the Kongo.¹¹ This significant representation certainly fostered the continuance of Kongolese culture in the slave society — which, in the late 1700s, was dominated by a Christian political ideology, witnessed through paternalism and the requirement for kings to be *for* the people.¹² Christian Kongolese slaves then, and those they influenced, had their initial conceptualizations of good governance defined by the precepts of the faith.

The French Revolution's Christian influence on enslaved spirituality — ironic considering *that* Revolution's infamous anti-clericalism — was largely coincidence. A month before the start of the French Revolution, Saint Domingue's elite planter group was vying for the colony's formal recognition in the Estates General, receiving negative backlash from the metropole due, in part, to the anti-slavery rhetoric of the largely Christian *Société des amis des Noirs* ("Society of the friends of the Blacks").¹³ The combination of increased Christian revolutionary Enlightenment ideology and heightened colony-metropole interaction likely facilitated a more rapid transfer of socially empowering Christian ideology. A boon to this development was Henri-Baptiste Grégoire, an extremely outspoken and well-known politician-priest. If any politician's words were to reach black ears in Saint Domingue and ring true, they would be Grégoire's — who, across multiple speeches in Paris (and in public messages to the black population), recognized slavery as an immoral and non-Christian institution and supported the ideal of Enlightenment principles leading blacks from

¹¹ David Geggus, "Slave and Free Colored Women in Saint Domingue," in *More Than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the Americas*, ed. David Barry Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine (Indiana University Press, 1996), 261.

¹² John K. Thornton, "'I am the Subject of the King of Congo': African Political Ideology and the Haitian Revolution," in *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, ed. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall (New York: Routledge, 2013), 92.

¹³ Malick W. Ghachem, "The 'Trap' of Representation: Sovereignty, Slavery and the Road to the Haitian Revolution," *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques* 29, no. 1 (2003): 131-136.

mistreatment.¹⁴ Serving as a human example of religion mixing with politics – and being a social pariah himself for supporting this ideology – Grégoire embodied the liberal Christian political involvement for both France and its colonies, and thus charged the ideals of the upcoming Haitian Revolution.¹⁵

Revolutionary Period

Vodou during the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) essentially served the same role as during the pre-revolution era, but with the abolition of slavery a much more tangible “political” accomplishment. This African-derived but Haitianized faith remained a tool of unification amongst insurgents, while also instilling fear in the colonial opposition; amidst the death that comes with revolution, it is clear — based on the horror of both white reaction and retaliation — that Vodou caused even Christian colonists to tremble at the thought of pagan witchcraft.^{16,17} Aspects of Vodou’s key principles — namely brotherhood — can be seen in the rhetoric of the most significant insurgent leader, Toussaint Louverture, as he frequently pleas for his “brothers” (insurgent footmen) to rally to his cause.¹⁸ But even more consistent was Toussaint’s use of paternalistic Christian rhetoric, citing himself as the “father” of “wayward children,” again for the purpose of

¹⁴ Henri-Baptiste Grégoire, “Lettre aux citoyens de couleur et nègres libres” [Paris, 1791] and “Mémoire en faveur de couleur ou sang-mêlés de St.-Domingue, et des autres isles françaises de l’Amérique” [Paris, 1789] in *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*, ed. David Geggus (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), 47-48.

¹⁵ Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, *The Abbé Grégoire and the French Revolution: The Making of Modern Universalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

¹⁶ Baron de Vastey, *The Colonial System Unveiled*, ed. Chris Bongie (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016), 115, 122.

¹⁷ M. LeClerc, “An Expedition Against the Insurgents [November 1791],” in *Racial Revolution: Eyewitness Accounts of the Haitian Insurrection*, ed. Jeremy D. Popkin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 93-104.

¹⁸ Toussaint Louverture, “Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Manuscrits, Fonds français 12104, piece 68, 1 ventose IV [20 Feb. 1796],” in *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*, ed. David Geggus (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), 130.

gathering support.¹⁹ Other black and mulatto leaders of the Revolution similarly utilized Christian symbolism to contextualize the goals and loyalties of the insurgent forces; Macaya famously referred to the King of Spain, the King of France, and the King of Kongo as the “three kings” of the revolutionary forces who would offer Haitians salvation — like the three magi who together charted a path to Christ.²⁰ Finally, this period saw pro-revolutionary involvement from colonist-clergymen (e.g. helping slaves build fortifications and providing general counsel), likely strengthening insurgent loyalty to Christianity along with Vodou.²¹

Post-Revolution

In the continuing post-revolutionary period of Haiti’s history, Vodou and Christianity have, for the peasant masses, largely served similar political purposes; they are sources of shared ideology and thus shared political desires. But in this extended timeframe, both faiths have also seen more extensive manipulation by the government — their “new” political evolution. The greatest degree of federal involvement was necessarily through Haiti’s Catholic Church, as Catholicism was made the official religion in Toussaint’s 1801 pre-nationhood constitution and was recognized by the Vatican as such in 1860 with President Geffrard’s concordat.²² After 1860 — with the influx of Vatican-approved

¹⁹ Toussaint Louverture, “Toussaint and the Ex-Slaves,” in *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*, ed. David Geggus (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), 131.

²⁰ Thornton, “‘I am the Subject of the King of Congo’,” 92.

²¹ LeClerc, “An Expedition Against the Insurgents,” 99; Léger-Félicité Sonthonax, “The Interrogation of the Abbé De la Haye, Curé of Dondon [December 1792]” in *Facing Racial Revolution: Eyewitness Accounts of the Haitian Insurrection*, ed. Jeremy D. Popkin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 158-163.

²² Toussaint Louverture, *Constitution de la colonie française de Saint-Domingue* in *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*, ed. David Geggus (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014), 164.

clergymen — the Haitian Church's status as a pro-elite authoritarian structure was solidified until the 1960s.²³

During this time, various government actors — including U.S. marines after the 1915 U.S. invasion — used the peasantry's Vodou and Christian faiths against them; the designation of Haitians as Vodou-practitioners was used as an excuse for execution; the defamation of Christian symbolism (e.g. the image of Charlemagne Peralte killed, in a crucified position) was used to encourage submission.²⁴ Rather than promote such submission, however, these actions have largely encouraged lower class political outcry against these and other mistreatments — an outcry centered in faith. This was seen in the significant public support for Francois Duvalier's election; the success of which has been credited to the public's approval of his connections with Vodou and Christianity, together.²⁵ However, it didn't take long for Papa Doc's reputation to nosedive for 90% of Haitians due mostly to his new evolution of despotic violence, in which children, the elderly, and civil servants (including clergymen) were no longer protected, and women became predominant victims.²⁶ And even though he attempted to bend the Haitian Church further into his will through nationalization (i.e. replacing foreign clergymen with Haitian Catholics), his continued injustices, together with his stifling of Christian newspapers and radio stations in attempts to stagnate the growing homogenization of public disapproval, eventually lead the national Church to outwardly scorn the Duvalier Regime.²⁷ It was at this point that both the official Haitian Church and organized Vodou factions began to focus on a particular aspect of their shared Haitian ideology, namely the necessary focus on improving

²³ Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, "Dynastic Dictatorship: The Duvalier Years, 1957-1986," in *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, ed. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall (New York: Routledge, 2013), 273.

²⁴ Brenda Gayle Plummer, "Under the Gun," in *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, ed. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall (New York: Routledge, 2013), 244-45.

²⁵ Bellegarde-Smith, "Dynastic Dictatorship," 273.

²⁶ Trouillot, *Haiti, State against Nation*, 167.

²⁷ Bellegarde-Smith, "Dynastic Dictatorship," 278.

the well-being of the mistreated and disenfranchised — essentially, the well-being of the Haitian people.²⁸ Influenced by liberation theology, the Church began its *Ti Legliz* (“Little Church”) movement, creating hundreds of Christian communities that were meant to serve the needs of the Haitian people by overseeing an improved articulation of the nature of Haiti’s unique Vodou-Christianity, and by encouraging public participation.^{29,30} Later, making the nationalized Church even *more* political, the religious political movement (and political party) *Lavalas* sprang from *Ti Legliz*, supporting the priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s ascendance to the presidency in 1990. Not surprisingly, in being twice ousted as President, Aristide has been regarded by *Lavalas* supporters as a messianic figure who will return to bring salvation.³¹

Looking Back

In this religious-political history, there are clearly common themes that apply distinctly to either Christianity or Vodou — but the ultimate effect (as seen in the continued relevance of the *Lavalas* and *Ti Legliz* movements) has been to foster the duo’s political convergence; in theory, this journey into the explicit political sphere was for the general beneficence of the Haitian people. But in this history, and in contemporary Haiti, it is also clear how Vodou and Christianity have complemented each other, through their political developments, for the sake of the spiritual health of Haitians — beyond the fact that they already shared aspects of ritual traditions and conceptualizations of spirits or saints.³² For example, as both the national Church and individual Vodou

²⁸ Bellegarde-Smith, “Dynastic Dictatorship,” 280.

²⁹ Ed. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2013), 223.

³⁰ Robert Fatton Jr., “The Rise, Fall, and Second Coming of Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” in *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, ed. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall (New York: Routledge, 2013), 298.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 296, 306.

³² Guynup, “Haiti: Possessed by Voodoo”; Terry Rey, “Junta, Rape, and Religion in Haiti, 1993-1994,” *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion* 15, no. 2 (1999): 85.

factions oriented themselves, together, against the despotism of such leaders as Duvalier, comfort in the unity of the Haitian people against the wealthy merchants and politicians was consolidated throughout the public, in response to simultaneous political consolidation.³³ Facing decades of both neglect and specific mistreatment, the idea of a unified Haitian people has only grown stronger — owing to shared spirituality. As another example, take the consistent messianic symbolism and supernatural Vodou powers that the public has attributed to previous leaders, Aristide being the most prominent in recent years. While most would rightfully argue against messianism due to its paternalistic and authoritarian tendencies, its political pervasiveness is telling of the public's spiritual needs, which were much the same for slaves in the days of Saint Domingue. This need is for *hope* — hope for the possibility of a beneficent interjection, either by God or by a messianic savant, from the horrific circumstances brought by unjust politics.³⁴ In this way, the continual need for revolt has translated into a continual need for hope. And hope, as one should expect from this clearly spiritual society, is defined chiefly in terms of faith.

Breaking the Cycle

Given the age of the nation and its intimate history of despotic leaders and peasant revolts, it is depressing to see that even with Haiti's most recent major political developments, many of the same problems persist and that, from a foreigner's perspective, little genuine progress has been made towards healing the population. Just as religion's founding and continual politicization in Saint Domingue — at least as a tool of the peasantry — mirrors the same active religious politicization that has recently been utilized by the Haitian public, the systematic mistreatment inherent to the institution of slavery mirrors the current class-based

³³ Bellegarde-Smith, "Dynastic Dictatorship," 283.

³⁴ Rey, "Junta, Rape, and Religion," 84.

oppression engendered by wealthy merchants and politicians (titled upper-class “urbanites” by Michel-Rolph Trouillot). In reviewing the horrors specific to Haiti’s colonial system just after the nation’s founding, Henri Christophe’s second-in-command, Baron de Vastey, said this regarding the effects of slavery and racial discrimination:

Indeed, how can life be endured when it has reached the lowest stage of degradation and wretchedness? When death must be suffered a thousand times over, in the cruelest of torments, when one has been reduced to that deplorable condition, without hope of escape, is it not a glaring act of cowardice to welcome life?³⁵

A harrowing depiction of the slave’s predicament, for certain, but considering the government’s continued violence into modernity — and the essential banishment of the lower class’ needs from the concerns of the elite — such feelings are likely shared by many Haitians. Indeed, their labor is also manipulated for the profit of those in power, but in the last ten years (especially since the 2010 earthquake) the Haitian people have suffered a host of abuses due to the neglect of their own government as well as foreign powers — a neglect to generally maintain human rights.³⁶ With 9,000 dead since 2016 from an ongoing cholera epidemic, an impacted prison system, an adult literacy rate of about 60%, and a “top 1%” that controls more than half of the nation’s wealth, hearing de Vastey’s words spoken by a Haitian today would be understandable.³⁷ Now, with the same degree of urgency felt by the slave insurgents that made the nation of Haiti, the Haitian public must look to each

³⁵ Vastey, *The Colonial System Unveiled*, 129.

³⁶ “Haiti.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed June 14, 2018.
<https://www.hrw.org/americas/haiti>.

³⁷ Anup Shah, “Human Rights in Various Regions: Haiti,” *Global Issues*, October 1st, 2010. <http://www.globalissues.org/article/141/haiti>.

other to mutually facilitate the end of the country's clear cycle of mistreatment.

The Role of Haitian Spirituality

While in 1990 Michel-Rolph Trouillot had no knowledge of the future intensification of Haitian turmoil by disease and natural disaster, his statement of the country's ultimate in need in the years following the Duvalier Regime still bears truth. In agreement with this paper, he believes that Haiti needs some unifying force or institution that allows *all* sectors of the population to communicate, express their needs, and work together for solutions.³⁸ Here, the solution is articulated with necessary facets, two of which are clear; the solution must come from and be enacted by the people, and it must also extend, at least in understanding, to all Haitians. Haitian spirituality — the Vodou-Christianity hybrid that has been developing politically since its inception — satisfies these facets of a “solution” to Haiti's ongoing turmoil.

Simply based on the evolutionary trajectory of Haiti's political faith, there should be no doubt that Haitian spirituality came *from* the Haitian people. Defined by revolutions, population mistreatment, and general socio-political unrest, Haitian historical identity necessarily encompasses religion because of Haitian spirituality's influence in these areas. As these major political movements, particularly the uprisings of the lower class, derived from the needs of Haiti's mistreated and disenfranchised, the political significance of Haitian spirituality was also derived from “the people,” and has in most cases been put into action by the people. However, the applicability of Haitian spirituality to the genuine needs of the population must also be evident if it is to be considered the “solution” for the Haitian public. But again, as is shown throughout Haiti's religious history, the purpose of Haitian spirituality has always been oriented for the people's benefit. To confirm its applicability in modernity, one might analyze the

³⁸ Trouillot, *Haiti, State against Nation*, 230.

purported values of Vodou and Christianity in relation to their usefulness for public beneficence. Vodou's focus on the innate equality and dignity of all mankind (reminiscent of Grégoire's ideology) certainly fits Trouillot's requirement, and the positive Haitian perception of the life-improving value of faith is clearly demonstrated in the rhetoric of Haiti-related artistic works, such as *Monsieur Toussaint*.^{39,40}

The widespread extension of Haitian spirituality — such that its predominant moral, social, and political principles have been recognized (though not necessarily followed) by nearly every Haitian — is also historically evidenced. Consistently, the nature of the faith's unique spirituality and cosmology heightened the island-wide awareness of its existence. Vodou being outlawed in the slave colony of Saint Domingue, and white colonists frequently punishing their slaves out of fear of Vodou witchcraft, both argue for the inherent ability of Haitian spirituality to invigorate reflection and action in *all* people — even those who, by their Catholic standards, shouldn't believe in “witchcraft.”^{41,42} But, as an example of Haitian spirituality's far-reach, its ability to incite fear in colonists is no longer relevant to the nation's situation — such a class distinction, between master and slave, no longer exists. However, there is of course the predominating class distinction between the peasantry and the wealthy merchants and politicians. Again, the ideology of Haitian spirituality essentially crosses this gap. The initial public support for Francois Duvalier, rooted in an appreciation of his knowledge of Vodou, is evidence of the public leaning towards politicians who best represent them.⁴³ Therefore, Haitian spirituality should continue to be relevant in the lives of Haiti's elected officials.

³⁹ Mary Clark, “Domestic Violence in the Haitian Culture and the American Legal Response: *Fanm Ahysyen ki Gen Kouraj*,” 37 *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 297 (2006): 309.

⁴⁰ Glissant, *Monsieur Toussaint*.

⁴¹ Fick, “Slave Resistance,” 60.

⁴² Vastey, *The Colonial System Unveiled*, 115, 122.

⁴³ Bellegarde-Smith, “Dynastic Dictatorship,” 273.

But, as mentioned before, the cyclical nature of Haitian oppression mimics the cyclical nature of the use of religion as a source of political unity amongst the peasantry. This relationship suggests another possible connection — that breaking the cycle of oppression requires breaking the cycle of revolt driven by religious connection. In other words, improvements made to the system of unity-in-spirituality might better facilitate the results of peasant pushback, providing a stronger voice for the people. Rooted in a liberation theology that ideologically accepts associations between Christianity and Vodou, the *Ti Legliz* and *Lavalas* movements offer starting points for change; these aren't, however, "solutions" themselves due to their failures of continued political paternalism after Jean-Bertrand Aristide's second term, as well as internal fractionation.⁴⁴

Paternalism, and the messianism that it fosters in such vulnerable, systematically mistreated populations as the Haitian lower class, is detailed in history above — but it would seem that the prophetic symbolism surrounding Aristide was the most explicitly articulated and widely encompassing of such symbolism in Haiti's history. To "pro-Aristidians," Aristide wasn't a simply a figure that would return to bring salvation, he was specifically the "messiah who would overcome all obstacles and triumph over the satanic forces of Duvalierism, privilege, and corruption."⁴⁵ And these thoughts weren't isolated to the most radical *Ti Legliz* supporters; Aristide's messianic role was agreed upon by the majority of Haitians.⁴⁶ The issue with the extreme tendency for messianism in Haitian spirituality is that it places the responsibility of salvation — breaking free of oppression — on someone else. This persistent ideology self-detracts from the agency of the united Haitian people. If it is drilled into the minds of new generations of Haitians that all one can or must do is wait for a savior, then proactive Haitian-driven efforts will continue to be stagnant,

⁴⁴ Fatton, Jr, "The Rise, Fall, and Second Coming of Jean-Bertrand Aristide," 307.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 295.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

rooted in complacency. While Haitian spirituality (and Christianity in particular) works well to provide hope through figures like Toussaint and Aristide, that faith-driven hope should be accompanied by active participation. Moving forward, the danger of explicit messianism — as spread by Haitian civilians and religious leaders alike — should be warned against.

In the developmental years of *Ti Legliz*, leading up to (and soon after) the end of the Duvalier Regime, the Haitian Church was seemingly being recognized by Western visitors as the center of proper democratic principles in the country — as the only institution with a framework that could subsist outside of the government, and as an organization working for social justice.⁴⁷ But with *Ti Legliz* founded as multiple communities spread throughout the country, there also didn't appear to be much organizational power besides *Lavalas* — not every religious community touted the same exact political principles, undermining the movement's holistic efforts.⁴⁸ Similar critiques of Haiti's small church communities and organizations are still made today.⁴⁹ For Haitian spirituality to make a stronger impact in the politically-charged unification of the Haitian public, there must be a greater degree of consolidation between the different splintered *Ti Legliz* (and Vodou-favoring) religious groups. While such consolidation may force compromises upon the promoted ideologies of different groups, the effort to make a stronger united front out of Haitian spirituality should improve not only the Western perception of Haiti's people-driven efforts for proper government treatment, but also encourage stronger ties between Haitians themselves.

⁴⁷ Mark D. Danner, "The Struggle for a Democratic Haiti," *The New York Times*, June 21, 1987, National ed. Accessed June 11, 2018.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Shelley Wiley, "A Grassroots Religious Response to Domestic Violence in Haiti," *Journal of Religion & Abuse* 5, no. 1 (2003): 23-33. Accessed June 15, 2018.

Facing Reality

Conveying the extent of human suffering in Haiti — both historical and contemporary — is a difficult task. Even more difficult, however, is conjuring an error-free solution to this suffering. In facing the reality of their politically-wrought mistreatment, Haitians and their allies must recognize that there won't ever be a single solution — especially when such institutions as racism and sexism still socially pervade the general populace and politically pervade Haiti's government.⁵⁰ But optimism for the usefulness of Haitian Spirituality to enact change shouldn't be abandoned. In recent years, community-based religious groups have been taking steps to strengthen Haitian unity, primarily by promoting music, poetry, and lectures that attack those social factors preventing communion, particularly sexism and domestic violence.⁵¹ Though these groups are critiqued for not “joining forces” into one human rights-supporting Vodou-Christianity, they still yield tangible changes in Haiti's communities, bringing Haitians of all genders together such that they might serve as a more influential political force.⁵² Here is Haitian spirituality in action: common faith, with the context of solidarity in oppression, promoting mutual values and thus unity against the oppressors. Progress is possible, but the struggle will continue to be hard-fought.

⁵⁰ Shah, *Human Rights in Various Regions: Haiti*.

⁵¹ Clark, “Domestic Violence,” 310.

⁵² Wiley, “A Grassroots Religious Response.”

The American Crusades: Exploring the Impact of Marine Persecution of Vodou in U.S. Occupied Haiti

Bridget Woody

In *Tell My Horse*, a 1938 personal account of and guide to her experiences in Haiti, Zora Neale Hurston reveals to the readers, “I know that there are zombies in Haiti. People have been called back from the dead.”¹ Hurston’s tantalizing language affirms one of the most sensationalized and fascinating aspects of Haitian vodou: the *zonbi*. Even preceding Hurston’s proclamation of vodou’s grim power, zombies had been a cultural phenomenon born of the American fascination with Haitian witchcraft, appearing first in the U.S. film *White Zombie* in 1932. The U.S. public was fascinated, and disgusted, with the idea of Haitian sorcery, no matter the realities of the religion itself. Significantly, Hurston’s book and the horror film both released at the tail end of a decade of United States military occupation of Haiti, out of which an unprecedented level of Haiti-centered news in America begun.

The 1915-1934 regime in Haiti began shortly after the passage of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and while its goals were to secure “the attainment of the peace of justice” and to ensure every nation “scrupulously recognizes and performs its duty toward others” the campaign was actually quite unpeaceful.² Military officials and individuals in Haiti did not demonstrate commitment to these lofty goals nor did they achieve some of the more specific, concrete, and covert aims of the occupation. The religion of vodou had inspired many fears amongst the Marines, and as such, the forces waged a war against vodou rather than improving the island. With their cultural crusade against Haitian vodou, U.S. Marines sought to “civilize” the nation

¹ Zora Neale Hurston, *Tell My Horse*, 3rd ed (Berkeley, CA: Turtle Island, 1981).

² Theodore Roosevelt, “1904 Annual Message to Congress,” Washington, DC, December 4, 1904. Our Documents.

<https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=56&page=transcript>.

by stamping out the rituals and behaviors they found threatening. However, by occupying Haiti from 1915 to 1938, the United States government and forces in many ways achieved the opposite of what they sought in Haiti, transforming Haitian vodou from a personal practice into a broader, more subversive form of worship.

In order to properly describe the impact of the U.S. occupation on vodou, I must first clarify the various terms writers use to refer to vodou and its related forms of worship. Period and modern authors' uses of voodoo, vodou, *vaudaux*, *vodun*, and other words interchangeably or synonymously warrants explanation. While one might describe the modern singularization of such terms to simply "voodoo" as an effort to replace linguistic variations of one word with a single term, the practice generally results in misuse. The anglicized voodoo, for instance, did emerge from the French-Creole word vodou; however, the selective use of only one of these terms is erroneous. Today, voodoo commonly refers to a general and ambiguous collection of American spiritual and magical practices with influence from West African religions such as Yorùbá.

In contrast, vodou, sometimes named *vaudaux*, is the most academically studied yet most misinterpreted religion of the group. Vodou is the Afro-Creole religion of Haiti, and it has been historically targeted as a subversive and uncivilized practice on the island. Its core pillars, however, rely upon interconnectedness and personal worship.³ Vodouizan, those who practice Haitian vodou, believe in a distant creator and thousands of *lwa*, or spirits, who are loyal to the central deity. Most of the actual practice of vodou centers around honoring and connecting with these *lwa*, which influence daily life.⁴ Group worship often takes place in private homes or outdoors rather than in churches or temples. Vodouizan

³ Ina J. Fandrich, "Yorùbá Influences on Haitian Vodou and New Orleans Voodoo," *Journal of Black Studies* 37, no. 5 (2007): 775-91.

⁴ Jeffrey E. Anderson, "Vodou in the Haitian Experience: A Black Atlantic Perspective," *Nova Religio* 21, no. 4: 120-121. *ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials*, EBSCOhost (accessed June 14, 2018).

believe this ensures better communication with spirits. Priests and priestesses, known as *Papaloi* and *Mamaloi* respectively, lead these sessions with song and dance, and sometimes conjuration or possession.⁵ For the most part, however, vodou consists of individuals following rituals and taboos in accordance with the central values of generosity and honor.

To clarify the other terms often confused with vodou, Louisiana voodoo is the Afro-Creole form of the generalized voodoo with practice centered in New Orleans. *Vodun* refers to traditional religions such as Yorùbá, practiced in regions in and around Benin.⁶ The appropriate definitions of these various religions and belief systems are important because of their differences. Louisiana voodoo, for instance, has a stronger Christian influence and history of symbolism than vodou.⁷ Referring to any of the religions plainly as voodoo and proceeding to describe its features would be analogous to calling all “religions of the book” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) Catholicism and then describing the latter. Therefore, I shall refer to Haitian vodou as such. When a source misnames vodou, I will not correct its usage but allow the error to reflect the writer’s time or misunderstanding.

A brief background on the history of Haitian vodou will help clarify why the U.S. Marine corps targeted the religion during their occupation. The foundations of vodou lie in the syncretic interactions of the diverse religions practiced by peoples captured during the 17th century slave trade. Along with the traditionalist African religions carried to the Americas, vodou draws symbolic and ritualistic elements from the Roman Catholic faith, imposed upon enslaved persons by the French *Code Noir* in 1685.⁸ Catholic

⁵ Anderson, “Vodou in the Haitian Experience: A Black Atlantic Perspective.”

⁶ Fandrich, “Yorùbá Influences on Haitian Vodou and New Orleans Voodoo.”

⁷ Ibid., 778.

⁸ Leslie Gérald Desmangles, *The Faces of the Gods: Vodou and Roman Catholicism in Haiti* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), *eBook Collection (EBSCOhost)*, EBSCOhost (accessed June 2, 2018).

symbolism was often used as a “veneer” overlain upon Afro-Creole practices to subvert French oppression, but the church did influence the rituals of vodou as well. Serpentine symbols, for instance, did not appear in vodou nor its religious predecessors until Biblical stories including snakes were well known amongst Vodouizan.⁹ It should be noted, also, that many Haitians identify as both Catholic and Vodouizan despite the potential incompatibilities. Notably, vodou emerged in its own right as a creole practice, not of the native people of Saint Domingue (who were practically wiped out by disease in early days of the colony) but of the enslaved people who claimed agency through its practice. As mentioned, King Louis XIV outlawed the practice of any religion other than Catholicism in the *Code Noir* and labeled non-complying individuals as “rebels disobedient of... orders” and subject to punishment.¹⁰ Thus began a long-standing tradition of governments on the island to politicizing and outlawing the practice of vodou. Despite the role vodou played in the insurrections leading to the nation’s independence, authoritarian Haitian governments have outlawed vodou from the passage of the *Code Noir* to the independence of the nation in 1804 and in varying degrees from 1835 to 1987. Through the centuries and regimes, the prevalence of vodou has ebbed and flowed, but it has always had a presence on the island.

Examining the American rhetoric regarding vodou preceding the U.S. invasion of Haiti reveals why Vodou received so much backlash and oppression during the occupation. Haitian vodou was, in the U.S. media, a black sorcery which demanded deliverance. Generally, vodou was portrayed not as a deeply spiritual and unifying religion but as a sensationalized and violent cult. The American public received, with increasing frequency, reports of

⁹ Leslie G. Desmangles, “The Maroon Republics and Religious Diversity in Colonial Haiti,” *Anthropos* 85, no. 4/6 (1990): 475-82.

<http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.scu.edu/stable/40463572>.

¹⁰ “The Code Noir (The Black Code),” *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, accessed December 29, 2018, <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/335>.

vodou ritual that were at best, exaggerated and misinformed, and at worst, falsified. *The New York Press* published an article in 1901 entitled “Haiti: Land of the Voodoo” in which the author proclaims the nation is “ruled by the voodoo drum” and describes (in ambiguous terms) a violent and unfamiliar ritual involving an animal sacrifice carried out in secrecy.¹¹ This was a common authorial position of the time, simultaneously invalidating Haitian self-governance and alarming readers.

Countless newspapers printed similar messages. Even when extricated from the black nation of Haiti, messages that regarded vodou and its theological cousins were distinctly negative, with authors in the American South who lamented that they were in land deeply influenced by “dark voodoo.”¹² The connections between the court of public opinion at the turn of the century and the military’s actions several year later become even more clear when expressed by the American marshals who too believed in the corrupting power of vodouism. One U.S. official, Admiral Colby Chester, stationed in Haiti in 1908 published in *National Geographic* an article decrying the ability of Haitians to exercise self-rule. Chester claimed the island was growing “blacker and blacker” and morally bankrupt.¹³ While the body of his argument addresses political instability as a sign of black failure, he also references vodou as another indication of a need for Christian intervention. Portraying vodou as a sign of how the people of Haiti were not developed enough to exercise self-rule set the stage for the crusade against vodou long before the invasion actually began. Since vodou was foreign, frightening, and historically linked to

¹¹ Haiti, “Land of the Voodoo, 1901,” *Current Literature (1888-1912)*, 12.
<https://login.libproxy.scu.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.scu.edu/docview/124798340?accountid=13679>, (accessed May 13, 2018).

¹² “More Mediaeval Mummery,” *Health (1900-1913)*, 1906, 04, 204.
<https://login.libproxy.scu.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.scu.edu/docview/90862919?accountid=13679>.

¹³ Colby Mitchell Chester, “Haiti: A Degenerating Island,” *National Geographic* 1908, 19, 200-217. *Readers' Guide Retrospective: 1890-1982 (H.W. Wilson)*, EBSCOhost (accessed June 4, 2018).

Haitian resistance, the U.S. military could justify intervening in its practice.

The Marines' campaign against vodou was multifaceted but ultimately centered around erasing any threat that vodou offered—primarily to the Marines themselves. An interesting aspect of many raids upon vodou temples or gatherings was the special attention paid to drums used in the vodou rituals. Recall that even preceding the invasion, *The New York Press* described Haiti as ruled by the “voodoo drum” rather than by vodou itself. Drums are quite noisy, which could obviously factor into the number of Marines whose accounts noted the drums in particular.¹⁴ However, Commanders and individuals corpsmen often would report the destruction of drums with “exceptional pride,” which seems to suggest a greater significance to the drums.¹⁵ I believe the attention paid to vodou drums, and the enthused accounts of their destruction, relates to Euro-American notions of militarism. In United States warfare, drummers and the various rhythms which they beat communicated commands to large forces as late as the American Civil War. Drums were implicitly connected to military orders in the collective consciousness of the U.S. Marines. Therefore, the drums (used for religious rituals) in Haiti were construed as a demonstrable and defeatable military threat by the forces of the occupation. As described in Congressional Hearings about Marine misconduct in Haiti, “wherever a voodoo drum was heard, [Marines] immediately got on the trail and captured it.”¹⁶ Drums

¹⁴ Pressley-Sanon Toni, “Haitian (Pre)Occupations: Ideological and Discursive Repetitions: 1915-1934 And 2004 to Present,” *Caribbean Studies* no. 2: 2014, 115. *JSTOR Journals*, EBSCOhost (accessed June 4, 2018).

¹⁵ United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, *Inquiry Into Occupation And Administration of Haiti And Santo Domingo: Hearing[s] Before a Select Committee On Haiti And Santo Domingo, United States Senate, Sixty-seventh Congress, First And Second Sessions, Pursuant to S. Res. 112 Authorizing a Special Committee to Inquire Into the Occupation And Administration of the Territories of the Republic of Haiti And the Dominican Republic* (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1922), 488.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 630-631.

represented the military's priority to eliminate that which threatened its regime.

Another demonstration of the military motivation behind oppressing the practice of vodou is the harshness of the punishments exacted against those discovered to be vodou leaders. Vodou priests and priestesses became a symbol, whether actualized or not, of depravity and manipulation in the Marines' eyes. The penalties for practicing vodou were extreme even on paper. Laws penalizing *sortilèges*, a generalized term referring to religious sorceries, included the repossession of all belongings and imprisonment for up to six months.¹⁷ On more than one occasion, individuals who U.S. Marines believed to be *Papaloi* awaiting trial were murdered in prison.¹⁸ The injustices of such treatment were ultimately a factor in the aforementioned Congressional hearings. In the same hearing interview, regarding mistreatment of Haitians by the U.S. Marines, witness Ernest Angell reports to Senator Medill McCormick and General Waller that the Senator of the Navy had been "strongly impressed with the number of Haitians killed" in the first Caco War, even adding that the vodou leaders amongst the Cacos must have been taught a lesson.¹⁹ Even during the investigation, the Marines actions were not actually condemned because vodou had been determined morally reprehensible. The Catholic Church even labeled vodou as a false religion.²⁰ Therefore, this religious oppression was a strategic and unethical decision receiving backing from American military officials.

The final and most ironic disparity between the proclaimed goals of the U.S. military and the results of the occupation lies in the idea that Marines would save Haitians from moral treachery. In efforts to dissuade Haitians from committing "immoral acts," the

¹⁷ Ibid., 588.

¹⁸ Kate Ramsey, *The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and Power in Haiti* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 118-76.

¹⁹ United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, *Inquiry into Occupation*, 632.

²⁰ Desmangles, *The Faces of the Gods*.

U.S. Marines acted with far more depravity than the Haitians ever had. In one Haitian man's open letter to the American public, he outlines in what ways the Marine occupation has violated principles of the American people. He declares the Haitian populace "conquered and helpless" under Marine control which has not exhibited "the slightest bit of evidence" of their stated pure intentions of stability and betterment.²¹ In fact, Hudicourt, who wrote the letter, describes the Marine occupation as cruel in the face of a public that, in general, is quite cowed. While acknowledging the rebellions against the Marine presence, he maintains that the majority of Haitians are a peaceful and religious people, robbed of their rights by American tyranny.²² Hudicourt's allusion to Marine forces treating average citizens with cruelty and discrimination are confirmed in accounts of the *corvée* system of forced labor. Another witness interviewed in the U.S. Congressional hearings, Mr. Evans, admits that Haitians were sensitive to the regular cruelty of the *gendarme* in building projects. He testifies that Marines and *gendarme*, the policing military instated for the duration of the American occupation, regularly beat and even tortured laborers for no reason other than increasing productivity or discouraging unfamiliar worship.²³ While I will not go into details of the hundreds of accounts of Marines abusing their power over the Haitian populace, it is important to recognize that torture, murder, and sexual violence were regularly overlooked aspects and instruments of the regime's order. In contrast to this American brutality, General Waller later confirms to the Senate that no American citizens or other foreigners had been killed in Haiti preceding the American

²¹ Pierre Hudicourt, "Haiti's Appeal to Americans," *Advocate of Peace through Justice* 84, no. 3 (1922): 95-97. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20659948>.

²² *Ibid.*, 97.

²³ United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, *Inquiry into Occupation*, 246.

invasion in 1915.²⁴ In light of this, it seems occupying Haiti was hardly an endeavor in stability and improvement.

Using such extreme measures to enforce obedience under the guise of a civilizing mission is even more ludicrous when considering some of the very actions cited as examples of barbarism in Haiti have no confirmed records. Misunderstandings of Haitian mythos and thinly veiled racism created an image of Haiti that was largely fictional. Cannibalism, for instance, was a commonly mentioned indication of black inhumanity. However, the common tradition of so-called cannibalism in Haiti is not the consumption of human flesh but rather the sacrifice of a goat or other animal symbolizing a human spirit.²⁵ In a piece published in 1907, Haitian author Jacques Nicolas Léger explains part of the issue with presumptions of cannibalism in vodou rituals. He discusses how if a practice so “shocking and horrible” were indeed occurring, there would surely be verifiable witness records of it—and there are no such confirmed accounts.²⁶ Additionally, he refutes claims that several practices that do occur are evidences of cannibalism; for instance, he explains that graves are desecrated not to consume the bodies, but to steal fine clothes and jewelry from corpses (as is common in many other impoverished societies). Since many of the foundational justifications for invading Haiti were sensationalist or outright untrue, the occupation itself was baseless.

While the American presence in Haiti undoubtedly enforced anti-vodou laws with an unprecedented ferocity, inconsistency and favoritism still undermined the success of the the Marines’ and the *gendarmes*’ crusade. Between regional and personal differences in the persecution of vodou, a consistent set of expectations for

²⁴ Ibid., 632.

²⁵ Erika Bourguignon, “The Persistence of Folk Belief: Some Notes on Cannibalism and Zombis in Haiti,” *The Journal of American Folklore* 72, no. 283 (1959): 36-46. doi:10.2307/538386.

²⁶ J. Nicolas Léger, *Haiti, Her History and Her Detractors* (New York: The Neale Pub. Co. 1907), 101-184.

Vodouizan was never fully realized. In the book *The White King of La Gonâve*, Marine Lieutenant Faustin Wirkus recalls his time stationed in Haiti, including his fascination with vodou and his coronation by the Vodouizan living on the island under his jurisdiction. Wirkus and his strange experiences capture the attitude some of the less prejudiced Marines had. Throughout his account, Wirkus struggles to reconcile his duty to enforce the anti-vodou laws and his fascination with the lived experiences of the religion, ultimately writing that he “very seriously believe[s] that it is unwise of the government to regulate the religious practices of its people unless they intend to create disorder.”²⁷ In accordance with this belief, Wirkus infiltrated many vodou ceremonies to observe and study the rituals rather than stop them or confiscate their religious artifacts as ordered. Admittedly, few experiences resembled that which Wirkus had in *La Gonâve* because for the most part, Americans did not work so closely with the Haitian populace in their region (and no other U.S. personnel managed to become a king of any form). However, many Marines made judgements calls disparate with the official laws prohibiting all practice of vodou and all possession of its traditional objects. Kate Ramsey recounts several such instances in *Spirits and the Law*. For example, one young private warned several Vodouizan of his commands to shoot all persons found with vodou “evidence,” seemingly to protect them from such a fate.²⁸ Even more common was the use of vodou as a reward system. If Haitians in a region behaved well and generally obeyed the American forces in the area, the troops would often allow Vodouizan to host dances and gatherings as a reward for their good behavior.²⁹ Incentivizing vodou in this manner made it into a sort of trophy, exchanging one American goal— obedient Haitians— at the cost of another— the

²⁷ Faustin Wirkus, *The White King of La Gonâve* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1931), 167.

²⁸ Ramsey, *The Spirits and the Law*, 161.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 159.

civilizing mission. Similarly, Vodou became a more coveted, attainable practice rather than a disallowed belief system.

Haitians were not merely a passive people taking advantage of the loopholes and inconsistencies of American rule. Though the accounts of such occurrences are rare, Haitian leaders used the few instances of power they could grasp during the occupation to keep the traditions of their people alive. One interesting dynamic of Haitian power during the latter half of the occupation is the “indigenization” of the *gendarme*, or American led Haitian constable regimen. While Haitians only ever made up twenty-five percent of the *gendarme*, and within that a miniscule portion of police officers, evidence suggests some Haitian members of the *gendarme* were themselves Vodouists.³⁰ Haitian *gendarme*, for instance, were much more likely to grant permission to hold vodou gathering than their white, American counterparts.

The campaign against vodou found its only real motivation in the previously discussed attempts to eradicate the threats it made to the U.S. Marines regime, but the occupation ultimately failed to sever ties between the Haitian rebels and vodou. Considering the ties vodou had to resisting white occupation long before any U.S. intervention, troops were skeptical of the religion which seemed to foreign to them. As Dr. Benjamin Hebblethwaite describes, the “U.S. authorities understood that vodouists opposed the occupation and drew inspiration to resist from the religion,” particularly referring to the *cacos*.³¹ In this manner, the perceived threat of vodou was real: persons who practiced vodou tended to oppose the American invasion and sustained regime. However, the Marines’ misunderstanding of vodou and its followers caused their campaign against vodou to be largely unsuccessful. One such indication of the Marine’s failure was their focus on destroying vodou drums. As previously discussed, whenever troops would

³⁰ Ibid., 154.

³¹ Benjamin Hebblethwaite, “The Scapegoating of Haitian Vodou Religion: David Brooks’s (2010) Claim That ‘Voodoo’ Is a ‘Progress-Resistant’ Cultural Influence,” *Journal of Black Studies* 10 no. 71, 2015, 1-20.

confiscate or destroy vodou drums due to their obvious nature and militaristic connotations. By imposing their own cultural expectations and personal biases upon the vodou drums, Marines ended up overestimating their importance to vodou as a whole. A vodou drum is an instrument (in every sense of the word) of worship; its use parallels the singing of hymns and spirituals in the Christian tradition. Drums, contemporarily and during the years of the U.S. occupation, have been most commonly used in vodou celebrations of life and in Haitian dance, both of which are peaceful and completely non-threatening.³² By confiscating and destroying vodou drums, Marines did not suppress the practice of vodou, but they did complicate their enforcement of its prohibition. Some Vodouizans began using a percussive tube called a *ganbo* to perform the same purpose as drums, but in a smaller, more easily concealed form.³³ *Ganbo*, interestingly, were almost never confiscated. Even more Haitians began carrying out their vodou rituals and gatherings without loud ceremonies and celebrations, making it much more difficult for Marines to track and stop the non-compliance. More significantly, there is even some record of boisterous, conspicuous celebrations using vodou drums occurring on the same nights as *caco* attacks against Marines. In *A Marine Tells it to You*, Colonel Wise recounts one day in which his forces successfully captured an enormous drum at a peaceful gathering, only to be “ambushed immediately” upon their return to base by insurgent Haitians, indicating the drumming had been used as a distraction for a *caco* assault.³⁴ Thus, their campaign against vodou achieved the exact opposite of what the Marines had intended. Rather than pacify and weaken vodou practices, the occupation

³² J. Ridgeway, and J. Jean-Pierre, “Heartbeats of Vodou: For Many Haitian Immigrants, the Sound of the Drum Recalls the Religion and Culture of their Native Land,” *Natural History*, 30, 1998. *British Library Document Supply Centre Inside Serials & Conference Proceedings*, EBSCOhost (accessed June 8, 2018).

³³ Ramsey, *The Spirits and the Law*, 150.

³⁴ Frederic May Wise, “Haiti,” in *A Marine Tells It to You*, 2nd ed. ed. Meigs O. Frost, (New York: J.H. Sears, 1929), 130-38. Accessed June 8, 2018. The Internet Archive.

transformed vodou into a more potent and subversive force than it had ever been before.

Another American misinterpretation of vodou that resulted in the strengthening of Vodouizan' agency was the gross imagining of the *zonbi*. The conception of a zombie that lived in most Marines' minds during the occupation is largely the same as the generalized pop culture zombie that lives on today— a deceased person called back from death as an unaware monster— as reflected in many publications and the media of the time. However, the *zonbi* in which most Haitians of the era believed to some extent joins with the ideas related to cannibalism previously discussed. In vodou and in folk sorcery belief systems, the term *zonbis* most often refers to “people... transformed into animals” but can also refer to a reanimated corpse in a more familiar sense of a “zombie.” Even the undead *zonbi* has been misinterpreted by ill-informed U.S. citizens because while the *zonbi* resembles a monster in many ways, the Haitian fear of *zonbi*-ism is rooted in fear of becoming one after death rather than meeting one in life.³⁵ Using *zonbi*-ism like so many other aspects of Haitian culture, American forces touted the image of a zombie as evidence of Haitian savagery and the belief in *zonbis* as an indication of Haitian ignorance. To most American forces, zombies were a scary monster story that justified “saving” the backwards, black nation.³⁶

Yet again, the use of *zonbi*-ism against the Haitian people did not necessarily produce the desired effect on the island. In the U.S., I must admit that zombie centered rhetoric did its job in characterizing how Americans thought of Haitians. The American understanding of *zonbis* did not, however, work nearly as well in Haiti itself. American rhetoric and authoritarianism could not create a new idea of a *zonbi* in the minds of the Haitian people. Instead, the twisted understanding of “zombies” became a symbol of resistance and Haitian pride to many *caco* fighters and

³⁵ Bourguignon, “The Persistence of Folk Belief,” 39.

³⁶ Ibid., 40.

Vodouizan alike. As scholar Margaret Heady describes, “the sensationalist depictions of ‘voodoo’ and zombies in American writing were adopted by Haitians as one of the few sources of power and intimidation available to them.”³⁷ Faced with the much more powerful American military, Haitian opposition could use the undying zombie as a symbol for what the U.S. forces could never eradicate: a Haitian spirit. The Haitian Penal Code itself even notes the survival of *zonbi*-ism, noting the belief’s survival despite its illegality. Yet even as the law and rhetoric of the occupation sought to delegitimize Haitian religion and power, some Marines remarked that their commands gave weight to what they labeled superstition and sorcery.³⁸ By acknowledging and attempting to combat belief in *zonbis* and other elements of Haitian *sortileges*, the American military acknowledged the power of Haitian belief. Haitian reclamation of the *zonbi* was so strong, in fact, that its symbolism persisted after the end of the occupation. To Haitians, mythos regarding *zonbi*-ism fits comfortably into their intersectional identities as Vodouizan and Catholic (or Protestant), in conjunction with the Christian story of Lazarus. While in the Christian tradition, the story of Jesus raising Lazarus from the dead with his godly power was never intended to be related to vodou, it confirmed the validity *zonbi*-ism to its practitioners. Despite the years of the American forces’ and the Catholic church’s attempts to alienate vodou from its plurality and practice, the *zonbi* remains an element of Haitian faith and pride to this day.

The most surprising impact the American regime left on Haitian vodou has little to do with the religion’s subversive power. U.S. Marines, through their violent and sustained presence, unknowingly became incorporated into the masses of *lwa*, or spirits, central to the faith of vodou. Rather than weaken the

³⁷ Margaret Heady, “Vaudou and the Marine: Jacques-Stéphen Alexis and Zora Neale Hurston on the American Occupation of Haiti,” *Atlantic Studies* 13, no. 2 (March 08, 2016): 282-300. Accessed June 8, 2018. doi:<https://doi-org.libproxy.scu.edu/10.1080/14788810.2015.1138026>.

³⁸ Ramsey, *The Spirits and the Law*, 156.

religion so influential to many Haitians, the American forces became a part of its mythos. One specific account of a naval officer's rebirth as a vodou spirit transforms the American imposition on Haitian nationalism into its own form. A vodou priest discovered the spirit and expressed that "Captain Deba... needed to be fed," potentially representing the way the Haitian people needed to accommodate for the cruel American regime.³⁹ However, the priest and his daughter also claimed the spirit was now too busy to ever again visit Haiti, casting out the the officer as a symbol of American power from the island. "Captain Deba" is only one example of an American imperial power becoming incorporated into the Haitian religion which, in life, they were obligated to persecute. Lieutenant Wirkus too alludes to an American influence within the vodou tradition. He describes a vodou gathering in which a "modern, white" spirit is referenced, which by definition could only be an American *lwa*.⁴⁰ These instances are not isolated and have left a persistent legacy on vodou and its practice in Haiti. Lauren Derby describes her observation of a recent vodou ceremony:

In 2008, at a ceremony for the gede spirits, which are propitiated on the Day of the Dead, I witnessed our hostess become possessed by Ogou Feray. She appeared in the khaki uniform of a US Marine, complete with epaulets and the flat-brimmed hat. Her procession was accompanied by a brass band, led by a bugle, that played US Marine tunes.⁴¹

Even considering the other failures of the U.S. enforced crusades against vodou in Haiti, the incorporation of American figures into the religion which they opposed is a firm mark of Vodouizan

³⁹ Lauren Derby, "Imperial Idols: French and United States Revenants in Haitian Vodou," *History of Religions* 54, no.4 (May 2015): 394-422. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost (accessed June 10, 2018).

⁴⁰ Wirkus, *The White King of La Gonâve*, 287-292.

⁴¹ Derby, "Imperial Idols," 420.

reclaiming the negative impacts of the occupation for their own culture. Becoming a part of the vodou mythos was in no way a goal of the American Marines, but the Haitian people sustained their own interpretation of *lwa* in face of oppression.

The legacies of the 1915-1934 occupation that live on in vodou represent the resilience of the Haitian people rather than the violence of oppression. In that regard, the U.S. failed to suppress vodou. Irregularity in the United States' declared goals compared to the realities in Haiti capture just the beginning of some of the disconnect within the American regime. The persecution of vodou was uneven: in some cases, the Marines were violent and oppressive, but in other cases, punishments were lenient or non-existent on a personal level. While the U.S. forces mostly viewed vodou as uncivilized and twisted, they were unable to exact the destabilization of the religion they sought. In many ways, vodou only evolved under the occupation. It became more furtive and more difficult for the Americans to persecute through adaptation to the circumstances of the U.S. rule. Vodou also served as a valuable rallying point and symbol of Haitian-ness to the downtrodden people. By adaptation and evolution, the Haitian Vodouizan refused to allow a foreign power to dominate their system of worship, reclaiming every aspect of appropriation that they could. Like a *zonbi* or an echo of a drum, the Haitian people have marched forward in their practice of vodou.

**“What Does our Council of Jewish Women Stand For?”:
Secular Versus Religious Goals Within the Progressive Era’s
Council of Jewish Women
Katherine Porter**

Contemporary debates over immigration in the United States often elicit concerns over assimilation into American society. Muslim immigrants are frequently discriminated against and viewed as the ‘other,’ often vilified as holding radical views based on their religion. Intensifying islamophobia has made assimilation much more difficult for Muslims in America, who are confronted with a variety of ways to meld their own religion, culture, and political views with those of a society much different from theirs. Yet this is not a dilemma unique to modern-day immigrants. Different groups have arrived in the United States facing the very same problem—how much should they adapt to American culture? Is it worth the potential loss, or watering-down, of a native culture or religion? And how does a group or individual reckon with different understandings and expectations of assimilation? Jewish immigrants dealt with these same difficulties during the Progressive Era, in which a vast wave of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe entered the country, resulting in profound xenophobia. The Jewish immigrants in this wave followed in the footsteps of Western European Jews who had immigrated in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.¹ These antecedents, many from Germany, had already begun the process of assimilation despite intense anti-Semitism. Many, especially Reform Jews, were also receptive to popular progressive ideas and embraced the reform spirit, allowing a Jewish-American identity to develop. This set the stage for a national organization for Jewish women.

¹ Eli Lederhendler, *American Jewry: A New History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 62-63.

Jewish women gathered at the Congress of Religions at the World's Fair in Chicago in 1893. This meeting offered a unique opportunity to discuss the long-awaited creation of a national organization.² By the end of the Congress, the women had established the National Council of Jewish Women (later the Council of Jewish Women), the foundation for a large, ultimately international organization.³ Although the Council initially maintained a fairly narrow religious emphasis, it was also distinctly progressive from its inception. It provided a space for Jewish women to have a political voice, echoing the sentiments of the era's first wave feminists. Their more secular social reforms were part of a wider array of reforms espoused by progressive activists. The philanthropic work these Jewish women championed eventually expanded into the secular arena of immigration, as they tackled white slave traffic and promoted Americanization.

Significant literature has analyzed the influence of the Council of Jewish Women. Faith Rogow's *Gone to Another Meeting: The National Council of Jewish Women, 1893-1993* chronicles the development of the Council and the ways in which it created a Jewish-American womanhood. Linda Kuzmack outlines the roles of Jewish women in England and the United States, noting similarities and differences between the two, in *Woman's Cause: the Jewish Woman's Movement in England and the United States, 1881-1933*. This paper reveals the internal struggle the Council faced in selecting comprehensive goals for the organization. The progressive spirit is a very American notion, and one that these Jewish women embraced—but what did that mean for their Jewish identity? In the Council's early years, these women struggled to define the objectives of female Jewish-American reformers, resulting in a tug-of-war between religious

² Hannah G. Solomon, "Beginnings of the Council of Jewish Women: Success Due to Readiness of Jewish Women of the Land to Organize," *American Israelite*, 2 May 1912.

³ "National Council of Jewish Women: First General Convention in New York," *American Israelite*, 26 Nov. 1896.

and philanthropic reforms. The results would play an important role in how Jews were characterized in the mainstream press.

Within two years of the Council's founding, the leaders established four resolutions to guide their efforts and shape their constitution.⁴ The first, "Seek to unite in closer relations women interested in the work of religion, philanthropy and education and shall consider practical means of solving problems in these fields," revealed the desire to provide a space for women to make a difference. These fields fit within women's sphere of influence as Progressives expanded domesticity to surpass the home and include greater society and city life. Second, they declared the Council "Shall encourage the study of the underlying principles of Judaism, the history, literature and customs of the Jews and their bearing upon their own and the world's history." Their Jewish faith and culture is clearly a vital component that the Council considered worthy of preservation, especially in the face of modernity. The third tenet, "Shall apply knowledge gained in this study to the improvement of Sabbath-schools and in the work of social reform," promoted the application of Judaism to social reform. Lastly, they stated the Council "Shall secure the interest and aid of all influential persons in arousing the general sentiment against religious persecutions wherever, whenever and against whomever shown, and in finding means to prevent such persecutions." With anti-Semitism plaguing countries around the world, the Council asserted its intent to combat religious persecution, thereby supporting its own religious values. These ideals and goals were the basis for the official constitution, adopted at the Council's first convention in 1896.⁵

A very basic purpose of the Council of Jewish Women was to provide Jewish women an opportunity to become active members

⁴ Hannah G. Solomon, "Report of the National Council of Jewish Women," *American Jewess*, April 1895.

⁵ National Council of Jewish Women, "Constitution of the Council of Jewish Women," *Proceedings of the First Convention of the National Council of Jewish Women* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1897), 407.

within their community. This expansion of women's arena within American society is fundamentally progressive. The Council was the first of its kind to provide Jewish women with this degree of power. It was geared towards helping and benefiting Jewish women, providing advancement within both within Jewish culture and American society.

There are mixed reports over the level of support the Council received. Council founder, Hannah G. Solomon, claimed, "We are receiving every possible encouragement from our Rabbis and should women desire to enter the ministry there will be no obstacle thrown in their way."⁶ Yet, fifteen years later, Solomon recalled the reception of the Council much differently: "First of all when we tried to organize, we met with objections from the men. Rabbis and laymen did not want to help us in the beginning, because they were skeptical about separating Jewish women from women of other faiths, and were doubtful of the feasibility of bringing together any large number of Jewish women."⁷ A lack of faith in Jewish women's ability to take charge and be successful was echoed by others. At Congregation Emanu-El in San Francisco, Rabbi Dr. Voorsanger articulated a stance against the Council. He believed that a women's organization increased the chasm between the sexes, and that men and women should be learning from each other and working together. Furthermore, the Council's work was redundant. According to Voorsanger: "They are establishing themselves as watchtowers in the community, reaching out in all directions to ingather the people and qualify the latter for the great task of perpetuating Judaism, its religion, its history and its culture. That is, strictly speaking, the task of the Synagog [sic], not of a council of women."⁸ Another religious leader, Rabbi Joseph Krauskopf, held similar doubts about the Council's ability to succeed, especially with duplicate institutions in place. After

⁶ Solomon, "Report of the National Council of Jewish Women."

⁷ "American Jewish Women in 1890 and 1920: An Interview with Mrs. Hannah G. Solomon," *American Hebrew*, 23 Apr. 1920.

⁸ "Opposed to Women's Organizations," *American Israelite*, 27 Feb. 1896.

observing its growth and success, however, he eventually saw the value in such an organization, and strongly expressed his support, saying: “The work of the National Council of Jewish Women will grow in breadth, and ripen in fullness...The woman keeping aloof from it will be regarded false to her sex; the man opposing it will be branded hostile to his species; the community without a Section of it will be considered an object of commiseration.”⁹

While there was not universal support for the Council, the women within the organization clearly saw the benefit in providing Jewish women this space. The Council gave Jewish women greater opportunities to work within their gender and religious spheres, and eventually push the limits of those spheres.

Initially, the Council focused on religious work and philanthropy, areas of engagement considered acceptable for women. As part of Rabbi Karuskopf’s proclamation in support of the Council, he encouraged this role: “The woman of Israel has at last found her way into the sphere where she is needed, for which her nature has constituted her, for which God has destined her, into the sphere of Religion and Philanthropy.”¹⁰ Some of the Councilwomen endorsed such ideals of womanhood, exemplified by Rebeka Kohut: “The women of America! The religiously enlightened matrons of our country, delivered from the oppressor’s yoke, must dive into the depths of vice to spread culture and enlightenment among our semi-barbaric Russian immigrants.”¹¹ Besides reflecting the blatant prejudice against new Jewish immigrants, Kohut’s remarks cater to traditional women’s roles. However, their philanthropic efforts quickly expanded into more secular and political arenas. As Solomon reflected in 1920, “Woman’s sphere is in the home, they told us. The last thirty years

⁹ Joseph Krauskopf, “The National Council of Jewish Women,” *Jewish Exponent*, 17 Apr. 1896.

¹⁰ Krauskopf, “The National Council of Jewish Women.”

¹¹ Rebeka Kohut, “Discussion of ‘Mission-Work Among the Unenlightened Jews,’” *Jewish Women’s Congress: Papers of the Jewish Women’s Congress* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1894), 190.

have been devoted to proof of our boast that women's sphere is the whole wide world, without limit."¹² Despite some level of doubt expressed by others in their community, these women banded together to influence American society in a growing number of ways. They might have been in agreement over allowing Jewish women this new space, but they did not necessarily agree on which issues should be their focus. Differing views on Judaism influenced the attention and effort given to religious goals, resulting in a divided front.

Although there was a push for religion, not everyone was in agreement about what this meant. Reform Judaism became a notably popular branch of Judaism in the United States by the middle of the nineteenth century.¹³ This branch of Judaism was open to Christian influence, adaptive to modern life, and receptive to progressive ideals. A statement by a prominent Reform Jew in New York conveys the appeal and intent of Reform Judaism: "As Jews we must revere and respect the ancient history of our race, but feel that Judaism, our religion, must be progressive, a religion that assists us in our daily life, not merely a religion of the synagogue, but of the home."¹⁴ This modern and fluid branch of Judaism stood at odds with Orthodox Judaism. Within Orthodox Judaism, religious practices and traditions are much more rigid. The Torah is considered to be directly divine, without any human interpretation.¹⁵ For some, Orthodox was the ultimate and only form of Judaism. "Orthodoxy and Judaism cannot be dissociated, as they are one, and the disintegration of Orthodoxy would be naught but the downfall of the Judaism that the countless centuries of attack in the past have found miraculously enduring."¹⁶ Whether

¹² "American Jewish Women in 1890 and 1920," *American Hebrew*.

¹³ Eds. Susannah A. Link and William J. Link, *The Gilded Age and Progressive Era: A Documentary Reader* (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 169.

¹⁴ "What America Means to Jews," *New York Times*, 18 Jan. 1911.

¹⁵ "Orthodox Judaism: Background and Overview," *Jewish Virtual Library*, accessed 26 May 2018, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-of-orthodox-judaism>.

¹⁶ "Reform Versus Orthodoxy," *New York Times*, 31 Dec. 1908.

an American Jew practiced Reform, Orthodox, or something in between, the different views on tradition and Jewish law impacted Council dynamics.

The Council claimed to be unaffiliated with a specific branch of Judaism, thus keeping it open to all Jewish women.¹⁷ Yet, reflective of broader tensions within Judaism, the Council was not immune to disagreements over religion. Discussions over changing from Saturday to Sunday-Sabbath raised particular controversy. American society largely centered around a Christian lifestyle, meaning Sunday was regarded as the major day of rest and worship. This disadvantaged those with different schedules of worship, especially Jews, who celebrated the Sabbath from sundown on Friday until after nightfall on Saturday. Having different days of worship negatively impacted Jewish business owners. By closing their stores on Saturday, they missed out on earning a profit from Christian shoppers. Some Jews could not even afford to observe the Saturday Sabbath, working instead on Saturday rather than more strictly observing the Sabbath. Jews in support of the Sunday-Sabbath believed this change would economically benefit Jewish business owners and allow for more faithful Sabbath observation.¹⁸

This debate within Reform Judaism infiltrated the dynamics of the Council. At an 1896 convention, “It was resolved unanimously that the Council should use its influence in favor of the observance of the Jewish Sabbath and to reinstate its observance in the homes of our people in its pristine purity.”¹⁹ Yet, concerns over Sabbath tradition continued, particularly since Council President Solomon and Executive Secretary Sadie

¹⁷ Hannah G. Solomon and Sadie American, “A Brilliant Record: The Rapid Work of the National Council of Jewish Women,” *Jewish Exponent*, 17 Jan. 1896.

¹⁸ “Radical Hebrew Reform: Services in the Synagogue on Sunday,” *New York Times*, 29 Dec. 1890.

¹⁹ “National Council of Jewish Women: This Week’s Convention,” *Jewish Messenger*, 20 Nov. 1896.

American were known to be supporters of Reform Judaism and the Sunday-Sabbath, leaving many members upset.²⁰

Those against the Sunday-Sabbath were vocal. The Cincinnati Council called on Jewish women to more carefully observe the Sabbath day and “[keep] alive in the heart and home the spirit of our faith.”²¹ Several articles in the Jewish press urged the Council to preserve the Jewish, or Saturday, Sabbath.²² They also advocated for leaders who would uphold this tradition.²³ Tensions over Sabbath observation mounted, indicative of a larger concern for religious practice overall.

Within the first decade of the Council’s founding, many women voiced their desires to strengthen women’s Jewish faith and increase religious practices. By 1896, Kohut proudly announced: “There are now more than thirty cities working in the same sphere and with the same object in view—the Judaizing of the Jews...It is safe to say that in the near future we shall have an intelligent body of Jewish women, proud of their race, their history and themselves, and with this knowledge shall come a greater and stronger love for their faith.”²⁴ Yet, by the end of the year, some Councilwomen were airing their doubts over Jews’ faith. One meeting in New York sparked a debate over the religiosity of Jewish women compared to Christian women. Nellie L. Miller claimed that Jewish people were losing their sense of religion and could learn something from Christian women’s organizations. She questioned the religious authenticity of a national Jewish women’s organization and contended, “This eagerness to open heart, mind, and home to all things non-Jewish, our impetuous zeal in

²⁰ Rogow, *Gone to Another Meeting*, 103.

²¹ “Appeal of Jewish Women: The Cincinnati Council Deplores the Desecration of the Sabbath,” *New York Times*, 28 Oct. 1898.

²² “The Council and the Saccah,” *Jewish Exponent*, 26 Jan. 1900.

²³ “Jewesses in Council,” *Jewish Messenger*, 2 Mar. 1900; “The Sabbath and the Jewess,” *American Hebrew*, 19 Jan. 1900.

²⁴ Rebekah Kohut, “The National Council of Jewish Women,” *The Independent... Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History, Literature, and the Arts*. 23 Jan. 1896.

affiliating with non-Israelitish [sic] movements, demonstrates how slightly and disparagingly we estimate the worth of any project distinctly Jewish in character.” While several women challenged this assertion, some agreed with it, with one matter-of-factly insisting, “The Christian woman goes to her church. The Jewish woman stays at home.”²⁵

These early statements and debates suggest the Councilwomen's strong interest in preserving Jewish religion, culture, and history, as reflected in the Council's constitution. They even established a Committee on Religion and a Committee on Religious School Work to help identify and achieve these religious goals.²⁶ However, the broadness of these goals allowed for different interpretations based on the various denominations within Judaism. A discussion at the first convention in New York revealed the disagreement over the religious intent of the organization, “Several of the delegates were of the opinion that the fact that the Council was an organization intended to promote Judaism was not sufficiently brought out in the constitution. One delegate said that the constitution ‘sat upon’ Judaism.”²⁷ This foretold the problem that would plague the Council for several years. No specific plan on how to preserve Judaism could be created without agreeing on one religious foundation. Variation in specific Jewish beliefs allowed cracks to form within the organization, creating a shaky foundation upon which the Council grew and its work expanded, particularly as it increasingly encompassed secular, philanthropic works.

The Council initially established a Committee on Philanthropy “to study the work of existing philanthropic associations with a view to making practical application of the

²⁵ “Jewish Faith Neglected: Mrs. Miller Says the Women are Indifferent,” *New York Times*, 17 Nov. 1896.

²⁶ National Council of Jewish Women, “Constitution of the Council of Jewish Women,” 409.

²⁷ “National Council of Jewish Women: First General Convention in New York,” *American Israelite*, 26 Nov. 1896.

results of this study.”²⁸ However, they did not foresee the expansion of this field until they began working with immigrants. The Council created the Committee on Immigrant Aid in 1904 to better focus on this issue and work together with the Committee on Philanthropy.²⁹ The Committee on Immigrant Aid “concerns itself primarily with the protection of young girls, giving them friendly aid and advice — not money...It is a safeguard to the girls from port to destination, and guides them to the best Americanizing influences.”³⁰ This goal required Councilwomen to work extensively with new immigrants, necessitating nearly continuous contact. Committee members stationed themselves at Ellis Island to gain immediate access to immigrants. Armed with brochures in different languages, multilingual agents met new arrivals and offered aid and advice. To help keep track of young immigrants, the name of any girl aged 12 to 25 years old was recorded, and she was visited to ensure she had found a safe home and received any further aid she might need.³¹

These “friendly visitors,” as they are often called, also urged immigrants to take classes related to Americanization. The Americanization movement was popular particularly during World War I, pushed forward by ideas of 100% Americanism strongly supported by Theodore Roosevelt.³² However the work of the Council did not completely align with this. Its tactics were more reflective of assimilation efforts that preserved a Jewish identity.³³ According to Rebekah Kohut in the *American Hebrew & Jewish*

²⁸ National Council of Jewish Women, “Constitution of the Council of Jewish Women,” 409.

²⁹ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Immigration, *Statements and Recommendations Submitted by Societies and Organizations Interested in the Subject of Immigration*, 61st Congress, 3d Session, 1910, S. Doc. 764 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1911), 39.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 33.

³¹ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Immigration, 38.

³² “Roosevelt Bars the Hyphenated,” *New York Times*, 13 Oct. 1915.

³³ Seth Korelitz, “‘A Magnificent Piece of Work’: The Americanization Work of the National Council of Jewish Women,” *American Jewish History* no. 2 (1995): 177, *JSTOR Journals*, EBSCOhost, accessed 5 May 2018.

Messenger, “We have taught them the American language, history and customs and have endeavored to instill into them the true American Spirit. We have tried to teach them that the Ten Commandments and the constitution of the United States must be the Decalogue of the American Jew.”³⁴ As a Jewish organization, the Council could not endorse complete Americanization at the price of its faith. Rather than directly addressing the role of religion in Americanized Judaism, the central means by which the Council approached Americanization was secular, promoting literacy in English, as “the fundamental, unifying force in Americanization.”³⁵ Helping immigrants, many of them Jewish, to assimilate into American society also allowed the Council to conduct preventative philanthropy, particularly in relation to prostitution, or white slave traffic.

Prostitution was certainly not an exclusive concern of Jewish women. Many Progressives expressed fear over the growth of vice and declining morality. Both men and women worked for reform, citing different reasons, but the most prevalent was to protect the family and home life.³⁶ Worries over prostitution culminated with the passing of the White Slave Traffic Act, otherwise known as the Mann Act, in 1910.³⁷ It “was aimed at the complete suppression of the ‘white slave traffic’ and imposing imprisonment and heavy fines for any person importing women into this country for immoral purposes or harboring them after their arrival.”³⁸ This landmark piece of legislation reveals the pervasiveness of the concerns over prostitution, especially when it pertained to white women.

³⁴ “Americanize the Immigrant Before He Comes to America,” *American Hebrew & Jewish Messenger*, 12 Mar. 1920.

³⁵ “Americanization Program: A Laudable Activity of the Council of Jewish Women,” *American Israelite*, 31 Oct. 1918.

³⁶ Ruth Rosen, *The Lost Sisterhood* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 44-45.

³⁷ “First Arrest Under White Slave Act,” *New York Times*, 10 Jul. 1910.

³⁸ “Report ‘White Slave’ Bill: Immigration Committee Presents New Measure to Suppress Traffic,” *New York Times*, 18 Dec. 1909.

The Council of Jewish Women took up the cause along with other progressive reformers. Sadie American, the president of the Council's New York section from 1902 to 1908, was the most prominent crusader against white slave traffic among women in the Council. She learned about it through Jewish women in Britain with whom she had been in correspondence. In 1899, she represented the Council at an international conference in London that addressed the evils of white slave traffic.³⁹ The New York Section was particularly influential in leading this cause. Working for the prevention of white slave traffic was a secular political reform area, drawing attention and resources away from religious goals. However, after reports in the early twentieth century were published confirming a problem with Jewish vice and prostitution, the Council, along with the greater Jewish community, grew concerned over female Jewish immigrants being tricked or persuaded into prostitution.⁴⁰ They took on the responsibility of protecting young women from this troubling phenomenon.

As reported to the United States Senate in 1910, "The immigrant is given much misinformation [and]...is apt to get false notions of American ideals and standards and ways. We must correct this misinformation and help her by putting her in touch with the best of American life immediately upon her arrival...They must learn to recognize pitfalls in their path and dangers in the gulse [sic] of what seem legitimate amusements or legitimate means of procuring employment."⁴¹ Even after helping girls settle into a new home and life, Councilwomen were still concerned that they could end up associating with the wrong people. They needed to be warned against and protected from the dangers of modern, urban life. As further stated in the report to the U.S. Senate, "The crowded quarters in which the girls live afford them no opportunity

³⁹ Linda Gordon Kuzmack, *Woman's Cause: the Jewish Woman's Movement in England and The United States, 1881-1933* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1990), 69.

⁴⁰ Kuzmack, *Woman's Cause*, 66.

⁴¹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Immigration, 38.

for home amusement; the wonderfully electric lighted streets of our day lure them, and all along these streets are dangers and pitfalls, dance halls which are bad, shows whose influence is bad, men and even women and other girls who in the guise of friends lead to the downward path.”⁴²

Work with immigrants to encourage Americanization and combat white slave traffic was clearly reflective of mainstream progressive reforms. However, it lacked the explicitly religious objectives of the Council. This kind of more secular philanthropic work only grew in the early twentieth century, garnering a lot of attention and support outside the Jewish community, especially for the New York Section.

The New York Times, America’s newspaper of record, published several articles that hailed the Council’s success in its philanthropic efforts. An article from 1895 describes the formation and development of the Council, organized only two years prior. Significantly, it glosses over the religious foundation of the organization, stressing instead the women’s involvement in philanthropy and education.⁴³ With a well-established interest in white slave traffic by 1910, an article describes Sadie American’s involvement at the Jewish International Conference in London and her explanation of the Council’s flourishing efforts to combat prostitution.⁴⁴ Prominent publications demonstrate great support for the Council’s involvement in secular philanthropy fields. Without much mention of the Council’s religious foundation, the press promoted the idea that the Council’s main goal was secular. News of the philanthropic achievements of the Council even reached those in the higher political echelons of American society.

The New York Times published several articles in which significant Progressive Era figures supported the Council of Jewish Women. It reported on a section meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria in

⁴²U.S. Senate, Committee on Immigration, 43.

⁴³ “Jewish Women’s Council: An Outgrowth of the Congress at the World’s Fair,” *New York Times*, 4 Aug. 1895.

⁴⁴ “Jews to Fight White Slave Traffic,” *New York Times*, 10 Aug. 1910.

which members proudly described the successes of their immigration work, while also calling attention to Colonel Roosevelt's interest in immigrants and his desire to have attended the meeting.⁴⁵ President Elect William H. Taft spoke out in support of the Council's work with the Red Cross and expressed regret for not attending the triennial convention. His wife, Helen Taft, provided best wishes for the Council's further success.⁴⁶ In 1920, Woodrow Wilson's wife spoke out in support of the Council's Americanization efforts.⁴⁷ As Americanization and prostitution were political, rather than religious fields it is no surprise that the Council gained the attention and support of a broader audience. While people outside of the Jewish community might have high praise for the Council's accomplishments, some Jews expressed more dissatisfaction over the direction the Council had been heading.

Articles from the Jewish press reveal popular discontent over the failings of the Council in fostering Judaism and religious practices. In 1899, an editorial in a weekly Jewish newspaper, *The American Hebrew*, praised the efforts of the Committee on Religion and strongly suggested it continue working towards its goals: "The Council of Jewish Women must stand or fall by its loyalty to Jewish Law and its success will be determined by what it stands for. If it shows only efforts for humanitarian or philanthropic work or only a feeble attempt at study of Jewish history, it must ultimately fall. If it means a revival of Jewish sentiment, then it will live."⁴⁸ A prominent religious leader from Philadelphia, Rev. Henry Iliowizi, also articulated support for the Council as long as it ultimately benefited Judaism and not just Jews: "If thy gatherings mean to restore Jewish womanhood to

⁴⁵ "Tributes to Work of Jewish Council," *New York Times*, 9 Dec. 1912.

⁴⁶ "Taft to Jewish Women: Sends Letter to National Council in Cincinnati—Miss Helen Taft Also," *New York Times*, 3 Dec. 1908.

⁴⁷ "Mrs. Wilson Aids Jews: Commends \$150,000 Americanization Drive of Women's Council," *New York Times*, 21 Mar. 1920.

⁴⁸ "The Council of Jewish Women," *American Hebrew*, 23 Jun. 1899.

faith and reverence, the Jewish home to its beauty of holiness, and Jewish life to its consecrating influences... then will God and man bless thy doings, American Jewess...[If] it means vanity and notoriety, articulate wind and vain boasting, then the sooner thy Council dies, the better for Israel and the Jewish family.”⁴⁹ After a convention in Cleveland, an article in *The Jewish Exponent* criticized the Council’s inability to fulfill its religious aims and the spirited passion it had ignited. “Religiously...the convention did not realize the expectations that the Council had awakened. The tone of the dominant spirits was one that was far removed from religious enthusiasm.”⁵⁰ These shared sentiments demonstrate a disappointment with the Council’s weak efforts to increase religiosity and observance of Jewish practices.

Within the Council, women were also in disagreement over the roles of religion and philanthropy. At a Triennial Convention in Chicago, Evelyn Aronson from San Francisco cautioned,

The Council is unconsciously swerving from its original impulse. Practical philanthropy is always intensely interesting...but primarily we are banded together ‘to further united efforts on behalf of Judaism’...Unless we constantly cultivate a Jewish spirit through an intelligent understanding of our religion, of our history and of our philosophy we will cease to be Jewesses through inclination and belief and remain Jewesses through habit and external pressure.⁵¹

Even some women providing assistance to immigrants were hesitant about Americanization efforts and the potential loss of a Jewish identity. As reported in *The American Hebrew & Jewish Messenger*, Mary Antin, one of the directors of the National Americanization Committee, shocked members of the Council with her “thoroughly Jewish sentiments,” when she asserted,

⁴⁹ “The Hallowing of the Home,” *American Israelite*, 13 Jan. 1898.

⁵⁰ “The Jewish Women’s Council’s Status,” *The Jewish Exponent*, 16 Mar. 1900.

⁵¹ “Report of Committee on Religion,” *American Israelite*, 18 Jan. 1906.

“Don’t try to Americanize us so much. Let us be good Jews first, and we will be good Americans too!”⁵² Other women attempted to promote religion at the Boston Section’s annual meeting by reminding the Council of the personal benefits of maintaining and practicing Judaism: “Our very vital efforts with the immigrant and delinquent classes should not blind us to the fact that we ourselves may need and require intellectual and spiritual stimulus. Study classes...should be arranged on such topics as the Bible, Jewish history and literature, child-life, mothercraft [sic], current events, —the field is limitless.”⁵³ These women clearly recognized the success of the Council’s philanthropic work, yet that was not all that the organization had sought to do. However, the study and preservation of Jewish culture, history, and religion that were initially meant to play a significant role within the Council of Jewish Women never successfully took hold, especially in comparison to philanthropic works, creating a divergence over the two. The question posed to a Chicago Section meeting in 1898 encapsulated the ongoing disharmony over the Council’s main goals: “And now, sisters of the Council, again I ask that oft repeated question: What does our Council of Jewish Women stand for?”⁵⁴

The formative years of the Council of Jewish Women were rife with disagreements and doubt as its members attempted to tackle differing areas of reform in an effort to establish a role for Jewish-American reformers during the Progressive Era. While they set out with the intention of explicitly promoting Judaism by creating study circles and Sabbath-schools, this work eventually took backstage to growing philanthropic work related to immigration that garnered Jews praise in the mainstream press and fostered assimilation. The variation within Judaism impeded the

⁵² “What Americanization Means,” *American Hebrew & Jewish Messenger*, 10 Mar. 1916.

⁵³ “Annual Meeting of Boston Section Council of Jewish Women: President’s Report in Full,” *Jewish Advocate*, 4 May 1916.

⁵⁴ “The Hallowing of the Home,” *American Israelite*.

establishment of a unified religious goal. Hindered by differences in belief, aiding immigrants became an initially unifying concern, even for those outside of Jewish society. Yet, Jews within and outside of the Council also spoke up about the need to preserve Judaism and practice religious customs. Despite this, the Council's more secular, philanthropic efforts persisted and dominated. The Council of Jewish Women continued to provide a place for women to take part in social and political reforms, allowing them to broaden women's sphere.

The fact that women within the Council faced such difficulties in establishing their main objective was reflective of broader Progressive Era reforms, not just differences within Judaism. Debates raged over the goals of secular social and political reforms of the Progressive Era, spanning a variety of topics, including child labor, big business, and women's rights. The dialogue and debate within the Council was both uniquely Jewish and fundamentally American, and speaks to the pervasiveness of progressive values, tactics, and divisions.

Today, the National Council of Jewish Women exists as "a grassroots organization of volunteers and advocates who turn progressive ideals into action. Inspired by Jewish values, NCJW strives for social justice by improving the quality of life for women, children and families by safeguarding individual rights and freedoms."⁵⁵ The contemporary Council continues to engage with prevailing issues from a Jewish point of view, yet their interests are much more pointedly and unapologetically political than those of the Progressive Era Council, with their main priorities encompassing issues like reproductive rights and civic engagement.⁵⁶ While the NCJW has come a long way from its initial iteration, it remains a space for women to get involved in

⁵⁵ "Mission," *National Council of Jewish Women*, accessed 28 Mar. 2018, <https://www.ncjw.org/about/mission/>.

⁵⁶ "Our Work," *National Council of Jewish Women*, accessed 2 Jun. 2018, <https://www.ncjw.org/work/>.

issues reflective of Jewish-American values and ideals and is just one of many multicultural organizations in the United States today.

For present-day immigrants, much can be learned from the evolution of the Council of Jewish Women and its reception by Jews and greater society. Secular, philanthropic successes of the Council received much attention and acceptance from a broad audience, but this left out the explicitly religious intentions of the Council. Modern Muslim immigrants face similar difficulties in assimilating into a predominantly white, Christian society and are often divided over their understandings of American society, with some embracing American culture and others fearful of assimilation.⁵⁷ While some organizations focus on geopolitics and a Muslim identity, newer organizations, like the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, embrace American society and politics by getting involved in both foreign and domestic issues.⁵⁸ This new approach will likely garner greater societal approval, just as it did for the Council of Jewish Women. However, it offers the same risk of losing sight of strictly religious goals and traditions. Muslim immigrants, along with others, must weigh the potential cost of assimilating into American society. The tradeoff between a seamless integration and a loss of culture and religion merits debate and continues to be a facet of the American immigrant experience.

⁵⁷ M. A. Muqtedar Khan, "Political Muslims in America: From Islamism to Exceptionalism," *Middle East Policy* 22, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 32, accessed 3 Jun. 2018.

⁵⁸ Khan, "Political Muslims in America," 34-35.

History Rewritten: How America has Failed to Address the Legacy of the Civil War

Maggie Debrovner

The American Civil War never really ended. The legacy of the war is still seen through American educational, judicial, and economic institutions. For the past thirty years, most historians have agreed that slavery was at least one of the predominant factors in the bloody fight between the North and the South. Despite this consensus among historians, the ‘Lost Cause’ and ‘Old South’ narratives remain pervasive, in both the works of these scholars and among the nation as a whole. One of the biggest sources of economic and social discrepancies in this country is our failure, as a nation, to understand the true causes and effects of the Civil War and slavery. The emergence of Southern nationalist pride in the face of defeat prevented full enfranchisement of African Americans after the war, and continues to shape our historical and cultural memory. The ideological lexicon of the Antebellum South not only altered this memory in the South, but throughout the entire American education system, forever altering the discourse surrounding America’s past. As a nation, the United States has failed to address the historical legacy of slavery, both in 1865, and today. The common rhetoric of “well, my grandparents didn’t own slaves...” or “can’t we just get over it already...” exemplify the way slavery has been constructed as an historical anomaly, an event that only exists within the confines of itself, and has been forever eradicated.

The Lost Cause rhetoric was popularized in the South as a rhetorical device to defend Southern pride and rewrite their own history. This is agreed upon by many historians, but why then has this historical narrative become so deeply embedded throughout the entire nation? This version of history appealed to both the South, as well as the North, because slavery was a national problem, not just a Southern one. Rather than deal with the

consequences of decades of enslavement and brutality, the national memory of the war has us looking primarily at ‘states’ rights.’ Racism had become an institutional structure that prevented both the North and the South from recognizing former slaves as equals and left the entire nation unwilling to remove Black men, women, and children from a permanent state of second-class citizenship. Throughout the nation, white leaders prevented full enfranchisement of African Americans, and led to the construction of a nation built on racism, inequality, and a fictional historical account. Through this paper I am going to argue that both liberal and conservative, Northern and Southern, Republican and Democratic historians have led us to a misrepresentation and false understanding of our nation’s past, an ideology that continues to influence all modern-day American institutions and structures.

The Lost Cause is not easily defined. It is “a full-blown, argumentative statement of the Confederate point of view with respect to all aspects of the Civil War.”¹ In summary, the Lost Cause legend was established “to foster a heroic image of secession and the war so that Confederates would have salvaged at least their honor from the all-encompassing defeat.”² The purpose of this narrative was to hide and cover up the embarrassing and tragic past of the South.³ The elements of the myth which I will explain briefly were all created intentionally, thus distorting national memory. There are several claims to this myth. These include, “slavery was not a sectional issue,” meaning that protecting slavery was not the reason the South seceded, “the South would have given up slavery,” the nature of slaves was not as bad as its made out to be (included is the imagery of the ‘faithful slave’), the idealization of the homefront, the idealization of the confederate soldier, and the belief that the war was a ‘white man’s

¹ Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan, *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2010), 12.

² Ibid., 14.

³ Ibid.

war.’⁴ Defenders of the Lost Cause praised "the heroism, the splendid courage, the patient toil and suffering, the unselfish patriotism and the sublime devotion of our countrymen who died in a unequal struggle for the preservation of what they believed to be the sacred inheritance of constitutional liberty bequeathed to them by their fathers.”⁵ In a single phrase, the Lost Cause can be defined as “the War of Northern Aggression.” There are so many elements of this ideological construction it is impossible to mention them all in such a brief space. The important part of the narrative remains why it was constructed and how.

One of the most important elements of the Lost Cause philosophy is the construction of Old South imagery. The Old South is an idealized version of the South that is presented in films like *Gone with the Wind*. The film follows the Southern belle, Scarlett O’Hara, as she traverses the harsh reality of being a rich Southern white woman during the Civil War and the period of Reconstruction.⁶ This image of the South is full of lavish plantation living, beautiful white southern women, and negative stereotypes of African Americans and slaves. The Old South was often characterized through history books and newspaper articles by “the homogeneity of its people,”⁷ meaning wealthy and white. However, other historians like Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker disagree, arguing that the identity of the Old South was not homogenous, but it was “slavery which bound the South together and created a sense of brotherhood.”⁸ Regardless of what ties the people of the Old South together, it was represented by

⁴ Ibid., 17.

⁵ W. Stuart Towns, “Haunting the South for a Century and More: Lost Cause Rhetoric and Ritual,” *North & South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Society*, 2012, 40.

⁶ *Gone with the Wind*, dir. Victor Fleming, prod. David O. Selznick, by Sidney Coe Howard, Max Steiner, and Ernest Haller, perf. Clark Gable, Vivien Leigh, Leslie Howard, Olivia De Havilland, Thomas Mitchell, and Hattie McDaniel.

⁷ R. S. Cotterill, *The Old South; the Geographic, Economic, Social, Political, and Cultural Expansion, Institutions, and Nationalism of the Antebellum South* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1939), 262.

⁸ Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, *The Old South; The Founding of American Civilization* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc, 1963), 350.

“aristocratic social structure, its wasteful agriculture, its courtly gentlemen, its fine mansions...”⁹ This is clearly seen in several film representations.

Films like *Gone with the Wind* served to present stereotypes and characteristics of different elements pertaining to Civil War Era dynamics. For example, the slaves presented in the film are portrayed as “unintelligent, passive, and faithful to the always indulgent ‘Old Massa.’”¹⁰ This serves to reaffirm the Lost Cause myth that slaves really weren’t treated that badly, and many were “happy,” “well treated,” and “did not care” about their status as slaves.¹¹ The film also goes further to depict “freed Black people as arrogant and crude” in the period of early Reconstruction.¹² The film also characterizes Northern or ‘Yankee’ soldiers as “bad people who were gratuitously and randomly upsetting the genteel and benign Southern culture.”¹³ Finally, the film represents vigilante groups like the Ku Klux Klan “in a manner wholly sympathetic to the idea of vigilantes and the necessity of their existence.”¹⁴ Through popular culture, this false perception of a wholesome and honorable Southern way of life is constructed. Although this film, or others like it, never address the issues of slavery or the North explicitly, they serve to recreate the legacy of the war for the American public. Films and other aspects of popular culture are not typically viewed through a critical lens. This makes this film’s legacy even more dangerous, as viewers passively allow it to alter their perception of the South and the reality of slavery. The Lost Cause and Old South myth has thus permeated the minds of millions of Americans through acquiescent participation. Southern nationalism becomes more deeply entrenched in discussions about the war and slavery so as to avoid

⁹ Ibid., 352.

¹⁰ Gallagher and Nolan, *The Myth of the Lost Cause*, 30.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 31.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

the admittance that the war was really fought over upholding their right to own bodies. The postwar South created an image of itself to feed to the rest of the nation to instill Southern pride and respect.

The Lost Cause mythology was spread not just through the popular culture image of the Old South, but also through confederate groups and ceremonies that formed after the end of the Civil War. For example, the United Confederate Veterans, UCV, formed in order to celebrate and memorialize the war.¹⁵ During the 1890s this group, along with other confederate groups and committees, “compiled a list of recommended histories, noted the publication of new books, and condemned a few it considered unfair to the south.”¹⁶ These groups worked together towards presenting a ‘true history,’ one that ensured “school children were taught only a southern understanding of the war.”¹⁷ In addition to these groups, museums and exhibits served to keep alive a respect for Confederate history, all under the pretense that “pride in their ancestors” would lead to “noble and patriotic action.”¹⁸ We still see this happening today with the creation and celebration of Civil War monuments of Confederate soldiers or generals. Pride in the past was necessary for the South, as well as the North. If there was ever to be unity within the country, the South could not be seen as the weak, powerless counterpart to the North.

President Andrew Johnson was driven by a desire to meld the North and South into one nation, to construct one unique American identity. After Abraham Lincoln’s assassination in 1865, the newly inaugurated Andrew Johnson pardoned all former confederates, took back all reparations paid, and lost the peace that had seemed so promising when the North won the war.¹⁹ Through Johnson’s

¹⁵ Gaines M. Foster, *Ghosts of the Confederacy Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865-1913* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2014), 104.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 116.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹⁹ A. J. Langguth, *After Lincoln: How the North Won the Civil War and Lost the Peace* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2015), 87.

national reunification, Johnson not only had to excuse the Northern role in slavery, but also the Southern one. By accepting the Southern doctrine in the North, Johnson was able to unite the two halves of the nation thus creating a consolidated union, but in reality, was only uniting white Northerners with white Southerners forever stunting the growth made towards racial equality. The Southern narrative infiltrated the entire nation so as to facilitate the integration of the South into Northern politics and discourse, and to vindicate the amalgamation of white power and control.

We see this national embedding of Southern pride through “ceremonies and rituals on Confederate Memorial Day, at Confederate veterans' reunions, and at Confederate monument dedications.”²⁰ Most important is “the rhetoric that was part of these celebrations” which “promoted stability in an unstable time.”²¹ As we have seen, “the power of that rhetoric is demonstrated in the persistence of the mythology that was developed and retained by many white southerners throughout the twentieth-century and, for some, on into the twenty-first century.”²² Most historians from after the 1960s will argue that slavery was an undeniable part of the Civil War and the South’s secession. The conviction that the Southern version of the past must be upheld is now seen by most historians as a tool to give stability and structure to the reforming South. The shift from Southern historians attempting to claim their own past to historians admitting the faults in these historical accounts occurred during the 1960s and the Civil Rights Movement. The reemergence of the Lost Cause narrative made it clear that the belief in Southern pride and heritage during the Civil War was a way to deflect Northern perspectives and the abolition movement, the same way it is later used to deny rights and freedoms to African Americans in the face of segregation and discrimination in the 50s and 60s.

²⁰ Towns, “Haunting the South for a Century and More,” 41.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

We have seen a bit on how and why the Lost Cause was constructed, but we have not yet looked into how racist ideology really informed this Southern dogma. At the end of the day, the Lost Cause was a defense of slavery. Historians have argued back and forth on the causes and precedents for the war, but the only part worth focusing on here is the way historians and thinkers have discussed the causes without addressing the racism that went into the decision-making process. Even before the 1950s you would be hard pressed to find an historian that did not acknowledge slavery as at least one primary motivation for the Confederacy. But what these historians fail to do is admit the gigantic role that slavery had in the Southern response to the war and how this was reflective of racist ideology and the overwhelming desire to maintain the institution of slavery. They admit that slavery was a driving force in the separation of North and South, but only as it pertains to economic freedom or states' rights. As William Barney discusses, "most Southern editors applauded any bold defense of slavery, and the most expedient course for the typical politician was a hard line on Southern rights."²³ And southern rights were exactly that, the defense and retainment of slavery.

Contrary to many beliefs, one of the main reasons the South was so persistent on maintaining slavery was the restrictions of immigration held by the North.²⁴ Since the North refused any large migration of freed Blacks, the South believed that as slavery became less and less economically viable, eventually the "inferior race would suffer a slow death by starvation," a popular view held by none other than famous confederate Jefferson Davis.²⁵ White Southerners desperately wanted to keep their slaves dependent and illiterate as they feared "a potential slave surplus."²⁶ Rather than simply wanting to maintain their economic system, "slavery was

²³ William Barney, *The Road to Secession; a New Perspective on the Old South* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 163.

²⁴ Barney, *The Road to Secession*, 68.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 69.

more crucial as a technique for race control than as a labor system. They wanted no part of a South in which Black slaves gradually monopolized the labor force.”²⁷ Not only was the South attempting to uphold white supremacy rather than economic stability, the North was actually benefiting economically from the removal of slavery as an economic institution. If anything, the decision to end slavery by the North was more about economics than the South’s decision to defend it. In this period after the 1960s, the racialized aspects of the Civil War dialogue become increasingly obvious. The construction of the Lost Cause narrative and the failure to recognize the effects of slavery largely stem from racist ideology and hostility towards African Americans, and the desire of both the North and the South to present the war as being about anything other than racism.

The roots of racism in the Civil War dialogue are seen clearly from Confederate and Southern historians from before the 1950s. Nehemiah Adams claims that “the most disastrous event to the colored people would be their emancipation to live on the same soil with the whites.”²⁸ They argue that “antipathy to their color would not diminish, and being the feeblar race, they would be subjected to great miseries.”²⁹ He cites a “looseness of morals” as well as an inferior mental state as the reason for their inferior status.³⁰ Adams argument is laden with racist beliefs about the nature of African Americans in his defense of slavery. This is not a unique take on the issue of slavery. E. N. Elliot defines slavery as “the duty and obligation of the slave to labor for the mutual benefit of both master and slave, under a warrant to the slave of protection, and a comfortable subsistence, under all circumstances.”³¹ Here the slave themselves are not seen as human beings, but the right to

²⁷ Ibid., 70.

²⁸ Nehemiah Adams, *A South-Side View of Slavery; or, Three Months at the South, in 1854* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1854), 119.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 121.

³¹ E. N. Elliot, *Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1860), vii.

their labor is a commodity owned by their master.³² The commodification of slaves was prevalent in both the North and the South.

In the early 20th century, KKK newspapers were heavily printed and disseminated throughout the nation. One issue of the newspaper, *The Fiery Cross*, featured a cartoon of a lynching by KKK members dressed in white hooded robes.³³ This issue was printed in 1923, over 50 years after the end of the War. Violence and ‘vigilante justice’ ran rampant in this period all the way through the 1960s and even later. This was in direct response to the inherent belief that whites were superior, and the violence was a reflection of their fear at losing this superiority. The lynching portrayed in this newspaper issue was meant not only to frighten Black readers, but also to ensure the dominance and control of whites over American society. This racism endured and grew after the end of the Civil War, largely because of confederate retellings of history and the creation of ‘race.’ Ira Berlin explains that “just as slavery had continually redefined notions of race, so notions of race would inform a new servitude.”³⁴ This is largely to do with the emergence of a “North-South dichotomy.”³⁵ The construction of Southern pride and the Lost Cause served to separate them permanently from the North, at least ideologically. In order to justify their cause and their role in the war, the South had to, in many respects, justify slavery, and the believed inferiority of African Americans. The disenfranchisement of African Americans was so prevalent in the period directly after the Civil War because racist convictions had become a deeply ingrained part of national discussions and education, largely thanks to Confederate historians.

³² Elliot, *Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments*, vii.

³³ *The Fiery Cross* (Indianapolis), February 02, 1923, 11th ed., sec. 9.

³⁴ Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 358.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 359.

Avery O. Craven argues that the breakup of the union was accepted on both sides. On the Southern side, they felt the breakup was a necessary step “for the preservation of their property, their self-respect, their rights, and the regard of their neighbors.”³⁶ For the Northerners, “the enslavement of human beings could not co-exist with the labor requirements of free enterprise.”³⁷ The argument here completely ignores the lives of the slaves themselves, rendering them an economic means to an end rather than recognizing them as human beings. The author goes on to say that “slavery had come to symbolize values in each of their social-economic structures for which men fight and die but which they do not give up or compromise.”³⁸ Although the argument does include discussion of slavery, it only does so in explaining the economic causes in the debate surrounding slavery.

The commodification of slavery and human bodies is seen clearly in the arguments against slavery in the period directly before the war. In the proceedings recorded from the Democratic Republican State Convention in Syracuse in 1856, an address is given to prevent the further spread of slavery. The address calls for the “end to the Slavery agitation,” by making “Kansas a Free State” and punishing those who are arguing for slavery.³⁹ The address is making the claim that to eradicate the tensions between the Northern and Southern states, the issue of slavery has to be resolved. They argue, however, that the “violence and lawlessness” between the sides is a result of their political conflict, but not once does the address mention the truly barbaric nature of slavery.⁴⁰ Rather, the statement often refers to slavery as “human

³⁶ Avery O. Craven, *A History of the South; The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861* (Texas: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 391.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Craven, *A History of the South*, 397.

³⁹ James Samuel Wadsworth and John D. Parsons, *Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Men: Proceedings of the Democratic Republican State Convention, at Syracuse, July 24, 1856: The Address and Resolutions, with a List of Delegates* (Albany: Printed by Order of the Convention, 1856), 8.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

servitude.”⁴¹ The authors criticize the spread of slavery and the continuation of the institution, but only in that it furthers the polarization between the North and South.

The address was written to oppose the presidential candidate Martin Van Buren. This debate became known as the Free Soil Movement. The authors of this address oppose this movement because they believe in there are free men on free soil, they will bring slavery with them anyways. They want the government to intervene in the restriction of slavery in the Northern/Western states. The address states that if Van Buren were to become president, “*Kansas is slave.*”⁴² The argument continued over the spread of slavery into the Northern states. Some did argue that slavery was an evil that needed to be contained and eventually eradicated. However, many others argued for this containment as a way to prevent the spread of African American slaves and ‘freedpeople.’

The Free Soil Movement was a direct discussion surrounding the existence of slavery, but at the same time had nothing to do with slaves at all. In the presidential elections of 1948 and 1952 both sides of the nation sought a remedy to the growing dispute over slavery and the tensions among the nation.⁴³ While both sides wanted to find a way to unite the country, neither was willing to advocate for the complete abolition of slavery, and rarely was slavery mentioned as a moral dilemma. At this point, slavery was causing issues within the nation that was making political and social life more difficult, but most importantly it was complicating the country’s economic interests. The majority of those who opposed slavery believed that it was “a threat to free labor, to free men, and to their cherished principle of equal opportunity for all men.”⁴⁴ Again, the argument against slavery is really an argument

⁴¹ Wadsworth and Parsons, *Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Men*; 6.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴³ Joseph G. Rayback, *Free Soil: The Election of 1848* (University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 307.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 308.

for free labor and the economic benefits that this entails. These two elections represent a critical moment in the history of slavery as the free soil and free labor proponents were some of the biggest supporters of abolition. However, even among these abolitionists their motives remain tied completely to the economy and slaves are seen as nothing more than a commodity that is less profitable than free labor. The North directly adopts the same arguments as the South in order to unite the nation under a single, more profitable economic system, free labor.

This economic theme is prevalent among many historians long after the end of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery. These historians do not really find the cause of the Civil War to be the Northern condemnation of slavery, but rather the economic service or threat that these slaves represent. Rather than focus on slavery as an institution that destroyed the lives of millions, it is represented as a transaction. Slaves were protected and given a stable life in exchange for their labor. This is deeply tied to the view of slaves as sub-human. Later historians like Thomas P. Govan address that “this fear of the Negro and the belief in his basic inferiority were the fundamental reasons for the Southern defense of slavery, not, merely the fact that the institution was profitable.”⁴⁵ This is seen clearly in Northern historians’ focus on the economic factors in explaining the war. Charles W. Ramsdell explained that although slavery was definitely a contributing factor, “the breaking of the power of the planting aristocracy opened the way for industry and commerce and the economic regeneration of the region.”⁴⁶ It was the potential economic benefits that really drove Southern secession and the Northern attempt to eradicate slavery. Even in a more recent historical account, John Ashworth describes the war as a “bourgeois revolution,” the North rebelling against the wealthy, aristocratic

⁴⁵ Thomas P. Govan, *Slavery and the Civil War* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1940), 537.

⁴⁶ Charles W. Ramsdell, “The Changing Interpretation of the Civil War,” *The Journal of Southern History* 3, 1937: 23.

‘Old South.’ He goes on to explain that through the industrial revolution, the North was aware that the implementation of machines rather than bodies for the majority of the labor would be more economically viable for the entire nation. The drive was to increase economic output and productivity through industry and machine.

These historians explain how the main factor in the Civil War was to destroy the system of slavery, but only so that the system could be replaced by an economic model that would be more efficient and beneficial for the country as a whole. The unification of the two sides was desired to promote industry and manufacturing during the very beginning of the industrial age. They acknowledge the rise of southern pride and nationalism, and how it occurred almost naturally in defense of losing economic and political rights to the federal government. But what almost all these historians fail to do is address how these decisions were deeply rooted in racist ideology and lack of sympathy for African American slaves. By failing to address the role of Southern ideology and racism in reconstruction decision and policy making, these historians further push the view of slaves as an economic commodity rather than human beings.

Through this emphasis on economic and political causes for the tensions between the North and the South, much of the attention to the harsh reality of slavery and its legacy has been lost. For example, “many Lost Cause orators proclaimed over and over how the war been fought over "constitutional liberty," The Confederacy was simply reclaiming it for the South.”⁴⁷ But these historians, both liberal and conservative, fail to address the truly harsh realities of slavery. In Frederick Douglass’ autobiography he describes the brutality and oppression of being Black in both the North and the South in the 1840s, claiming “that killing a slave, or any colored person, in Talbot county, Maryland, is not treated as a

⁴⁷Towns, “Haunting the South for a Century and More,” 4.

crime, either by the courts or the community.”⁴⁸ This is just an example that Douglass uses to explain the racism and discrimination that was manifested in every part of the nation, not just the South. He goes on to explain life on the plantation as well, and the brutality of his former masters.

So far, we have looked at historians who argue that slavery plays a central role, and those who put slavery on the backburner and focus more on the economic role slavery had in the Civil War. But what all of these historians fail to address is the role that this narrative played in the North as well as the South. Although they mostly agree that the narrative was constructed in the South as a rhetorical device to maintain pride and strength in the face of an embarrassing defeat, we can see that this historical memory is not preserved in isolation in Southern education or ways of thinking. All of these historians fail to mention the appeal that the Lost Cause had for Northern historians and thinkers as well. The war has been represented as two sides fighting for what they believe to be right. This constructed Civil War narrative appeals to both the North and the South because it exempts the South from the cruelty of enslaving thousands, and removes the North from blame for upholding racist institutions and policies. It allows the nation, as a whole, to move on from the War and slavery without confronting its lasting legacy. As much as the North had fought for abolition and emancipation, racism still ran rampant, as we can see from Frederick Douglass’ personal account. The South had removed themselves from the North so thoroughly based on ideology and history that the North had to appeal to them somehow.

The two halves of the nation were united in their defense of racism, the desire to keep white men in power, and the belief that economics were the real driving force in the war. As a united country they could overlook the racism inherent in thinking of the system in terms of commodity rather than the exchange of human

⁴⁸ Frederick Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave* (Boston: Published at the Anti-Slavery Office, 1847), 24.

bodies. The inferior and dependent status of black men and women in America was an inherent belief in many of these thinkers. Rather than deal with the consequences of slavery or try to mend the gap between white and black Americans, the Lost Cause became the unwritten history for the entire nation. They are still so intertwined in all aspects of American life, that we have been unable, as a nation, to overcome this narrative, and reclaim and readdress our historical memory.

This is seen clearly in the article “What Kids Are Really Learning About Slavery,” published by the Atlantic. A study was conducted on American students in middle and high school on their understanding of slavery and the civil war. According to the study, “among 12th-graders, only 8 percent could identify slavery as the cause of the Civil War, while “fewer than one-third (32 percent) correctly named the 13th Amendment as the formal end of U.S. slavery.” Huge discrepancies still exist between the races, and racism and discrimination still run amok. A huge part of the social issues in the United States stem from our historical memory and the failure as a nation to recognize the influence of the Lost Cause narrative and how this nation is built upon a series of lies, falsehoods, and injustices. The debate surrounding the historical tie between modern understanding and southern restructuring of history, has repeatedly and consistently ignored the realities of slavery and failed to change the way we perceive the past. America is a nation built on slavery, racism, and inequality, not simply because of our history with slavery, but because of historical, political, and social misrepresentation and inability to address and confront the past.

Praying for Peace: The Influence of Jesuit Values on Santa Clara Students During the Early Cold War (1945-1953)

Mary Claire Simone

Before the American public could breathe a sigh of relief at the end of World War II, the nation was caught up in another hostile standoff. The Cold War emerged out of the opposition between two domineering forces, the Soviet Union and the United States, whose political ideologies and visions for the postwar world clashed significantly. The Truman administration acted quickly to convince Americans of the threat that the Soviets' posed to peace, stability, and democracy in the world. Appealing to patriotism to rally public support for his foreign policies of containment and deterrence, President Harry S. Truman sought to unify the nation behind his "Truman Doctrine," Marshall Plan, the Selective Service Act of 1948, NSC 68, and other measures aimed at bolstering the country's national security and efforts overseas.¹

For undergraduates at Santa Clara University, however, the primary focus of the early Cold War centered not on the democratic exigency promoted by the government but instead on Jesuit concerns. Santa Clara's Jesuit objectives sponsored the creation of moral and engaged citizens enriched with an education in the humanities and Catholic principles advocating for peace, solidarity, and the protection of human dignity. Though Santa Clara strived to produce functioning democratic citizens, these students acted first as mindful, educated Catholics. While many other universities at the time succumbed to the "era of conformity"² and enforced undergraduates' support of the federal government, many students at Santa Clara remained critical of the government's actions and were bold enough to propose their own

¹ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (United States of America: Penguin Books, 1997), 82.

²Noam Chomsky, *The Cold War & The University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years* (New York: The New Press, 1997).

political agendas. They disagreed with aims of the government that did not align with the Jesuit agenda of peace, justice, and education, and instead demanded actions inspired by moral leadership. Therefore, the Catholic and Jesuit values that permeated the atmosphere of Santa Clara had a profound impact on the students' understanding, attitudes, and responses towards the early events of the Cold War.

The Catholic and Jesuit Atmosphere

Catholic and Jesuit values largely shaped the atmosphere at Santa Clara following the end of World War II. However, the campus was not immune to the altered demographics and postwar aftershock. The dramatic increase of enrollment during the early postwar years is primarily attributed to the influx of veteran students attending Santa Clara using the GI Bill. Veterans made up two-thirds of the student body in 1946,³ adding a distinct presence to campus that was jaded by their years at war and explained their overall disinterest in trivial clubs and functions on campus. The apathy veterans displayed toward school activities spilled over into their academics as well. Many veteran students already felt educated or only wanted training in fields of science that mirrored the "courses of a practical nature... taught in the armed forces."⁴ They complained that their liberal arts classes were not teaching them the skills and information necessary for the real world, and thus displayed a disregard for the value and importance of the humanities.⁵

In spite of many veterans' negative attitude towards Santa Clara's traditions and educational values, the university's administration, provoked by the repercussions of World War II, made a huge push to implement Santa Clara's Catholic and Jesuit objectives. The postwar years demanded expansion in both

³ Gerald S.J. McKevitt, *The University of Santa Clara: A History 1851-1977* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), 265.

⁴ "What's Wrong?" *The Santa Clara*, May 15, 1947.

⁵ Ibid.

housing and classes to accommodate for the increase in student registration. Similar advancements that took place at larger universities used this recovery time as an opportunity to secure federal funding by establishing the necessary framework for research programs in science and technology. Stanford, for example, was highly preoccupied with becoming a superior resource center for the government, equipped to handle the circumstances of the Cold War and future world conflicts.⁶ As a much smaller university with a lower probability of obtaining much federal sponsorship outside of the tuition stipends from the GI Bill, Santa Clara was not as heavily influenced by the needs of the government when crafting their development plans. Thus, during this time of change, “tradition reigned strong at Santa Clara and also in the religious order that guided almost every aspect of its development.”⁷ The recovery and expansion induced progress at Santa Clara that further promoted Catholic and Jesuit values through academic programs that emphasized religion and the humanities.

During the immediate postwar years, the university continued to enforce numerous religious requirements. Mandatory religious exposure included Catholic classes each semester, attendance at Sunday mass, retreats, and weekly chapel lectures.⁸ Additionally, standards of conduct did not tolerate any expression of attitude “that was ‘opposed to Catholic beliefs, or practices, or to the known attitudes of Catholic authorities.’”⁹ Thus, all activities on campus focused on reinforcing the tenets and beliefs of Catholicism in daily life.

Administrative efforts were most prominent in promoting proper education infused with the Jesuit mission of developing

⁶Rebecca S. Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997).

⁷ McKevitt, *The University of Santa Clara*, 269.

⁸ Santa Clara University (Calif.), “Bulletin / Santa Clara University,” University Records of Santa Clara University (Santa Clara, Ca: The University, 1944-1955).

⁹ McKevitt, *The University of Santa Clara*, 272.

moral character and emphasizing lessons from the humanities. The school bulletins from 1944-1953 outlined Jesuit education in terms of educating compassionate and intellectual men with the goal of creating virtuous and educated citizens.¹⁰ Stressing the importance of an educated mind and heart, the mission statement of Santa Clara University was “to mould men after the model of the Man-God and thus form them to serve their fellowmen, their country and their God.”¹¹ Fr. Hauck, president of the university from 1951 to 1958, considered intellectual excellence to include “professional competence, moral character, and the deepening of the supernatural life,”¹² concepts that strongly influenced the knowledge, opinions, and beliefs of Santa Clara students.

Santa Clara sought to preserve the importance of the humanities, which was especially threatened by the effects of the war and jaded attitudes of the veterans. In addition to protesting against compulsory military training so as to not “interrupt the education of the young men,”¹³ the university also campaigned for liberal arts education as an integral part of achieving peace.¹⁴ Fr. Gianera and Fr. Hauck, who served as successive presidents of Santa Clara University from 1945 to 1958, attended multiple national conferences to discuss and advocate for the importance of education and liberal arts. Following the United States’ entry into the Korean War, both attended conferences to champion higher education amidst the draft¹⁵ and discuss the timely topic of “American Leadership in Spiritual and Moral Values.”¹⁶

¹⁰ Santa Clara University (Calif.), “Bulletin / Santa Clara University,” 1944-1946.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Santa Clara University (Calif.), Office of the President, “Papers of Hermann J. Hauck, S.J., 1951-1958,” University Records of Santa Clara University, Santa Clara University, 1958.

¹³ “Dirksen Tells Reaction to Compulsory Training,” *The Santa Clara*, January 31, 1946.

¹⁴ “Father Hauck Attends Presidents’ Conference; Sessions Emphasize Liberal Education in Science World,” *The Santa Clara*, January 17, 1952.

¹⁵ “Fr. Gianera Attends Talks in Chicago,” *The Santa Clara*, February 22, 1951.

¹⁶ “College Educators to Meet on SCU Campus,” *The Santa Clara*, October 15, 1951.

The actions of university presidents and faculty members clearly resonated with the students, who covered these campaigns of devotion to humanities favorably in the school newspaper. Echoing these sentiments with their own gratitude for their superior liberal arts education, students expressed pride in Santa Clara's Jesuit focus and capacity to instill within them the moral foundation necessary to correctly address the problems of the world.¹⁷ Overall, their belief in the positive outcomes of the embodiment of their institution's objective gave students a profound appreciation for the power of education, identifying the accumulation of knowledge and morality as the "process whereby a man becomes human."¹⁸ Jesuit education thus instilled competence, compassion, and conscience within the students, and created informed citizens while developing Catholic moral character.

The combination of the administrative push for religion and crusade for humanities-focused education inspired the students of Santa Clara to value the importance of their Jesuit education as a means of developing sound moral judgement and critical knowledge, which encouraged them to seek ways to apply these skills. Thus, the atmosphere of the campus and promotion of Catholic and Jesuit values by the administration greatly influenced Santa Clara students. An article in the student newspaper written in October of 1949 states: "The college man is not a childishly proud person, avidly striving after his own egocentric disposition; he becomes a member of the organization, the university and modifies his temperament to that of the group."¹⁹ It is clear that the students conformed to the temperament of the institution of Santa Clara University by taking on the sentiments, values, and goals of the collective mission of Santa Clara. Specifically, the institution of Santa Clara University greatly influenced the students'

¹⁷ "Educational Choice," *The Santa Clara*, September 22, 1948.

¹⁸ "On Becoming Human," *The Santa Clara*, October 28, 1949.

¹⁹ "An Institution Falls Flat," *The Santa Clara*, October 5, 1949

understanding, attitudes, and responses toward the early events of the Cold War.

Understanding

*“There is a flame of alertness flickering on our campus”*²⁰

Following World War II, a majority of the students at Santa Clara displayed a general interest in understanding international events. Facts regarding the global situation were enforced in classes and lectures, where members of the faculty and the administration delivered messages concerning current events through Santa Clara’s Catholic and Jesuit worldview. The tinted information conveyed to the students resonated with their own views and opinions on the matter, as displayed through independent club activities and debate topics, and most prominently articulated in the students’ own description of the international situation.

Santa Clara students’ understanding of postwar conflicts were directly influenced by class content and the messages of lectures. As the university expanded after the war, the number of classes offered increased, noticeably in the history and political science departments.²¹ Courses between 1944 and 1953 included an explanation of the causes of World War II, the study of international organizations and examination of the potential for peace, and a comparative political analysis of problems in Russia and Asia.²² These courses and others allowed students to have intellectual discussions with professors regarding the current state of the world.

In addition to everyday classes, multiple lectures were given on campus concerning international affairs, including Fr. Hubbard’s popular series on postwar recovery in Europe and Asia. Specialized scholars and world travelers delivered firsthand

²⁰ “Safe in the Ivory Tower,” *The Santa Clara*, January 17, 1952.

²¹ Santa Clara University (Calif.). “Bulletin / Santa Clara University.” University Records of Santa Clara University, 1945-1953.

²² Santa Clara University (Calif.). “Bulletin / Santa Clara University.” University Records of Santa Clara University, 1946-1949.

accounts of war atrocities and ongoing conflicts, such as the communist revolution in China. The general purpose of these international lecture series was to outline “world conditions... and discuss the relationship of the Catholic student and adult to these conditions.”²³ These lectures described the global situation in religious terms and emphasized the importance of a Catholic response considerate of the pervasive suffering found in war devastated areas.

Another unique aspect of these lectures was their defiance of conformity to political support of the government, sentiments that were typically unspoken at other universities.²⁴ Many of these lectures criticized the federal government’s approach to foreign policy and expressed fear of a potential World War III. In 1949, one lecture by Fr. Hubbard went so far as to denounce American foreign policy as “silly.”²⁵ Faculty and speakers not only gave students the opportunity to further their understanding and nurture a passion for awareness, but also presented them with perspectives that decried efforts by the government.

The club activities and debates hosted by student groups reveal how receptive Santa Clara students were to the Catholic and Jesuit lens their classes and lectures used to describe the world. The student newspaper chastised the initial apathy instigated by the domineering presence of veterans in 1946 and advocated for passionate student involvement in on campus gatherings and engagement with global affairs. By 1948, the students began displaying a substantial desire for student-led discussion. A student news article titled “Need Seen for Active Political Clubs on Campus” articulated the students’ desire to develop as informed citizens with strong, Catholic inspired opinions.²⁶ In 1949, the

²³ James O’Neill, “Santa Clara Prepares for New Day of Recollection,” *The Santa Clara*, February 27, 1947.

²⁴ Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University*.

²⁵ “Fr. Hubbard Confers with Symington,” *The Santa Clara*, May 4, 1949.

²⁶ John Sherman, “Need Seen for Active Political Clubs on Campus,” *The Santa Clara*, April 15, 1948.

International Relations Club was formed, declaring its purpose “to stimulate interest in vital national and international problems through debates and lectures.”²⁷

Additionally, Santa Clara had multiple active debate clubs on campus, whose topics of contention displayed awareness to current world events and consciousness of potential developments in international relations while often reciprocating the criticism of governmental action voiced in lectures. Many debates centered on ways to overcome challenges to world peace²⁸ and which approach the United States should implement against the rise of communism.²⁹ During the Korean War, debate topics shifted heavily towards discussion of nuclear weapons,³⁰ the effects of war on education,³¹ and whether or not the United States should withdraw from international arrangements.³² The goal of these conversations was to develop a sound knowledge base that would allow for informed analysis of the global situation and ultimately inspire solutions to establish peace. Overall, the discussions of student-run organizations demonstrate how student opinions reflected of the content and tone given in their lectures and classes.

²⁷ “Formation of the IR Club Announced,” *The Santa Clara*, December 15, 1948.

²⁸ “No Decision in White Debate on Disarming,” *The Santa Clara*, December 19, 1946.

²⁹ “Senate Holds First Debate,” *The Santa Clara*, October 6, 1948.

³⁰ “Senate and House Continue Active Debating Program,” *The Santa Clara*, November 2, 1950.

³¹ Ibid.

³² “House Debaters Travel to St. Mary’s, Stanford,” *The Santa Clara*, May 3, 1951.



A cartoon image published in *The Santa Clara* in November of 1950 depicting Europe clinging to a cross to avoid drowning in a sea of communism. This image displays students' faith and reliance on religion to provide salvation to countries struggling against communism.³³

Coverage of international news by the student newspaper, *The Santa Clara*, reveals the most obvious influence of Catholic and Jesuit outlook on Santa Clara students. Nearly all of the articles concerning the rise of communism describe it as a challenge to Christianity rather than democracy. Titles such as "Reds' Influence Being Battled By Christians" and "The Vatican vs Kremlin" pave the way for both opinion and news pieces that depict the atheism of communism as a direct threat to Christianity such that "Christ and the Devil are locked in open battle."³⁴ Articles such as "Christ Shows Way to Peace" reference the messages of lectures with the assertion that the "Christian cause"³⁵ is the only hope for establishing lasting world peace. Thus, these articles call upon Catholic faith to actively combat the world evils that prevent peace.

³³ "Communism," *The Santa Clara*, November 2, 1950.

³⁴ Leo Bailey, "Bailey Analyzes the 'Cold War,'" *The Santa Clara*, January 18, 1949.

³⁵ "Editorial," *The Santa Clara*, April 15, 1948.

An overall desire to remain informed encouraged both exposure and discussion of foreign affairs on campus. Supported by faculty members, Santa Clara students were granted the liberty of having controversial discussions and voice critical opinions concerning world affairs that condemned the pursuits of political leaders. This was a rare freedom at the time, as many college campuses did not allow these discussions to formally take place. Stanford, for example, asserted “social conformity and political repressiveness”³⁶ by depriving undergraduates of political speakers and religious activity. Similar restrictions at the University of Pennsylvania kept students silent by convincing them that criticism was “so far out of the mainstream you did not talk to anyone.”³⁷ Under the environment of a Catholic and Jesuit institution, Santa Clara students’ understanding of the Cold War developed independently of the position of the federal government. Thus, Santa Clara provided students with an atmosphere conducive to the acceptance of Catholic and Jesuit imperatives over those of the government.

Attitude

*“Let us face reality with the proper attitude, the Catholic attitude.”*³⁸

The encouragement of Catholic and Jesuit values on campus was greatly responsible for shaping the attitudes of Santa Clara students by generating lofty goals of world peace and international justice. The student newspaper for the academic year of 1945-46 prominently exhibited the hopes of members of the faculty, administration, and student body for stability, demobilization, and lasting peace in the world. Since these hopes were rooted in Catholic and Jesuit tenets, the students developed demands for political action that were critical of the approaches of the federal government. Opinion pieces in *The Santa Clara* emphasized the

³⁶ Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University*, 228.

³⁷ Chomsky, *The Cold War & The University*, 176.

³⁸ “Editorial,” *The Santa Clara*, December 14, 1950.

United Nations over the U.S. government as the sole institution necessary for world peace,³⁹ the need for responsible international control of atomic power rather than the continuation of Truman's deterrence policy,⁴⁰ and the imprinting of moral values on world leaders.⁴¹ The student newspaper's requirements for peace stressed that "the moral character of the person, therefore, is of paramount importance,"⁴² which emphasized the students' belief in the integral role morality and religion would play in the successful establishment of a peaceful postwar world.

However, Santa Clara students' optimism regarding the possibility of peace waned throughout the years as communism persevered and efforts by the federal government failed to implement international stability. Thus, the hopes forged in Christian and Jesuit values led Santa Clara students to express worries about the rising influence of communism and frustrations with failings of government leaders to successfully establish peace and justice.

Between 1947 and 1950, *The Santa Clara* published many articles covering the advancement of communism, often articulating concerns about the expansion and power of the "totalitarian menace."⁴³ When Russia won control of Czech in 1948, the newspaper ran an article comparing the event to the beginnings of World War II,⁴⁴ indicating an alertness and fear for the potential of a third World War. In addition to external communist threats, the students were also worried about the presence of communists in the United States. Expressions of paranoia regarding a communist infiltration of the U.S. government were common on campus during the late 1940s. Further, articles published in 1949-1950 encapsulated the elevated

³⁹ Philip Patton, "International Parade," *The Santa Clara*, June 2, 1949.

⁴⁰ "Does the U.S. Lead in Atomic Power?" *The Santa Clara*, February 23, 1950.

⁴¹ "Peace Again," *The Santa Clara*, March 13, 1947.

⁴² "Christ Shows Way to Peace," *The Santa Clara*, February 19, 1948.

⁴³ "War Relief," *The Santa Clara*, March 4, 1948.

⁴⁴ "Another 1939?" *The Santa Clara*, February 26, 1948.

dismay of students, who were upset that peace remained elusive and anticipated another global war.

With these worries regarding the expansion of communism came a list of expectations put forward by the students to the national government to address the escalating problem and eventually reach the solution of peace. Failure to achieve these high expectations inspired dissatisfaction among the student body.⁴⁵ Many editorials in *The Santa Clara* reveal disgust with failed peace attempts and careless action by leadership in foreign relations. Others indicate a personal sense of helplessness many students felt towards productive action to peace.⁴⁶

On the eve of the Korean War, the students consistently displayed a loss of faith in the government's power. A reflective piece published in December of 1949 lamented the "loused up"⁴⁷ state of the world and expressed doubt in the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to enhance global conditions. After the Soviet Union developed atomic weapons, the student newspaper published articles questioning whether the United States had ever held nuclear dominance, ultimately doubting the power behind U.S. deterrence policy and expressing distrust in the government's capability to successfully manage nuclear weapons.⁴⁸

Between September 1950 and the ceasefire ending the Korean War in 1953, Santa Clara students experienced a dramatic shift in attitude. The initial optimism for peace that was consistently challenged since the end of World War II officially shattered when the United States entered the Korean War, and the Selective Service Act and Truman's declaration of emergency in December of 1950 reinstated the draft. Frustrations inspired by animosity and disgust towards the federal government escalated as a result of the draft laws and government actions; a large degree of


⁴⁵ Chomsky, *The Cold War & The University*.

⁴⁶ Bob Carmody, "A Real Doubt: Has Anyone A Workable Peace Plan?" *The Santa Clara*, March 8, 1950.

⁴⁷ John Igoo, "Dear Vince," *The Santa Clara*, December 7, 1949.

⁴⁸ "Does the U.S. Lead in Atomic Power?" *The Santa Clara*, February 23, 1950.

“loose talking and emotionalism”⁴⁹ present on campus indicated the students’ distress.



Both of these images, taken from successive graduation editions of *The Santa Clara* in 1951 and 1952 respectively, show Santa Clara graduates walking forward to receive their diploma and then their gun. These cartoons comment that graduates were susceptible to the draft and likely to be deployed to Korea upon their exodus of the university.⁵⁰

As the student newspaper noticed hope plummeting on campus due to the “cloud of war, fear, and doubt,”⁵¹ articles were written to combat the “swelling of frustration and pessimism”⁵² by rallying school spirit, increasing excitement for education, and promoting continued efforts to seek peace. The student reporters attempted to rein in negative emotions with messages imploring positive outlooks: “We need less protest against evil, and more

⁴⁹ “Father Hynes Explains Draft Deferment Tests,” *The Santa Clara*, May 3, 1951.

⁵⁰ *The Santa Clara*, June 16, 1951; *The Santa Clara*, June 14, 1952.

⁵¹ “Great Expectations,” *The Santa Clara*, September 13, 1950.

⁵² “Editorial,” *The Santa Clara*, December 14, 1950.

faith in human goodness... less reforming of others, and more transforming of ourselves; less talking about peace and more living the life of peace.”⁵³ These efforts of emotional management of Santa Clara students promoted positive attitudes by reminding students of the continued need to work towards Catholic and Jesuit goals of peace.

Response

*“The Solution must be had by simple labor done with a faith in God”*⁵⁴

Since Catholic and Jesuit values heavily impacted the understanding and attitudes of Santa Clara students, it is not surprising that the students’ responses to global affairs and recommendations for international actions were similarly inspired. Student reactions stemmed from their discontent with how the current crises were being handled, and so to redirect efforts towards their goal of world peace, the students suggested personal actions that conformed to Catholic and Jesuit standards of behavior, which consistently advocated for prayer and education.

What can now be considered the “Pray for Peace” movement at Santa Clara began in 1945, when renowned world traveler Fr. Hubbard gave a lecture to the students concluding that the world needs prayer.⁵⁵ Following that talk, articles published in the student newspaper instructed students that the “power of prayer”⁵⁶ would enlighten the world leaders, inspire Russian conversion, and ensure peaceful solutions to the world’s problems. Students were told that praying the rosary was “the first thing that we must do as Catholics”⁵⁷ to establish peace. Many articles in *The Santa Clara* guaranteed peace through “the explicit promise of Our Lady of

⁵³ “Faith Needed,” *The Santa Clara*, November 9, 1950.

⁵⁴ “The Younger Generation,” *The Santa Clara*, November 8, 1951.

⁵⁵ “Father Hubbard Proclaims Christian Principles as Only Hope for Lasting Peace,” *The Santa Clara*, December 13, 1945.

⁵⁶ “A Victory for Prayer,” *The Santa Clara*, April 22, 1948.

⁵⁷ “Another 1939?” *The Santa Clara*, February 26, 1948.

Fatima”⁵⁸ and called for “the Christians of the world to unite in the practice of devotion.”⁵⁹ Therefore, students’ understanding of world affairs in terms of a religious battle greatly influenced their ideas for solutions.

The 1949-1950 academic year saw the largest devotion to prayer to counter the growth of communist influence and solve world conflicts. Rising fear and frustration toward the national government's inability to quell the rise of communism and establish peace four years after the end of World War II escalated the intensity of the students’ prayer initiative. Articles titled “Fatima, You and the Rosary” appeared in multiple editions of the student’s newspaper, articulating the imperative for the students to combat their feelings of helplessness with prayer.⁶⁰ Additionally, this was the first school year that knew of Soviet atomic power. One article, titled “Lent, H-Bomb, and You,” approached the sense of fear and helplessness inspired by the possibility of nuclear annihilation with the calming suggestion of prayer.⁶¹

Alongside the prayer movement, an increasing devotion to the uniquely Jesuit education offered at Santa Clara gained momentum during the early years of the Cold War. Students’ Catholic duty was constantly called upon during charity drives and extended into their daily lives through their political actions. Lectures and clubs encouraged students to communicate their informed opinions to their congressmen. In addition to referring to voting as a Catholic tenet,⁶² writers in the student newspaper often implored the student body to make educated decisions while voting. Students were reminded to vote for “Christian principles,”⁶³ and thus their civic actions were predominantly driven by religious values rather than democratic incentives.

⁵⁸ “Editorial,” *The Santa Clara*, April 15, 1948.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ “Fatima and the Rosary,” *The Santa Clara*, February 23, 1950.

⁶¹ “Lent, H-Bomb, and You,” *The Santa Clara*, February 15, 1950.

⁶² “Absentee Ballots,” *The Santa Clara*, October 3, 1946.

⁶³ “It’s Your Country,” *The Santa Clara*, February 26, 1948.

Awareness of world events was considered a necessary component of education at Santa Clara. One particular editorial from 1948 adamantly addressed the need for engaged students:

Perhaps it is an ideal situation for the student to withdraw from the world for four years to study the ideas and events of man's past. But today's world is far from ideal. And the almost daily occurrences of world-shaking events does not permit the cloistered retreat for the man who next year or the year after must go out into the world to face the situation as it exists.... He must know what their policies are and how they have evolved. He must be able to criticize and to assume leadership if necessary.⁶⁴

More than ever before, Santa Clara students realized the direct connection between their education and their own capacity to establish a better postwar future. Acknowledging this fact enhanced their appreciation for the Jesuit education, which nurtured knowledge and faith and inspired societal application.

Once the Korean War began, the shocked and disheartened students altered their actions to world situations. Virtually no articles were published that promoted prayer as a solution, and all calls for donations were replaced by pleas for participation in blood drives to send to U.S. soldiers on the front lines. The student body turned away from prayer and based their responses solely in the acquisition of education. The students argued that educated leadership, defined in Jesuit terms by "conscientious concern"⁶⁵ and enlightened diligence to the global circumstances, was essential for the instigation of peace. Thus, the newspaper compelled each student to fulfill their obligation as "a responsible Catholic man"⁶⁶ to properly utilize their voting rights and to take

⁶⁴ John Sherman, "Need Seen for Active Political Clubs on Campus," *The Santa Clara*, April 15, 1948.

⁶⁵ "Citizen Students," *The Santa Clara*, September 13, 1950.

⁶⁶ "Register! It's Your Right," *The Santa Clara*, February 21, 1952.

the initiative to write to their congressmen regarding the “discriminating and illogical” draft laws.⁶⁷ Additionally, the student newspaper increased the number of publications encouraging students to remain passionate and engaged in their education. These articles served to remind students of the importance of remaining focused on their studies and taking full advantage of the educational opportunities currently denied to their counterparts serving in Korea.

Immediately following the end of World War II, students and other members of the university advocated extensively on behalf of the power of prayer to solve the world’s crises; however, the faith and support of this movement did not survive the initial impact of the Korean War. During the same time period, an even larger campaign was launched to support the importance of attaining a Jesuit education to develop compassionate, competent, and conscientious citizens, which persevered throughout U.S. involvement in Korea.

Conclusion

The distinct characteristics of the Catholic and Jesuit environment at Santa Clara University provided the students with a unique experience during the early events of the Cold War. Due to the absence of restrictions posed by political conformity, which influenced other universities at this time, Santa Clara students were given the opportunity to cultivate their own understanding, attitudes, and responses towards world affairs during this volatile period. The combined effects of this freedom coupled with the Catholic and Jesuit atmosphere of the campus encouraged students to reflect the values of their academic institution, regardless of the position of the national government. Pieces published in the student newspaper indicate the deep impression Santa Clara’s Catholic and Jesuit values had on the students’ outlook and

⁶⁷ John Maloney, “How About A GI Bill For World War III Vets!” *The Santa Clara*, March 8, 1951.

reactions to world events leading up to and throughout the Korean War. Above all, these articles illustrate the confidence the students felt towards the power of faith and knowledge to bring individuals to “arrive at correct conclusions”⁶⁸ and trust that “education that will mean victory or defeat.”⁶⁹

⁶⁸ “What Value Catholic Education?” *The Santa Clara*, September 13, 1950.

⁶⁹ “Editorial,” *The Santa Clara*, December 12, 1950.

The Reagan Era's Effect on Hip Hop (and Vice Versa): How Hip Hop Gained Consciousness Pablo Lopez

DISCLAIMER: *This work includes explicit language. Any explicit content within this paper are solely the opinions of the respective artists or writers and are not reflective of my personal opinion.*

We cannot underestimate how far Hip Hop has come in the last 40 years. Since its birth in the late-1970s, Hip Hop has consisted of four elements: Disc Jockeying (DJing), Emceeing, Breakdancing, and Graffiti. Some these elements have been disbanded over time, nearly to the point of extinction, but there is no questioning the weight that is carried by the Emcees today. Rappers are today's rock stars, surpassing the boundaries of recorded music and finding success as actors, television stars, businessmen and businesswomen. Rap has soared to become the popular music of today, shattering sales, billboards, and becoming a global phenomenon. It is hard to imagine the music industry without the influence of rap music. However, the average listener may know strikingly little about its roots or the influential artists who have paved the way for Hip Hop to become what it is today.

One of the bridges connecting Hip Hop and jazz is the way both genres were solely the products of their respective environment. Hip Hop is inextricably linked to both the experiences of its artists and the history in which it arose. As jazz arose from its pioneers, notably Scott Joplin, Buddy Bolden, and Jelly Roll Morton, it blended Spanish, French, and Anglo-Saxon roots with the rhythms derivative of Africa, and presented it under the traditions of classical music.¹ Jazz began in the red light districts of Storyville, New Orleans among the prostitutes, pimps, and gangsters. From studying jazz's transformations up to the

¹ Newton Francis, *The Jazz Scene* (New York and Oxford: Da Capo, 1975), 41.

1960s, we can begin to understand just how far Hip Hop has travelled in the past 40 years.

In the 1970s, Hip Hop was birthed by its forefathers, DJ Kool Herc, Grandmaster Flash, and Afrika Bambaataa, in the district of South Bronx, New York City. The young genre, carried by predominantly Black and Latino communities, became known for its fast tempo rhyme schemes, danceable break beats, and flashy, unique fashion. Hip Hop's sphere of influence grew as did its knowledge and breadth of its influences. DJs sampled the likes of James Brown, Sly & the Family Stones, Isley Brothers, and Chic, while Emcees rapped over instrumental breaks. However, Emcees' subject matter remained rather limited to the party culture it was surrounded by until the release of Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five's "The Message." The feature 1982 solo track stamped its mark on Hip Hop containing the popularly repeated famous line "It's like a jungle sometimes, It makes me wonder how I keep from going under."² This recording is perhaps the most influential early hip-hop record to shine light on the everyday experiences of urban-based African-American youth.³ Thus began the tradition and obligation of Hip Hop artists to include political, social, and cultural commentary within their lines.

This political fervor came to fruition in the Reagan Era, an extremely transformative era for the American economy and culture. In the simplest terms, the country transformed alongside the country. Hip Hop found the full breadth of its commercial capabilities with the release of The Sugar Hill Gang's "Rapper's Delight" in 1982. In the mid-1980s, its net-worth was further unleashed, skyrocketing artists such as RUN DMC, Beastie Boys, and Whodini to commercial success. But in the late-1980s, Hip Hop gained a consciousness that it had yet to receive through the Black Nationalist, Afrocentric artists KRS-One (of Boogie Down

² Melle, Melle, and Duke Bootee, *The Message*, Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five. Sylvia Robinson, Sugar Hill, 1982, CD.

³ Mark Anthony Neal, "Postindustrial Soul: Black Popular Music at the Crossroads," *That's the Joint: The Hip-Hop Studies Reader*, no. 2 (New York: Routledge, 2012): 488.

Productions) and Public Enemy. Boogie Down Productions' *By All Means Necessary* (1988) served as a prelude of sorts to perhaps the most influential Hip Hop album of this era, Public Enemy's *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back* (1988). Hip Hop was still a product of its environment - the environment simply changed drastically. Within the backdrop of the Reagan Era, Hip Hop's adoption of a political consciousness in the late-1980s would be a justified, important, and extremely pertinent narrative telling of the environment which surrounded Hip Hop's artists.

Black Nationalism and Afrocentrism in Hip Hop were in no way limited to KRS-One and Public Enemy; rather, it was these two groups who became the most widespread vocal advocates for many of the issues relating to their social environments. Perhaps one of the most crucial mistakes of those unfamiliar with Hip Hop history is qualifying their music as "gangster rap." Although both "gangster rap" and Black Nationalist rap emerged at virtually the same time, they are far from interchangeable. Music historian Greg Dimitriadis calls the emergence of both subgenres at the same time "an ironic and uncomfortable reality,"⁴ namely because of the stark disparity of subject matter between the two subgenres, muddling a unified message and creating an extremely double-sided image for Hip Hop outsiders. Dimitriadis is not alone, as one of the founding fathers of Hip Hop, Afrika Bambaataa, stated an adjacent opinion in a 1993 interview:

Before, we had people that was teaching, in New York...you had Public Enemy, you had KRS, and they was [painting] pictures that was waking up the people. Then [gangster rap] came from the West Coast, which, I'm sorry to say, was

⁴ Greg Dimitriadis, "Hip-Hop: From Live Performance to Mediated Narrative," *That's the Joint: The Hip-Hop Studies Reader*, no. 2 (New York: Routledge, 2012): 588.

negativity. Those are still my brothers, but they was teaching negativity.⁵

“Gangster rap” came to define the times as N.W.A. (Niggaz With Attitude) would release *Straight Outta Compton* in the same year as *By All Means Necessary* (1988). The West Coast group garnered the full attention of media outlets, shedding negative light on Hip Hop music as a whole. However, the works of KRS-One and Public Enemy would prove to be much different, a phenomenon that was “waking up the people” by iterating real, ground level issues pertaining to the politically and socioeconomically suppressed environments that the artists KRS-One and Public Enemy considered themselves products of.

To better understand this environment, we must step into the late-1980s, a time period not so different from the present-day. The decade became defined by the United States’ first celebrity president, California’s own Ronald Reagan. Kevin Phillips, author of *The Politics of the Rich and Poor*, critiques Reagan’s administration: “The 1980s were the triumph of upper America - an ostentatious celebration of wealth, the political ascendancy of the richest third of the population and a glorification of capitalism, free markets, and finance.”⁶ The 1980s were a critical time in which many of the disparities that already existed in America were further separated. Reaganomics legislation functioned off the basis of trickle-down economics, awarding tax cuts for the wealthy and big business in an effort to stimulate the economy. However, taxes would increase and benefits would evaporate for poor America, pinning a Black underclass into poverty. At the same time, white-flight promoted the growth of suburban America, furthering racial and economic isolation into the suburban white pockets and the

⁵ Ben Westhoff, *Original Gangstas: Tupac Shakur, Dr. Dre, Eazy-E, Ice Cube, and the Birth of West Coast Rap* (New York: Hachette Books, 2016), 228. Afrika Bambaataa interview at Columbia University October 1993.

⁶ Kevin Phillips, *The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990), xvii.

urban black pockets. One of these urban black pockets was the South Bronx, the birthplace of Hip Hop. Hip Hop did not originate from the ripest fruits of the 1980s, but grew out of the shadows of neglect, the underclass, which Reagan's administration deemed a worthy sacrifice for the rest of America to flourish. This was the legacy forced upon Hip Hop.

Boogie Down Productions (BDP) burst onto the Hip Hop scene in 1987 with their debut album *Criminal Minded*. The group, KRS-One and DJ Scott La Rock, quickly garnered a wide following as well as much controversy among other rap groups. KRS-One, the self-proclaimed Teacha, used *Criminal Minded* as a platform to establish not only BDP's rap credibility but the credibility of the South Bronx as the birthplace of Hip Hop, as told in the tracks "South Bronx" and "The Bridge Is Over," alluding to the misinterpretation of Queensbridge as the birthplace. Today, South Bronx as the birthplace is nearly universally accepted among artists. Although *Criminal Minded* is the most crucial to Hip Hop's evolution, it was BDP's next album *By All Means Necessary*, started later that year, that contained most of the grunt work of KRS-One's politically commentative subject matter.

Perhaps one of the biggest reasons for KRS-One's revolution of subject matter was the fatal shooting of his partner and mentor Scott La Rock five months after the release of *Criminal Minded*. The loss of Scott La Rock brought BDP's career to a brief hiatus, but the release of *By All Means Necessary* on May 31, 1988 ended this silence and introduced a new image for the group. The album name and cover directly referenced Malcolm X, reflecting a new militant, black nationalist aesthetic which KRS-One would come to embrace. The iconic cover shows KRS peering through the shades of a window, holding an Uzi in his right hand as Malcolm X did with his rifle in the iconic *Life* magazine shot in March 1964. As KRS-One alludes many times in *Criminal Minded* to his metaphorical armed and dangerous rapping abilities, KRS was now armed with a new purpose for *By All Means Necessary*, tackling the physical barriers that KRS and the Black community faced.

KRS opens many dialogues in *By All Means*, beginning with the tributary single “Stop the Violence.” This single served as a tribute to Scott La Rock, bearing the same name as a music industry movement that began after his death, preaching a message against black-on-black crime. But from the beginning, “Stop the Violence” contrasts from the movement before it as KRS discusses not black-on-black violence, but the political machines behind war:

Social studies will not speak upon political crooks
It's just the presidents, and all the money they spent
All the things they invent, and how their house is so
immaculate
They create missiles, my family's eating gristle.⁷

Instead of focusing on media portrayal of violence in America's urban cities, KRS builds a parallel between the way we perceive war. In “Stop the Violence,” the government funded military build-up is just as violent as the black-on-black crime that garners media attention. In the midst of Cold War America, KRS-One's narrative is an extremely important one. As America pointed a finger at the American underclass for their violence, KRS points one right back at our own government, using underclass taxes to fund the arms race while “[his] family's eating gristle.” KRS-One's questioning of authority recurs again and again in *By All Means*, as he moves to the effectiveness of the police force and legislators. Police authority would become one of the more prevalent themes in Hip Hop music to come, most notably in the highly controversial single “Fuck Tha Police” by N.W.A. In “Illegal Business,” KRS questions police, pharmaceutical companies, and legislative branches of their practices:

⁷Boogie Down Productions, “Stop the Violence,” in *By All Means Necessary*, KRS-One, 1988, CD.

The police department, is like a crew,
 It does whatever they want to do
 In society you have illegal and legal,
 We need both, to make things equal
 So legal is tobacco, illegal is speed,
 Legal is aspirin, illegal is weed
 Crack is illegal, 'cause they cannot stop ya,
 But cocaine is legal if it's owned by a doctor
 Everything you do in private is illegal,
 Everything's legal if the government can see you.⁸

In questioning what drugs are considered legal, KRS-One alludes to the use of crack, an epidemic that infested urban communities throughout the United States. In his eyes, legislation that qualifies certain drugs as illegal unjustly targets people of color in urban neighborhoods. KRS's top-down vision, examining the legislative institutions creating our laws, allows him to see the prejudice underlying within the system. This system causes turmoil for the urban black communities in the form of incarceration and drug addiction. This incarceration became highly prevalent during Reagan's continuation of the War on Drugs, in which mandatory minimum sentences prosecuted offenders using crack cocaine excessively in comparison to offenders who used powder cocaine. This campaign specifically targeted poor black communities to eradicate the use of specific drugs like crack cocaine while maintaining the lax prosecution of others - those "owned by a doctor." The War on Drugs would continue to be a topic of discussion for many other Emcees who experienced its effects first hand throughout the 1980s. Although he was not the first Emcee to speak on the War on Drugs, KRS-One's controversial subject matter continued the pattern of proactivity and consciousness in Hip Hop music. He quickly

⁸Boogie Down Productions, "Illegal Business," in *By All Means Necessary*. KRS-One, 1988, CD.

became a voice of reason for urban listeners, earning his nickname “The Teacha.” *By All Means Necessary* is important in the narrative of Hip Hop because it is indeed the album that KRS became “The Teacha,” a title that persists to this day. His informativeness and commanding ethos brought a consciousness to Hip Hop that was previously not seen. Only one month after *By All Means*, another authoritative voice would emerge, creating an album recognized not only as one of the most influential in Hip Hop, but in American music.

Within the template of Reagan’s arch-conservative America, the release of Public Enemy’s *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back* in June 28, 1988 was perhaps one of the scariest phenomena of the late 1980s. Following up their debut album *Yo! Bum Rush the Show!* (1987), Public Enemy would create a counter-culture narrative that continued much of what KRS-One left on the table. As Public Enemy’s publicist Bill Stephney once said, “Hip-Hop was not just a ‘Fuck you’ to white society, it was a ‘Fuck you’ to the previous Black generation as well.”⁹ *Nation of Millions* embodied this to the core, clearly distinguishing Hip Hop into the Post-Civil Rights Era and becoming a new outlet of representation for Black people.

Public Enemy’s lead Emcee, Chuck D, would call Hip Hop “the black CNN” in years to come.¹⁰ The group’s obligation to inform the urban black public through music would be their greatest strength. *Nation of Millions* demanded authority with their political and social commentary that was nearly as dense as the sonic wall of sound that Public Enemy created within their instrumentals. *Nation of Millions* was a nonstop attack from front to back, beginning with the album art.

The album art showed Chuck D and Flavor Flav behind bars with the Public Enemy logo - a black man in the crosshairs of a gun scope - above them. Through their simple imagery Public

⁹ Bill Stephney, *The Search for Identity* (Harlem, New York, 1992).

¹⁰ Quoted in Mark Anthony Neal, “‘The Message’: Rap, Politics, and Resistance,” *That's the Joint: The Hip-Hop Studies Reader*, no. 2 (New York: Routledge, 2012): 435.

Enemy directed attention towards mass incarceration of African-Americans which grew from 87,000 in 1985 to 169,500 in 1990, nearly double in just five years.¹¹ Upon buying the album, consumers stared at the issue in the face, reminded that Public Enemy, as Black leaders, were not exempt from these trends. In the track “Terminator X to the Edge of Panic,” a sample of Minister Louis Farrakhan is heard proclaiming, “The federal government is the number one killer and destroyer of Black leaders!”¹²

On multiple occasions, the voice of Minister Farrakhan and other Islamic leaders is heard in *Nation of Millions*. Public Enemy were members of the Nation of Islam, unapologetically proclaiming their teachings and presenting themselves with their signature militancy. Minister Farrakhan, one of the most prevalent Nation leaders, was a vital reason for the Nation of Islam’s growth among Black communities in the 1980s. The Nation’s message was instilled within the very fabric of Public Enemy’s music, adding the political fervor of the teachings of Malcolm X, Farrakhan, and Marcus Garvey to name a few. But despite the heavy Black Nationalist firepower behind them, Public Enemy made clear that they were not concerned with continuing the Civil Right Movement. *Nation of Millions* did not open a dialogue between them and America, but rather they used history to completely denounce the government as revealed in the lyrics of “Party for Your Right to Fight”:

This party started right in '66
With a pro-Black radical mix
Then at the hour of twelve
Some force cut the power and emerged from hell
It was your so-called government that made this occur

¹¹ Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, *Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear*. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1985, 1990.

¹² Public Enemy, “Terminator X on the Edge of Panic,” in *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back*. Chuck D, Rick Rubin, Hank Shocklee, 1988, CD.

Like the grafted devils they were.¹³

P.E. spins-off of Beastie Boys' popular song title "Fight For Your Right to Party" to reference the suppression of the Black Panther Party (created in 1966) by the U.S. government. He calls this government "grafted devils" in reference to the Nation of Islam's Doctrine of Yakub, claiming black asiatics as the original humans and white people as "grafts" off of the black population. The potency of Minister Farrakhan's Pro-Black rhetoric is not shied away by Chuck D, whose anti-government stance points to the heart of the issue: Black people do not have just representation in America. As evidenced by the suppression of the Panthers, Public Enemy now carried the flame, vowing to continue the work of the Panthers and oppose the white supremacy of the U.S. government. The anti-government stance stretches further, as Chuck D advocates for Reagan's impeachment in "Rebel Without A Pause":

Impeach the president, Pulling out the raygun (Reagan)
Zap the next one, I could be ya shogun.¹⁴

This simple rhyme is evidence of Public Enemy as perhaps the first Hip Hop group to completely utilize their platform for political commentary. Through music, they became extensions of the same movement as KRS-One's "Teacha" platform, raising their audiences' awareness of issues around them. This recognition of power and responsibility is undoubtedly what made Public Enemy so effective to Black listeners. Pro-black radicalism was the megaphone that informed black listeners of why their conditions in America were they way they were. For Public

¹³ Public Enemy, "Party for Your Right to Fight," in *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back*. Chuck D, Rick Rubin, Hank Shocklee, 1988, CD.

¹⁴ Public Enemy, "Rebel Without a Pause," in *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back*. Chuck D, Rick Rubin, Hank Shocklee, 1988, CD.

Enemy, the great majority of black oppression was America's continued possession of black bodies.

In "Night of the Living Baseheads," P.E. continues a conversation started a month earlier by KRS-One: drug infestation in urban America. Baseheads, users of free-base cocaine, were portrayed as horror film monsters possessed by drug addiction. This possession is best articulated by Dr. Khalid Abdul Muhammad in the opening of the song when he says, "Have you forgotten that once we were brought here, we were robbed of our name, robbed of our language. We lost our religion, our culture, our god...and many of us, by the way we act, we even lost our minds."¹⁵ For Public Enemy and Dr. Muhammad, drug addiction is a continuation of the physical possession of black bodies initially brought forth by slavery. "Night of the Living Baseheads" as an antidrug statement not only tells of the dangers of drug use but the dangers of drug dealing, a self-destructive vice-grip on the Black community. Chuck D identifies another form of physical possession comes from the army recruits targeting African-Americans. Chuck D recalls getting a recruit letter in "Black Steel in the Hour of Chaos:"

I got a letter from the government the other day
I opened and read it, it said they were suckers
They wanted me for their army or whatever
Picture me giving a damn, I said never
Here is a land that never gave a damn
About a brother like me and myself because they never did
I wasn't with it but just that very minute it occurred to me
The suckers had authority.¹⁶

¹⁵ Public Enemy, "Night of the Living Baseheads," in *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back*. Chuck D, Rick Rubin, Hank Shocklee, 1988, CD.

¹⁶ Public Enemy, "Black Steel in the Hour of Chaos," in *It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back*. Chuck D, Rick Rubin, Hank Shocklee, 1988, CD.

Army recruits targeting young black men would often present a military career as a “way out.” Upon receiving a recruit letter, Chuck D’s expression in “Black Steel,” like KRS, examines a prejudiced system from the top-down. As America “never [gave] a damn” about him in the past, he finds no reason to give a damn about serving in a war on their behalf. To Chuck D, army recruitment is yet another outlet which suppresses black people under a white government, putting black bodies in the unconcerned, disposable role as the frontliners in America’s wars. Although the “suckers had authority,” Chuck D attempts to dismantle this authority by informing the public, stressing the consciousness and questioning of the institutions around them. This theme persists throughout the whole album.

Nation of Millions is not just a series of political commentaries over instrumentals. Public Enemy desired to create an institution of Black empowerment. In studying this purpose, Mark Anthony Neal writes, “Chuck D’s call for truth, justice and a black nationalist way of life was perhaps the most potent of any political narratives that had appeared on a black popular recording. Public Enemy very consciously attempted to have hip-hop serve the revolutionary vanguard, the way soul did in the 1960s.”¹⁷ The tradition of soul artists like Gil-Scott Heron and Marvin Gaye took it upon themselves to not only entertain, but to educate listeners of the socio-political issues around them. This spirit, present in the same records that created Hip Hop, is carried by the Black Nationalist works of KRS-One and Public Enemy.

The instilling of a clear ideology within Hip Hop music effectively marked the genre as what Todd Boyd calls an “alternative institution.”¹⁸ Marking the end of the Civil Rights movement, the Hip Hop of the late 1980s crafted the genre into an institution that has taken it upon itself to remain conscious, inform, and educate, launching America into what Todd Boyd boldly calls

¹⁷ Mark Anthony Neal, “Postindustrial Soul,” 142.

¹⁸ Todd Boyd and Yusuf Nuruddin, “Intergenerational Culture Wars: Civil Rights vs. Hip Hop,” in *That's the Joint: The Hip-Hop Studies Reader*, no. 2, 440.

“The Reign of Hip Hop.”¹⁹ We should not take it as coincidence that the genre’s pinnacle transformation happened in the late-1980s. Reagan’s America made clear the great divides that plagued America: White and Black, rich and poor. Hip Hop artists took it upon themselves to transform the genre from a commercial institution to a conscious institution. Artists such as Ice Cube in the 1990s, Mos Def and Talib Kweli in the 2000s, and Kendrick Lamar in the present day have continued the work of this institution.

In concluding, I am reminded of a stanza from Amiri Baraka’s poem “Black Art” written in 1969:

We want “poems that kill,”
Assassin poems, Poems that shoot
Guns. Poems that wrestle cops into alleys
And take their weapons leaving them dead.²⁰

In the grand scheme of American Black Art - beginning with the blues, jazz, stretching to soul, rhythm and blues, transcending into motown, funk, and disco - Hip Hop birthed from the combination of all Black Arts, sampling music of the African-American traditions and speaking a new breed of poetry. When Baraka craved “poems that kill,” he may have been craving the sounds of Public Enemy: militant, defiant Black Nationalist power that stand opposed to the authorities put before them. More than 40 years into Hip Hop’s history, we are led to examine if the works of KRS-One and Public Enemy still hold weight. Are we struggling with the same issues they faced? If so, who is continuing the flame? Whether or not we are still living in “The Reign of Hip Hop” is solely reliant on the consciousness of its artists.

¹⁹ Todd Boyd, *The New H.N.I.D. (Head Higgaz In Charge): The Death of Civil Rights and the Reign of Hip Hop* (New York, NY: NYU Press), 2004.

²⁰ Amiri Baraka, *The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader*, ed. William J. Harris (New York, NY: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1991), 219.

Rape as an Act of Genocide: Definitions and Prosecutions as Established in Bosnia and Rwanda

Bailey Fairbanks

Rape and other acts of gender violence have been a contributing factor in all examples of modern genocide. However, it wasn't until the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda prosecuted Jean Paul Akayesu that rape was officially considered a genocidal act. During the 1990s as both the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) were being held there were a number of breakthrough charges and convictions. These tribunals redefined the way that acts of sexual violence during genocide were legally classified.

Despite huge changes in the conceptualized relationship between sexual violence and genocide, these changes have been less radical in their implication for prosecution. Since the trials in the 1990s, there have been fewer than fifty convictions of sexual violence in relation to genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes and fewer than one-hundred charges brought against people for these crimes. Although we have since seen examples of mass sexual violence during genocide in places like Darfur, it has not been prosecuted on the same scale as Bosnia or Rwanda. The ICTY and ICTR set precedents for the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence in times of genocide, creating new definitions that recognized the severity and interrelatedness of sexual violence and genocide. By exploring the historical setting, the demands of activist groups and intellectuals, and the events of the genocides in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the circumstances of the time lead to the establishment of these precedents. However, since these precedents were set, prosecutors have not used them to prosecute similar crimes in other times of genocide or ethnic cleansing. It is due to the rigid nature of these definitions, a general sense of skepticism about the classification of sexual violence as an act of genocide, and a disregard toward the unique experiences of sexual

assault victims in genocide that the precedents set by the ICTR and ICTY have not been applied to more current examples of genocide.

As a foundation it is important to understand how sexual violence aligns with other forms of genocidal violence. While most modern scholars agree that rape is a form of genocidal violence and can be considered either a tool of genocide or weapon of war, there is some debate surrounding the place sexual violence has within genocide. Scholars like Martin Shaw and James E Waller argue that sexual violence is merely a tool used to perform a larger genocidal goal. Shaw writes, “Genocide seeks out all vulnerabilities’ and sexual violence may be a form of vulnerability in a specific context.”¹ Similarly Waller argues that sexual violence is merely one of the many processes through which the characteristic “othering” of genocide can take place.

In contrast to these views, scholars such as Joan Ringleheim and Dagmar Herzog argue that sexual violence is a reflective coordinate of genocide that is directly related to societal views of certain groups. Ringleheim examines female experiences of sexual violence during the Holocaust and concludes that the cases of sexual violence were directly related to “sexism and the division of social roles according to biological function,”² which put women at a disadvantage. Herzog made a similar connection between the treatment of homosexual men during the Holocaust and the Nazi’s “cultural attitudes and practices of sexuality”.³ However, she does take it a step further, considering sexual violence as soul murder. Soul murder equates the deliberate traumatization or deprivation by the perpetrator to the severity and finality of murder. In this way the victim is robbed of her identity and thus is damaged in a way Herzog argues in equivalent with other acts of genocide including murder.

¹ Robin May Schott, “‘What is the Sex Doing in the Genocide’: A Feminist Philosophical Response,” *European Journal of Women's Studies* 22, no. 4 (2015): 400, accessed Fall 2017, Women's Study International.

² Ibid., 401.

³ Ibid., 402.

The scholarly argument that most closely aligns with the views of the ICTY and ICTR are those of scholars such like Catharine MacKinnon and Kelly Dawn Askin, who emphasize sexual violence as an integral component of genocide. MacKinnon argues that not only is sexual violence a key genocidal function, but that it has a greater capacity than other forms of violence to damage the targeted groups. She writes that when rape occurs, “a specific tool of domination is selected...When men rape and do not kill, or rape and then kill, or kill and then rape, the same is true in genocide.”⁴ MacKinnon makes the argument that rape is as genocidal and often more impactful than other acts of genocide like murder. Dawn Askin supports this argument by positing that sexual assault satisfies all five components of the definition of genocide as described by the United Nations.

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- A. Killing members of the group;
- B. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- C. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- D. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- E. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.⁵

⁴ Catharine MacKinnon, “Genocide’s Sexuality,” in *Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 210.

⁵ “United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.” United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.html>.

Legally, this is the argument made by the ICTY and ICTR when the decision to prosecute acts of sexual violence as acts of genocide.

Although sexual and gender violence were important aspects of both the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, Bosnia was the first case of widespread systematic rape as an organized part of genocide. Theorist Pascale R. Bos acknowledges that “the most significant incidents of large-scale rape were reported in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-93.”⁶ Weitsman explains the relationship of sexual violence to genocidal killing as she states, “In the case of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, wholesale slaughter of identity groups went hand in hand with forced impregnation campaigns. These policies, undertaken for the purpose of actually eliminating, biologically, an ethnic or religious group.”⁷ Bos points out that it is difficult to know the exact number of cases of sexual violence, but the estimates range anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000. These number reflect the women who were raped during the forced impregnation campaigns as well as women who were raped to negate their perceived honor or societal position. Genocidal rape is as deeply tied to identity and societally constructed values as genocidal killings are to racial or religious identities. Weitsman continues, “Policies of sexual violence in wartime are predicated on these conceptions of gender roles within the larger context of ethnic identity.”⁸ Genocidal rape is unique in its intersectional consideration of ethnic identity and gender roles as many other genocidal acts are predicated much more singularly on religious or ethnic identities.

⁶ Pascale R. Bos, “Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape: Berlin, 1945; Yugoslavia, 1992-1993,” *Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 31, no. 4 (Summer 2006): 1012, accessed Fall 2017, Historical Abstracts with Full Text.

⁷ Patricia A. Weitsman, “Constructions of Identity and Sexual Violence in Wartime: The Case of Bosnia,” in *Genocide and Gender in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Amy E. Randall (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 121.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 123.

While Bosnia was the first case of mass rape as a function of perpetuating genocide, it the breakthrough case of The International Criminal Tribunal involved no charges related to genocide. Doris Buss describes the case saying, “The decision by the Yugoslav tribunal in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic was the first case where the charges related solely to sexual violence crimes, though genocide charges were not pursued.”⁹ Although charges of genocide were not pursued, this landmark case, in conjunction with the similar cases in Rwanda, sanctioned that perpetrators can be charged with crimes that did not directly involve death or end of life. These men were charged with crimes such as rape and enslavement and these crimes were classified as crimes against humanity and war crimes. Previously crimes of this nature were viewed as honor crimes and were not prosecuted at the larger trials, if they were prosecuted at all.

It is important to note that the decisions to prosecute crimes of sexual violence did not stem directly from the ICTY or ICTR, but from feminist activists who pushed for these crimes to be taken seriously and prosecuted in a way that acknowledged the severity. The decision to prosecute crimes of sexual violence as crimes against humanity and war crimes during the ICTY did not come directly out of ICTY leader’s motivations. Feminist activists were not alone in this fight as many scholars were also pushing for a reform of the UN’s policies. Bos recalls their fight, “From 1992 on, when increasingly more reports on these rapes became public...feminists in the Balkans as well as in the rest of Europe and the United States started calling for intervention.”¹⁰ Feminist sociologist such as Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis argued that nationalism and its ideologies are deeply rooted in gender ideologies. This correlation between nationalism and gender ideologies was the foundation for the argument that genocide in

⁹ Doris Buss, “Making Sense of Genocide, Making Sense of Law: International Criminal Prosecutions of Large-Scale Sexual Violence,” in *Genocide and Gender in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Amy E. Randall (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 282.

¹⁰ Bos, “Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape,” 1012.

not solely motivated by nationalism or a desire for ethnic purity but also by gender ideologies.

The argument inextricably linking nationalism and gender ideologies made by Anthias and Yuval-Davis, was used as a platform for the argument that the rape campaigns in Yugoslavia were the effects of nationalism and gender working together toward a genocidal cause. In the early half of the 1990's as the violence in Yugoslavia and Rwanda was unfolding, many activists were appealing to the international community to take the crimes of sexual violence seriously and to prosecute them appropriately. Catharine MacKinnon wrote an article in *Ms. Magazine* arguing that the rape should be seen as genocide. A year later, in 1994 Alexandra Stiglmayer published *Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia*, focusing on the role rape plays as a function of genocide. It is largely through this activism and the attention that it garnered that rape was prosecuted as a legitimate crime and act of genocide during the ICTY and ICTR, shaping international humanitarian law.

Alongside Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic, the two cases from Rwanda that helped shape the precedent for prosecuting rape in genocide are Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu and Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko. Jennie E. Burnett describes the importance of the Akayesu case saying, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established sexual violence as an explicit strategy of the genocide and yielded the first judgement of rape as a genocide crime in an international court."¹¹ The case against Akayesu was the first case in which rape was prosecuted as a crime of genocide and a crime against humanity. Originally, he was not indicted on any charges related to sexual violence. However, after hearing the testimonies of multiple women who spoke openly about rape, even when the questions did

¹¹Jennie E. Burnett, "Rape as a Weapon of Genocide: Gender, Patriarchy, and Sexual Violence in Rwanda," in *Genocide and Gender in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Amy E. Randall (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 147.

not pertain to rape or sexual violence, that the court decided to amend Akayesu's indictment. Usta Kaitezi writes,

In a hearing held on 17 June 1994, prosecution counsel submitted an oral motion to amend Akayesu's indictment. In justifying the amendment prosecution witnesses expressed that the testimonies of Witness J and H had helped the prosecution to link the evidence on rape and sexual violence to the actions of the accused.¹²

It is this ruling that is used to create the guidelines for prosecuting rape as crime against humanity and a crime of genocide.

The Trial Chamber outlined guiding definitions that state when rape and crimes of sexual violence can be considered acts of genocide or crimes against humanity. The Trial Chamber states that sexual violence and rape, "constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such."¹³ This meant that as long as the crimes of sexual violence were in accordance with the United Nations definition of genocide and any of the five components of genocide outlined in the definition the crimes can be prosecuted as crimes of genocide. Similarly, the Trial Chamber set out specific guidelines for the prosecution of sexual violence as crimes against humanity. The Chamber wrote, "Rape and sexual violence constitute crimes against humanity as long as they are: (a) part of a widespread or systematic attack; (b) on a civilian population; (c) on curtailed catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial, or religious grounds."¹⁴ These definitions lay out

¹² Usta Kaitezi, *Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence: The Legacy of the ICTR, Rwanda's Ordinary courts and Gacaca Courts* (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014), 128.

¹³ Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Indictment Documents (International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda September 2, 1998).

¹⁴ Ibid.

the possibilities for determining acts of sexual violence as either genocidal or crimes against humanity.

These guidelines were applied directly to the case against Pauline Nyiramasuhuko. Much like Akayesu, Nyiramasuhuko was charged with acts of sexual violence as part of her participation in the genocide. The groundbreaking aspect of this case was Nyiramasuhuko's gender. Nicole Hogg and Mark Drumbl wrote about the case saying, "Nyiramasuhuko is the ICTR's only female accused. She is, moreover, the only woman tried and convicted by an international tribunal for the specific crime of genocide and the only woman tried and convicted by an international tribunal for rape as a crime against humanity."¹⁵ This ruling welcomed a whole new level of reform into international humanitarian law, as well as domestic law, as a woman was being charged with rape. Indicting a woman on these charges challenges the traditional perpetrator/victim narrative. However, it is important to note that the Chamber failed to prosecute or convict Nyiramasuhuko for genocidal acts of sexual violence.

This failure works to set a precedent of on some level, by prosecuting Akayesu's crimes as acts of genocide and Nyiramasuhuko's crimes as crimes against humanity this establishes a difference in severity between the acts carried out by these perpetrators, adhering to the societal narrative of perpetrator and victim along gender lines. Although prosecutors were able to hold Nyiramasuhuko accountable for genocide and sexual violence separately, the failure to prosecute her for the crimes in relation to each other, like they had done with Akayesu, speaks to an inability to view similar crimes carried out by men and women as equal in severity and implication. Nyiramasuhuko was involved in acts of sexual violence in very proximal ways to those Akayesu was tried for, but the charges brought against Nyiramasuhuko were

¹⁵ Nicole Hogg and Mark Drumbl, "Women as Perpetrators: Agency and Authority on Genocidal Rwanda," in *Genocide and Gender in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Amy E. Randall (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 199.

differentiated. At times, when reading the case notes and the Chamber's comments it seems as though they were unable to see Nyriamasuhuko's crimes as independent acts and focused heavily on the influence of male leaders around her rather than acknowledging her autonomy and her ability to make decisions independent of those around her.

By establishing the precedent of adhering to gender roles and set ideologies of perpetrator and victim in the Nyriamasuhuko ruling, that the breakthroughs in genocidal definitions made during the Akayesu and Nyriamasuhuko cases are ultimately stunted. The rigid nature of the definitions created by the ICTY and ICTR, a general sense of skepticism about the classification of sexual violence as acts genocide, and a disregard toward the unique experiences of sexual assault victims in genocide upholds the less nuanced accounts of victims and perpetrators as established in previous genocides. Joshua Kaiser and John Hagan examine the issues with these accounts stating, "Accounts of mass atrocities habitually focus on one kind of violence and its archetypal victim, inviting uncritical, ungendered misconceptions: for example, rape only impacts women; genocide is only about dead battle aged men."¹⁶ These misconceptions continue on even after the Trial Chambers in Rwanda and Yugoslavia created the possibility of prosecuting crimes of sexual violence in a legitimate way.

This issue is twofold. In the feminist attempt to urge the international community to prosecute rape appropriately the focus often centered on female only narratives of sexual violence and victim only narratives of female participation in the war, which in turn was mirrored at the ICTY and ICTR. Although the majority of people subject to sexual violence during both genocides were women, there were cases of male focused rape and sexual violence, but often these cases go unreported or untried. Bos discusses the

¹⁶ Joshua Kaiser and John Hagan, "Gendered Genocide: The Socially Destructive Process of Genocidal Rape, Killing, and Displacement in Darfur," *Law & Society Review* 49, no. 1 (2015): 69, accessed Fall 2017.

implications of neglecting these narratives writing, “In the end, by focusing exclusively on the victimization of women in this conflict, feminist analyses suggest all women were victims and only victims, and therefore by definition not participants in the war.”¹⁷ Left out of this critique by Bos is the compounding neglect of men as victims, by forcing women into a victim only narrative and men in a perpetrator only narrative there is a disregard for cases that oppose these narratives.

Working in tandem with simplification of victim and perpetrator narratives is the misunderstanding of the legal requirements for genocidal rape or rape as a crime against humanity. Kaiser and Hagan highlight this and tie it to the simplification of victim narratives, “Yet even experts who accept these arguments [rape as a form of genocide] in theory have trouble understanding how- and therefore when- such violence is genocidal. Absence of the genocide label reduces humanitarian and political aid, changes legal requirements, hinders public and scholarly understandings, and all but invalidates survivors’ experiences.”¹⁸ This lack of understanding and its consequent underuse of the classification have tangible effects on survivors of more contemporary genocides.

Turning to Darfur for evidence, we see that although there are high numbers of cases of sexual violence carried out during the genocide, none of these crimes are being classified as crimes of genocide. According to the International Criminal Court in Darfur (ICC), the current investigations that started in 2005 revealed crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, rape was only classified under war crimes and crimes against humanity and the court documents only refer to the rape of women in the charges brought against perpetrators.¹⁹ However, in many people’s testimonies, including women’s, the rape that they recall is perpetrated against men and boys. In the article, “Gender-

¹⁷ Bos, “Feminists Interpreting the Politics of Wartime Rape,” 1020.

¹⁸ Kaiser and Hagan, “Gendered Genocide,” 70.

¹⁹ “Darfur, Sudan.” International Criminal Court. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur>.

Based Violence Against Men and Boys in Darfur: The Gender-Genocide Nexus,” it is written that one, “21-year-old Masaleit woman recounted a key method of emasculation: rape. Rape preceded and followed murder, and groups of soldiers and Janjaweed typically used penile penetration or objects, such as sticks and gun barrels, against groups of Darfuri men.”²⁰ Throughout the article the authors provide countless testimonies that echo these experiences, men and boys raped by soldiers in order to emasculate and humiliate them.

Through not recognizing these acts of rape legally in the same way acts of rape and sexual violence against women are recognized, the ICC is only deepening the resistance to recognize the nuances of the roles of perpetrator and victim. Kaiser and Hagan comment on this saying, “Such arguments encourage dangerous assumptions that only women experience sexual assault, that only men perpetrate it, that only women interpret it and that women experience no other victimization.”²¹ It is through these rigid interpretations of victim and perpetrator roles and how those roles are in conversation with societally constructed gender roles that the prosecution of gender and sexual violence during genocide is being stunted.

Although there were major breakthroughs in international humanitarian law at the end of the 20th century, these breakthroughs continue to be inhibited by strict interpretations of gender roles and victim and perpetrator roles. These strict interpretations work together with the misunderstanding of the policy laid out by the ICTY and ICTR to restrict the use of sexual violence as a crime of genocide in more contemporary examples. It seems that unless it is as clear cut as the Akayesu case, meaning the man in power inflicts rape and sexual violence on women in the victim group, there is an international hesitation to prosecute

²⁰ Gabrielle Ferrales, Hollie Nyseth Brehm, and Suzy McElrath, “Gender-Based Violence Against Men and Boys in Darfur,” *Gender & Society* 30, no. 4 (August 2016): 573, accessed Fall 2017, Women's Study International.

²¹ Kaiser and Hagan, “Gendered Genocide,” 81.

crimes of sexual violence as acts of genocide. If the narrative strays even slightly, like in the case of Nyriamasuhuko, the international community is unable to reconcile the preconceived notions of gender roles and victim/perpetrator leaving them unable to hold perpetrators accountable for their crimes in the appropriate way. This hesitation is seen again in the ICC for Darfur's prosecution of sexual violence. Those that they are holding accountable are men who raped women, although there is evidence to support the systematic rape of men as a form of emasculation before and after their deaths. By viewing men as victims to male perpetrator the genocide in Darfur strays from the typical narrative and therefore forces the international community to recognize that their rigid definitions of genocidal crimes do not hold up to the realities of genocide.

Why the United Nations Cannot Stop Genocide

Cooper Scherr

Upon the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the United Nations was founded as an organization dedicated to preserving the postwar peace throughout the world. Ironically, the UN's conception marked the beginning of a chaotic postwar era marked largely by brutal violence and conflict in nearly every corner of the globe. During this new era of violence, two genocides occurred in the 1990s that truly demonstrated the UN's inability as a global organization to keep the peace. First, following Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power in Serbia and the splintering of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, ethnic tensions led to genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1992 to 1995, Bosnian Serbs—with the support of Milosevic's government—used genocidal tactics against Bosniak Muslims in their efforts to carve out territory for ethnic Serbs. Meanwhile, in 1994, Hutu extremists in Rwanda mobilized a quick, popularized campaign of genocide against the Tutsi minority, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans. The bloodshed in both Bosnia and Rwanda occurred in the presence of UN peacekeeping forces who—despite their mission to prevent the violation of human rights—proved very incapable of stopping the killings.

In the aftermath of Bosnia and Rwanda, it was clear that the United Nations, as a slow, reactionary bureaucracy, failed to effectively combat the genocides. The UN's approach to the genocides was ineffective because of its aversion to military confrontation and an overall lack of organizational will to fully intervene. This lack of will stemmed from the reluctance of UN member nations to contribute to peacekeeping operations, and thus, the UN could not exert any influence throughout the world while possessing such little influence over its own members. Therefore, the UN served as a scapegoat as human rights violations went unpunished, when in reality, as a cumbersome bureaucracy with

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little support from its sovereign member states, it was in no position to be defending the world from such evil.

The futility of the United Nations' responses to the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides stemmed from errors in policy and action. As the violence in Yugoslavia escalated in the early 1990s, the United Nations implemented policies that it hoped would limit the spread of the conflict. First, in September 1991, the UN passed Resolution 713, which placed an arms embargo on Yugoslavian territories.¹ Then, in 1992, the UN stationed a peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), in Bosnia so as to protect the civilian population from becoming casualties of the war. Finally, the UN continued to pursue a "negotiation process aimed at convincing the 'warring parties' to settle their differences."² These policies all failed to achieve the UN's goal of establishing peace in the region, and if anything, allowed the Serbs to continue their campaign of genocide. For instance, the arms embargo "froze in place a gross imbalance in [Bosniak] and Serb military capacity" and left the Bosniaks "largely defenseless."³ Thus, the blockade was "naïve and destructive... provid[ing] a major advantage to Serbian aggressors" and "play[ing] a key role in undermining the Bosnian state."⁴ Meanwhile, the UN desperately sought to appear impartial in the conflict by giving UNPROFOR a strict mandate to provide "only military assistance for humanitarian missions."⁵ This mandate placed "UNPROFOR in the impossible position of [being] a formally neutral force 'protecting' ... [the Bosniaks]," and clearly demonstrated the UN's

¹ James Mayall, *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 66.

² Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 259-260.

³ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁴ T. David Curp, "Human Rights and Wrongs in Failed States: Bosnia-Herzegovina, the International Community, and the Challenges of Long-term Instability in Southeastern Europe," in *Failed States and Fragile Societies: A New World Disorder?* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2014), 31.

⁵ Mayall, *The New Interventionism*, 75, 72.

reluctance to forcefully stop Serb aggression.⁶ UN squeamishness played right into the Serbs' hands, causing "the 'peace process' [to become] a handy stalling device" for the Serbs, and allowing them to appear cooperative while continuing the genocide in Bosnia.^{7,8}

United Nations policymaking for the situation in Rwanda was similarly misguided. After the Rwandan Civil War, a UN peacekeeping force—United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)—was deployed to prevent the country from slipping back into war. UNAMIR's rules of engagement "allowed [the peacekeepers] to intervene and use... deadly force to prevent crimes against humanity," but upon President Habyarimana's sudden death and the resulting Hutu power grab, the UN seemed to forget about UNAMIR's stated rules of engagement.⁹ According to UNAMIR commander Romeo Dallaire, in a call to the UN offices in New York, his superiors informed him "that UNAMIR was not to fire unless fired upon—[they] were to negotiate and, above all else, avoid conflict."¹⁰ This hasty retreat at the first sign of conflict mirrored the UN response in Bosnia, and was due in large part to the fact that few UN policymakers "even possessed firsthand experience of Rwanda."¹¹ "There was no room for a detailed understanding of the [situation in Rwanda] on the two-page briefing papers given to high-ranking officials" and thus, Dallaire's repeated requests for more troops and permission to intervene were denied.¹² Unlike Dallaire, UN officials in New York could not see how "5,000 troops could have saved 500,000 lives," and therefore held UNAMIR to a strict policy of non-confrontation, which

⁶ Diana Johnstone, *Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO, and Western Delusions* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 113.

⁷ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 260.

⁸ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 138.

⁹ Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2003), 229.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 229.

¹¹ Michael N. Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 58.

¹² *Ibid.*, 59.

effectively served as a death sentence for hundreds of thousands of Rwandans.¹³ Thus, misguided UN policies in both Bosnia and Rwanda allowed for the proliferation of genocide.

The United Nations' grave policy errors were made even more evident through the actions—or lack thereof—of UN forces on the ground. Due to the UN's preference to avoid military confrontations at all costs, the few steps UNPROFOR and UNAMIR took were “always of limited value and reactive.”¹⁴ For example, one UNPROFOR mission was to establish a no-fly zone in Bosnia, so as to limit the Serbs' crushing military advantage over the Bosniaks—an advantage enhanced, ironically, by the UN-imposed arms embargo. However, continuous Serb violations of the no-fly zone demonstrated UNPROFOR's inability to carry out its own mission, prompting NATO to step in to enforce the directive; upon NATO's intervention, Serb airpower was neutralized and the tide of the war changed.¹⁵ UNPROFOR commanders in Bosnia would also at times call for air support, “but whereas action could only be effective if taken within minutes, clearance... took 6 hours.”¹⁶ Likewise, during the siege of Sarajevo, Serb forces prevented UNPROFOR from securing the city's airport as a means of delivering humanitarian aid to the city's inhabitants. Meanwhile, French president Francois Mitterand highlighted UNPROFOR's inadequacy by paying an unexpected visit to war-torn Sarajevo that sent a bold political statement to the Serbs and prompted them to relinquish control of the airport soon after.¹⁷ UNPROFOR's biggest failure in Bosnia, however, was allowing Serb forces commanded by General Ratko Mladic to capture the designated safe area of Srebrenica and proceed to murder thousands of Bosniak men and rape Bosniak women and

¹³ Kurt Mills, *International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa: Responsibility to Protect, Prosecute, and Palliate* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 57.

¹⁴ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, 91.

¹⁵ Ibid., 132.

¹⁶ Ibid., 139.

¹⁷ Ibid., 94.

girls. According to Hasan Nuhanovic, a survivor of Srebrenica, upon Serb occupation of the city, “the Dutch [peacekeepers] just stood there” while the “Serb soldiers... push[ed] the men and boys away from their sisters, wives, [and] children.”¹⁸ In fact, the Dutch were so keen on avoiding conflict that they decided “to actually throw [the Bosniaks] out” of their base in Srebrenica.¹⁹ “[The UN peacekeepers] were supposed to protect [the Bosniaks] from the Serbs,” but instead, they pushed “about 20,000 people... outside the base,” abandoning them to the Serbian soldiers.²⁰ Over the next few days, the peacekeepers ignored the signs of the atrocities that were taking place in their vicinity: gunshots coming from fields where the Serbs were keeping Bosniak men; countless Bosniak bodies; reports of the widespread raping of Bosniak women. Despite these signs, UNPROFOR did nothing to stop the Serbs. The failures of UNPROFOR in Bosnia demonstrated the UN’s naïveté in avoiding combat, for “Serbian leadership [would] not respond to reason, but only to coercion.”²¹

In Rwanda, meaningful action from Romeo Dallaire and his UNAMIR peacekeeping force was also lacking. UNAMIR was a ragtag force of around 2,500 peacekeepers—most of whom lacked proper equipment—that hardly resembled a capable military unit. Unsurprisingly, UNAMIR received a constricting mandate that hampered the force’s ability to operate in Rwanda both prior to and during the genocide. For example, Dallaire and his forces could do little but watch as a string of political assassinations occurred in early 1994 and the *Interahamwe* militia units began to increase their activity. When Dallaire finally obtained permission to conduct weapons searches in the region, “the restrictive terms of UNAMIR’s mandate, including that any such operations be done in cooperation with the police,” meant that “few weapons were

¹⁸ Hasan Nuhanovic, “Srebrenica: A Survivor’s Story,” interview by Joe Rubin, *PBS Frontline*, March 28, 2006.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, 93.

found.”²² Once the genocide in Rwanda commenced, UNAMIR’s inefficacy became even further pronounced. The day after President Habyarimana’s death, Hutu militiamen stormed the compound of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana—which was under the protection of Belgian and Ghanaian peacekeepers—assassinated the prime minister, and then proceeded to kill and mutilate the bodies of ten Belgian peacekeepers assigned to protect Uwilingiyimana. The peacekeepers had not fired a single shot. Just as the Hutus had planned, the shocking murder of the European peacekeepers prompted a Belgian “cry for either expanding UNAMIR’s mandate or immediately pulling out” of Rwanda.²³ In the eyes of the world, the current UNAMIR peacekeeping force was incapable of effectively controlling what was becoming a bloody hell in Rwanda. Member nations did not have the stomach for further UN casualties and thus, most UNAMIR forces withdrew from Rwanda, while the remaining peacekeepers were still instructed to avoid military confrontation. On their way to the Kigali airport, the withdrawing Belgian troops refused to protect thousands of Rwandans desperately pleading for help—a fitting portrait of the role the UN ultimately played in Rwanda.²⁴ Thus, the many failures of UNPROFOR and UNAMIR in action reflected the overarching flaws in UN policy.

The passive, ineffective nature of the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Rwanda sprung from the fact that UN interventions lacked the full support of UN member nations. The United Nations is an organized political body of separate, sovereign states. It draws its power and influence from these member nations, yet possesses no concrete power over them. Thus, UN action is dictated by the will of its members, none of whom were particularly eager to commit resources or troops to potential interventions in Bosnia and Rwanda. According to UNAMIR commander Romeo Dallaire, “UN force commanders... depended

²² Mills, *International Responses*, 62.

²³ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 332.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 353.

on the generosity of donor nations for both troops and equipment.”²⁵ With most nations “peacekeepinged out,” it was no surprise that UNAMIR looked like a ragtag force compared to the “clean-shaven, well fed, and heavily armed” European commandoes who oversaw the hasty evacuation of expatriates from Rwanda.²⁶ The nation most fatigued by UN peacekeeping was the United States. After decades of foreign wars and many ill-fated interventions—Vietnam, Lebanon, and the most recent, Somalia—the United States was weary of its Cold War role as international policeman. In addition to their own foreign endeavors, the Americans had also contributed heavily to UN actions, and by 1994, “Congress owed half a billion dollars in UN dues and peacekeeping costs.”²⁷ Thus, the United States “had tired of its obligation to foot one-third of the bill for... an insatiable global appetite for mischief and an equally insatiable UN appetite for missions.”²⁸ It was time to share the burden of global policing with European nations and other UN members. However, the United States’ role as Cold War superpower and its history of interventions in the latter half of the 20th century had established the Americans as the face of the West. Passing the baton to Europe would not be so easy. Thus, the United States’ unwillingness to act in Bosnia and Rwanda played a key role in deterring UN action.

Initially, Bosnia represented Europe’s chance to prove it could function outside the Americans’ shadow. At the outset of the war in Bosnia, the leading members of the UN—the United States, Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom— “were... not inclined to support firm UN action in the Balkans”—in most cases of UN intervention, “firm action” meant U.S. involvement.²⁹ Instead, “their view was that the Europeans should take the lead.”³⁰

²⁵ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 84.

²⁶ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 353.

²⁷ Ibid., 341.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Mayall, *The New Interventionism*, 65.

³⁰ Ibid.

Indeed, the Europeans “[had] a more sophisticated historical knowledge of the region” than the Americans, and there existed fears that, should the U.S. jump in, it would “pursue ahistorical policies that would not achieve the desired result” in Bosnia.³¹ However, as the situation in Bosnia deteriorated, it became clear that the relatively new European Council was unable to stabilize the situation. Thus, all eyes turned to the United States to help prevent a “possible spillover effect on other countries in the region.”³² “The Europeans were waiting for American leadership... but [would not] get it for three years.”³³ Haunted by its past interventions, the United States looked to avoid engaging in the conflict at all costs, and “the one-word bogey ‘Vietnam’ became the ubiquitous shorthand for all that could go wrong in the Balkans.”³⁴ Despite the fact that “authentic intelligence analysis in the earliest days of the war corroborated the existence of [the Serbs’] genocidal plan,” the U.S. did not want to end up sending “thousands of body bags... [to] a new Vietnam.”³⁵ Thus, the Americans did not contribute any troops to UNPROFOR. The lack of American troops in UNPROFOR indicated that the force was more of an obligatory UN response to Serb atrocities rather than a staunch UN commitment to stopping the genocide.

In regard to the crisis in Rwanda, more recent history served to deter U.S. action and craft the tepid UN response. Less than a year prior to the Rwandan genocide, U.S. casualties in Somalia at the Battle of Mogadishu had horrified the American public and severely affected the United States’ will to intervene in similarly unstable areas. Therefore, “when the reports of the deaths of the ten Belgians came in, it was clear [to the Americans] that it was Somalia redux,” and the United States did not want to get roped in

³¹ James B. Steinberg, “History, Policymaking, and the Balkans,” in *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 239.

³² Ibid., 242.

³³ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 325.

³⁴ Ibid., 284.

³⁵ Edina Becirevic, “Genocide in Eastern Bosnia,” in *Genocide on the Drina River* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 85; Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 284.

to another Somalia.³⁶ The Belgians wanted out of Rwanda too, and upon the withdrawal of the Belgian element of UNAMIR, Dallaire was left with the scraps of his already minimal force. In the hopes of avoiding a situation where the U.S. military would have to come to UNAMIR's aid, the United States advocated the complete removal of UNAMIR from the chaotic situation in Rwanda.³⁷ Therefore, rather than convincing the UN to send reinforcements, Dallaire's chief problem became convincing the UN to allow UNAMIR to stay. The Belgians' and Americans' responses to the situation in Rwanda were evidence of the fact that "for most countries, serving the UN's objectives has never seemed worth even the smallest of risks."³⁸ Therefore, "it was undoubtedly difficult for most states to imagine sending their troops into a demonic space where killings were accumulating in record numbers."³⁹ Thus, the U.S. refusal to intervene in Rwanda did not cause the failure of the UN mission. Rather, it demonstrated just how unpopular UN peacekeeping missions were among member nations, and how reliant the UN had become on U.S. support for these missions.

When the dust settled following the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, it was clear that the United Nations' peacekeeping missions in both countries had resulted in failure. The noble UN commitments to peace and neutrality had rendered UNPROFOR and UNAMIR bystanders to genocide, despite their stated intent to bring stability and protection to the war-torn nations. Thus, the UN was the wrong organization/entity to lead the world in its efforts to curtail the violence in Bosnia and Rwanda. Having been founded in the aftermath of World War II, under the understanding that war was "the scourge of mankind, the worst of all 'humanitarian catastrophes,'" the United Nations could be considered the

³⁶ Ibid., 366.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 89.

³⁹ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 131.

antithesis of a martial organization.⁴⁰ Indeed, this was reflected in the naming of the peacekeepers. As the UN would have the world believe, the peacekeepers were not soldiers, but rather trained military professionals dedicated to protecting humanity from its greatest evil. Sadly, the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides demonstrated that, at times, prevention of humanity's greatest evil requires fighting fire with fire. Instead, the UN and its representatives—such as Brigadier General Henry Kwami Anyidoho, commander of the Ghanaian peacekeepers in Rwanda—remained committed to the idea that “negotiation [was] an effective mechanism for resolving conflicts,” something true of conventional conflicts between nations, not genocide.⁴¹ It also held that “neutrality in a conflict situation [was] a must for the peacekeeping forces,” failing to recognize that war rarely—if ever—leaves room for neutrality, especially for an intervening military force.⁴² Thus, the UN ethos of peace and neutrality spelled disaster for its military endeavors.

Years after the conclusion of the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides, the United Nations owned up to its shortcomings. In a self-critical UN report released in 1999, Secretary General Kofi Annan detailed the UN's grave policy errors and lessons learned with regards to the fall of Srebrenica, which served as a snapshot for UN efforts in Bosnia and Rwanda as a whole. The report admitted to a “philosophy of neutrality and nonviolence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia” and “criticize[d] those who negotiated with [Milosevic and Mladic] rather than using military force in the war's early stages.”⁴³ The UN therefore “[made] clear the inadequacy of [its] entire approach” and “the inadequacy of a system that allowed political considerations to color [UN] military

⁴⁰ Johnstone, *Fools' Crusade*, 3.

⁴¹ Henry Kwami Anyidoho, *Guns Over Kigali* (Woeli Publishing Services: Accra, 1997), 124.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Barbara Crossette, “U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre,” *New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1999.

decisions.”⁴⁴ Moving forward, the United Nations committed itself to avoiding the mistakes of Bosnia and Rwanda by recognizing “that a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel, or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means.”⁴⁵

The UN report thus criticized strict adherence to policies of peace and neutrality, but in order to preclude another Bosnia or another Rwanda, the United Nations needed to make further changes to its peacekeeping approach. First off, the United Nations needed to garner full support for peacekeeping missions from its member nations. As Brigadier General Anyidoho observed, “it is upon strong logistics support that any mission will succeed,” and this held especially true in Rwanda, where “UNAMIR was exposed to extreme danger through a fragile logistics support.”⁴⁶ Therefore, in order to improve the chances of success for future peacekeeping missions, UN member nations had to contribute more troops and money to the cause. In addition to material support, the peacekeeping missions required a higher level of commitment from contributors. Peacekeeping was not intended to become a political game where UN members boosted their political prestige by betting on easy, low-risk missions and then bailed at the first sign of hardship or danger. Rather, successful peacekeeping required that “the military... maintain morale in the face of extreme danger” and “have a strong will to... attain the command mission despite the associated danger and difficulties.”⁴⁷ Peacekeeping missions had made a joke of the United Nations in the 1990s; only by bolstering the strength and commitment of future forces could the UN improve its international reputation. In conjunction with the organization’s stated commitment to increased use of force, UN commanders required more decision-making power in the field. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR’s adherence to

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Anyidoho, *Guns Over Kigali*, 122.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 124-125.

the strict UN mandate had allowed the Serbs to continue waging a campaign of genocide against the Bosniaks. In Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire and UNAMIR had struggled to obtain permission to intervene, only to be shut down by UN authorities outside of Rwanda. Thus, many echoed the call of Brigadier General Anyidoho “for a review of the UN system where a civilian controls... the military during peacekeeping.”⁴⁸ Key decisions during the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides had been made by UN authorities away from the battlefield, with little jurisdiction given to leaders on the ground. Thus, in order for peacekeepers to operate effectively in a theater of war and violence, UN military commanders—such as Dallaire—had to be given full “access to the assets [they] require[d] to accomplish [their] mission,” including increased autonomy in the field.⁴⁹ Finally, the United Nations needed to stop relying on the U.S. to “[contribute] the lion’s share” to peacekeeping efforts.⁵⁰ Given the huge U.S. contributions to peacekeeping and foreign interventions, the United Nations seemed to have morphed into the United States & Friends, and, as Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright stated in 1999, the weary U.S. “need[ed] the... leadership and help of [its] allies in Europe and... friends around the world.”⁵¹

Since its shortcomings in Bosnia and Rwanda, the United Nations has continued its peacekeeping efforts throughout the globe and tried to learn from its mistakes in the 1990s. The Bosnian and Rwandan genocides demonstrated major flaws in the United Nations’ approach to peacekeeping, as UN policies of neutrality that were designed to keep the peace instead led to UN inaction in the face of genocide. The inadequate UN responses in Bosnia and Rwanda underscored UN members’ lack of will to fully commit to peacekeeping and caused the UN to appear timid

⁴⁸ Ibid., 124.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Madeleine K. Albright, *Focus on the Issues: Europe* (Bureau of Public Affairs: Washington, D.C., 1999), 65.

⁵¹ Albright, *Focus on the Issues*, 61.

in the face of evil. While the United Nations cautiously avoided war—the scourge of mankind—at all costs, it allowed some of the greatest crimes against humanity to occur on its watch. The United Nations has yet to encounter another peacekeeping challenge like the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides, but one can only hope that the lessons the UN learned in the 1990s will help prevent genocide in the future.

Finding the Clitoris: Societal Clitoridectomies Created from Pushing (for) the G-spot in the 20th and 21st Centuries

Giannina Ong

Men have struggled to comprehend the realities of women's sexual pleasure, despite having sexual relations with women since the beginning of time. The prevailing androcentric model of sex focuses on the promotion of male pleasure, specifically ejaculation, a necessary component of reproduction. Women's pleasure and biological reproduction is then either completely misconstrued or construed to be an accessory to the same reproductive acts. At one point in time, the belief was that both the man and woman had to orgasm to successfully produce a child; moreover, the one-sex and the androcentric model combined has allowed psychologists and biologists to conceptualize women's sexual anatomy as reciprocal to men's. In this way, women's pleasure has become the "Other" that defines masculinity and male sexual prowess. Despite the fact that Freud's theories lack popular pushback, there has been shifts concerning the site of women's pleasure from interior vaginal arousal to the exterior clitoris during the sexual revolution in the 1960s and 70s. Inspired by research produced by the Kinsey Reports on human sexuality and the subsequent Masters and Johnson studies, feminists shared this knowledge publicly and on a mass scale. The purpose of this paper, however, is to historically chart the shift back to the androcentric model after the discovery of the g-spot takes a hold of sexual imaginations in the 1980s. Although LGBTQ+ and feminist literature remains focused on the clitoris, the g-spot has taken over the covers of popular women's magazines, a spot never delegated to the clitoris. This paper will discuss "symbolic clitoridectomies" arising from a lack of language. Then, will apply that theory to the 20th and 21st century phenomena in the form of societal clitoridectomies, created through the negligence of the clitoris medically and popularly. These metaphorical clitoridectomies are a problem concerning

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women's sexual pleasure, an obstacle to accepting clitoral orgasm as normal and a part of sexual intercourse.

In order to contextualize the shift to the current day conceptions of women's pleasure, it is helpful to contextualize points in history where a change occurs. At a certain time in history, Galen's one-sex model of reproductive organs—i.e. male and female organs share a reciprocity—is replaced by the two-sex model. Along with the one-sex model, the notions of joint pleasure which Elizabeth D. Harvey summarizes as “clitoral pleasure” being linked to conception and “female pleasure” being “indispensable to reproduction” are thrown out as well.¹ Harvey wrote of a 21st century historical fiction novel inspired by the account of Renaldus Columbus, the anatomist who “discovers” the clitoris in 1559; yet, she also demonstrates the enigmatic nature of the clitoris by pointing out that the anatomical structure had been known since Hippocrates' day. What Columbus did for the clitoris was place the anatomical part within the realm of women's pleasure: Harvey states that “Although women must surely have known about the clitoris long before its putative discovery, naming the clitoris nevertheless incorporates it into the emergent control exerted by medical language.”² What results from Columbus' “discovery”—occurring around the time when the two-sex model is becoming ubiquitous—is the realization that male and female pleasure are not symmetrical. Moreover, the contradictions create uncertainty concerning the correlation between male and female reproductive organs, leaving female pleasure as more theory and less fact for women's sexuality as it does not directly promote reproduction.

Despite overwhelming evidence that the male and female sexual pleasure are, in fact, asymmetrical, in 1905, Sigmund Freud reaffirms the androcentric model. Although he notes that women can achieve orgasm through clitoral sensitivity, he argues that the

¹ Elizabeth D. Harvey, “Anatomies of Rapture: Clitoral Politics/Medical Blazons,” *Signs* 27, no. 2 (2002), 321.

² Harvey, “Anatomies of Rapture,” 322.

mature woman would do so through vaginal penetration. In writing about the sexuality of “little girls,” Freud acknowledges their preference for clitoral masturbation; however, he claims that in order to mature, women must “transfer” their “erotogenic susceptibility to stimulation” from the clitoris to the interior, the “vaginal orifice.”³ According to Freud, failure to do so could result in hysteria or neurosis. Therefore, from Freud’s point of view, not addressing the inability to vaginally orgasm could result in real health disorders.

Freud reifies the androcentric model through his psychological theses; a conclusion which warrants a discussion on the androcentric model of sex. The androcentric model of sex as defined by Rachel Maines—who writes about hysteria and the invention of vibrators—consists of three steps: foreplay, male penetration, and male orgasm, with a focus on male orgasm in order to define the act as “real sex.”⁴ This predominantly heteronormative model of sex informs the notion that any sex act that was non-penetrative is not truly an act of sex. Maines adds complicates this argument by citing that “possibly 70% of women” do not reach orgasm through penetrative methods despite this androcentric definition of “real sex.”⁵ From this data, yet another contradiction arises: women’s continued pursuit of the vaginal orgasm in conjunction with the negligence of the clitoris in conversations on women’s pleasure.

During the sexual revolution, women began to speak up. In 1968, Anne Koedt aired the central issue concerning women’s pleasure in her aptly-named article “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm.” Among the various points she makes about men ignoring the clitoris in order to reproduce the standard androcentric model of sex, Koedt notes that “women need no anesthesia inside the

³ Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (Mansfield Center, CT: Martino Publishing, 2011), 99.

⁴ Rachel P. Maines, *The Technology of Orgasm: “Hysteria,” the Vibrator, and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction* (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2001), 5.

⁵ Maines, *The Technology of Orgasm*, 5.

vagina during surgery, thus pointing to the fact that the vagina is in fact not a highly sensitive area.”⁶ (Feminists argue with this notion, but uphold that the clitoris is overlooked.⁷) Koedt, herself, goes on to hypothesize why women go along with the “myth” and why men uphold this standard regarding women’s pleasure. She alludes to a gendered power dynamic created from men’s ability to control women’s bodies and pleasure by referring to female genital mutilation:

By removing the sexual organ capable of orgasm, it must be assumed that her sexual drive will diminish. Considering how men look upon their women as property, particularly in very backward nations, we should begin to consider a great deal more why it is not in men’s interest to have women totally free sexually.⁸

Although Koedt claims that it is only in these “very backward nations” that men control women’s pleasure, but the same could be said about the United States and other developed nations where the myth of vaginal orgasm has reemerged via the discovery of the g-spot. Furthermore, the lack of language—a realm controlled by the men of science and medicine for a greater part of history—contributes to the symbolic clitoridectomies of women in the Western world as well.

Before addressing the g-spot, the notion of “symbolic clitoridectomies” warrants attention because the lack of language could contribute to the re-suppression of the clitoris despite feminists’ movements, such as Koedt’s activism in the 1960s, advocating for the knowledge of the clitoris. Maines writes that the issue of language has pervaded women’s reproductive anatomy: “the failure of the Western tradition until the eighteenth century to

⁶ Koedt, “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm,” 2.

⁷ Nancy Tuana, “Coming to Understand: Orgasm and the Epistemology of Ignorance,” *Hypatia* 19, no. 1 (2004): 217-19.

⁸ Koedt, “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm,” 6.

develop a complete and meaningful vocabulary of the female anatomy” is that “The vulva, labia, and clitoris were not consistently distinguished from the vagina, nor the vagina from the uterus.”⁹ A research study by Waskul et al. sought to understand the realities of symbolic clitoridectomies: how words and the lack of vocabulary silences, stigmatizes, and/or erases the existence or purpose of a woman’s clitoris. In 2007, the researchers interviewed a sample of 15 women to record women’s attitudes concerning the clitoris as well as societal constraints that could enforce symbolic clitoridectomies. A symbolic clitoridectomy is defined by Waskul et al. as “a bracketing of the clitoris by means of linguistic and discursive erasure.”¹⁰ In addition, social taboos construct a resulting purgatory where women cannot share their feelings regarding the clitoris. The accounts from the women provided evidence that the clitoris is not discussed in classrooms or classes addressing sexuality, nor by most parents; in fact, many women recall not being able to name the clitoris because they were simply never told that it had a name. The work of Nancy Tuana reflects this fact as she notes that, in the 21st century, “anatomical illustrations in standard college human sexuality textbooks reveals a surprising lack of attention to the functions and structures of the clitoris.”¹¹ Despite the 1960s and 1970s research addressing female sexual pleasure, particularly the power of the clitoris, a shift has occurred, returning the discussion to not only a symbolic clitoridectomy, but androcentric models through the g-spot. Ironically, medical discoveries near the beginning of the 21st century should have advanced the notion of the clitoris as a site of female sexual pleasure, but the literature circulating and addressing women’s issues do not continue this pattern.

Working in the 1980s, Helen O’Connell “discovered” the rest of the clitoris. Publishing her work in 1998, O’Connell was

⁹ Maines, *The Technology of Orgasm*, 7.

¹⁰ Dennis D. Waskul, Phillip Vannini, and Desiree Wiesen, “Women and Their Clitoris: Personal Discovery, Signification, and Use,” *Symbolic Interaction* 30, no. 2 (2007): 152.

¹¹ Tuana, “Coming to Understand,” 209.

disturbed by the way that “female genitals [were] often described in denigrating and inaccurate terms (i.e., as inverted or inferior homologues of male sex organs, an idea that appears to have survived relatively intact from Galen)” and focused her research on female sexuality.¹² She found that the clitoris is twice as large as most thought it to be as “the visible tip connects to a pyramidal mass of erectile tissue extending back into the body.”¹³ Feminists hypothesized that the lack of inquiry regarding the clitoris could have included the fat mound that anatomically hides the clitoris—but they note that kind of anatomical obstruction has not stopped other similar anatomical surveys—or that “the medical representation of sexuality and reproduction has from its earliest constructions wrestled with the nature and control of female desire.”¹⁴ As with Koedt’s point about patriarchal control of women’s bodies, likewise women’s literature today has shied away from discussions of the clitoris and the g-spot has taken center stage.

In order to contextualize the g-spot, Terence Hines provides a survey of the various medical research that has been conducted to prove the existence of the g-spot. Proposed by Dr. Ernest Grafenberg in a 1950 paper, the g-spot—i.e. the Grafenberg spot—is purported to be a highly erogenous zone on the anterior wall of the vagina. Hines, however, digs through a sample of papers that have been used to prove the g-spot’s existence and finds studies that are not well conducted and methods that are faulty due to a small sample size or improper methods. One such research study had a small sample of women be digitally penetrated so that the researcher could note the difference in texture, which was understood to be evidence of the g-spot. Similar to the “myth” of vaginal orgasms, a survey found that 84% of professional women believe the g-spot exists and since the 1980s, human sexuality

¹² Harvey, “Anatomies of Rapture,” 320.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

textbooks declare the g-spot to be a part of female anatomy.¹⁵ In response to Hines' article, two researchers cited by Hines argued that their research purpose was:

...to validate and find a scientific explanation for the reported experiences of many women, not to create new goals. These were women who did not fit into the monolithic clitoral-centric model of sexual response, that is, they reported vaginal sensitivity and orgasm from vaginal stimulation.¹⁶

That being said, the purpose of this history is not to debunk the vaginal orgasm but pay homage to the neglect and overriding rhetoric of the g-spot that pervades women's understanding and sources of knowledge. Tuana's epistemology of ignorance and knowledge surrounding female sexual pleasure also asks that we do not pose the question as vaginal *or* clitoral, but vaginal *and* clitoral. The concern of this paper is the lack of information regarding the clitoris and the resulting societal clitoridectomy that has occurred since the 1980s solidification of the g-spot as common knowledge. Yet the question begs of itself and is not asked in order to pit the clitoris against the g-spot: how many studies have aimed to prove that both clitoral and vaginal orgasm is real and concurrent in women?

A database of alternative press newspapers, magazines, and journals provides evidence of a pattern of silencing the clitoris. By looking through the publication dates, we find that Independent Voices' majority of articles concerning the clitoris dates back to the 1970s—with over 500+ citations, but the clitoris receives little press in the 1990s and the 2000s—totaling just 20 citations. A 1969 article from *No More Fun and Games* summarizes the findings of Masters and Johnson for its readers:

¹⁵ Terence M. Hines, "The G-spot: A modern Gynecologic Myth," *American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology* 185, no. 2 (2001): 360.

¹⁶ Beverly Whipple and John D. Perry, "The G-spot: A Modern Gynecologic Myth," *American Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology* 187, no. 2 (2002): 519.

All orgasms take place in the clitoris, whether they are induced through direct stimulation of the clitoris, through indirect stimulation of the clitoris during conventional intercourse, or occur as a result of fantasy of mystical concentration.¹⁷

The article goes on to say that the concept of frigidity “should have been killed” by the report and declares that there is “no such thing as vaginal orgasm.” While discrediting the vaginal orgasm is not the point of this historical analysis, the urge to debunk women’s frigidity was clearly a motivating factor for the article. This short journal article is singled out by my research for openly discussing the clitoris; nevertheless, similar examples abound, including poems and odes to female sexuality that explicitly name the clitoris (and noticeably, not the g-spot).

In the 20th century, the clitoris can still be found openly discussed in LGBTQ+ magazines. An article from *Herizons* focuses on the “orgasm gap,” a data point collected by *Cosmopolitan* that claimed 57% of the women surveyed did not have orgasms during sex, whereas 95% of the men did.¹⁸ Moreover, the article points to the fact that lesbian and bisexual women have higher orgasm rates than their heterosexual counterparts. In addition, the piece adds to the historical discussion of the clitoris by providing the state of medical research regarding the clitoris:

... the clitoris wasn't even fully understood by the medical community until 2009, when a French sonographic study finally uncovered the clit's true shape and size. It turns out it's not just the hooded nub you can see on the outside of the body—it has a significant internal portion hidden under the

¹⁷ “The Frigidity Spector,” *No More Fun and Games*, November 1969 (Cambridge, MA: Sallie Bingham Center for Women's History and Culture, Duke University), 35.

¹⁸ Kate Sloan, “The Orgasm Gap,” *Herizons* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 25.

skin, which is shaped like a wishbone and may partially explain the responsiveness of certain internal erogenous zones like the G-spot.¹⁹

The article does not disclaim the g-spot, nor the realities of vaginal orgasm, but does point to the medical realities of the clitoris as well as the misinformation regarding female pleasure. Narratives of the clitoris are presented in magazines like this one as well as *Off Our Backs* and other feminist/LGBTQ+ literature and attempt to understand the disconnect between sexual realities and the knowledge that abounds in popular culture. If the orgasm gap is truly as great as it is, perhaps the clitoris' time to shine.

While LGBTQ+ articles continue to address the clitoris, mainstream articles from *Cosmopolitan*, *Women's Health*, and male audience targeted magazines, continue to cite the g-spot as the primary erogenous zone for women's pleasure. A 2018 article from *Health* magazine titled "G-spot 101" is just one of many displays of the prominence of the g-spot in our society. The subheading reads, "Yup, it's real—and touching it the right way can turbocharge your sexual pleasure. Here's how to locate yours and tap into its powers."²⁰ While advocating for female masturbation is world's away from the concept that female masturbation would lead to health issues, the article attempts to prove that the g-spot is real through testimonies from several sexologists. Moreover, the article, like Freud maturation theory, puts the onus on the woman who should be able to find this "spot": "The G-spot needs direct, constant stimulation to achieve orgasm," explains [sexologist Emily] Morse. "Don't get discouraged if it takes a while to unlock—that's normal."²¹ The rhetoric of the g-spot used conjures vaginal orgasm as the ultimate goal with the clitoris taking a back seat: again reminiscent of

¹⁹ Sloan, "The Orgasm Gap," 26.

²⁰ Amanda Macmillan and Anthea Levi, "G-spot 101," *Health* 32, no. 2 (March 2018): 72.

²¹ Ibid.

Freud's theories, the article notes that if you are failing, attempt to first have a clitoral orgasm, but then aim for the loftier and more pleasurable g-spot orgasm.

The similarities to the Freudian model of female sexual pleasure is clearly a debasement of the clitoris as a primary erogenous zone. If we are to respect the reality of a vaginal orgasm, perhaps we ought to realize the power of a clitoral orgasm as well. The taboo surrounding discourses of the clitoris is much greater than that of the g-spot, despite the g-spot still being a risqué topic. Nevertheless, "g-spot" is displayed on covers of women's and men's magazines that are sold at checkout lines of grocery stores, but nowhere to be found is the clitoris. Finding the clitoris in popular women's literature seems to be as difficult as finding it during partnered heterosexual intercourse. Moreover, certain researchers, men, and women are defensive about the g-spot being a reality, a new manifestation of the defense of Freudian theories and the androcentric model—which Koedt addresses, which unfortunately—whether real or not, shines the spotlight further away from the clitoris, a known organ that arouses female pleasure and orgasm. One theory could be that the clitoral orgasm is common knowledge and does not deserve attention, as those who call it a "monolithic clitoral-centric model" would presume, but if that is so, what reasoning would there be for the "orgasm gap" and why do women still experience symbolic clitoridectomies? I believe the research demonstrates that the androcentric model is rearing its head once more through the discovery of the g-spot, but in order to not disregard the female voices that may truly experience g-spot orgasms, a more comprehensive history of the clitoris is warranted and needs to be shared with women in order to gain sexual parity—and maybe even peace of mind—in heterosexual encounters with our male counterparts.

“Donald the Dove, Hillary the Hawk”: Gender in the 2016 Presidential Election Brandon Sanchez

“Nobody has more respect for women than I do,” assured Donald Trump, then the Republican nominee for president, during his third and final debate with the Democratic nominee, former secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton, in late October 2016. “Nobody.” Over the scoffs and howls issued by the audience, moderator Chris Wallace tried to keep order—“Please, everybody!”¹ In the weeks after the October 7th release of the “Access Hollywood” tape, on which Trump discussed grabbing women’s genitals against their will, a slew of harassment accusations had shaken the Trump campaign. Fighting fire with fire, on October 10th, before the second televised presidential debate, Trump held a press conference with a panel of women that included Paula Jones and Juanita Broaddrick, both of whom had years earlier accused Bill Clinton of sexual misconduct.² Trump had invited them to the debate in an effort to reframe public discourse and to spook Hillary Clinton.

This battle, waged between the two campaigns throughout the election cycle, was intimately tied to a larger war over not just policy but representation—what would the next occupant of the Oval Office convey about American identity? What did it mean that Donald Trump, an evident chauvinist, had secured the Republican nomination? How would the Democratic Party contend with the Clintons’ silencing of such victims as Monica Lewinsky in the nineties? And how would American voters reshape the American presidency? Would they opt for a candidate who

¹ Peter Allen Clark, “Not even the audience can take Trump seriously when he says he respects women,” *Mashable*, 19 October 2016, <https://mashable.com/2016/10/19/donald-trump-women-laughing/#pAYC.04UpqqT>.

² Dylan Matthews, “The rape allegation against Bill Clinton, explained,” *Vox*, 14 November 2017, <https://www.vox.com/2016/1/6/10722580/bill-clinton-juanita-broaddrick>.

affected ostentatiousness, unapologetic bravado, and appealed to a certain lone-wolf machismo (“I alone can fix it”)? Or would they choose their first woman head-of-state, a diplomat whose comparative calm relied on a message of unity (“Stronger Together”)? During the campaign, the Trump and Clinton teams presented through rhetoric and marketing these respective messages. However, such gendered messaging was but one element of a larger, knotty matrix of expectations, stereotypes, and contradictions.

This election had a unique relationship with gender; integral to that relationship was its historic nature. Hillary Clinton was the first woman to be nominated for president by a major political party. On June 7, 2016, banners reading “Herstory” hung behind her as she addressed an audience of hundreds. Though women gained the franchise (and were allowed to exercise that privilege) with the passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920,³ their exclusion from the nation’s highest office has been a source of scholarship for decades. The Eagleton Institute at Rutgers University in New Jersey and its Center for American Women and Politics “worked for 21 months to further public understanding of how gender influences candidate strategy, voter engagement and expectations, media coverage, and electoral outcomes in campaigns for the nation’s highest executive office.”⁴ Because presidential politics have served as a site for performative masculinity, the ways in which candidates have felt obligated to portray themselves—and subsequent reactions to those portrayals—have orbited around certain masculine expectations. In preparing for her 2008 presidential bid, for example, Clinton was told by a strategist that “voters ‘do not want someone who would be the first mama.’”⁵ Consequently, she spent that primary

³ U.S. Constitution Amend. 19.

⁴ Center for American Women and Politics, “Finding Gender in Election 2016,” 2017, http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/presidential-gender-gap_report_Final.pdf.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

campaign adhering to a set of pre-existing norms and attempting to overcome stereotypes that ascribed leadership abilities to men more than to women. However, for women candidates, performance has been a double-edged sword: not only must they fulfill the masculinity rubric, they must also exhibit femininity—the Center for American Women and Politics calls this the conundrum of “pantsuits and pearls.”⁶ Throughout the campaign, Trump would comment that Clinton did not have a “presidential look,”⁷ alluding to her gender. Reflective of hegemonic masculinity (first conceptualized in the early 1980s and re-interrogated by R.W. Connell and James Messerschmidt in 2005), these obstacles revealed the underlying cyclical nature of men’s leadership—the reproduction of patriarchy through socialization perpetuated such imbalances.⁸

Ellen Fitzpatrick explores “the highest glass ceiling” in her book of the same title, analyzing the gender dynamics at play in previous bids by women, including excessive moral scrutiny and notions of “naturalness.” For instance, Victoria Woodhull, the Equal Rights Party’s nominee for president in 1872, was subjected to scrutiny over a number of personal issues, among them her second husband’s sketchy financial dealings and her advocacy for “free love,” which drew ire at the time and made her into an icon of “immorality and unchastity.”⁹ She was also accused in the press of living with two different men in one house.¹⁰ However, central to the construction of Woodhull as unnatural and unfit for polite society was her self-possessed engagement in politics. These questions about naturalness would persist in the national discourse for over a century—and, in forms both covert and overt, would remain. Fitzpatrick’s chapter on Shirley Chisholm underscores

⁶ Ibid., 5.

⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁸ R.W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” *Gender & Society*, 19, No. 6 (2005): 829-859.

⁹ Ellen Fitzpatrick, *The Highest Glass Ceiling: Women’s Quest for the American Presidency* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 62.

¹⁰ Ibid., 57.

some of these motifs. During the 1972 primary campaign, the Nixon administration fabricated and circulated a phony press release that sought to humiliate and delegitimize Chisholm. It claimed that she “dressed as a transvestite in men’s clothing” and that she was “diagnosed as schizophrenic” in the early 1950s.¹¹ Here, again, appeals to some basic sense of gender norms were deployed. Women who dare to enter the political arena become “unwomanly”—somehow twisted, wrong, deranged. Opponents of Margaret Chase Smith, the senator from Maine, used a combination of these tactics against her. Critics spread rumors about her “loose morals,”¹² and her pro-labor stances became fodder in the post-World War II period for anticommunist crusaders, who suggested that Smith herself might be a communist sympathizer (despite her membership in the Republican Party). Also, important to note about Smith is her route to political office. Urged by her ill husband to follow in his footsteps and run for his seat in the House of Representatives, Smith followed what was for women at the time a common path.

Of central import to scholarship on the 2016 election are analyses and media portrayals of the respective candidates’ personalities, both of which adhered to traditional gender roles while also subverting them. Since changing her name to “Hillary Rodham Clinton” to appease Arkansans during her husband’s 1982 gubernatorial race, Clinton had grappled with the media’s gendered depictions of her. In 2016, this manifested itself in the adoption of a relational identity. The first items in her Twitter biography were, and remain, “wife, mother, grandmother.” Even after the election, Clinton’s tendency toward relational conceptualizations has been evident. In *What Happened*, her 2017 memoir, she writes of her defeat by contextualizing it, placing into the story of her life, work, and ambitions the people she sought to please most. Of her father, the late Hugh Rodham, she writes, “As

¹¹ Ibid., 221.

¹² Ibid., 98.

a kid, I would come up with elaborate hypotheses to test him. ‘What if I robbed a store or murdered somebody? Would you still love me then?’ He’d say, ‘Absolutely! I’d be disappointed and sad, but I will always love you.’ ”¹³ After the election, she thought to herself, “‘Well, Dad, what if I lose an election I should have won and let an unqualified bully become President of the United States? Would you still love me then?’ ”¹⁴ Yet these relationships would, throughout the course of the campaign, be tempered by other gendered tropes. Most enduring was the sense among her critics that Clinton had for the past quarter-century been a “Lady Macbeth” figure, concerned only with her own advancement. This proved to be perhaps the most insidiously sexist roadblock that she came up against: when she demonstrated ambition, that most stereotypically masculine of traits, she was met with criticism.

Trump’s personality, at once easier and harder to pin down, required for many writers the ability to hold multiple ideas in mind at one time. *New York Times* columnist Maureen Dowd, in her May 2016 column, “Donald the Dove, Hillary the Hawk,” commented on Trump’s many contradictions, citing both his tendency toward braggadocio and his “tender ego, pouty tweets, needy temperament, and obsession with hand sanitizer.”¹⁵ Clinton, by contrast, was “so tough and combat-hardened, she’s known by her staff as ‘the Warrior.’ ”¹⁶ Trump’s obsession with health manifested itself in a number of unconventional regimens. In *Trump Revealed*, Mike Kranisch and Marc Fisher of the *Washington Post* write that Trump “believed the human body was like a battery, with a finite amount of energy, which exercise only depleted. So he didn’t work out.”¹⁷ A draft dodger allergic to

¹³ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *What Happened* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017), 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁵ Maureen Dowd, “Donald the Dove, Hillary the Hawk.” *The New York Times*, 30 April 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/opinion/sunday/donald-the-dove-hillary-the-hawk.html>.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Marc Fisher and Michael Kranish, *Trump Revealed: An American Journey of Ambition, Ego, Money, and Power* (New York: Scribner, 2016), 181.

athleticism, Trump would nevertheless become the darling of his beer-swilling, sports-watching, red-white-and-blue-donning crowds. In other ways, too, he was far from the hyper-masculine ideal prized by his supporters. The decor in New York's Trump Tower has been described as reminiscent of Versailles, as well as "bright, brassy, loud...gaudy and fake."¹⁸

Buttressed by that twenty-first-century culture factory, the Internet, these personalities took on lives of their own; however, the proliferation of caricatures and "fake news" resulted in real-life animus. Trump rallies became known during the summer of 2016 as sites of eruptive anger, playgrounds for the id. On display was a kind of animalistic righteousness, fostered by the candidate himself. A clash between rally-goers and anti-Trump protesters at one San Jose, Calif., rally prompted myriad threats and telephone calls by Trump supporters to the Office of the Mayor of San Jose the next day.¹⁹ To the Left, he was a bigoted ignoramus; to the Right, an acid-tongued pot-stirrer. George Saunders, in a July 2016 piece for the *New Yorker*, reported from Trump rallies across the country. As a nondescript fly on the wall, Saunders recorded with sardonic perceptiveness the back-and-forth between flabbergasted liberal protesters and defiant Trumpist attendees. One shouting match went like this: "'Go back to California,' Trumpie A shouts at Green Shirt. 'Bitch!'"²⁰ Also noted in Saunders's article was the frequency with which brawls broke out, and the often gendered dimensions of such violence: "Rebecca LaStrap, an African-American woman, twenty years old, wearing a 'FUCK TRUMP' T-shirt, was grabbed by the breast, thrown to the ground, slapped

¹⁸ Peter York, "Trump's Dictator Chic," *Politico*, March/April 2017, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/trump-style-dictator-autocrats-design-214877>.

¹⁹ As an intern in the mayor's office, I was tasked with listening to and cataloguing voicemail.

²⁰ George Saunders, "Who Are All These Trump Supporters?" *The New Yorker*, 4 July 2016, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/11/george-saunders-goes-to-trump-rallies>.

in the face.”²¹ In these interactions, Trump supporters appeared to find freedom, according to Saunders, a sort of liberation from the shackles of feminine “political correctness.”²²

If discourse about violence followed the Trump campaign, then the Clinton campaign faced questions about its candidate’s health and strength. After a smartphone captured footage of Clinton collapsing while leaving a ceremony commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11th attacks, Trump pounced, saying that Clinton lacked the fortitude necessary to serve in the nation’s highest office. In light of the incident, he appealed again to the idea that he could be a “protector” in a way that Clinton could not. This “masculinist protection,” delineated in the Eagleton report, is predicated on the notion of male dominance—physically, politically, and socially.²³ Conspiracy theories about Clinton’s health began to proliferate; bound up with this was another thread that contributed to the campaign’s historic nature: age. The winner of the general election would become either the oldest (Trump) or second-oldest (Clinton) person ever to ascend to the presidency. After a debate with Clinton, Trump said in a stump speech to his supporters, “The other day I’m standing at my podium, and she walks in front of me, right? She walks in front of me, and when she walked in front of me...believe me, I wasn’t impressed, but she walks in front of me.”²⁴ Implicit in this statement were criticisms of Clinton’s health and beauty. Here, again, the double standard was applied with brute force—Clinton looked frail, according to Trump, but the Republican nominee himself was exempted from such criticisms.

The looming presence of sex on the campaign trail speaks to a division that was rooted in partisan ideas about men’s and

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Center for American Women and Politics, “Finding Gender in Election 2016,” 30.

²⁴ Daniella Diaz, “Trump: I ‘wasn’t impressed’ when Clinton walked in front of me at debate,” *CNN*, 15 October 2016, <https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/14/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-appearance-debate/index.html>.

women's "natural" roles. Though the first summer of his campaign would be defined by his comments about Mexican immigrants, by the fall of 2015, increased attention was paid to Trump's misogyny. In the aftermath of his "unfair" treatment by Megyn Kelly during the first televised Republican debate, in August 2015, Trump tweeted that there was blood "coming out of her wherever" and incited a media frenzy.²⁵ This was the first widely publicized instance during the campaign of gendered innuendo. In spring 2016, Trump said during another debate that "[Marco Rubio] referred to my hands— 'If they're small, something else must be small.' I guarantee you there's no problem. I guarantee."²⁶ Invoked during a debate with Hillary Clinton was the comedian and television personality Rosie O'Donnell, whom Trump has called a "slob" and with whom he engaged in a very public feud in 2006. O'Donnell represented for Trump the antithesis of "womanhood." Opinionated, brash, and unwilling to cater to the male gaze, O'Donnell has for years posed a threat to Trump's brand of masculinity. The bidirectional effects of this misogyny have not yet been measured; that is, the attraction of misogynists to a misogynist has not been extricated from its potential influence on his misogyny. However, by the second quarter of 2016, "50% of Trump supporters said that it benefits society for men and women to stick to the roles for which they are naturally suited."²⁷ Additionally, "58% of Trump supporters surveyed in fall 2016 agreed that 'these days society seems to punish men just for acting like men.'"²⁸

Since the election, hypotheses about voter turnout have implicated seemingly everyone: the Obama coalition, the Rust

²⁵ Holly Yan, "Donald Trump's 'blood' comment about Megyn Kelly draws outrage," *CNN*, 8 August 2015, <https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/08/politics/donald-trump-cnn-megyn-kelly-comment/index.html>.

²⁶ Gregory Krieg, "Donald Trump defends size of his penis," *CNN*, 4 March 2016, <https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/03/politics/donald-trump-small-hands-marco-rubio/index.html>.

²⁷ Center for American Women and Politics, "Finding Gender in Election 2016," 7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

Belt, sexists, misogynists, white women, “Bernie Bros.” Whether these explanations hold up upon further review has been the subject of much debate. Sanders supporters have criticized the “Bernie Bro” archetype for being reductive and not representative of the diverse coalition Sanders assembled. Still, the angry, “brawl[ing]”²⁹ persona projected by Sanders was more palatable than Clinton’s “yelling,” which drew criticism throughout the campaign.³⁰ Despite the fact that “Sanders espouses the same liberal-feminine beliefs Clinton does, they are set into a hypermasculine frame that makes these ideals much more appealing.”³¹ As for the general election, the Center for American Women and Politics cites in its report one statistic that counters the “women lost it for Hillary” narrative— “Clinton won 82% of black men’s votes in 2016 compared to Obama’s 87% in 2012” as well as “31% of white men’s votes” to Obama’s 35%.³² Dips in support among men would prove consequential.

Yet questions about white women voters remain salient, especially as the anti-Trump Resistance faces infighting over representation and who ought to lead the movement. In 2017, this question dominated the literature on Clinton’s loss. One study of gender-linked fate interrogates why married white women are less progressive than their single and WOC (women of color) counterparts. Linked fate, or “one’s identification with a group and the perception that one’s life chances are tied to the success of that group”³³ has proven a useful way of conceptualizing constituents’ interests. The authors of the 2017 study postulate that married women will generally demonstrate less gender-linked fate, due to

²⁹ Kelly Wilz, “Bernie Bros and Woman Cards: Rhetorics of Sexism, Misogyny, and Constructed Masculinity in the 2016 Election,” *Women’s Studies in Communication*, 39, No. 4 (2016): 357.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 358.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 359.

³² Center for American Women and Politics, “Finding Gender in Election 2016,” 27.

³³ Christopher Stout, Kelsy Kretschmer, and Leah Ruppanner, “Gender Linked Fate, Race/Ethnicity, and the Marriage Gap in American Politics,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 70, No. 3 (2017).

their identification with their husbands' economic interests. They also hypothesize that married black women, who more often serve as breadwinners than white women, will show greater gender-linked fate. The results found that among the white, Latina, and black women surveyed, gender-linked fate decreased precipitously with marriage. Single women of all races were more likely to view gender as an important part of their identity. It seems, then, that perhaps sheer partisanship is the source of white women's voting patterns, as the Eagleton Institute studies suggest.³⁴

Furthermore, in the sixteen months since the election, a veritable subfield of scholarship, journalism, and Internet think-pieces (not to mention "hot takes") have sprung up to explain the result. Most instructive when it comes to conceptualizing the immediate post-election reaction of the Obama/Clinton coalition, though, is Rebecca Traister's piece for *New York Magazine*. Published on November 12, 2016, Traister opens the piece on Sunday, November 6, two days before the election. Clinton was preaching to a black church in Philadelphia, where she said, "Our Founders said all men are created equal...[But] they left out African-Americans. They left out women. They left out a lot of us."³⁵ The next day, Clinton, her husband, daughter, and the Obamas campaigned together outside Independence Hall; this joint appearance painted a picture of America's more inclusive future. But on November 8th, this coalition would be defeated. As Traister writes:

The enormity of the upset came at the end of what had already been a traumatic election for the women and immigrants and people of color to whom Clinton was trying to appeal, and who had spent months being derided, threatened, groped,

³⁴ Center for American Women and Politics, "Finding Gender in Election 2016," 59.

³⁵ Rebecca Traister, "Shattered," *New York Magazine*, 12 November 2016, <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/hillary-clinton-didnt-shatter-the-glass-ceiling.html>.

caricatured, insulted, and humiliated by Donald Trump and his supporters.

Arguments against the centrality of gender to the campaign often cite Clintonian neoliberalism as a principal driver of the election result, a bugbear that could not be overcome in the face of a populist groundswell; often sidelined in these discussions are related ruptures in the women's movement. Morris Fiorina looks at identity politics, class, and culture to explain the result, integrating ethnocentrism and the "populism thesis" to relate the 2016 election to other recent phenomena in the West, like the Brexit vote and Marine le Pen's candidacy for president of France.³⁶ However, these analyses neglect a widespread sense among progressives, and particularly among millennial feminists, that Clinton was the peddler of a manufactured, corporate feminism, undergirded by deregulation, globalization, and imperialism. In this sense, the standard to which she was held—the intersectional, vaguely socialistic feminism by which voters expected her to abide—became a focal point of the campaign; to represent the Establishment was, to many Democratic voters, to be a hypocrite, to betray the revolutionary underpinnings of feminism itself. For example, feminist writer bell hooks, in 2014, announced that she could no longer align herself with a feminism like Hillary's, as it had enabled militarism, imperialism, American exceptionalism, and white supremacy.³⁷ Hooks's view spoke to a narrative that would eventually gain traction and result in squabbling within the Democratic Party in 2016. Such ideas no doubt dampened enthusiasm for the Clinton campaign, even if they did not aid Trump's directly. Additionally, the fury of the populist movement

³⁶ Morris P. Fiorina, "The 2016 Election—Identities, Class, and Culture," *Hoover Institution*, 22 June 2017, <https://www.hoover.org/research/2016-presidential-election-identities-class-and-culture>.

³⁷ The New School, "Man Enough: Theory and Practice In and Outside the Classroom," *YouTube*, 10 October 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-3jyZ1c7s>.

was, as analyses of Sanders have indicated, framed in overtly masculine terms.

Then came the #MeToo Movement of 2017, which echoed and built on the campaign. The Women's March, held in cities around the world after Trump's inauguration, heralded a period of heightened awareness in the mainstream media of women's lives. Allegations of sexual misconduct against Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein, in late 2017, appeared to open the floodgates, giving many women the confidence they needed to speak out publicly about their own experiences with harassment and assault. On a November 10, 2017, episode of her Crooked Media podcast *With Friends Like These*, commentator Ana Marie Cox discusses Hillary and Bill Clinton with Rebecca Traister in light of the movement, illuminating campaign residue: to what extent did the nineties follow Clinton's campaign and political career? In what ways did the Clinton mythology interact with and alter the gendered dimension of this campaign? Would things have turned out differently had Clinton not had such "baggage"? The answer, say Cox and Traister, is complicated. Clinton's tendency to shield herself from scrutiny and to keep the media at arm's length was rooted in a long history of gendered coverage.³⁸ Thus, questions about why Hillary Clinton is "evasive" or, as critics might say, "paranoid," when it comes to the press, are intimately tied to over twenty-five years of gendered treatment.

Both the subtle and overt ways in which gender manifested itself during the 2015-2016 election cycle will likely remain a source of scholarship, especially given rumors about potential runs for the presidency in 2020 by Senators Elizabeth Warren, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Kamala Harris, among other women. The blend of criticism about ethics, appearance, shrillness, and political purity Clinton faced had also ensnared her predecessors, like Margaret Chase Smith and Shirley Chisholm. Still, the campaign was a

³⁸ Ana Marie Cox, "What About Bill?" *With Friends Like These*, Crooked Media (podcast), 10 November 2017.

tangle of contradictions and departures from “traditional” gender roles. Trump, id-made-flesh, encouraged violence and salacious sex talk, but also whined incessantly about his hurt feelings. Clinton, by contrast, spoke about unity and argued that Americans were “stronger together,” but was often “tight-lipped” and austere. Thus, questions about “naturalness” dogged the match-up. The competitive nature of the race indicates that a number of factors coalesced, but the ardent and consistent manner in which Trump characterized Hillary (through appeals to her health, stamina, and appearance) suggests the presence of a darker, misogynistic undercurrent. Trump took it upon himself to define who possessed the presidential “look,” and with that the faculties necessary to govern the country.