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Can Virtue be Taught?

William J. Prior
Santa Clara Univeristy

Can Virtue Be Taught? Ethics and Education in Aristotle[1]

You may have seen a recent Doonesbury cartoon, one of a series in which Garry Trudeau poked fun at State Assemblyman Vasconcellos and his "self-esteem commission." The scene is a press conference, at which Vasconcellos has presented the results of the commission's study. Reporter Rick Redfern, having called Vasconcellos' attention to the fact that the study could posit no causal connection between self-esteem and its alleged benefits, asks Vasconcellos, "In the light of that, isn't it possible that self-esteem isn't causal at all, but simply the happy side effect of a sturdy character, itself the product of unambiguous moral education?" The final frame shows Vasconcellos whispering to an aide, "Call Security. He must be from out of state."

Of course, there is something, if not "out of state," then at least "out of place," about the reporter's question. The expressions "sturdy character" and "unambiguous moral education" are part of the moral vocabulary of an earlier era; and, indeed, the assumption that self-esteem should be based on morality is itself an assumption that seems quaintly archaic in an age dominated by therapeutic models of psychological development. This feeling of archaism is not mistaken; for Redfern's question, I think, is exactly the question that Aristotle would have asked. The question contains an incisive summary of Aristotle's theory of moral education: self-esteem (Aristotle would have said *eudaimonia*, which we translate inaccurately as "happiness") results from virtue (*arete*, more properly translated as "excellence"); and a necessary ingredient in virtue is what Redfern calls a good char-

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acter, resulting precisely from an unambiguous moral education.

Redfern's question, though archaic, is not irrelevant; for Aristotle's moral theory, though quaint-sounding to modern ears, is by no means obsolete. The topic for this conference, as I understand it, originated in a practical concern about the moral education of American youth. I am one of those people who thinks that the study of the classics is valuable, not primarily for what it tells us about some long dead civilizations and individuals, but for what light it can shed on our own culture and lives. My conviction, I should state at the outset, is that the classics in general, and Aristotle in particular, can tell us much about contemporary moral education, and that we ignore its and his lessons at our peril.

I shall assume that I am speaking to an audience of people who do not work with Aristotle's ethical theory on a daily basis, and are therefore on less than intimate terms with it. If some in the audience *are* Aristotle scholars, they are bound to be disappointed with the obviousness of what I say. Even if you are not Aristotle scholars you may find the content of these remarks obvious. That is because a good deal of Aristotle's ethical theory is simply common sense. I don't think it is futile or profitless, however, to remind ourselves of what common sense and Aristotle have to say on the subject of moral education, especially since contemporary educational theory diverges from both a great deal.

I want to begin my presentation of Aristotle's views with a brief look at his predecessor and mentor, Plato. You probably remember the answer that Plato gave to the question "Can virtue be taught?" in the *Meno*. There, in response to Meno's skepticism about the possibility of discovering the nature of virtue (a skepticism induced by Socrates' refutation of his various attempts to define virtue), Plato had Socrates present his famous theory that learning is recollection. It is possible to teach virtue, Plato suggests, because people already have an innate knowledge of the nature of virtue, knowledge that has been acquired during the previous existence of the soul, prior to its present embodiment, and that can be brought to consciousness by means of skillful questioning.

This Platonic account of the acquisition of virtue is intellectual through and through. One learns to be virtuous by coming to know what virtue is. One comes to know this as the result of philosophical inquiry, under the guidance of one who knows how to examine others. (Socrates was, of course, the prototype and in fact Plato's only example of such a person.) What one acquires as a result of this inquiry is an explicit definition of virtue, which is grounded in some previous acquaintance with the Form of Virtue itself. (The *Meno* does not explicitly describe recollection as a process that involves Forms, but the *Phaedo* does.) The account of learning as recollection not only provides a positive aim for the Socratic practice of examining others, it explains the Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge.

This Platonic model of the teaching of virtue resembles in some ways a popular recent theory of moral education, that of Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg's student, like Plato's, possesses an innate understanding of morality, which is to be developed by a process of education that is thoroughly intellectual. According to Kohlberg, what the child possesses is not knowledge of the nature of virtue,[2] but an innate program of moral development that proceeds through six stages to an enlightened understanding of the nature of ethics; but, though the alleged content of the knowledge possessed by the child is different, its innateness and the method of eliciting it are the same as in Plato.

There are problems with this picture of moral education, intellectually appealing though it may be. First of all, it offers no explanation (beyond the presence or absence of the right kind of intellectual stimulation) for why people differ in their moral knowledge. If the same knowledge or sequence of stages is innately programmed into us all, why do so few of us attain full moral insight? Second, it does not explain

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[2] Kohlberg rejects virtue as a key element in moral education, and claims not to know what virtue is; see Christina Hoff Sommers, "Ethics without Virtue," *The American Scholar* 1984, 384.

the fact that the content of moral practice differs from culture to culture. Even if the universal nature of moral judgment is the same everywhere, customs play some role in our moral actions; but these theories give no account of that role. Third, and perhaps most important, the Plato-Kohlberg theory does not seem to give an accurate portrait of the way in which people actually shape their moral sensitivities. It is not primarily though intellectual inquiry that people develop morally, but through the process of making moral decisions in the course of their lives and by experiencing the effects on themselves of the decisions of others.

Plato was aware of at least some of these problems, as the end of the *Meno* shows. No sooner do Socrates and Meno reach the conclusion that virtue is knowledge than Socrates raises two powerful objections to that contention. First, if virtue is knowledge, there ought to be expert teachers of the subject, as there are in mathematics, medicine and the other sciences. Yet no such teachers exist, unless the claims of the Sophists are accepted. Second, there are people who seem pre-eminent in virtue (Socrates puts forth Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides son of Melesias, all *bona fide* Athenian heroes), but who are not virtuous by knowledge. (In the cases mentioned, Socrates cites the fact that they could not pass on their virtue to their children as proof that they did not have moral knowledge.)

If there are virtuous people who lack knowledge, how did they acquire their virtue? Plato's answer is that it came to them in the form of right opinion, as a result of divine inspiration. At the end of the *Meno* the possibility of acquiring virtue in the form of knowledge seems to have receded to a remote possibility:

> If all we have said in this discussion, and the questions we have asked, have been right, virtue will be acquired neither by nature nor by teaching. Whoever has it gets it by divine dispensation without taking thought, unless he be the kind of statesman who can create another like himself. Should there be such a man, he would be among the living practically what Homer said Tiresias was among the dead, when he described him as the only

> one in the underworld who kept his wits—'the others are mere flitting shades.' Where virtue is concerned, such a man would be just like that, a solid reality among shadows [*Meno* 99e-100a, tr. Guthrie].

Plato's resort to divine inspiration to explain the existence of correct moral judgment that falls short of knowledge seems a desperate expedient. Even if one allows that phenomena of that sort may on occasion occur, it is simply not the case that we wait to hear the word of God before making up our minds what we ought to do about most moral matters. It is at this point that Aristotle's account of moral education provides an attractive alternative.

For Aristotle, as for Plato, moral education is education in the virtues. Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of virtue: moral and intellectual. This distinction is based on a distinction between parts of the soul. In *Nicomachean Ethics* I.13, Aristotle divides the soul into two parts: the rational and the irrational. The irrational part he again divides in two: there is the vegetative part, which is responsible for nutrition and growth, and which he dismisses as irrelevant to ethics; and there is another part, which it turns out later is the locus of our appetites and emotions. This part, in morally weak people at least, "fights and resists the guidance of reason" [1102b17, tr. Ostwald]; in morally strong and virtuous people, however, it "accepts the leadership of reason" [27] and "partakes of reason insofar as it complies with reason and accepts its leadership" [31-2].

As Aristotle points out at the start of Book II, different methods exist for acquiring the two kinds of virtue: "Intellectual virtue...owes its origin and development chiefly to teaching...Moral virtue, on the other hand, is formed by habit (*ethos*)" [1103a15-17]. Habit, in turn, is formed by action:

> Men become builders by building houses, and harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, we become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by performing acts of courage

> [1103a 33-b32]...in our transactions with other men it is by action that some become just and others unjust, and it is by acting in the face of danger and by developing the habit of feeling fear or confidence that some become brave men and others cowards...In a word, characteristics develop from corresponding activities [1103b14-17, 21-22].

Aristotle regarded the formation of proper habits, that is, of moral virtues, as the necessary foundation for the kind of moral reflection that is the proper activity of the intellectual virtue of *phronesis*, practical wisdom. Without moral virtue, as we shall see, there can be no practical wisdom. That is why Aristotle says:

> Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or, rather, all the difference [1103b23-25].

That is also why he thought it futile to attempt to teach ethics to people who had not been raised properly: "to be a competent student of what is right and just,...one must first have received a proper upbringing in moral conduct" [I.4, 1095b4-6]. The attempt to substitute moral argument for proper habituation, he thought, was doomed to failure:

> Most men do not perform such acts, but by taking refuge in argument they think that they are engaged in philosophy and that they will become good in this way. In so doing, they act like sick men who listen attentively to what the doctor says, but fail to do any of the things he prescribes. That kind of philosophical activity will not bring health to the soul any more than this sort of treatment will produce a healthy body [11055b12-18].

If Aristotle is correct about the necessity of habituation for moral development, then one part of our question is answered. Can virtue be taught? Moral virtue cannot, but it can be acquired by practice. But this answer itself suggests addi-

tional questions. First, one might ask why any training is necessary. Proponents of the "values clarification" approach to moral education would argue that this training is the imposition of the values of society, or perhaps of the child's parents, on the child, and that the child should be allowed to discover his or her own values. Aristotle's answer is that children do not find virtuous actions initially pleasant, and that training is needed to enable them to do so, just as physical conditioning is needed to enable people to enjoy vigorous exercise, and intellectual training necessary to enable them to enjoy, say, reading Greek authors in the original. It is an interesting question, which I cannot even attempt to answer here, why our society is in general willing to endorse the "no pain, no gain" model for physical conditioning, but insists that moral development ought not to place unwelcome demands on the young.

Note that Aristotle's endorsement of a strenuous program of moral habituation is not based on an ascetic preference for burdensome duty over pleasant indolence. Unlike Kant, for instance, he thinks that virtuous action is pleasant for the virtuous person, and that in fact one mark of the truly virtuous (as opposed to the morally strong) person is that he or she genuinely enjoys performing virtuous acts. Indeed, Aristotle suggests in places that only the good person knows what is really pleasant (cf., e.g., II.3, VII.9, X.3). But he also insists that not all pleasures are equally available to everyone: the pleasures of a morally good person can only be experienced by one who has undergone the training necessary to become good.

A second question might be, who is to oversee the moral habituation of the young? The alternatives seem to be, the family and the state. Given the choice, Aristotle somewhat surprisingly (to us) prefers the state. In *Politics* VIII.1 he writes:

> For the exercise of any faculty or art a previous training and habituation are required; clearly therefore for the practice of virtue. And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same

> for all, and that it should be public, and not private—not, as at present, when everyone looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. In this particular as in some others the Lacedaimonians are to be praised, for they take the greatest pains about their children, and make education the business of the state [1337a19-32, tr. Jowett].

Now rhetoric of this sort inevitably suggests to modern ears the indoctrination of children in totalitarian states, so perhaps it is useful to recall that the end of the state, as he sees it, is the good life for the individuals in it, and that Aristotle's sentiments about the relation of the citizen to the state are not much different from those that Thucydides attributes to that great champion of democracy, Pericles, in his funeral oration. The point Aristotle is trying to get across is that moral education serves a public good, something in which we have a common interest. Because the American political tradition focuses more on the liberty of the individual and less on the common good than did classical political theory, and because modern Americans tend to think of ethics as personal rather than as public, we may find his recommendation that the state undertake moral education unpalatable; but it was only a generation ago that the public schools took it for granted that this was one of their primary educational aims. One might also note that the state that Aristotle recommends conduct moral education was the Greek *polis*, a far more homogeneous and unified entity than the contemporary United States. If one agrees with Alasdair MacIntyre that the contemporary nation state has long lost the requisite moral authority to oversee moral education,[3] one may find the family,

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[3] *After Virtue* (South Bend, 1981), p. 195.

or perhaps the local community, the only acceptable alternative. (It is interesting to note that Aristotle had another, more practical motive for suggesting that moral education be a matter of public, rather than private, control, a motive every parent will sympathize with: "A father's command," he remarks in *N.E.* X.9, "does not have the power to enforce or compel," but the law does.)

If the size, diversity and moral ambiguity of the modern state, the emphasis on individual liberty in contemporary American society, and the understanding of ethics as a private matter are all obstacles to the practice of moral education as Aristotle recommended it, they are also indicators of how different the assumptions of the fourth century Athenian audience were from ours and of how much more straightforward the task of moral education must have seemed, not just to Aristotle but to anyone of that era, than it does to us.

A third question that is sure to be raised in these skeptical times is, "How are we to know what actions are to be habituated in young people?" As a modern proponent of moral pluralism might put it, "*Whose* values are we to inculcate?" Aristotle's answer to this question goes to the heart of his ethical theory, and gives us an indication of its distance from modern accounts of ethics. Naturally, Aristotle wants children to learn virtuous actions rather than vicious ones; but how can we tell what acts are virtuous? Aristotle does not appeal to moral principles to answer this problem: there is nothing in his ethical theory comparable to Kant's Categorical Imperative or the Greatest Happiness principle of utilitarianism, or to the Ten Commandments (though he notes in II.6, at 1107a10ff., that adultery, theft and murder are always wrong). Instead, he uses the concept of a virtuous person to define the nature of virtue.

We can now see this strategy at work in two places in *NE* II. The first is in II.4, when he says that "acts are called just and self-controlled when they are the kind of acts which a just or self-controlled man would perform" [1105b5-7]. The second, more famous, instance is in his definition of virtue in II.6. Moral virtue, he states,

> ...is a characteristic involving choice, and...it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it [1106b36-1107a2].

In other words, virtue is a characteristic that enables us to choose virtuous actions, and these are actions that would be chosen by a person possessing practical wisdom. Aristotle refers to this person as the *phronimos*. *Phronesis*, practical wisdom, is an intellectual virtue, but one that can only be possessed by someone who has already been habituated in moral virtue. It is not mere skill in deliberation; that skill, unaccompanied by moral virtue, Aristotle calls cleverness [VI.12, 1144a23ff.]. It is, rather, the ability to deliberate well about the means to the end of *eudaimonia*, what we call "happiness."

Aristotle thinks that moral virtue is what enables the individual to know what this end is, and we can see why from what has been stated above. *Eudaimonia*, as Aristotle defines it, is the state in which one habitually acts well and enjoys doing so, and the process of forming good habits is the process of acquiring moral virtue. But *eudaimonia* is also a state that involves rational activity, for it is, Aristotle thinks, a distinctively human state and rationality is in his view a distinctively human trait.

Aristotle identifies the rational element in *eudaimonia* with *phronesis*, and *phronesis* with deliberation:

> The capacity of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself is regarded as typical of a man of practical wisdom—not deliberating well about what is good and advantageous in a partial sense, for example, what contributes to health or strength, but what sort of thing contributes to the good life in general [VI.5, 1140a25ff.].

(Note that, though *phronesis* is the ability to deliberate well about what is advantageous to oneself, Aristotle thinks that what is truly advantageous to oneself, *eudaimonia*, is advantageous for everyone. It is the ability to think about what the

good life in general is that makes the *phronimos* a model of ethical thought and not just of narrow self-interest.)

The limitation of reasoning to deliberation is a flaw in Aristotle's theory, I think, for he explicitly restricts deliberation to reasoning about the means to the good life, and leaves it to moral virtue to supply the deliberator with a vision of that end: as he states at 1144^{a}8-9, "virtue makes us aim at the right target, and practical wisdom makes us use the right means." Apparently Aristotle thought that rational reflection on the nature of the end was unnecessary; a peculiar view, because he devotes most of Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to just that activity. We need to augment Aristotle's account of the rationality of *eudaimonia*, therefore, by adding to the ability to deliberate about the means to the good life an ability to understand correctly the nature of that life itself.

The *phronimos* becomes, on this revised Aristotelian view, the person who both knows what *eudaimonia* is and can figure out how to attain it. That knowledge will be grounded in the habituation to moral virtue acquired in youth, but it will not be identical with that habituation. It will be reflective, not reflexive. Now Aristotle doubtless had a much more precise view of the nature of the *phronimos* in mind than this. He was undoubtedly influenced by the cultural standards of classical Athens in this respect. It is virtually certain that Aristotle's vision of the *phronimos* was that of a free Greek male, a citizen of a *polis*. He did not picture women or slaves or barbarians as *phronimoi*; in fact, his own theory disqualified them for this role. Happily, though, we need not follow him in this respect: we can detach the ideal of the *phronimos* as a rational thinker about the good life from the specific cultural environment in which Aristotle wrote. Indeed, we must do this if we are to adapt his theory to our present situation.

There is, however, one aspect of the cultural context in which Aristotle wrote that I want to note, for it has an effect on our ability to incorporate his thought into contemporary American life. Remember that the *phronimos* is no less than the foundation of Aristotle's ethical theory. We only under-

stand the nature of virtue, moral reasoning, and *eudaimonia* by understanding the *phronimos*. It is crucial, therefore, that we be able to identify unproblematic instances of *phronesis*: people who exemplify in their lives moral virtue and rational thought about ethics—people who live the life of *eudaimonia*.

Aristotle apparently found this a simple matter, for he scarcely touches on the question at all in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Rather, he writes as if his students, people who had a proper upbringing, would have no difficulty in grasping what he meant by the *phronimos*, or in thinking of examples. His attitude recalls that of Meletus in Plato's *Apology*, who thought that virtually all the citizens of Athens except Socrates provided suitable examples of good conduct, or of Protagoras in the *Protagoras* and Anytus in the *Meno*, who say virtually the same thing.

Aristotle's attitude may seem puzzling to us, coming as it does after Socrates' relentless questioning of the ethical ideals of the ancient Athenians, and Plato's formulation of an ethical model, the philosopher-king, who not only had no earthly embodiment but seemed in principle unable to have one. Yet Aristotle's attitude was, I think, far closer to that of his contemporaries than was Plato's or Socrates'. *We* find Socratic skepticism about the existence of moral exemplars attractive because we think it hard to find unproblematic examples ourselves; and herein lies a major stumbling-block to the incorporation of Aristotelian ethical thought into American education.

As Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out in *After Virtue*, Aristotle's scheme of moral education depends on a threefold distinction:

> Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. Ethics is the science which is to enable men to make the transition from the former state to the latter. Ethics therefore on this view presupposes some account of potentiality and act, some account of the essence of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the human *telos* [p. 50].

MacIntyre's argument is that only with this threefold scheme can we make sense of ethical principles. As he states, "each of the three elements of the scheme...requires reference to the other two if its status and function are to be intelligible" [p. 51]. His historical claim is that we have lost the means to construct an account of the third stage, the human *telos*, what Aristotle called *eudaimonia*, and that this loss has rendered ethical principles unintelligible and led to moral chaos. I cannot recapitulate MacIntyre's case, which I regard as powerful and largely convincing, here. Fortunately, the point I want to make does not depend on establishing the claim that only an Aristotelian teleology makes moral theory intelligible.

My point is simply this. Though the process of acquiring moral virtue is a process of habit formation and cannot be taught, but can only be acquired through training, the process of reflection on the end of life and the means to achieve it is an intellectual one and can be taught. It can only be taught, however, in a culture where there is some measure of agreement about the nature of that end; and, if Aristotle is correct against Plato, it can only be taught in a culture where there are unproblematic examples of people living good lives. Even if Plato is correct about the philosophical possibility of basing an ethical theory on an unrealized and probably unrealizable ideal such as the philosopher-king, that possibility will only be a live one for students who have Plato's love for abstract intellectual activity. Most people will require examples.

I suggest that this is just what our culture is at present unable to provide. In order to test this hypothesis, you might try to generate a discussion in your classrooms of people the students think are leading good lives, lives they would like to emulate. If your experience is like mine, the ethical examples will peter out shortly after Mother Teresa is mentioned, and non-ethical examples such as Donald Trump, Madonna and Joe Montana will replace them.

Nor will the discussion improve if, instead of focusing on the end of life, you concentrate on the means, and ask for

examples of virtue. I asked my upper-division college ethics class a couple of weeks ago to discuss the issue of character and to try to come up with examples of people who had character. This discussion did not take place out of the blue: they had been assigned to read some material on this subject, and some had written papers on the reading. In discussion, however, this group, which consisted in part of advanced philosophy majors, was unable to identify traits essential to the possession of character, though the reading had mentioned such attributes as honesty, responsibility, perseverance and concern for the well-being of others as partially constitutive of character, and was unable to come to settled answers on such questions as whether the possession of character was a good thing, and whether people such as Hitler, the captain of the Exxon Valdez, and Oliver North possessed or lacked character.

Our students, I suggest, lack the wherewithal, the vocabulary and the conceptual scheme necessary to discriminate between good and bad character, good and bad lives. They also lack the ability to formulate clear principles of moral conduct; if MacIntyre is right, they lack the latter ability because they lack the former. Even those with good intuitions about ethics find it impossible to justify those intuitions theoretically. The role-models our culture provides through the mass media are almost always negative; but the students, even when they reject these models for their own lives, are unable to criticize them effectively or suggest alternatives.

Nor can they turn to literature and history, as could the students of my generation, for examples of ethical conduct; for the moral interpretation of literature and the moral use of history are about equally unpopular (as they were about equally *popular* in Aristotle's time). As the authors of *Habits of the Heart* put it, the impoverished moral vocabulary of utilitarian and expressive individualism, which justify respectively whatever works and whatever feels good, have become the first languages of contemporary moral discourse,

virtually eclipsing the older, second languages of the Biblical and republican traditions.[4]

What is to be done? More specifically, what's a teacher to do? Perhaps nowhere is the confusion engendered by our contemporary moral situation more evident than in our disparate attempts to answer this question. At one extreme, there is the view of Michael Levin, stated in a *New York Times* editorial dated 28 November, 1989, entitled "Ethics Courses: Useless":

> Moral behavior is the product of training, not reflection...abstract knowledge of right and wrong no more contributes to character than knowledge of physics contributes to bicycling. The idea in both cases is to build the proper responses into nerve and sinew. Bicyclists don't have to think about which way to lean and honest men don't have to think about how to answer under oath. There is certainly a place for philosophical reflection on the existence and nature of values. But its practical significance is nil.

On the other hand, when attention was drawn by recent events on this campus to the continued existence of racist and sexist attitudes among students, the call went out for course requirements to correct these attitudes (though the courses in question were not, interestingly enough, in ethics, but in ethnic and women's studies).

I think it is clear what Aristotle would say about these opposite approaches. He would say that offering courses would do no good if a sound basis in moral virtue had not been laid down first in the students taking them. In this respect he would agree with Levin. He would also say, though, that education could refine and perfect the moral thinking of people who had such a training, that the effect of

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[4] Robert N. Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley, 1985).

philosophical reflection on a well-trained population would not be nil, but could be highly significant. In assessing our current situation, he would recommend that we undertake to develop a socially accepted set of values and inculcate them in our youth by moral training, and he would say that, in the absence of that, there is little educators can do to alter matters. He would recommend, in the words of Rick Redfern, an unambiguous moral education as the means to the development of a sturdy character, and he would see a sturdy character as the necessary means to a life of dignity, self-respect, and *eudaimonia*. Any culture which attempted to attain the benefits of *eudaimonia* without going through the process of character development, and any culture that lacked the wherewithal to provide the necessary unambiguous moral education, he would write off as hopeless, as he wrote off those who did not take their physicians' advice but criticized it instead. If he is correct about all of this, and if we are unwilling to accept his verdict on our culture, the task for us is the provision for our children of that unambiguous moral education we now lack. In that task, I suggest, the role of the schools, though important, is limited to developing and correcting the values of our culture; the primary task of moral development lies not in formal education but in the larger school of society.

William J. Prior
Santa Clara University