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The Quest for Women's Rights in Turn-of-the-Century Japan

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Barbara Molony

[We should take up . . . this discussion of equal rights for men and women only after we have first considered the nature of men and women and become well informed on what rights are.

—Fukuzawa Yukichi, “The Equal Numbers of Men and Women”1

Responding to a fussy diatribe by Katō Hiroyuki that denounced, eponymously, “Abuses of Equal Rights for Men and Women,” Fukuzawa Yukichi published these words in 1875. Though Fukuzawa believed that debate about “rights” should occur only after the meaning of “rights” was better understood, his words were not heeded. “Rights” remained a central issue in a wide variety of intellectual and political discussions, including feminist ones, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2

To be sure, Fukuzawa was correct in asserting that “rights” did not have a singular meaning clear to all. And his suggestions that men’s and women’s natures were worthy of analysis sounds more postmodern than Fukuzawa would ever have intended. That is, Fukuzawa was not interpreting “gender,” but rather was attempting to state what he viewed as naturalized gender roles as the basis for men’s and women’s complementary rights.

The Japanese were not alone in perceiving “rights” to have multiple meanings.3 Rights discourse in Japan was lively and diverse, particularly because it surfaced in a variety of contexts and blended
notions of Tokugawa anti-authoritarianism with a tidal wave of often conflated “Western” rights discourses. In addition, the terms for “rights” (kenri), “women’s rights” (joken), “male-female equality” (danjo byōdō), male-female equal rights (danjo dōken), and other concepts in the lexicon of rights were themselves neologisms. (These terms were, at times, used interchangeably, though their meanings were actually distinct.) It should be pointed out that late nineteenth-century politically motivated activists in Japan were not entirely to blame for the conflation of Western philosophers’ terms. The works of Rousseau, Mill, Spencer, Locke, and other theorists of the state, civil society, and rights, differing in time and nationality though they did, entered Japanese discourse within a decade of each other. In addition, state, nation, nationality, ethnicity, gender, and so on were all in the process of mutual construction around the same time, and in some cases, rights advocacy was used selectively to resist the emerging structure of one or another of these categories. Conversely, the language of rights could also be employed to help reify any of these categories or institutions, either in a positive, supportive way or through a Foucaultian type of negotiation. That is, as Foucault noted: “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of externality to power. . . . [T]he strictly relational character of power relationships . . . depends upon a multiplicity of points of resistance.”

Meiji-era (1868–1912) joken can be seen as a way of conceptualizing relations of power. Other than People’s Rights advocate Ueki Emori, who claimed that resistance to unresponsive government was a people’s right and duty and that men and women were entitled to equal rights, Meiji-era advocates for women did not call for women’s resistance to the state or society that might lead to its overthrow. Resistance always occurred in relation to the institutions of power it called into question. At the end of the nineteenth century, women’s rights constituted a quest, undertaken through a “multiplicity of points of resistance.” To put it a bit more simply, women’s rights called for inclusion, not revolution. This chapter suggests two reasons: first, the fundamental nature of rights themselves, and second, the identification, for some 1890s women’s advocates, of rights with recognition and rewarding of female self-cultivation as a marker of a woman’s personhood.
Rights discussions in the late Meiji era, whether by advocates for men or for women, developed in a context of iconoclastic rejection of past (Tokugawa) relations of power and of engagement with foreign ideas. That power (e.g., a state, social norms, laws, customs) would exist was not questioned; rather one’s relationship to power was under discussion. And the most important way to frame questions about one’s relationship to power was through discussion of rights. Rights at that time, in Japan and elsewhere, were strictly gendered, however, and so women’s quests for rights involved—as feminist theorist Wendy Brown writes—“a longing to share in power rather than be protected from its excesses.”

Any quest for rights, then, might seem rather ironic. One of the purposes of rights is protection from something—such as from encroachment by another person, from encroachment by the state, or from being limited in one’s expression. (The various notions of rights are frequently in conflict—one’s freedom of expression, for example, might conflict with another’s right to protection—but that is beyond the scope of this chapter.) Notions of rights as protection from encroachment were clearly held by some Meiji rights advocates; but to what extent were they applied to women? I would argue that the idea of rights as protection from the state was a very minor thread in women’s rights talk—instead the main focus was on inclusion in the state and equality in both the private domain of the family and the public domain of civil society. Admittedly, a “public/private” dichotomy does not quite work here, where women sought to empower themselves in the family (“private”) through means of the law (“public”) and through public recognition of their intellectual accomplishments. The notion of protection was not absent from Meiji discourse but it arose more in connection with the idea of “liberation” (kaibō) than with rights. “Liberation” was not used in discussing women’s political rights until Socialists began using the term in 1907. Kaibō was first used to discuss the liberation of prostituted women and girls from contractual bondage after the 1872 Maria Luz affair in which unfree sex workers escaped from a ship of that name, and came to include, by the end of the century, liberation of wives, through divorce, from oppressive marriages.

“Civil society” is a term commonly used in Western social and political discourses—like all such terms, it has no single, stable mean-
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ing—but did it exist in Japan in the Meiji period? It is clear that it did by the 1920s when rights of participation in civil society were understood to be related to *kōmin ken* (variously interpreted as civic and civil rights). Though "civil society" was not named in the late nineteenth century, it was in the process of development and its existence was understood, even if prematurely, by rights advocates. Some critics, taking civil participation for granted, lamented what they viewed as Japanese women’s limited involvement in social and philanthropic endeavors. Yet, as early as the late nineteenth century, women and men working to improve the status of women were instrumental in the development of civil society through the creation of institutions like schools and welfare organizations as well as ideas disseminated in cities and towns throughout Japan by speeches, newspapers, and magazines. Even if unnamed, a concept or institution may exist, and borrowing language from one context to apply to an analog elsewhere can be illuminating.

As Carole Pateman has shown, the term “civil” has had shifting meanings in Western discourse. Before the creation of the social contract, “civil” was seen as the opposite of “natural”; thereafter, it was seen as the opposite of “private.” Thus, by the nineteenth century in the West, civil society came to be viewed as standing in opposition to the family (the private). But such an opposition was not assumed by women’s rights advocates in turn-of-the-century Japan. While some rights advocates in the early Meiji period did assume the family was a warm private haven from a cold public world, others believed the official policy of gender inequality in the early modern Japanese family offered little comfort to women. Later Meiji images of the family may not have been so gloomy for women, but again, the family was not seen as something separate from the public sphere. Indeed, many Meiji advocates for women believed women deserved a public role not *despite* their family status but *because* of it. Thus, for instance, the mother who kept her family healthy could be seen, during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), as serving her nation publicly. The ideological opponents of the women’s rights advocates—gender conservatives who opposed any concept of inherent (natural) rights or even earned rights based on service in the public sphere—also argued that the family was the basis of the state. But their idea of “family” was a patriarchy with...
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no thought of rights or even equality among its members. So where did rights advocates start their quest for women’s rights?

Although the earliest discussions of rights in the 1870s and 1880s often did not explicitly correlate rights with male gender, the Japanese discussants frequently employed the ideas of Rousseau, whose vision of a social contract was founded on the rights of men in a fictive fraternal relationship. Those men and (the smaller group of) women who clamored for rights in the 1870s demanded the rights of political participation or inclusion. By 1890, a tiny minority of men had been awarded the right of inclusion in the state and civil society, but women were pointedly excluded from political participation. The modern state was gendered as “male” by 1890—maleness was required of all government officials, including the emperor—and the state itself was seen as a fraternity under a patriarchal emperor. Indeed, when political rights were extended in 1890 to some of the men who had earlier demanded rights of fraternal inclusion, many of those activists followed up on their demands by joining parties and entering the government in some capacity. The prior state and society were male dominated as well, and it required no imagination for many in the late nineteenth century to take male gender for granted as a requirement for political participation.

But though it was a necessary condition, male gender was not a sufficient condition of inclusion. Large numbers of men were outside the political arena, excluded either because of their occupation or because of lower-class status. Many men continued to work for inclusion but perhaps cared as much about gaining the respectability that was implied by their participation in civil society and the state as about casting ballots. Male gender as a barrier to inclusion in politics was not at issue for them, class was; and unenfranchised men were seeking to claim the rights of fraternal inclusion that were enjoyed by other men.

This chapter will discuss the goals of women’s rights advocates and the meaning of their demands in the context of turn-of-the-century state and society formation. It examines women’s rights discourses in late nineteenth-century periodicals, some of them directed to a female readership and some directed to a general, often male, audience. Sources include journals like Meiroku zasshi, Jogaku zasshi, Joken, Tokyo fujin kyōshu kai zasshi, and some regional publications.
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century advocates for women were, of course, of varying minds about the definition of “women’s rights,” but all agreed that women did not have rights at that time. Some argued for a communitarian inclusiveness reminiscent of the Rousseauian ideas espoused in the 1870s when neither ordinary men nor women had political rights. Others, inspired by Mill, stressed improved education as a way for women to gain the subjectivity (personhood or identity) that would make them eligible for rights. There were also those who believed inclusion must follow the elimination of patriarchal sexual privileges, such as those implied by polygamy, prostitution, and patrilineality. This chapter examines these different positions and their similarities and differences with late nineteenth-century arguments for expanding men’s inclusion in the state.

Meiji-Era Engagement with Western Rights Theories

In its formulation and its legal applications, the concept of rights is one that separates the individual from his or her community rather than embracing the notion of community. People struggle for rights on behalf of an oppressed identity group (a class, a gender, and ethnicity), but when rights are granted they are applied to individuals. This type of thinking was discussed in the West by philosophers as divergent as Jefferson and Marx. Japanese commentators on Meiji civil law, both before and after the implementation of the Civil Code of 1898, rightly argued that this concept of rights was at odds with the notion, codified in the Constitution of 1889, that women, and especially wives, were under the jurisdiction of the patriarchal family head, and thus had no individual rights within the community of the family nor the independent right of contract that would permit rights in the larger society. The Civil Code, therefore, explicitly excluded the idea of rights held equally by separate individuals (irrespective of household membership).

Nevertheless, Japanese supporters of improving the lot of women brought rights in as a means to elevate women’s status. Many saw rights in terms of inclusion in state and civil society rather than as a basis for continuing resistance and separation from power. This view of rights had many parallels with Western notions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Under the social contract, which had come to be understood in the West as occurring after the defeat of the metaphorical father (the patriarchal king), individuals voluntarily gave up some rights
in return for the protection of civil law and inclusion in the fraternity of citizens—liberty, equality, and fraternity were the ideal of the civil, or public, sphere. The “state” that was constructed of this public sphere could define the terms of inclusion or citizenship, according to Rousseau, though Mill championed the rights of individuals against this “tyranny of the majority.” Mill and Rousseau were particularly important sources for the creation of Japanese thinking about rights.

The problem with this construct was that its theorists supposed that only “individuals” could enter into this contract; because of their putative weakness in strength and intellect, women were not entitled to ownership of property in the person, and were therefore not individuals. For Mill, women were thus not in the public sphere, and where they were—the home—was to be “private” or off limits to the state and dominated by the home’s own patriarch, who was part of the civil, egalitarian “fraternity.” Not surprisingly, women’s rights advocates (including Mill) reckoned that education was one key to making women deserving of being “individuals” and therefore improving their status, but even Mill did not know what to do with a husband’s right to dominance in marriage. Rousseau, male-centered though his writings often appear, did, in fact, suggest that women had a publicly important role—that is, as mothers. Men could not be “brothers” if they were not ethical fathers and sons, and the mother was the key to preserving the moral and ethical family. This idea resonated with women’s rights thinking in turn-of-the-century Japan, one of whose key components was moral and intellectual cultivation and its connection with social respect.

Historians of Japan have traditionally raised concerns about “state intrusion in the family,” but that formulation ignores the fact that patriarchal dominance may have felt more confining to many women in the Meiji era than state authoritarianism. (In fact, one component of state authoritarianism was the reification of male dominance in family law.) Patriarchal problems in the “private” sphere seemed so debilitating in Meiji Japan that issues surrounding marriage and sexuality became a major early concern of women’s rights advocates. Inclusion in the state, which must be preceded or accompanied by inclusion in the public sphere, was thus a goal (though one fraught with problems) of many feminist political activists, in Japan as it was in Western countries as well.
Though concepts of rights and participation in civil society as they developed in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Western thought were central to the mid- to late-Meiji discourse on rights, the political context was quite different. Most significantly, the metaphorical patriarch (the emperor) was not defeated in Japan but rather was used as the centerpiece of a male-gendered (and upper-class-centered) polity. When male sex was made a requirement for emperorship in 1890, many women’s rights advocates were surprised and disheartened.31 Nevertheless, though the emperor had to be male, he co-existed with a slowly expanding participatory society, a scenario that led many advocates of rights, both civil and women’s rights, to continue to look, in varying degrees, to Western discussions of rights as desirable and perhaps even normative. Rights discourse was a big tent that accommodated a variety of opinions, and Japanese thinkers—male and female, radical and liberal—drew on what appealed to them in this diverse body of thought.

Even though rights might be problematic, based as they were on assumptions—masculinist, Western, individualistic—that presented significant drawbacks, there were feminists in the Meiji period who advocated women’s rights.32 Looking back at her activist career, Fukuda Hideko noted in 1913 that while she and other women in the Freedom and People’s Rights movement of the 1880s may have wanted equal rights with men, by the end of the Meiji period women on the left (like herself) wanted liberation from men.33 Historian Sotozaki Mitsuhiro notes that nonsocialist feminists in the Taishō period reinvigorated talk about equal rights in reaction to the socialists’ focus on liberation, creating a varied and sophisticated discourse on rights.34 The extremely lively discussions and activism around women’s rights in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s had historical antecedents.35

Nor were the issues raised by women’s rights advocates sui generis; they developed in the context of men’s political rights. The concept of male fraternity, so central to Rousseauian rights discourse, was deeply embedded in Japanese social culture, even in contexts in which rights were not at issue. Donald Roden’s study of elite male education in imperial Japan, for instance, describes a fraternal communalism that violently resisted even the suggestion of a womanly presence in its hallowed manly halls.36 Some women who used notions of rights to advocate elevating the status of women would have agreed with the
gender essentialism implied in the fraternity concept while rejecting the notion that it might presume male superiority; others leaned toward the notion of rights inherent in individuals irrespective of gender. But because women's rights implied women's inclusion in the state and civil society—which would erode a sense of fraternity of male citizens—and because most advocates for women recognized that equality first required the destruction of patriarchal family practices, women's rights talk eventually diverged from (male) rights discourse after the 1890s, when some men had become enfranchised citizens.

Discussing women's rights primarily in terms of politics, however, overlooks a significant part of the discussion about women in Meiji Japan. At that time, discussions of women's rights were closely related to discussions of women's education, particularly education beyond the elementary level. Cultivating a good, moral, ethical, responsible character capable of manifesting agency—through being an exemplar or even a leader—was a goal of Confucian education as well as the recently introduced Western-style learning. Intellectual and moral cultivation produced a person worthy of respect, worthy of having a recognizable subjectivity. The centrality of education in rights discourse at the turn of the century suggests that rights at that time were closely connected to the desire for respect for women's subjectivity. Talk of rights takes persons' subjectivity for granted; talk of education as self-cultivation advances the cause of women as subjects or persons. In Meiji Japan, even the type of education that claimed to train women who did not need political rights was to mold ethical wives and mothers who led by example in the family and in civil society. These women would be active not in electoral politics but, as individuals or as members of organizations, in public activities such as relief for the poor or more controversial reforms like those calling for regulation of sexuality.

Some scholars suggest that 1890s discussions about women, which focused more on educated women's managing a warm, loving family and home (katei) or on playing a leadership role in legal reification of moral reform (especially reform of the patriarchal family), was a shift away from earlier discourses focusing on political rights. But I would argue that there is no real gulf between the 1880s and the 1890s when viewed from the perspective of respect for women's personhood. Before 1890, discussions focused on the equality between men and women
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(danjo byōdō)—a concept used both as the foundation for women's rights (joken) and equal rights (döken) and as the justification for the attack on polygamy. Unlike joken advocates, advocates of monogamy did not necessarily wish women to be active in politics, but they did view women as fully realized individuals deserving equality and respect. Both types sought women's inclusion in society—one through political, civil, or civic participation on a par with men, the other through the use of law to improve familial relations, which would further dissolve the barriers between public and private spheres. The theme of respect for women's subjectivity also undergirded the 1890s focus on moral reform and on "creating a warm home." These discussions were supplemented by those on equal rights and, most noticeably, on education. Ethical and well-trained women were worthy of respect and were, therefore, integrated with society, a necessary step toward inclusion in the state and possession of rights.

Women's Rights and Women's Education

Decades after its inception in the 1870s, at the height of the pre–World War II feminist political movement, women's education—at least elementary education—had become so normalized that it was viewed as both a right and a duty. Although as late as the 1920s many farm families and others disputed the need for any education for their daughters beyond the sixth grade, others, particularly those who contributed to the public discourse on the elevation of women's status either through "rights" or through "liberation," took it for granted that women's education was both a prerequisite for and a result of that elevation. Feminist Hiratsuka Raichō (1886–1971) argued, from Meiji precedents, that education helped to advance the rights and powers of wives in marriage—a liberatory discourse—while Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981) tied women's education to social and political participation—a rights discourse.

From the beginning of the Meiji period, what later came to be called fujinron (discourse on womanhood) occupied the attention of quite a few commentators, many of whom discussed education, especially in the context of morality in the family and, by extension, in the whole nation. Meiroku zasshi (founded 1873, circulation 3,000) was an early venue for these discussions. Mori Arinori, who later became education min-
ister, noted in a series of articles in *Meiroku zasshi* in 1874, that girls should be educated, that educated women could better protect their chastity as well as their husbands’ morality, and that mothers should instill moral values in their children. Moreover, Mori argued, as had Mill, that education was not only a right but a prerequisite for rights; thus, Mori nimbly combined gender, rights, and education. He called attention to women’s weakness, however, when he added that oppression of the weak by the strong was a sign that righteousness did not prevail.

Tsuda Mamichi, another contributor to *Meiroku zasshi*, who vehemently rejected the idea of keeping women out of the public eye, was, however, less enthusiastic about women’s rights in his argument for otherwise representative government, taking as natural that women and other incompetents should be excluded from the electorate. Tsuda recognized the disjunction in Western law between the civil rights of unmarried and married women. Since husbands possessed their wives, he wrote in 1875, married women had unequal personal, property, and contract rights. While it was “evil” to shut women up entirely, Tsuda wrote, why should Japan go so far in the other direction and grant women rights not yet enjoyed in the West? Sakatani Shiroshi, decrying bigamy in 1875, went on to say that equal rights should be limited to the bedroom, as it was far worse for a wife to have more rights than her husband than for a husband’s rights to surpass his wife’s. The previous year, he had argued that preventing women from cutting their hair, as men were encouraged to do, was unjust; though he added that haircuts would mainly be beneficial because they would promote women’s virtue. Sakatani’s influential discussion of women, then, focused mainly on private matters. Nakamura Masanao, who had called for educating “wise mothers, good mothers” (*kashikoi baha, yoi baha*) in an influential speech at the opening of Tokyo Women’s Normal School in 1874, continued his discussion, in the pages of *Meiroku zasshi* in 1875, of the role of compassionate and educated mothers in giving birth to good children and then educating them in spirituality, morality, and arts and sciences. Fukuzawa Yukichi, perhaps the most famous early participant in the “fujin ronso” (dispute about women), and author of the influential *Nihon fujinron* in 1885, stressed monogamy as the basis of equality (*byōdo*). Elsewhere, Fukuzawa linked “equality” closely to education.
Like Fukuzawa, female advocates for women also linked education, monogamy, and respect. Moving beyond the printed word alone, women advocates took the feminist message to the public through political speeches, like those of (Nakajima) Kishida Toshiko and Fukuda Kageyama Hideko, or through organizing civic groups and thereby moving into and helping to develop civil society in Meiji Japan. Kishida gave scores of speeches between 1882 and 1884. Her talks were pointedly political, calling for equal rights for men and women, decrying the stultifying effects of repression of freedom of thought, denouncing the equating of personhood with male gender alone and, above all, calling on women to develop the mental strength (seishin ryoku) to be confident public persons. Kishida rhetorically connected the development of women’s subjectivity—their existence as persons in society—both to national strength and to People’s Rights politics. Because “[e]quality, independence, respect, and a monogamous relationship are the hallmarks of relationships between men and women in a civilized society,” she stated, women’s rights would elevate Japan in international esteem and thereby aid in its defense against a possible Western threat. Kishida also gave sexual inequality a political twist her colleagues in the People’s Rights movement should not fail to grasp when she equated male supremacy with the government’s dominion over the people—as in her speech entitled “The government is the people’s god; man is woman’s god” (“Seifu wa jinmin no ten; otoko wa onna no ten”).

Kishida inspired women all over Japan. Women’s groups sprang up in cities and towns, large and small—many of them to welcome speakers like Kishida. There were women’s friendly societies (joshi konshinkai), women’s freedom parties (fujin jiyūto), women’s rights associations (jokenkai), women’s societies (fujin kyōkai), and at least one women’s freedom hall (joshi jiyukan). Whether these groups continued to exist long after they sponsored Kishida and others is unclear. Yet they did have specific goals, and they did participate in feminist debates that continued in later decades. Their role in disseminating ideas of rights and reforms is as significant as their role in involving women in nongovernmental advocacy groups outside the home. Moreover, they helped set the stage for the growth of larger and more influential feminist groups, such as the Japan Christian Women’s Reform Society (Nihon Kirisutokyō fujin kyōfukai) or the Women’s Morality Association.
(Fujin tokugikai) in the next half decade, and they created a context for the expansion of women’s rights discourses in magazines and journals in the 1890s. These groups dealt with political advocacy on behalf of monogamy and women’s sexual dignity, political discussion, and collaborative feminist efforts to set up schools for girls and women. “Joseiron” (discourse on femininity) carried out by these groups meant discourses on ways to improve women’s lot through politicizing the private by means of education, marital respect, and the relationship of these to public voice and self-cultivation.

Educator Fukuda Hideko followed in Kishida’s footsteps. Inspired by Kishida, the young Hideko founded a community women’s group that brought in speakers on natural rights, equality, and freedom. Though her school was closed by the government and she herself jailed, her efforts were lauded by feminists who celebrated her release in 1889. The following year, Fukuda petitioned the Diet to permit women’s political participation—a clear use of what she viewed as her right to address the government. In 1891, Fukuda caught the attention of the mainstream media with her proposal to establish a newspaper for women run entirely by women. Like Kishida, Fukuda tied women’s rights and political involvement to strengthening the nation. Though more famous than most of their contemporaries, Fukuda and Kishida were not alone among women who translated into notable political action their desire for the right of inclusion, for education, and for respect that came with personhood.

Thus, a wealth of commentary on education and rights, in print and in speeches of the People’s Rights advocates and embedded in the structure and philosophy of separate educational institutions for boys and girls, informed thinking in the late 1880s when new publications directed at educated women began to be published. Women’s rights discourse in the late nineteenth century took many forms, of course. But fundamental to all discussion was the connection between joken and jogaku (women’s education). While the content of rights discourse had changed by the middle of the 1880s, the examination of rights within the family continued in the pages of magazines like Jogaku zasshi, discussed in the next section. There was no simple unidirectional trajectory in the development of ideas of women’s rights and education. For example, Tsuda Umeko, who taught for a while at Meiji Jogakkō before
founding her own school, eschewed political rights for women while fighting tenaciously for their right to prove their worth through educational accomplishment.\textsuperscript{67} Positing a polarization between the state and society, Tsuda argued that women's responsibilities to serve society meant that they must be educated as good mothers,\textsuperscript{68} but that they had no obligations to the state.\textsuperscript{69}

**Discourses on Education, Morality, and Rights in Late Meiji**

The most important of the new journals for women in the 1880s was *Jogaku zasshi* (Women's education journal), co-founded by Iwamoto Yoshiharu (Zenji) in 1885, and edited by him for most of its eighteen years. *Jogaku zasshi* employed the talents of numerous writers, including at least eight women known in their day as advocates of rights, both women's rights and people's rights; the most famous of these were probably Shimizu Toyoko, Kishida Toshiko, and Wakamatsu Shizu (who married Iwamoto in 1889).\textsuperscript{70} All were influenced by the readily accessible thought of the Freedom and People's Rights polemists as well as lively intellectual discourse in other publications like the *Meiroku zasshi* of the previous decade and *Kokumin no tomo*, a journal that shared a readership with *Jogaku zasshi*.\textsuperscript{71} From these sources, the writers were influenced by a diverse body of thought on rights.

*Jogaku zasshi*, as a journal that took women's education seriously, treated the issues of *jogaku* and *joken* in numerous editorials and articles. These two terms were used extensively over the entire period, but their meanings kept shifting, and therefore their intersections shifted as well. Writing in *Jogaku zasshi*'s predecessor, *Jogaku shinshi* (New women's education journal), in 1884, Iwamoto defined the term *jogaku* as a type of education that concerned the body and soul, the future, and the status of women;\textsuperscript{72} until the day when there was human education, *jogaku* would be necessary, he added.\textsuperscript{73} His working with the term *jogaku* became more sophisticated four years later when, in a response to economist Taguchi Ukichi's questioning of the neologism "*jogaku*" in an article in *Tokyo Keizai zasshi*—a journal founded by Taguchi—Iwamoto felt compelled to clarify his thinking. Taguchi wondered why there should be *jogaku* (literally "female educa-
tion”) if there were no dangaku (literally “male education”). Iwamoto replied, in an article entitled “Jogaku no kai,” that jogaku had multiple meanings—the education of women (joshi no kyōiku) and education for or about women (joshi no gakumon); thus it could mean either a type of education geared to women or women’s studies. Moreover, he wrote, jogaku was the key to women’s rights in that it would raise the position of women, extend their rights, and promote their welfare.

Raising women’s status had particular and changing meanings to Iwamoto. In 1885, Iwamoto stressed that women’s human character must be recognized. He argued for the fundamental equality of men and women although he rejected male/female equal rights. The phrase “respect the male, despise the female” (danson johi) was particularly odious to Iwamoto. Christianity, which permeated Iwamoto’s thinking, emphasized the equal humanity of men and women in the eyes of God. That women must not be seen as less than human, he wrote in 1885, did not imply that men and women must be granted equal rights; servants are human, too, but they do not have the same rights as their employers. Though Iwamoto believed in gender equality before God, he—as did many contemporary social contract theorists in the West whose grounding was also in Christianity—took social stratification by gender as perfectly natural.

From the mid-1880s to the early 1890s, when Iwamoto fervently espoused education for women, he also believed that the purpose of women’s education should differ from men’s. Women must be trained to be good wives and mothers—but he called for a “modern” type of wife and mother. Christian, modern (kirin to kyōteki, kindai teki) thinking would respect men and women for the particular roles each fulfilled. It would elevate women’s status. It would create mothers who were intelligent and wives who were good persons, and not merely mothers who were wise educators of their children and wives who served their husbands well. But it would not require political rights. Such a concept of rights, which would set a woman apart from the community constituted by her family, was alien to Iwamoto’s communitarian construction of rights at that time. To counter opponents’ criticism that educated women made bad wives, Jogaku zasshi extolled the virtues of an educated wife.
By 1887, editorials in *Jogaku zasshi*, which reflected Iwamoto’s views, asserted that women’s rights, women’s work and economic independence, and equal respect in marriage would be enhanced by women’s education. The editorials conveyed a sense of optimism that the course of Japan’s modernization would be progressive if the need to investigate the true nature of men and women based on concepts of equality were recognized; if correct education, understanding of rights discourse, and interactions between men and women were developed; if prostitution was eliminated; if monogamy was fostered; if a modern home based on the human bond between husband and wife was created; and if other reforms were undertaken.

Iwamoto was bitterly disappointed in the 1889 Constitution. His sense of betrayal when he read that gender determined imperial succession comes across as surprising naivety. But interestingly, it was after this shock that Iwamoto adopted a new approach to women’s education and to women’s rights. In a June 1889 article entitled “100-Year Chronic Disease” (“Hyaku-nen no koshitsu”), Iwamoto presented a stinging criticism of sexism in education. If Japanese opposed women’s high schools, objected to women voting, objected to monogamy, insulted the morality of female students, and failed to regard men and women as equally human, then Japan would never cure its century-long chronic disease. The ruler would be separated from the people, the people from the officials, the slave from the master, the rich from the poor. It is remarkable how advocacy of the education of women, of Christian moralism, of religious egalitarianism, and of women’s civil rights are all brought under one discursive umbrella. Moreover, the article’s rhetorical device of equating the disease with standard symbols of Tokugawa authoritarianism like the separation of the ruler and the ruled or the people and the officials is a powerful one.

*Jogaku zasshi* published a number of criticisms of the denial of women’s right of political inclusion in 1890. In an unsigned article, *Jogaku zasshi* called for women to take part in political discussions in order to promote “political harmony among men and women” (*seijijō danjo kyōwa*). Shimizu Toyoko wrote in August 1890, condemning the recent passage of legislation barring women from political meetings, that “if individual rights are to be protected, and the peace and order of society secured, laws should not be discriminatory, granting advantage
to men only, and misfortune only to women." In another article two months later, Shimizu considered it irrational that "one part of humanity arbitrarily controls . . . the other part." These articles indicate Shimizu's individual rights based concept of women's rights as well as her displeasure with the denial of women's agency.

Iwamoto, two years later, expanded on some of these aspects of rights discourse and added education to the mix. In an important article that seemed to completely reject his earlier stress on men's and women's fulfillment of their naturally defined duties, he called for a much freer and more unfettered education for the girls at Meiji Jogakko and other schools. In an 1892 installment of the series of articles entitled "Gōto no joshi kyōiku" (Our side's women's education), he considered the gender essentialism increasingly dominating the higher schools for women to be a violation of "true womanhood" (makoto no josei). Though the terminology was the same as that used in Western discourse, "true womanhood" had specific meanings for Iwamoto. Gender essentialism was slavery, he wrote, because long-term discrimination against women had constructed a womanly nature that was probably unreal, so no one knew women's true nature. Until women's true nature could be determined, it was imperative to allow girl students the freedom to develop their minds. Conversely, too, education that permitted an individual's development would also free women's true nature from the shackles of discrimination, thereby permitting it to be observed. When and if differences between men's and women's nature were discovered, moreover, those differences must not become the basis of discriminatory treatment.

Elsewhere in the "Gōto no joshi kyōiku" series Iwamoto revisited the issue of marriage and motherhood. Not only was education the key to a more egalitarian marriage, Iwamoto also wrote that women did not need to marry at all if they so chose. Along with other Japanese advocates of women's rights, Iwamoto had earlier problematized the marital relationship, attempting to insert rights in where several Western theorists had ignored them, although he argued from the same Christian viewpoint those theorists had originally used to deny full humanity to women. By 1892, Iwamoto was opening up a space for a respectable unmarried status. Although it was true, Iwamoto wrote, that women were the ones who bore children, that fact alone was not what made
one a woman. Women and men were “psychologically, mentally, and socially” constructed. Based on this notion, he expanded the definition of motherhood. Queen Victoria was mother of her nation, Heloise was the mother of love, and so on. Thus, girls’ education should create mothers who are intelligent and wives who are able to do good deeds in the public arena. At the height of the Sino-Japanese War, however, Iwamoto appeared to be adopting a view that naturalized women’s separate status in the family when he advocated the equation of their domestic role with national service for wives: that is, that the home is equivalent to the battlefield.

Many advocates of women’s rights focused on sexuality issues in their struggle for developing women’s personhood and dignity. The heterosexual relationship was problematized early on in the discussions on womanhood, as seen in the early discussions by Meiroku zasshi writers. These articles stressed the damage done by polygamy to Japanese ethical values and Japan’s resulting weakness in the face of the West. Feminists expanded these ideas and discussed control of sexuality—that of men and of some women—as a way of improving women’s conditions and helping their development as full, equal human beings.

Sexuality issues were increasingly politicized after the founding of the Tokyo (later Japan) Christian Women’s Reform Society by Yajima Kajiko in 1886. The society’s views on monogamy—as good for Japan, as respecting nature’s gender balance, and as a move away from evil customs of the Confucian past—emerged in articles by and about the society’s political activities in Shinonome shinbun and Tokyō fujin kyōfukai zasshi in the late 1880s. Jogaku zasshi, another source of information about the Reform Society, also stressed control of male sexuality through the banning of polygamy in an 1887 article by Iwamoto entitled “The Atmosphere of Adultery” (“Kan’in no kuki”), for which the entire issue in which it was to appear was banned by the government.

Women’s advocates viewed polygamy as a denigration of women’s rights. For that reason, Yajima and others were passionate in their struggle against it—this was no abstraction to them. In 1889, Yajima delivered to government officials a petition with 800 signatures, demanding an end to concubinage. She took a dagger on this mission, prepared to commit suicide if she were unable to hand over her petition. Tokyo nichibei shinbun reported that in November 1891, the Reform Society
planned to submit a petition to the Diet for legislation banning polygamy. Thus, the Reform Society recognized the use of the power of the state in influencing equality in the marriage relationship. Male morality was often at stake in these discussions; Shimizu, for instance, wrote “Discussing Japanese Males’ Moral Character” (“Nihon danshi no hinkō o ronzu”).

Discussions about controlling all men’s sexuality were accompanied by those concerning the control of some women’s sexuality. Reform Society goals included the elimination of prostitution as well as concubinage as two sides of the same coin. The sex trade denigrated wives by supporting husbands’ adultery, and thus was seen as a women’s rights issue that focused on legitimate wives. As for women in the sex trades themselves, Reform Society attitudes were often unsympathetic. The Reform Society’s journal, Tōkyō fujin kyōfu zasshi, called for shaming women into leaving sex work: “Succumbing to the easier life of prostitution . . . they brazenly walk the streets in broad daylight. . . . There is no way to stop them other than to shame them into reforming!” Overseas prostitution, moreover, shamed Japan as a whole, the journal noted, and may have contributed to anti-Japanese discrimination in the United States. The Reform Society’s concern about prostitution was, in these types of comments, less connected to saving fallen women—which was, in fact, another goal of the organization—as it was to supporting the human dignity and equal personhood of wives.

Gaining subjectivity was an important requirement for eligibility for rights; and rights discourse was a well-used way of discussing subjectivity. The two were often elided. The issue of “morality” was essential to women’s subjectivity. This can be seen, for instance, in the journal Joken (Women’s rights). Established in September 1891, Joken included articles by leading feminists such as Fukuda Hideko and reported extensively on the activities of the Women’s Morality Association throughout Japan. The goals of various branches of this association called for freedom (jiiyō), equality, women’s rights, and morality (tokugi). The Women’s Morality Association’s stated goal was “the expansion of women’s rights and the elimination of the evil of ‘respect the male and despise the female.’” Like Jogaku zasshi, Joken, in an 1891 article entitled “People’s Rights or Men’s Rights?” (Minken ka danken ka?) strongly
criticized the exclusion of women from the political world, arguing that “rights” should not be gendered.\textsuperscript{107}

The Women’s Reform Society and the Women’s Morality Association attempted to push their agendas in the political arena. That venue was quite restricted, however. Even before the revisions of the Police Security Regulations of 1890, with its infamous “Article 5”—which banned women from all political participation, including political speaking and assembly—the City Code and Town and Village Code of 1888 pointedly excluded women from such participation.\textsuperscript{108} Feminists submitted petitions to the Diet to eliminate these restrictions, but failed.\textsuperscript{109} In response, feminist Shimizu Toyoko contributed her important article in \textit{Jogaku zasshi}, “Why Are Women Not Permitted to Take Part in Political Meetings?” (“Naniyue ni joshi was seiden shūkai ni sanchō suru to o yurusarezaru ka?”).\textsuperscript{110} One response by the government, in turn, was a Diet member’s assertion that women should not have political rights because they should focus on their work in the home—the first such assertion in the Diet.\textsuperscript{111} Failing to gain a political voice, women’s rights advocates did not abandon their causes, but turned even more attention to the issues of sexuality, which were now redefined as “social” rather than the banned “political.” Economic independence became yet another part of feminists’ quest for sexuality-based marital respect as social reforms.

Shimizu (and others) connected the rights of citizens (kokumin) with social and moral issues.\textsuperscript{112} Women needed to be citizens—to have the right of participation—because they should educate their children as citizens and support their husbands in the exercise of their citizenship. Thus, Shimizu posited that women’s political rights arose from their relationship with those who had (some) rights. This resonated with Kishida Toshiko’s 1884 article, “Appeal to My Sisters” (“Dōhō shimai ni tsugu”).\textsuperscript{113} Women’s advocacy groups, then, restructured the political to be more like the social or moral. Advocacy of improving women’s conditions did not end with Article 5; concerns about morality, the home, economic conditions, and other issues took center stage as women moved increasingly into public realms of advocacy, or civil society. And women’s education was essential to this ability to penetrate civil society, in its creation of a woman’s personhood or subjectivity.
Conclusions

Notions of women’s rights in late Meiji discussions of women’s education encompassed marital equality, economic independence, overcoming denigration—as exemplified in the phrase “respect the male, despise the female”—and supporting women’s dignity and subjectivity, as well as rights of societal or state participation. Discussion of jogaku could encompass a wide variety of meanings, each of which could be rhetorically used in different ways to improve the status of women and/or women’s rights. Most importantly, they supported the notion of women’s potential personhood, a necessary prerequisite for rights. The education arguments were revived by Taishō activists, and the parallels with Meiji thinking are strong.114

Was there any danger, however, in the quest for rights? Perhaps—because of the nationalistic meanings of political participation. As Carol Gluck notes in Japan’s Modern Myth, Ethical, national, and historical values were gradually intertwined in various renderings, the ideological amalgam of which was a catechism of citizenship that joined code and country in a newly generalized civil morality.115

If the type of morality catechized as the foundation for “citizenship” was derived from ethical, national, and historical values, that left much less room for the kinds of values espoused by advocates of women’s rights. Under those circumstances, either women’s rights advocates would become marginalized—which is exactly the opposite of their goal of inclusion—or they would be forced to compromise. The legacy of Meiji-era rights advocacy is, thus, quite complex. It left as unfinished business the meaning of inclusion if the family-state were left even marginally intact. The quest for women’s rights must be applauded, but it must be viewed as part of the larger context for rights in an emperor-based system, a matter of continuing concern to prewar feminist-suffragist movements.
Notes


2. Although the term “feminism” (*jeminizumu*) was introduced in Japan after the period under consideration in this chapter—in a 1910 article in *Hogaku kyōkai zasshi*—I shall use the term to refer to a broad range of discourses supportive of women’s rights or the improvement of women’s condition or status. See *Nihon josei no rekishi*, ed. Sōgo joseishi kenkyūkai (Kadokawa Shoten, 1993), 192–193, for more on the introduction of the term “feminism.”

3. Susan Mann has written persuasively that “contemporary Western feminism may remain parochial in its insistence that its own telos of freedom and agency be at work in every record of women’s lives.” See Mann, “The History of Chinese Women before the Age of Orientalism,” *Journal of Women’s History* 8, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 174. In the case of discussions about rights, writers were explicit about the quest for women’s rights; the historian need not project her own feminist hopes of finding calls for agency.


5. Mill’s *On Liberty* was translated very early—in 1868. This translation was followed in the 1870s and early 1880s by translations of works by other Western political theorists. Rousseau’s *Social Contract*, though translated later (1882) than Mill’s work, was highly esteemed by People’s Rights advocates. See *Japanese Thought in the Meiji Era*, ed. Masaaki Kosaka, vol. 8, *Japanese Culture in the Meiji Era* (Tōyō Bunko, 1969), 115, 146.


16. See Martha Tocco’s essay in this volume.

17. Iwamoto Yoshiharu, in Taiyō, “Katei” column, cited in Muta, “Images of the Family,” 64. See also Kathleen Uno’s chapter in this volume.
18. See e.g., Hozumi Yatsuka, quoted in Kosaka, *Thought*, 381, 383. “Family” was not seen in the same light by conservatives and by feminists. For feminists, the family was made up of loving members whose sexually differentiated but complementary roles were to be equally valued. Conservatives found that definition of the family threatening, believing that it could undermine the foundation of the Japanese authoritarian state. That is, as the influential conservative legal scholar Hozumi wrote in 1896, “The obedience to... the headship of the family is, inferentially, what we confer on the Imperial House as the extant progenitor of the nation”; or, in 1898, “The family expanded becomes the country... we cannot be indifferent to whether the family institution is maintained or abolished!”

19. For more on Rousseau’s ideas, see e.g., Carole Patemen, *Sexual Contract*.


21. On “fraternity” see e.g., Donald Roden, *Schooldays in Imperial Japan: A Study in the Culture of a Student Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).


24. Most men, regardless of social or economic class, were included in the electorate by *fusen* (universal suffrage) legislation passed in 1925. The first national (Diet) election in which this expanded electorate could vote was the 1928 election.


26. Patrilineality is effectively problematized by Kathleen Uno in “Questioning Patrilineality: On Western Studies of the Japanese *Ie*.” *positions* 4, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 569–594. She argues convincingly that scholars have often distorted the historical roles of patrilineality. Meiji women’s rights advocates also strongly contested what they saw as continuing patterns of women’s subordination through patrilineality and its ties with the other “p’s” of patriarchy, prostitution, and polygamy.


Ironically, critics of the individual rights basis of the first draft of the Civil Code complained that the code smacked of “European” civil rights ideas.

Pateman, The Sexual Contract, passim, and Yasukawa and Yasukawa, Josei sabetsu, chapter 1.

Noheji, Josei kaibō shisō, 14.

Pioneering work in English on Meiji-era feminists was done by historian Sharon Sievers, whose often used and cited classic, Flowers in Salt, was the first English language book to take Meiji feminism seriously.

Fukuda Hideko, quoted in Sotozaki, Fujin kaibō ronso, 44. Some socialists moved away from talking about rights because women did not have the freedom to make contracts, on which political rights were based. Since rights were meaningless in that context, many socialists turned to other forms of social and labor reform to improve women’s conditions and status.

Sotozaki, Fujin kaibō ronso, 28.


Roden, Schooldays in Imperial Japan, 146, 139.
37. See chapters by Martha Tocco, Donald Roden, and Barbara Sato.

38. See e.g., Sievers’s discussion of the Women’s Reform Society in her *Flowers in Salt*, 87–114.

39. See e.g., Muta, “Images of the Family,” 62–63, who offers important evidence that articles on “women’s rights” peaked in 1886, to be replaced by those focusing on *katei*.


42. Yamaguchi Miyoko, *Meiji keimōki no fujin mondai ronsō no shūhen* (Domesu, 1989), 186.

43. See Kathleen Uno’s discussion of the “good wife, wise mother” ideal in this volume.


48. Sakatani Shiroshi, “On Concubines,” *Meiroku zasshi* 32 (March 1875), in Braisted, *Meiroku zasshi*, 392–399. Sakatani may have been betraying his class snobbery, as he took as his example of excessive women’s rights the spectacle, which he found distasteful, of a lower-class Tokyo wife yelling at her husband for cruelly selling her clothes.


50. Yamaguchi, *Meiji keimōki*, 194. Nakamura was the first president of Tokyo Women’s Normal School.
51. Ibid., 199. For an extensive treatment of the philosophical basis for Fukuzawa’s thought on equality and on education, see Yasukawa and Yasukawa, *Josei sabetsu*, 36–104.

52. Suzuki, *Shisii*, 56–85, offers a wealth of information about Kishida and her public activities. Newspaper articles, reprinted here, show that Kishida had an extraordinarily busy schedule, rushing from city to city to speak out—with occasional censorship by the police—on women’s rights.


56. Ibid., 56.

57. Ibid., 71–73, has articles describing the founding of several of these groups.

58. Hirota Masaki, “Kindai eriito josei no aidentiti to kokka,” in *Jiendc1a no Nihonshi*, eds. Wakita Haruko and S.B. Hanley, vol. 1 (Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1994), 203, is not impressed with the Okayama Women’s Friendly Society, noting that its members were merely wives and daughters of men in the People’s Rights movement. He contrasts this group with those formed by women not related to male activists.


63. Ibid., 127.

64. Ibid., 98.


66. Sōgo joseishi kenkyūkai, *Nihon josei no rekishi*, 195–197. See also the chapters by Kathleen Uno and Martha Tocco in this volume.


69. Ibid., 134.


76. Ibid., 9.

77. Ibid., 129.

78. Ibid., 128.

79. Ibid., 133.


83. Noheji, *Josei kaibō shisō*, 155, notes that the four characters—ryō, sai, ken, and bo—were used throughout “Gōto no joshi kyōiku.” Iwamoto’s use of “good wife, wise mother” (ryōsai kenbo), Noheji notes, differed from that of his contemporaries in his stress on Christianity as the basis for that type of education.


86. Ibid., 112.

87. Ibid., 14.

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94. Ibid., 151–152.

95. Muta, “Images of the Family,” 64. See also Kathleen Uno’s chapter in this volume.


97. See Suzuki, *Shisô, seiji*, 86–94, who cites several articles from these journals.


105. At the same time, the Ministry of Education, in its compendium of regulations, stated that the goal of women’s education was “womanly morality” (*jotoku*). Womanly morality required that the focus of girls’ education be the fostering of “docility” (*wajun*) toward one’s husband and “chastity” (*teiso*). This morality theme, which contrasted with the goals of the Women’s Morality Association, was reiterated in another journal established in 1891, *Jokan* (Women’s mirror). See Sôgô joseishi kenkyûkai, *Nihon josei no rekishi*, 197.


114. Hiratuska Raichō was one of many who picked up on Iwamoto’s themes. Noheji, *Josō kaibō shisō*, 85.