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CHAPTER 3

Reconsidering Citizenship Models and the Case for Cultural Citizenship: Implications for a Social Psychology of Social Justice

Regina Day Langhout and Jesica Siham Fernández

Abstract

This chapter reviews citizenship constructions in the United States and examines how historic, legal, economic, schooling, and multicultural “melting pot” ideology landscapes shape citizenship and its performance. It introduces cultural citizenship as an alternative starting point for citizenship and its performance, providing a theoretical foundation and empirical evidence for cultural citizenship, and argues in support of incorporating this framework into social psychology when working toward collective social justice. It also discusses the implications of adopting a cultural citizenship perspective for social psychology and how this perspective can extend our understanding of citizenship practices to enact social justice. We conclude with recommendations for research and action.

Key Words: citizenship, cultural citizenship, social psychology, neoliberalism, social justice

The question of how individuals come to be positioned and to understand themselves as the subjects and objects of democratic governance arguably represents the core problematic of the social sciences.

—Condor and Gibson, 2007, p. 116

There have been numerous calls for social psychologists to study citizenship (Barnes, Auburn, & Lea, 2004; Carolissen, 2012; Condor, 2011; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011; McNamara, Muldoon, Stevenson, & Slattery, 2011). This appeal often occurs because the small body of psychological research that examines citizenship behavior does so based on individual differences and cognitions, which does not consider context and fails to capture the fluidity, dynamicity, and contested quality of citizenship (Barnes et al., 2004; Condor, 2011; McNamara et al., 2011). For example, citizenship determines who is a state-sanctioned member of society; therefore citizenship, as a construct, has social consequences that are generally ignored when examining it within the realm of individual differences or as a mental state (Barnes et al., 2004).

Citizenship is also important because it is a defining dimension of Western society; it is intrinsically tied to civic, social, and political institutions (Barnes et al., 2004; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011; Mouffe, 1992a; Nyers, 2007). As such, it shapes individual, group, and community behavior. Therefore, what influences notions of citizenship should be within the domain of social psychologists because of their longstanding interest in social action, context, and social realities. Indeed, citizenship is central to how people understand their
sociopolitical identities, as well as the civic and political obligations of others (Barnes et al., 2004; Bhatia, 2002, 2010; Condor & Gibson, 2007; Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2004; Deaux, 2011). Hence, the practice of citizenship is the exercise of cultural politics that serves to regulate public life through discourse, action, attitudes, and categorization (Barnes et al., 2004; Condor & Gibson, 2007; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011; Jansen, Chioncel, & Dekkers, 2006; Nyers, 2007). Moreover, citizenship practices are often determined by dominant social groups, who usually construct citizenship in ways that keep power structures intact (Conover et al., 2004; Isin, 2012; Isin & Turner, 2007; Montero, 2009; Young, 1989). This is especially salient because research indicates that many people conflate the social and legal domains of citizenship; the result is that “the good citizen”—or how citizenship is practiced—is how “citizen” is often defined (Conover et al., 2004; Lister, Smith, Middleton, & Cox, 2003; Smith, Lister, Middleton, & Cox, 2005). For example, participants might say that citizens are people who are law-abiding, engage in charity work, pay taxes, and vote (Lister et al., 2003). Therefore, citizenship should be viewed and studied as a social structure connected to power, which situates it in the domain of social psychology (Condor, 2011; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011).

The purpose of this chapter is to consider how different landscapes in Western society, with an emphasis on the United States, shape citizenship and how this, in turn, informs how citizenship is performed. We also provide an alternative model for considering citizenship. By engaging these issues, we answer the call to consider how social actors may orient themselves to political processes (Condor & Gibson, 2007). As social-community psychologists, however, we address this question by examining higher levels of analysis. Specifically, we are interested in how social landscapes might influence understandings of citizenship and citizen behaviors. Social landscapes must be interrogated through a macro-approach—especially in psychology, due to its overemphasis on the individual—if structures are to be de-naturalized (Carolissen, 2012; Diaz & Zirkel, 2012; Marsella, 2012; Prilleltensky, 2012; Upegui-Hernandez, 2011); this is our intention. Furthermore, we draw on the literatures of political science, feminist studies, citizenship studies, legal studies, and Latin American and Latino Studies to help us reach this goal. This attempt to de-center psychology is an essential tool for critical reflection within the field because it allows us to (re)examine assumptions (Carolissen, 2012). Additionally, at times, we use California as an example to concretize specific ideas. We focus on California because of its social, political, and economic context, as well as its history of colonization, deterritorialization, and assimilation of ethically (and culturally) subordinated groups. Our goal is to interrogate the meaning of citizenship through an historic-legal-political-economic-social lens, with the intent to (re)consider how citizenship is conceived, legitimated, and performed.

Understanding how citizenship has been constructed historically and legally, as well as what broader political, economic, and social forces shape how people perform citizenship, enables individuals to see citizenship as socially constructed and mutable (Barnes et al., 2004; Condor, 2011; Isin & Turner, 2007; Montero, 2009; Rosaldo, 1999a; Sindic, 2011). Subsequently, one could imagine a construction of citizenship that is not tied to a specific nation (Alexander & Mohanry, 1997; Ansley, 2010; Isin, 2012; Lister, 2008; Nyers, 2008; Sindic, 2011). This perspective also promotes a critical examination of the ways in which all people can enact citizenship. The following kinds of questions can be examined through this standpoint: How do social landscapes shape citizenship and its performance? Do citizenship performances maintain and/or work against oppression and domination? Would other frameworks be more effective in creating socially just change? Without first understanding the historic, legal, social, political, and economic landscapes that inform citizenship from the perspective of the state (in our case, the United States) and how this relates to power, a more critical analysis is unlikely.

To further this cause, we begin by briefly discussing current conceptualizations of citizenship and, subsequently, performances of citizenship. We then examine how these ideas of citizenship were formed by providing an overview of how citizenship has been shaped by historic, legal, economic, schooling, and multicultural “melting pot” ideological social landscapes in the United States. We review empirical literature within the United States when possible. At times, we draw on evidence from the United Kingdom (UK) because the social psychological literature on citizenship has been more prolific there, and the United Kingdom shares some similarities with the U.S. context (e.g., colonial power, white dominant group). Next, we introduce cultural citizenship as an alternative form of citizenship. Finally, we discuss the value of a cultural citizenship
framework for social psychology, its implications for social justice, and future directions for research and action.

Conceptualizing Citizenship

The discussion of citizenship is nascent in social psychology. This literature, which draws from political science, usually conceives of citizenship as liberal, communitarian, or civic republican (Isin & Wood, 1999; Lister, 1998). We describe and critique each of these conceptions in turn.

Liberal Citizenship

Liberal models of citizenship highlight legalistic constructions that guarantee basic rights to its citizens. That is, the individual is conceived of as the sole bearer of rights with the freedom to exercise those rights in accordance with the state (Isin & Wood, 1999). This view of citizenship is consistent with Marshall’s (1950) notion of citizenship as tied to individual rights and responsibilities to the state. Citizens are expected to take up a set of responsibilities; in Western societies, responsibilities generally include voting and paying taxes (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2008; Lister et al., 2003; Yuval-Davis, 2006). In this model, it is assumed that all citizens are to be viewed equally in the eyes of the state, regardless of ethnicity, culture, creed, values, etc. (Lister, 1998; Modood, 2008; Young, 1989).

There are limitations with how liberal citizenship is enacted. Specifically, it focuses on political and legalistic views of citizenship as status, thereby overlooking social/cultural dimensions of social participation (Bloemraad et al., 2008). This perspective, when overlaid with “value neutrality,” often naturalizes dominant social group experiences, which, in the United States, are middle-class, male, straight, Christian, able bodied, and white. This standpoint does not take into account individual subjectivities and cultural differences among subordinated group members, such as women, children, people of color and immigrants (Bhatia, 2010; Bloemraad, et al., 2008; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011; Young, 1989). Subsequently, a “difference-blind” process within the liberal model assumes that all people can perform citizenship in the same way; yet not all people can enact citizenship similarly because institutions often ignore differences regarding race, culture, gender, age and ableness. Instead of undermining oppression, such practices usually create or reify inequities for subordinated social groups. A liberal model of citizenship, therefore, often results in differential treatment and exclusion of subordinated groups (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Conover et al., 2004; Isin, 2012; Yuval-Davis, 2006; Young, 1989).

Communitarian Citizenship

Unlike the liberal notion, the communitarian perspective emphasizes membership, social participation and connectedness (Condor, 2011; Conover et al., 2004; Delanty, 2003; Lister, 1998). In this model, all share a common group identity because they are part of a community, and “the good community” is dependent on mutual understanding and reciprocal relationships (Isin & Wood, 1999). Specifically, the foundation of a communitarian model is shared national and community values as determined by the group (Isin & Turner, 2007; van Hensbroek, 2010).

Because of domination, communitarian models are often implemented in ways that are consistent with assimilationist practices (Bhatia, 2002, 2010; Delanty, 2003). Therefore, this perspective often emphasizes loyalty to the state, as well as the promotion and preservation of its ideologies (Conover et al., 2004; Isin & Turner, 2007; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Although more open to subjective experiences of performing citizenship, and thus more inclusive of multicultural diversity, equal rights are often not granted to cultural groups who hold values that differ from the dominant group (Bhatia, 2002; van Hensbroek, 2010; Young, 1989).

Civic Republican Citizenship

A third model of citizenship, civic republican, contrasts with liberal models of citizenship and emphasizes participation in civil society, through civic bonds (Condor, 2011; Delanty, 2000; Isin & Nielsen, 2008). Participation often occurs through social and civic groups such as churches and labor unions. Civic republican citizenship focuses on what binds people together into a shared political community, and how this creates a shared moral position (Delanty, 2000). The goal is for people to work together toward the shared common good, regardless of their social group identities (Delanty, 2000; Isin & Wood, 1999; Mouffe, 1992b).

Civic republican citizenship also suffers from critiques. For example, it assumes a singular unifying conception of the common good and therefore political participation (Isin & Wood, 1999; Isin & Nielsen, 2008); in many cases, who is authorized to participate hinges on dominant ideas of membership and belonging (Conover et al., 2004; Isin, 2012). In U.S. society, many groups are left out, such as children; people who are homeless; incarcerated;
immigrants; or lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, queer, intersex, asexual, and other non-dominant sexualities, sexes, and genders (LGBTQIA+), to name a few (Mouffe, 1992b; Young, 1989). Also, civic republican citizenship is often considered time-intensive and therefore difficult to uphold for social groups who have many other demands on their time, such as women and the working poor (Lister, 1997). Moreover, the construction of the common good is often done in a universal way, which usually means the views of subordinated group members are not taken into consideration (Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Lister, 1997; Mouffe, 1992b).

Why These Models? How Social Landscapes Shape Citizenship Constructions

Citizenship and its performance can be understood in multiple ways. How these conceptualizations are constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed occurs against the backdrop of historic, legal, political, economic, and social landscapes. Citizenship performances are therefore read in particular ways by dominant groups with the intent to (de)legitimize certain actions and/or social groups (Carolissen, 2012; Deaux, 2011; Delanty, 2003; Isin & Wood, 1999; Young, 1989). These structures are essential to examine because they are systems of authority, and authority is a form of social influence (Passini & Morselli, 2011). Because systems of authority are typically designed to maintain the position of dominant groups (Passini & Morselli, 2011), their influence on citizenship and how it is performed deserves special attention. Specifically, these social landscapes must be brought to the foreground when examining citizenship because they are current dominant U.S. cultural values. Subsequently, it is important to understand how these landscapes shape citizenship before moving into contemporary and alternative citizenship models. Indeed, without a critical examination, alternative proposals may uphold the same systems, rather than work to transform them.

To help us attend to transformation, we describe three citizenship possibilities from the educational literature. From this perspective, citizenship definitions and practices fall along three types: (1) the personally responsible citizen, (2) the participatory citizen, and (3) the justice-oriented citizen (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004a, 2004b). With respect to how conceptualizations align with action, the personally responsible citizen works at the individual level to better the community without questioning social structures (e.g., donating to a food drive). The participatory citizen actively engages in the civic and social life of the community in order to improve it (e.g., organizing a food drive). Finally, the justice-oriented citizen calls attention to injustice and pursues justice-oriented goals (e.g., assessing why people are hungry and working to address root causes, such as lobbying for a living wage ordinance or creating community gardens); their emphasis is on social movements that work toward achieving systemic change. Although these three ways to perform citizenship exist, U.S.-based performances are often constructed around individual responsibility and service (McNamara et al., 2011; Watts & Flanagan, 2007; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004a, 2004b). With this in mind, we outline historic, legal, economic, and ideological systems that heavily influence citizenship constructions.

Citizenship from an Historic Landscape

The notion of who can claim citizenship and therefore rights in the United States has been contested from the founding of the nation. Initially, citizenship was not tied to the state (Sindic, 2011). Over time, however, definitions evolved to privilege state control (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Nyers, 2004; Ong, 2003). For example, after the process of “inspection upon immigration” in the 18th and 19th centuries, many who were phenotypically perceived as white were granted citizenship upon arrival or thereafter, as were the Italians and the Irish who were constructed as a darker shade of white and, subsequently, faced higher levels of oppression than others marked as white (Ansley, 2010; Bayor, 2003; Guglielmo, 2003). When slaves were freed in the United States in 1863, they were not considered citizens because they had not followed the legal process of being “inspected upon immigration.” Regardless of their legal freedom and place of birth, former slaves were displaced to other cities within the United States (Parker, 2001; Volpp, 2001). The reason for this racist construction of citizenship was to prevent freed slaves from making claims on public assistance granted through civil notions of citizenship (Ansley, 2010; Parker, 2001).

The experience of Mexican people following the Mexican American War in 1848 has some parallels to African American struggles for legal citizenship recognition. Citizenship was granted to Mexicans who were phenotypically white, of a higher social class, and who owned property (Garcia Bedolla, 2009). Citizenship was denied based on race/ethnicity and social class. As social structures, social identities intersect with ideological constructions.
of citizenship (García Bedolla, 2009), and therefore the politics of how it is contested and performed.

This construction of who is a citizen and therefore deserving of protection and support has been empirically examined in contemporary Britain (Barnes et al., 2004). Twelve letters written to local city council officials that complained about New Travelers (Bohemians) camping near the resident’s property were analyzed discursively. Results indicated that letter writers tended to portray themselves as citizens through their identities as local property owners and/or hard workers. By implication, letter writers argued the New Travelers did not have a citizenship claim because they were not local, local landowners, or hard workers; therefore, they did not warrant protection and should be removed from the area. Note that this construction of citizenship is within the realm of liberal citizenship, where rights are granted by the state and are coupled with individual responsibilities. Claims cannot be made unless one is fulfilling obligations to the state, often operationalized as paying taxes via having a job.

Citizenship from a Legal Landscape

Liberal constructions of citizenship are based on individual rights within the state. Currently, however, U.S. and California boundaries are porous with respect to the state (not people), which calls into question liberal citizenship. This instability is likely due to the context of globalization (Jansen et al., 2006; Marsella, 2012; Turner, 2007a; Upegui-Hernandez, 2011). For example, those who are detained in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, are within U.S. jurisdiction. In fact, this power and control is so absolute (historically and currently) that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that detainees are considered to be within the United States. This ruling makes them subject to U.S. legal regulations and subsequent rights (Boumediene v. Bush, 2008; Rasul v. Bush, 2004). Yet the leadership under President Bush continued to assert that inmates could be detained indefinitely for the protection of the U.S. people, even if found not guilty of any crimes (Turner, 2007a). Also, in California, then-Governor Schwarzenegger proposed building prisons in Mexico and housing “illegal immigrants” there (Yamamura, 2010). In both cases, the boundaries of the United States are made mutable and re-drawn in ways that benefit the state by enabling legal/formal/institutionalized power and control outside of U.S. borders for the purposes of securitization, which is connected to xenophobia (Isin & Turner, 2007; Nyers, 2004; Turner, 2007a). Like historic constructions, legal constructions are also tied to liberal citizenship, but this time, from the perspective of protecting the sovereignty of the nation-state, as well as the individual freedoms of those who are considered “good citizens.”

Citizenship from an Economic Landscape: Neoliberalism as a Form of Capitalism

Economic structures shape citizenship (Berlant, 1993; Isin & Wood, 1999; Mowrer, 1939; Turner, 2001). It is therefore important to ask what type of citizen the political economy produces and how it shapes notions of social justice (Albee, 1981; Isin & Turner, 2007; Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Lister, 2003; Prilleltensky, 2012; Turner, 2001). Capitalism constructs the “good citizen” from a labor-market perspective (Carolissen, 2012; Giroux, 2005; Isin & Wood, 1999; Lister, 2003; Ong, 1996; Turner, 2001). Accordingly, a good citizen is a hard worker in the paid labor force. For immigrant or foreign-born workers, acquiring a work permit is often informed by the person’s place of birth, U.S. relations with that country, and whether the person has appropriate credentials and/or a degree. Under these circumstances, people born outside the United States are partially constructed as citizens due to their labor value; these benefits can be conferred within the citizen-as-laborer perspective (Giroux, 2005; Gleeson, 2010; Lister et al., 2003).

Those who are undocumented may also construct themselves as citizens through their participation in the paid labor force (Beltrán, 2009; Gleeson, 2010). Consider the nation-wide 2006 Immigrants’ Rights protests against U.S. House Resolution 4437, or the Sensenbrenner Bill, which would have made it a felony to be undocumented or to provide humanitarian aid to undocumented immigrants (Johnson & Hing, 2007). Signs held at rallies had sayings such as, “We Demand Because we Produce,” “I’m a Worker, Not a Criminal,” and “We Build Your Homes,” (Beltrán, 2009). This protest can be understood as aligned with the argument that citizenship is defined by the social psychological experience of participation in a cultural community rather than the boundaries of the state (Sindic, 2011). In this way, people who are undocumented draw upon a common U.S.-based experience of work and the social psychological experience of that reality, while refuting dominant narratives that they are takers and not contributors (Nyers, 2008; Turner, 2007a). This
stance is important because who does and does not belong is contested (Berlant, 1993; Bhatia, 2010).

A third and final example of citizen-as-laborer includes President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals executive order (DACA; www.uscis.gov/childhoodarrivals). DACA grants temporary work permits to some younger people who are undocumented. Implicit is that paid labor is what matters. In exchange for paying payroll taxes, “DACAmented” people are granted a specific and limited set of rights. Unpaid work—often carried out by women and youth—such as housekeeping, cooking, and childcare, is not eligible. The policy fails to consider gender-, age-, class-, and race-based inequalities because it does not take into consideration social groups’ differing access to power and modes of production. Indeed, constructing citizenship as economic independence through waged labor ignores the various ways people contribute to their communities and societies (Jones & Wallace, 1992; Smith et al., 2005).

Lessons regarding the role of work in the performance of citizenship are learned early. For example, the Civic Education Study surveyed 2,584 eighth grade students across 124 schools in the United States and asked them the characteristics of a good citizen (Schultz & Sibberns, 2004). The questionnaire asked, “To become a good adult citizen students should learn to recognize the importance of . . . .” The response, “working hard” had the second highest average score (M = 3.58, Range = 1–4) only behind “knowing about history” (M = 3.65). In fact, not one respondent strongly disagreed that a good citizen is one who works hard, and only 36 disagreed with the statement. Working hard, therefore, seems to be an agreed upon way to perform citizenship in the United States and is well-aligned with the personally responsible citizen and liberal notions of citizenship.

Capitalism is an important economic structure to critique for understanding citizenship (Albee, 1981; Carolissen, 2012; Isin & Wood, 1999; Mowrer, 1939; Spinner-Halev, 2000; Turner, 2001). Indeed, capitalism and citizenship will always be in conflict because capitalism promotes scarcity and citizenship should promote solidarity (Isin & Turner, 2007; Turner, 1990, 2001). Yet there are many forms of capitalism. The dominant form of capitalism currently practiced in the United States is termed late capitalism or neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Ortner, 2011). It is especially important to interrogate neoliberalism because leaving it unexamined will facilitate an analysis that is unlikely to promote transformative change in citizenship that prioritizes health and well-being (Carolissen, 2012; Marsella, 2012; Sandoval, 2000; Prilleltensky, 2012).

Neoliberalism is a political-economic system that, in the United States, was a reaction to economic stagnation of the 1970s. Policies could have been designed to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, or maintain/increase the gap. Neoliberalism increased the gap through the language of offering liberty and freedom, rhetoric aligned with U.S. ideals (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism promises liberty and freedom by privileging free trade, cutting public services, deregulation, and privatization (Brekenridge & Moghaddam, 2012; Harvey, 2005; Marsella, 2012; Ong, 1996). Moreover, under neoliberalism, the public good is redefined away from community wellness and toward individual liberties and responsibility (Prilleltensky, 2012); this fits easily within dominant discourses in the United States of the Protestant work ethic, meritocracy, and individualism.

Neoliberalism also creates a socio-political-economic context in which individuals view their roles as citizens and their societal participation as tied to their consumer identities and choices (Berlant, 1993; Carolissen, 2012; Isin & Wood, 1999; Plummer, 2001; Sandoval, 2000). By implication, we engage in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them . . . . Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, Libertyunites.org . . . . I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity; they did not touch its source.

(paragraphs 68–70)

When considering how to respond to the tragic events of September 11, 2001 or how to engage civil society in the aftermath, President George W. Bush constructed the good citizen as one who contributes to what some would label a sacred U.S. value—liberty—by participating in the U.S. economy. Because the U.S. economy is primarily service-based, this means shopping (Berlant, 1993; Carolissen, 2012; Sandoval, 2000). By implication, the good citizen is middle class or has the financial resources to consume. A common slogan
that enjoins democracy and citizen as consumer is, “Vote with your dollars.”

Consider the “green economy” as another example. Consumer choices become ways to perform citizenship. Good consumer-citizens are those who use their money as a form of civic action (e.g., driving a Prius, purchasing fluorescent light bulbs and fair trade coffee). Because of the conflation of race and social class in the United States, this person is also more likely to be white. Hence, this construction upholds an historic trend of privileging white middle class groups as good citizens (Conover et al., 2004).

To summarize, a capitalist structure views paid labor as a priority over other possible contributions a person might make to society. Worth is constructed as paid labor and items consumed rather than human or political rights. This construction keeps the subordinated tied to their contribution in the chain of consumption (Beltrán, 2009; Sandoval, 2000). Additionally, because of differing levels of resources and power, this construction is classist and racist; it privileges the middle class, which is more likely to be white (Conover et al., 2004). Moreover, the connection to individual rights is consistent with liberal notions of citizenship that sustain the power of the state in determining who is a sanctioned member of society, and therefore deserving rights. Unlike civic republican citizenship, which emphasizes civic duties and participation, the liberal notion emphasizes individual rights, as well as privileges and obligations to the state.

Citizenship from a Schooling Landscape

Schooling, or the institutionalized practices associated with education, is examined because it has long been understood as a structure that shapes citizenship (Elias, 1993; Elias, Arnold, & Hussey, 2003; Jansen et al., 2006; Mowrer, 1939; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004a, 2004b). Because of the neoliberal project, most heavily embodied around standardized testing (as a form of teacher and school accountability, especially for so-called inefficient public schools) and voucher programs or charter schools (as a form of offering parent choice via a modified free market), there is little latitude for constructing the good citizen. Indeed, there is no time during the school day to do much more than the “three Rs”: reading, writing, and arithmetic (Ravitch, 2010). Therefore, what is missing in citizenship constructions in schools is an in-depth understanding of social movements and struggles for social justice, deliberative democracy, a politics of radical pluralism, skills for creating and affirming community stories, empowerment, critical reflections on public life and mass culture, and how to participate in economic, state, and public sphere decisions (Giroux, 2005). These missing pieces might facilitate the emergence of a justice-oriented citizen education curricula. What is left, then, is individual liberty, possessive individualism, and moral fundamentalism as the building blocks for constructing the good citizen (the fourth R: [individual] responsibility; Giroux, 2005). This foundation severely restricts the possibility of developing a politicized understanding of the broader social-political-economic context. The construction is citizen-as-docile, or one who is passive, obedient, and punctual (Giroux, 2005). This citizen is well-aligned with the personally responsible citizen. It is also aligned with the liberal notion of citizenship because it emphasizes the reciprocal relationship of rights and responsibilities between individuals and the state (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

Schools also actively socialize citizenship by shaping actions outside of school. Many schools (including universities) have a service-learning requirement. Choices to fulfill this requirement are sometimes limited to activities such as food drives, working in soup kitchens, teaching skills to the “less fortunate,” painting a house, helping to clean up a neighborhood, or tutoring. These activities align with communitarian and civic republican citizenship; they promote connection and participation in civic society. Yet these options tend to define social problems as individual deficits and are therefore ameliorative because social structures are left intact (Mitchell, Donahue, & Young-Law, 2012). Indeed, even community outcomes are measured at the individual level of analysis in this framework; for example, a review study indicated that those working in service-based institutions thought that student involvement was beneficial because it increased the number of positive role models for young people and provided companionship for the elderly (Bringle & Steinberg, 2010). Similarly, student outcomes are operationalized as motivation to volunteer for service-based organizations and/or non-profits (Bringle & Steinberg, 2010).

To summarize, at its worst, service-learning conceptualizations re-cast citizenship performance as charity work or as helping the “less fortunate” rather than as working to transform inequitable social structures. At its best, this conceptualization does not distinguish between ameliorative and transformative performances. In this case, the paradigm can be labeled citizen-as-charitable. This way of conceptualizing citizenship as service, or as a civic
responsibility that is expected of all citizens, may last a lifetime. Indeed, researchers who conducted a survey of adults in the South, Midwest, and East Coast concluded that the good citizen is viewed as one who performs citizenship through volunteerism, helping the elderly and ill, and contributing to charitable causes—all activities that are more likely to be raced as white and to keep social structures intact (Conover et al., 2004). This construction is consistent with the participatory citizen, as well as the communitarian and civic republican model of citizenship. Specifically, young people are taught a set of moral principles that embed them in a community, but because these activities rarely, if ever, challenge social structures, they tend to assimilate all people into dominant cultural structures, which serves to reify hegemony (Conover et al., 2004).

**Citizenship from a Multicultural “Melting Pot” Landscape**

Finally, the multicultural “melting pot” ideology informs citizenship. Deconstructing this system enables an intersectional approach to understanding dominant citizenship notions, which is essential because social identities are multi-dimensional (Carolissen, 2012; Essed, 2001; Lister, 1997, 1998). Here, a good citizen is one who assimilates to the dominant culture by upholding mainstream values and views (Carolissen, 2012; Conover et al., 2004; Delany, 2003; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011; Kymlicka, 1995). For example, 174 high school students (170 were white) from eight schools in northern England were interviewed in small groups about their attitudes regarding citizenship in the United Kingdom (Gibson & Hamilton, 2011). Topics included political participation, social inequities, immigration, and European integration. Results indicated that these young people were welcoming of immigrants as long as they did not challenge hegemonic cultural structures, which are marked as white and Christian. Similarly, a study of Muslims in Britain concluded that they felt they had to conform to white Christian ideologies if they were to be accepted as British and be heard in the public sphere (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011).

Moreover, U.S. adults consider immigrants to be good citizens—and therefore citizens—if they learn English, respect and uphold U.S. institutions, are obedient, and follow social norms (Conover et al., 2004; Delany, 2003). Accordingly, the good citizen, especially the good citizen of color, is one who performs either an individual or hybrid citizenship construction as already detailed: the citizen-laborer, citizen-consumer, citizen-as-docile, or citizen-as-charitable. As such, these constructions most easily fit under the personally responsible or the participatory citizen because social structures are not questioned. These constructions are also consistent with civic republican citizenship, which emphasizes a shared moral position that works toward the “common good,” often constructed in relation to values upholding the status quo.

People of color, but especially Asian Americans and Latinxs, who perform other types of citizenship—such as those aligned with socially just citizenship practices—are more likely to be cast outside of the realm of citizen because their citizenship is already contested by virtue of the existing narratives that delegitimize and disenfranchise them (Beltrán, 2009; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011; Rosaldo, 1999a; Shimpi & Zirkel, 2012; Volpp, 2001). Specifically, Asian Americans and Latinxs may be more likely to be labeled as “un-American” or divisive when engaging in justice-oriented struggles because of the assumption that they are foreign-born and therefore illegitimate actors. Indeed, it is common for whites to engage in the “othering” of people of color, especially if they are perceived as immigrants (even when they are not); this is the case perhaps partly because the United States has had a history of barring specific groups from obtaining citizenship (e.g., Chinese Americans; Shimpi & Zirkel, 2012). Also, dominant U.S. constructions hold that citizenship is conferred by the state (via papers) and that citizens behave in specific ways, which are marked as white (Delany, 2003; Ong, 1996); actions outside the realm of the “good citizen” are therefore delegitimized. An excerpt of the lyrics from an Asian American slam poetry group, “I was Born with Two Tongues,” illustrates this point (2003). The first two stanzas are statements made to the poets. The third is their partial response.

“If you don’t like this country, get out. You’re too angry, stop complaining. Why are you complaining? Leave. Go back to where you came from. You didn’t come here on the Mayflower; go home. This is not your home.”

“Stop getting so angry. Stop hating America; there’s no racism against your kind. Stop being so angry; Lighten up. Can’t you see you’re too angry? Stop complaining. Stop hating America.”
Excuse me, ameriKa. I'm confused.
You tell me to lighten up, but what you really mean is whiten up.
You wish to wash me out; melt me in your cauldron.
Excuse me if I tip your melting pot, spill the shades onto your streets.
I don't want to lose my color.

The pressures on people of color to assimilate and perform citizenship in ways consistent with the personally responsible and participatory citizen are quite strong. Moreover, the multicultural “melting pot” ideology is consistent with a communitarian model of citizenship, which emphasizes relatedness and solidarity with the state (Conover et al., 2004; Kymlicka, 1995; Modood, 2008, 2010). In this view, communities of color experience some degree of acceptance by dominant group members as long as they assimilate to dominant cultural ideologies, including language and creed, as well as ways of performing citizenship.

Yet even when immigrants assimilate to the dominant group and are conferred rights by the state, how they are treated can change as the context changes. For example, in a study of three middle class Indian Americans, respondents relayed that after the attacks to the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 09/11/2001, neighbors, coworkers, and others who they had known for years treated them differently (Bhatia & Ram, 2009). In other words, they lost their sense of belonging. One participant marked this moment by exclaiming that he lost his whiteness. Another intimated that her son’s U.S. citizenship had been erased. Similar ostracizing experiences of sociopolitical marginality have been palpable among Muslim communities in the United Kingdom and the United States (Modood, 2010; Turner, 2007b). These results illuminate the constantly shifting ground underneath the feet of immigrants of color, especially when their sociocultural identities are salient (Bhatia, 2002; Turner, 2007b). Indeed, research with adults and teens indicates that those from dominant groups (i.e., white) expect all people—but especially those from subordinated social groups, such as immigrants—to conform to their ideas of how to perform citizenship (Bhatia, 2010; Conover et al., 2004; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011; van Hensbroek, 2010).

**Summary**

History, the legal system, neoliberalism as a form of capitalism, schooling, and multicultural “melting pot” ideologies are landscapes that shape citizenship in particular ways. These ways are best aligned with the personally responsible citizen and the participatory citizen, which relate to liberal, communitarian, and civic republican models of citizenship that dominate political theorizing in Western democracies. Specifically, the types of citizenship performances associated with these dimensions are generally those that do not apply pressure directly to underlying social structures (Sandoval, 2000; Watts & Flanagan, 2007; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004a, 2004b). This is perhaps not surprising, given that dominant structures make it difficult for people to envision revolutionary justice. Moreover, all of these structures work within the U.S. legal system, which dictates who is considered a citizen.

To move toward social justice, some scholars argue for shifting the view of citizenship as a legal status to one that considers the performative aspects of citizenship (Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Isin, 2012). One way of doing this is by changing systems to include the participation of all members of a society, irrespective of social status differences (Kymlicka, 1995; Lister, 1998, 2007). Still, others claim that political institutions should transform to recognize shared universal human rights, which also take into account cultural differences and subjective experiences of citizenship (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Getrich, 2008; Isin & Turner, 2007; Isin & Wood, 1999). These changes would facilitate all people claiming a set of shared human rights, including civil, political and social rights, as the bases of their citizenship practices (Isin & Wood, 1999). More importantly, these practices would set the stage for a citizenship definition that refers to a set of rights both claimed by and bestowed to all members of civil society.

**Contemporary Citizenship Models**

The more recent shift to models that move toward social justice has resulted in various possibilities for re-constructing citizenship. Some examples include: (a) transnational citizenship, where all people would have a right to international mobility (Ansley, 2010; Isin, 2012; Upegui-Hernandez, 2011); (b) global citizenship, where people strive to maintain equally ideals of citizenship and human rights, while advocating for economic opportunities for those nations on the economic margins (Lister, 2008; Turner, 1990); (c) environmental citizenship, which is a post-national perspective where people engage globally to prevent further environmental
degradation and protect humanity (Turner, 2001); (d) inclusive citizenship, where individual rights, the participation of all people in policy making, and political identities are balanced (Lister, 1997, 2007; Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2000); (e) citizenship for liberty and equality, which focuses on achieving the goals of modern democracy (i.e., liberty and equality) by focusing on citizen identities, common public concerns, and constructing plurality as equivalence (Mouffe, 1992b); and (f) intimate citizenship, where rights, responsibilities, and care of—and emerging conflicts for—intimate groups, such as cybercitizens and test tube citizens are recognized (Plummer, 2001).

What many of these contemporary citizenship models have in common is a focus on cultural pluralism, which has been theorized to address the critiques associated with liberal, communitarian, and civic republican models. A cultural pluralism model presumes that cultural groups should maintain their cultural identities and be treated equally under the law (Condor, 2011; Conover et al., 2004; Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006; Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Isin & Wood, 1999; Mouffe, 1992a, 1992b; Plummer, 2001). Cultural identities and values are maintained through "dissensus" rather than consensus (Jansen et al., 2006). In other words, social cohesion is redefined as a community adept at embracing diversity and recognition of differences (Modood, 2010; Mouffe, 1992a). That is, equality is the act of honoring and validating the myriad of identities within a community (Isin & Wood, 1999). Also, equality is achieved through the legal protection of subordinated groups; this protection is needed to prevent assimilation and subordination in the context of colonization and domination (Young, 1989).

Accordingly, citizenship has been re-conceptualized as a practice rather than a set of legal rights and responsibilities connected to the state. Isin and others (Isin & Wood, 1999; Isin & Nielsen, 2008; Isin, 2012) eloquently highlight the efforts of moving away from top-down notions of citizenship, as well as identity politics, which construct citizenship as a dichotomous label: citizen or non-citizen. This literature defines citizenship as the right to claim rights (Isin, 2012). That is, through their political subjectivities, along with acts and actions, people engage dialogically in the transformation and creation of inclusive, participatory and democratic politics by resisting top-down notions of and making demands for rights (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). This view shifts away from conventional notions of citizenship by considering how citizenship is manifested through a constellation of embodied experiences and practices. Furthermore, this perspective considers people's struggles for membership, including how individuals and groups form and perform citizenship as a status and, most importantly, as a practice. In this view, people constitute themselves as political subjects, with the right to disrupt social conventions associated with the status quo (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). Citizenship becomes a relationship between the personal and the political (Isin, 2012), or a way of finding new modes of being and acting in a society where the label of citizen is socially constructed behind the backdrop of historical and legal constructions, neoliberal capitalism, and assimilationist melting pot agendas.

Although these cultural pluralism models of citizenship address some of the shortcomings found in conventional models, they are also subject to critique. Much of this theorizing assumes mobility. Yet some argue that the application of mobility as a model is misplaced because Western borders are more tightly controlled than they have historically been, thus decreasing possibilities for global or universal forms of citizenship (Nyers, 2004; Turner, 2007a). Indeed, borders are currently permeable regarding capital but rigid regarding people due to Western politics of securitization. Under re-territorialization, nations assert their sovereignty via surveillance of the general population and control over migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (Isin & Turner, 2007; Turner, 2007a). Also, some approaches assume the state will give power in order for subordinate groups to be involved in decision-making. Although this has happened in the global South (Baiochi, 2003; Cabannes, 2003; Serageldin et al., 2003), there are no signs that the United States is moving toward a similar model. To wait for the state to create these models is to expect subjugated groups to remain disempowered. Finally, some conceptions focus on ideals such as liberty and equality as traditionally defined in liberal democracies. Under this view, liberty means freedom, or the power to do what one chooses. Yet liberty and freedom defined in these ways are illusions because there are always social structures that limit possibilities and choices (Hayward, 2000). A more appropriate way to consider freedom is to have control over the boundaries of one's political participation (Hayward, 2000). Although these models hold promise, greater action needs to be taken to create more social/cultural, political, and civic inclusiveness to challenge such forms of hegemony.
Our interests are rooted in how citizenship conceptualizations shape citizenship performance and if these performances move society toward social justice. We share this perspective with others who are interested in thinking of citizenship as a strategy that can help center identity, participation, empowerment, and rights rather than as something endowed by or conforming to the state (Nyers, 2007; Plummer, 2001). For this reason, we find the previous categorization scheme insufficient for the reasons already given, and also because these models are not necessarily tied to specific citizenship practices.

Some scholars make clear distinctions regarding different forms of citizenship behavior, but few studies maintain these differences when conceptualizing how citizenship is embodied. Indeed, in the social sciences, citizenship practices are often assessed via a list of behaviors, or a checklist. Some of these behaviors include activities such as belonging to at least one voluntary group, attending religious services regularly, belonging to a union, having a political affiliation, reading the newspaper regularly, contributing money or time to a political campaign, protesting, gathering signatures for a petition, voting, creating an agenda for a community meeting, and/or engaging in community service or volunteering (Flanagan & Levine, 2010; Lenzi et al., 2012; Saegert & Winkel, 1996; Snell, 2010; Speer & Peterson, 2000; Torney-Purta, Amadeo, & Andolina, 2010). These behavioral checklists are generally summed to create a citizenship score.

The problem with these behavioral checklists is that they treat all citizenship practices as if they were similar in type and therefore do not discern whether the behaviors challenge or reinforce the status quo (Watts & Flanagan, 2007; Westheimer & Kahne, 2004a, 2004b). Making the distinction between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic behaviors is important because some types of citizenship practices challenge injustice through collective action, and other types are more ameliorative in scope and tend to leave social structures intact (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004a, 2004b).

An additional critique is that acts of citizenship can often be interpreted to mean individual participation in the political and social spheres. Yet acts can also happen collectively, and in most cases some of the most powerful acts of citizenship are done in unity and in solidarity with others. Engaging in acts of citizenship therefore requires understanding and fleshing out the processes and practices at both the individual and group level. Given the need to further expand the growing body of literature on the performance of citizenship, as well as how citizens who take action come into being, we move away from current contemporary models of citizenship to consider and make the case for cultural citizenship.

Cultural citizenship, which is consistent with a subjective and embodied experience of citizenship, seems an appropriate intervention in moving toward social justice and solidarity across difference. First, cultural citizenship enables a critique of and challenges to dominant U.S. notions of citizenship. Second, it calls into question the fact that the state can re-draw its boundaries for its benefit, but people cannot. This critique invites us to consider participatory and self-defining constructions of citizenship, where people take power and demand rights, regardless of state approval. Most importantly, it considers citizenship from the perspective, experiences, and acts of people themselves, who resist superimposed labels of citizenship. Theorizing citizenship from this bottom-up participatory perspective also enables the consideration of citizenship practices of those who are not viewed as legitimate social actors under current dominant constructions, such as people who are undocumented, children and youth, people who are imprisoned or detained, people who are poor, people who are homeless, and others who have been subordinated to second-class citizen status (Lister, et al., 2003; Lister, 2007; Smith, et al., 2005; Young, 1989). As such, this perspective addresses the call for researchers to consider how rights, status, and identity are connected when considering citizenship, including its enactment (Nyers, 2007).

Cultural citizenship provides a framework from which to understand citizenship performance as a form of resistance against unjust structures, especially for those with subordinated social identities (Rosaldo, 1999b). This enactment is aligned with the justice-oriented citizen because it seeks to create structural, systemic change through collective cultural representations that reaffirm people power and transformation. It is also compatible with the cultural pluralism model of citizenship because it does not require assimilation. Moreover, it is consistent with perspectives in social psychology that emphasize transforming social structures (Apfelbaum, 1979; Fine, 2006; Gurin, Nagda, & Lopez, 2004; Haney, 2005; Hurtado, 1996, 2005; Lott & Bullock, 2006; Opotow, 1997).
Cultural Citizenship as an Alternative to Dominant Notions of Citizenship

A Brief History

Cultural citizenship began as a model for understanding theories of assimilation and acculturation (Rosaldo, 1988, 1994, 1999b). Initially, anthropologist Renato Rosaldo (1988) coined this phenomenon during his ethnographic work with Ilongots in the Philippines—a group labeled as “people without culture.” Motivated to counter the dominant deficit narratives of Filipinos, Rosaldo found that people’s ways of perceiving and organizing their social reality is related to their cultural ways of being and acting. Moreover, Rosaldo posited that the interaction between culture and colonization is what shapes invisibility, difference, and assimilation.

Hence, Rosaldo’s initial work led to his exploration of the “melting pot” as a colonizing context and his study of how some groups assimilate, whereas others resist. Fascinated by culture, Rosaldo and others looked at the ways in which Latinx and other subordinated group members—like immigrants—in the United States resisted exclusion and invisibility by forging cultural communities and claiming social rights (Flores, 2003; Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1988, 1994, 1999b). In this view, culture is defined as involving a range of social experiences through which people make sense of their lives, form practices, and learn to be and perform in the social world. Consistent with Bourdieu (1993), Rosaldo (1994) conceived culture as encompassing ideologies, values and traditions, as well as artistic and linguistic representations of an individual or collective experience. Cultural citizenship, therefore, was coined to describe the ways in which people resisted, (re)claimed and (re)constructed the terms of their citizenship, giving strong consideration to the role of culture instead of legally prescribed definitions by the state. This eschewing of legal structures often created the freedom to perform citizenship in ways consistent with the justice-oriented citizen.

Many Latinx communities in the United States, for example, achieve rights and recognition through an active and continuous process of claiming membership, as well as the right to be different linguistically and culturally (Flores, 2003; Rosaldo, 1994, 1999b). Yet these groups also demand equality in a democratic and participatory sense (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1988, 1994, 1999b). When people practice cultural citizenship, they construct a community that seeks equality, justice, and power for their subordinated group or a group with which they stand in solidarity, while also defining, defending, and affirming their social group identities (Flores & Benmayor, 1997). What makes cultural citizenship unique and necessary to notions of citizenship is that it provides people with the power to name and construct their own ways of being and performing citizenship (Rocco, 2014; Rosaldo, 1994).

Although a relatively new term, cultural citizenship has been practiced for many decades within the United States. This is the case because, unfortunately, the United States has a history of legalizing democratic (and other forms of) exclusion. If this were not the case, then many movements—including for emancipation, women’s suffrage, and civil rights—would have been and would be unnecessary. An examination of cultural citizenship, therefore, is a study of how groups form, define themselves, enter the public sphere, make demands, claim rights, and change society (Flores, 2003; Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rocco, 2014; Rosaldo, 1994, 1999b). Put another way, cultural citizenship reveals how people demand citizenship, regardless of the state, and sometimes in direct conflict with the state.

Cultural Citizenship Defined

Cultural citizenship is the process through which groups come to identify themselves, forge a community, and claim space, membership and social rights in society (Flores, 2003; Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1994, 1999b). In other words, cultural citizenship moves beyond definitions of citizenship as rights based on and determined by the state (Delany, 2003; Flores, 2003; Flores & Benmayor, 1997) and emphasizes the importance of cultural practices and vernacular meanings of citizenship as defined by people (Rosaldo, 1988, 1994, 1999b). Cultural citizenship does not require the conferral of state legitimation to practice it; rather, it is the claiming of space and rights, often done through self-definition, via political action and everyday social and cultural practices (Delany, 2003; Fuentes, 2011; Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Getrich, 2008; Rosaldo, 1999a).

Cultural citizenship is aligned with theories of power and liberation, which assert that power must be taken and cannot be given (Freire, 1970/1988; Hayward, 2000; Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2005). Consistent with this theory is empirical evidence that concludes whites are unlikely to cede power because they are more likely to accept social inequality as justifiable than are those from more
subordinated groups (i.e., Blacks and Latinxs; Deaux et al., 2006; Young, 1989). Additionally, subordinated groups (in this case, Blacks and Latinxs) wish to maintain their cultural distinctiveness and not assimilate into dominant U.S. ideologies (Deaux et al., 2006). Given this context, and because so many people are left out of the category, “citizen” (Lister, 1997; Lister et al., 2003; Turner, 1990), cultural citizenship is an important social intervention. How subordinated groups claim and perform citizenship when they are denied this legal status—or the rights associated with citizenship when it is granted—provides a way forward for new conceptualizations of citizenship and, potentially, the embodiment of a model for the justice-oriented citizen where all members of a society are included and welcomed to participate in constructing that society (Ansley, 2010; Lister, 1997, 1998, 2007; Nyers, 2008). This participatory parity in any citizenship model is essential because with it comes a call for material redistribution and social recognition (Lister, 2007). Indeed, this conceptualization is consistent with theory that maintains that citizenship, like power, needs to be claimed and affirmed through intentional actions that support agency and resist systems of oppression (Nyers, 2007; Rocco, 2014).

The cultural repertoires through which people claim space and their right to full membership in society may vary from outright public manifestations, like the anti-immigration rights protests in 2006, children’s organization of the newsboy strike in 1899, disability rights protests, prison hunger strikes, and other civil rights movements, to more subtle forms, such as public gatherings (e.g., Pow-wows, Puerto Rican Day Parades), political performances (Flores, 2003), and groups remaking their own “space.” In the next section we discuss the four components of cultural citizenship: membership, sense of belonging, claiming space, and claiming rights.

Components of Cultural Citizenship

Membership. Cultural citizenship facilitates the creation of community for group members often situated at the margins of U.S. civil society. In this respect, membership is characterized by the struggle for inclusion, enfranchisement, and belonging (Ong, 1996). Because of intersectional identities, considerations for membership require moving beyond simple in-group and out-group binaries toward the establishment of mutuality and equality; this is consistent with a transcultural and multi-identification approach (Essed, 2001; Lister, 1997, 1998). In other words, what allows people to become “members” is the shared experience of making demands to full citizenship despite cultural differences. It is the act of self-making and being-made by power structures that affords people a shared experience of marginalization; the struggle is what thereby creates a set of shared values and, therefore, ideological membership (Ong, 1996; Stevenson, 2003).

For example, when people recognize the oppression and struggle of their group or another group and choose to engage in the ideological and material struggle to challenge the status quo, they engage in a process of cultural citizenship that is bound by a desire to change the social structures of domination (Stevenson, 2003). Membership therefore entails identification with a struggle for justice and equality that advocates and supports the group’s values, goals, and cultural practices (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1994). Also, membership can involve having a social awareness of shared social categories or social identities; this awareness is what therefore binds the social group together and allows for collective action (Flores, 2003; Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1994). This conceptualization moves away from essentializing, fixed, and static views of culture (Essed, 2001). For example, Latinxs are a heterogeneous group but have found that the racial, cultural, and linguistic differences that bind them as a social group also mark them as different from the dominant white U.S. society. In this view, racism constructs impassable social and institutionalized boundaries that label and mark the differences as racial exclusion, and thus social membership (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Oboler, 2006).

Sense of belonging. Whereas membership focuses on the construction of a shared group identity, sense of belonging focuses on the emotional, affective and relational ties that allow a person to feel “at home,” validated, and connected to others (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Oboler, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Membership, however, is not sufficient for belonging. For instance, a person can experience membership in a social group, yet have a limited sense of belonging with that group; this is more likely to be the case when an intersectional approach is not practiced (Essed, 2001; Lister, 1997, 1998). Sense of belonging is therefore defined as the forging of community; it involves having emotional connections to a social group, as well a sense of community. It is characterized by actions and interactions that
shape one's feelings of acceptance and validation within the group (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Yuval-Davis, 2006).

In a cultural citizenship framework, the claiming of rights is part of the process of belonging. In particular the focus is on how individuals and groups, especially communities of color, conceive of community, where they do and do not feel a sense of belonging, and how they claim rights to belong in the United States (Oboler, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2006). For example, the slogan “Black is Beautiful” has become a powerful way of reaffirming African American identity and is in part shaped by racialized constructions of beauty and by collective efforts to achieve social respect and recognition as African American people. Hence, cultural citizenship is a process that involves providing individuals and groups with a sense of belonging, with feelings of entitlement and of being in and belonging to a community (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Flores, 2003). Thus, the process of claiming rights both defines communities and comprises a renegotiation of belonging.

Claiming public space. Claiming space is a powerful way to demand recognition and rights. Examples include public parks, recreation areas, neighborhoods, community centers, and streets. Space is not limited to physical places, but can include social spaces, such as community groups, classroom periods, or other interactional settings (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Gottdiener, 1985). Public space provides individuals and groups with opportunities for critical creative modes of expression, self-representation and affirmation (Gottdiener, 1985).

One example of claiming space includes the restructuring of school curricula to include culturally relevant material. Several studies on cultural citizenship have explored the ways in which Latinx students restructure their school curricula to include their voices, lived experiences, language, history and culture (Benmayor, 2002; Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Fuentes, 2011; Sepúlveda, 2011). In this respect, Latinx youth reclaim not only the physical and public space of the classroom, but also the intellectual space within the learning environment of the classroom. Although dominant group members might perceive such spaces to be threatening—as was the rationale for the 2011 ban on ethnic studies (H.B. 2281) in the Tucson Unified School District—the claimed or recreated space is not perceived as threatening by group members who create the space. Instead, such spaces are considered valuable and empowering because they provide individuals and groups with the social networks and support, as well as sense of belonging and membership, that other spaces might not provide (Benmayor, 2002; Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Fuentes, 2011).

Claiming rights. The act of claiming rights—social, cultural, legal, civil and human—is part of the process of belonging in the United States (Rosaldo, 1994). In this view, struggles for rights are associated with broader struggles for social justice, equality and enfranchisement, and more specifically the right to be treated as human (Delanty, 2003; Essed, 2001; Rocco, 2006). Cultural citizenship therefore acknowledges that all people have rights, and can claim those rights. Taking a transcultural approach also means that what those specific rights entail is open to debate and negotiation by group members (Essed, 2001; Lister, 1997, 1998). Cultural citizenship, therefore, affirms that people have the right to equality, justice, and respect, as well as human and civil rights, regardless of racial, ethnic, gender and other social status differences (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1994).

The struggle for social/cultural rights, and the claiming of these rights, constitutes the foundation for the forming of a new meaning of citizenship (Dagnino, 1998). This notion of citizenship goes beyond state definitions as legal status, privileges, and responsibilities, to the creation of new rights that value and respect cultural diversity. That is, cultural citizenship implies the right to be different, and that different will not serve to justify structural and social inequalities (Dagnino, 1998; Flores & Benmayor, 1997).

Social and cultural rights are therefore defined as being treated with dignity and respect, as well as belonging, participating, and having opportunities in civil society amidst structural, racial, cultural and linguistic differences (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1994). Thus, the awareness of both individual and collective needs, and the claiming of social/cultural rights based on those needs, is what allows for cultural citizenship to be performed. By advocating for and claiming rights, group members define their communities and interests. In this respect, cultural citizenship is characterized by the everyday practices through which people reaffirm their right to participate, belong and be treated with dignity and respect.
Examples of Cultural Citizenship

In exploring citizenship from a cultural citizenship perspective of rights claiming and membership, Flores (2003) demonstrates how Latinx youth and their families performed skits on their experiences of migration. The skits enabled the performers to become political subjects of their own migration experiences. Through their performances, they reflected and retold their stories, as well as the stories of many Latinx families and youth in the United States. This group performance led many audience members to identify with such stories and become collective members of a shared experience and history. By relating their experiences, audience members identified and related to the actors and created a space where stories of migration and being Latinx in the United States were shared. Through this process, Latinxs forged a community space and created a sense of belonging by reaffirming their cultural identities and experiences as Latinxs. Through this cultural citizenship performance, they demanded the right to self-definition by temporarily claiming a social space.

Space-claiming as a form of cultural citizenship can also be more permanent. For example, when Asian immigrants created ethnic enclaves and communities to negotiate racial and cultural boundaries in the United States, they enacted cultural citizenship (Ong, 1996). Specifically, Chinatowns and other ethnic neighborhoods afforded Asian immigrants a public space that encompassed their membership and sense of community. Through establishing this public space, they were also able to gain some degree of power to claim legal and social rights (Ong, 1996). Although creating ethnic-cultural communities can be interpreted as isolationist, Asian immigrants facilitated a sense of inclusion within the public domain in a country where dominant groups viewed them as subordinate and foreign. By forging a public space where they could be seen and heard, Asian immigrants engaged cultural citizenship while simultaneously claiming rights.

Creating spaces that affirm the right to power for subordinated group members is an important practice of cultural citizenship. Taking action in making claims to equal treatment and participation within the space in some cases requires critically examining power and how it operates to delegitimize members within the subordinated group. In a study of Puerto Rican working-class men in the United States, their identity as Latino men was constructed in relation to masculinity (Weis, Centrie, Valentin-Juarbe, & Fine, 2002). This construction of masculinity affirmed their cultural identity as Puerto Rican men, yet it reinforced an oppressive structure of power and violence against women. Realizing the tensions between these two identities, participants reflected on and renegotiated their relationship to masculinity, while they simultaneously redefined their cultural identity as Puerto Rican men in the United States. As is evident in this example, engaging in a practice of cultural citizenship requires social group members to assert their right to respect in ways that do not oppress others, while also creating conditions that facilitate the equal participation of all members of the group regardless of social status differences.

Multi-racial and multi-ethnic groups can also perform cultural citizenship. In one case, Mexican women workers and community allies, including white farm owners and other community stakeholders, organized a cannery strike in California's Central Valley (Flores, 1997). Membership, sense of belonging, and rights claiming were documented through the group's strike participation and leadership. The group claimed social rights such as dignity and respect for women workers. Material gains were also claimed, including more fair pay and benefits, and greater participation and representation in the union (Flores, 1997). The group's continuous involvement and day-to-day commitment to the strike led many other women, including Latinx and non-Latinx community members, to stand in solidarity and unify for a cause (Flores, 1997). Through this process, the group, but especially the Mexican members, established a sense of community and affirmed their right to participate civically in local affairs, despite the linguistic and institutional challenges they experienced as working class women of color. The strike served as a catalyst to mobilize women workers into action with the intent of affirming their identities as workers deserving of rights, recognition and respeto (respect).

These studies serve as examples of cultural citizenship in action. That is, they demonstrate a different way of performing citizenship by grounding it in their lived experiences of struggles, and using culture as the foundation of community and social action. Indeed, collective organizing and social action from various groups demonstrates how cultural citizenship is enacted to empower and reaffirm claims to justice and equality. Thus, through a cultural citizenship process groups can create their own communities, sense of belonging, and membership to claim rights (Flores, 2003; Flores & Benmayor, 2003).
that require intervention by psychologists but as situate within the field the struggles and acts of up. These acts must be understood not as conflicts members to create social change from the ground resistance made by historically excluded group social context, intergroup relations, and social iden­

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chisement , respect and equality held by subordi­
nated group members and allies. Thus, given that notions of citizenship are often shaped by dom­
inant ideologies that determine who is included or excluded—that is, who are in-group and out­
group members—cultural citizenship must be cen­
tered within the social psychological literature that focuses on unraveling the relationship between social identities, groups and collective action.

Cultural citizenship is a bottom-up process of social action and solidarity building toward claim­
ing rights and a legitimate place at the decision­making table. Because claims to citizenship are reinforced or subverted by socio-cultural construc­
tions and assumptions of who is (not) a citizen, cultural citizenship presents itself as an alternative justice-oriented model of citizenship that resists and challenges assumptions that uphold the status quo. Cultural citizenship encourages communities
to define citizenship, rather than allowing boundar­ies to be drawn around it exclusively by the state (Getrich, 2008). Also, it enables alternative nar­ratives regarding how to consider citizenship and its performance. The (re)affirmation of one’s cultural practices, within a cultural citizenship framework, allows for the decoupling of formal citizenship granted by the state and substantive citizenship rights (Flores, 2003; Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Getrich, 2008; Rosaldo, 1994). This has important implications for the performance of citizenship for many subordinated groups, such as children, people who are or were imprisoned, people who are undocu­mented, people of color, LGBTQIA+ people, and people who are homeless.

Our goal is not to downplay the structurally limiting nature of how citizenship is currently rec­ognized in the United States (i.e., as a legal right conferred by the state), but rather, to create spaces where individuals and groups can harness their power to move into self-definition and practice citizenship in ways not determined by dominant groups and/or the state (Getrich, 2008; Montero, 1998; Ong, 1996). Two aims are therefore worth noting.

The first aim is to engage in action that moves society toward a participatory democracy (Montero, 1998). Hence, intergroup relations in context includes important processes for shaping and strengthening social identities, as well as embodying the goals and values endorsed by the group. When these cultural psychology processes are mutually reinforcing, and emerging from shared experiences of struggle, they give rise to collective forms of resistance that can transform relationships, and ultimate­ly structures (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996). This democratic vision, however, is far from being real­ized if we do not take seriously the task to challenge the underlying social psychological mechanisms that have justified the exclusion and subordination of some groups (Deutsch, 1973; Fine, 2006; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996).

A second aim is to facilitate empowering oppor­tunities for people to acquire the material and psy­chological resources needed to have more control over what affects them (Rappaport, 1987). Indeed, empowerment is a process of constructing and asserting human rights by developing and organiz­ing people’s collective identities and practices toward social justice and action. The process and practice of people coming together to act for more socially just ends manifests itself as cultural citizenship, which is sometimes described as collective empowerment (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Rosaldo, 1994) or relational empowerment (Christens, 2012), and at other times as a process of collective action (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Flores & Benmayor, 1997).

Although the parallels between cultural citi­zenship, social identity, intergroup relations, and empowerment are enticing, our goal has been to explore and interrogate constructions of citizenship—or the relationship between the nation-state and individuals—and to assess how these landscapes shape citizenship performances. Our attempt has been to provoke a greater criti­cal analysis of citizenship, specifically cultural citi­zenship, within the discipline of social psychology. We therefore introduce cultural citizenship into the discipline of social psychology with the intent of providing a conceptual framework to assist in movement toward socially just action that reconsid­ers a transformative notion of citizenship from the bottom-up.

Cultural citizenship is not an end point. Instead, it is a starting point for action, but it is not suf­ficient for action; rather, it facilitates collective action through cultural expression and representation that is counter-hegemonic, critical, and relational. Cultural citizenship is important because it extends our understanding of citizenship performances as a collective process in response to the historic, political, economic, and social lives of subordinated group members and allies.

Interrogating dominant constructions of citizen­ship through a historic-political-economic-social lens, as well as the ways in which citizenship is enacted, allows for a more flexible and fluid defini­tion of citizenship—one in which people are defin­ing the terms of their belonging, participation, and rights, irrespective of the state. Because social psy­chology is concerned with power, power structures, social action, social context, and social realities, it behooves us to consider how our understandings of citizenship uphold the status quo or work toward transformative social change. Therefore, we return to the questions posed at the outset of this chap­ter: How do social landscapes shape citizenship and its performance? Do citizenship performances maintain and/or work against oppression and dom­i­nation? Would other frameworks be more effective in creating socially just change?

How do social landscapes shape citizenship and its performance? It is important that we take into consideration how historic, legal, political, economic, and social landscapes construct cur­rent notions of citizenship, as well as the role this
shaping plays in determining what counts as citizenship practices. Social psychology does not serve social justice ends by working only within the confines of historic, legal, economic, schooling, and multicultural “melting pot” ideological notions of what a good citizen is and does. The point is not to eschew any actions that are aligned with these landscapes, but to realize that the actions are consistent with dominant power structures and to ask if there are other actions that might be more transformative. Indeed, some strategies require working within specific structures, especially depending on the positionality and social location of the actors. Additionally, people likely perform citizenship in ways aligned with multiple constructions. Yet the state should not be the sole determiner of which citizenship performances are deemed appropriate.

Do citizenship performances maintain and/or work against oppression and domination? Citizenship performances shaped by the state are likely more ameliorative than transformative. In fact, this is what many scholars argued when asserting that a psychology working within the structures of capitalism, consumerism, and the Protestant work ethic upholds the status quo and shies away from frameworks and actions that would trouble the established order (Albee, 1981, 1997; Carolissen, 2012; Mowrer, 1939). In other words, working solely within dominant ideologies is unlikely to change discrimination, oppression, and/or power asymmetries; hence, alternative frameworks, like cultural citizenship, are necessary.

Would other frameworks be more effective in creating socially just change? Cultural citizenship is well aligned with social psychology’s goal of social justice. We believe that it is an effective framework to consider when working toward transformative social change. Specifically, we have argued that cultural citizenship is a construct that should be more widely used within social psychology, and we have presented empirical evidence and theory in describing it. Cultural citizenship demands an analysis that attends to historical, social, political, and economic contexts. Moreover, it enables us to work in contexts other than those facilitated through historic, legal, economic, schooling, and the multicultural “melting pot” ideological landscapes; we need other lenses for analysis and action.

Cultural citizenship can help us move toward recognizing the justice-oriented citizen in ways consistent with cultural pluralism models of citizenship. It can also assist us in developing interventions that include more socially just civic actions. Re-conceptualizing the meaning of citizenship to include cultural practices and ways of belonging would bring about a process of cultural and social decolonization where each person and social group is valued, respected and represented, and where those in power would not dictate the lives of others who are subordinated and different (Flores & Benmayor, 1997; Flores, 2003). Consistent with our argument, in our last section, we outline recommendations for research and action.

**Recommendations for Research and Action**

Taking our analysis into consideration, we have five recommendations for research and action. These include documenting the actions and experiences of subordinated groups, researching groups that claim power through actions that affirm their sociopolitical enfranchisement, prioritizing cultural citizenship as a concept within social action research, researching how cultural citizenship fits into a broader nomological network (i.e., theoretical constructs or concepts, and how they connect or relate to one another; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), and studying broader structural links to cultural citizenship research and action.

It is important to document the work of groups typically not seen as capable, competent, or able to be citizens. Some of these groups include people who are homeless, those who are seriously mentally ill, those who are undocumented, children (including middle school-aged children and younger), people who are imprisoned, people who are disabled, and people who are LGBTQIA+. Yet these groups also have intersectional identities and need to be considered with this in mind. For example, DREAMERS (college students and military personnel) do not constitute all undocumented people; there are also restaurant owners, food service workers, and farm workers, to name a few groups. Their citizenship performances should be prioritized within research and action. Similarly, LGBTQIA+ movements include not only citizenship performances that advocate for the legalization of gay marriage, but also queer liberation, including the abolition of marriage (Conrad, 2010). Understanding how these subordinated groups, and those on the margins of these groups, perform citizenship can provide another vantage point from which researchers and activists (and activist researchers) can examine and understand power, privilege, and citizenship. Researchers could conduct this work through participatory action research, ethnography, interviews, or other methods appropriate for the goals of description and explanation.
Second, researchers and activists should study instances in which groups do not wait for the state to grant citizenship, but they simply take it. This, in and of itself, is an act of citizenship (Nyers, 2008). An example is the Zapatistas, an indigenous group in Chiapas comprised of Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Tojolabal, Chol, and Mam Indians. After nine years of negotiating with the Mexican state, the Zapatistas came to the conclusion that the state would never grant them autonomy. Rather than continue negotiations, they claimed their own autonomous zone (Speed, 2007). They argue that rights are exercised, and not established by the state. In other words, citizenship is taken, not granted. With this philosophy, they have governed themselves since 2003 via a structure they designed to serve their interests and needs. Researchers and activists should know more about how these actions have transformed social structures (if they have), people's relationships to one another and the state, and what citizenship performance looks like under these conditions. Participatory action research, ethnography, interviews, or surveys might be appropriate methods for these questions.

Similarly, other groups have created spaces by publicly exercising their rights to property ownership. In 1970, Barrio Logan in San Diego, California, was taken by the county for the purpose of creating an interstate highway, which would have gentrified the area (Rosen & Fisher, 2001). The Chicano community organized and occupied the construction site. They organized, refused to leave the area, and petitioned for the construction to stop and for a park to be built in that community. Eventually, the territory was returned to the Mexican American community who lived in and claimed ownership over that area. Presently, this area is known as Chicano Park. It contains a large collection of cultural/political murals (Rosen & Fisher, 2001). Like the Zapatistas, the Chicano community of Barrio Logan demanded their rights by simply taking them. Future research should examine such instances, and researchers/activists should make it a point to be familiar with these types of examples, and study them because these demonstrate the power of collective groups engaging in social action—processes that are of concern to social psychologists (Fine, 2006; Deutsch, 1973). Appropriate methods are those designed for description and explanation, such as participatory action research, ethnography, surveys, interviews, and focus groups.

Third, researchers and activists should document the relationship between collective action and cultural citizenship. This conceptualization would make more obvious resistance to the state, and broader structures of institutionalized power and oppression. Specifically, if grassroots/community-based organizing is conceptualized as citizenship, the work can highlight how movements essentially re-define who should have control over the boundaries of political participation, as well as where decision-making power should be located. There is research within social/social-community psychology where subordinated groups—such as children and people who were imprisoned—claim space, membership, sense of belonging, and/or rights, but this research is not explicitly conceptualized within the realm of citizenship. For example, 4th and 5th grade Latinx students from immigrant families identified a poor connection between their school, themselves, and their families (Langhout & Fernández, 2014). They subsequently created school murals to claim space and tell their community's stories, thereby increasing their sense of belonging; their evaluation of their murals indicate students and families feel connected to the murals (Langhout & Fernández, 2014). Moreover, people who were formally incarcerated researched prison and parole experiences, as well as the human and economic effects of long sentencing; as a result of this research, the group claimed rights by effectively lobbying to change a law in New York, which increased the number of merit-based discharges from prisons (Marquez-Lewis et al., 2013). If these studies were conceptualized as subordinated groups performing cultural citizenship, the connections to and implications for structures, such as U.S. policy and constructions of citizenship, would be explicit, and current boundaries would be troubled.

This explicit connection of social action by subordinated groups to citizenship appears more common in legal studies, citizenship studies, political science, and Latin American and Latino Studies. For example, in a legal studies account of how an undocumented community and allies got a law passed in Tennessee to allow people without documentation to get driver's licenses, Ansley (2010) made clear that current constructions of citizenship are intimately tied to U.S. history. With respect to political science, researchers have linked citizenship to state-imposed institutionalized systems that have created indentured labor and racial divides (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Isin & Turner, 2007; Mouffe, 1992a). What these studies make explicit is the fact that current citizenship/rights debates are a continuation of a social justice movement that has
been underway in the United States since at least the 1700s.

With respect to our forth recommendation, fleshing out the nomological network, there is much work to be done. Questions researchers might ask are varied. For example, how can social psychological theories, specifically social identity theory, contribute to the deepening of cultural citizenship practices without fragmenting or essentializing the multiple and intersecting positionality of those engaged in collective action? If citizenship has been constructed in relation to social identities, such as race, social class and gender, in what ways does cultural citizenship problematize status-identities associated with being (or not being) a citizen (e.g., documented, undocumented, naturalized citizen, resident)? These questions require further theorizing, as well as more explicit analysis on the relationship between citizenship and social identity.

Sometimes the nomological network is examined via assessing how latent constructs, measured via scales, relate to one another. Scales designed to assess social action and cultural citizenship should be designed and psychometrically validated, with great attention paid to ensuring that not all social action is collapsed into one type. If researchers and program evaluators plan to assess citizenship practices via checklists, the checklist should not be collapsed over types of citizenship. Cultural citizenship is aligned with the justice-oriented citizen, as opposed to the personally responsible or participatory citizen (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004a, 2004b). Developing measures that maintain these distinctions might clarify relations between citizenship practices and other outcomes, and might be instructive for programs in their evaluation efforts.

Finally, research and action that makes visible the relationship between citizenship performances and history, the political economy, and socio-cultural structures is essential if researchers and activists are to deconstruct how macro-level structures shape social action. It is worth knowing how social action (dis)connects with the long history of negotiating U.S. citizenship, the legal system, capitalism-neoliberalism, schooling, and the ideology of the multicultural melting pot. Being aware of these histories and social landscapes can orient social justice work and action, as well as facilitate cultural citizenship and critical reflection. Our belief is that, when these four areas are given ample consideration, social psychology research and action that engages cultural citizenship will have much to offer to movements for social justice.

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Notes

1. All empirical and anecdotal examples are from the United States unless specified otherwise.

2. The term Latinx is used to denote gender inclusivity, as some might not identify along socially constructed gender binaries.

3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.

4. The marriage abolition argument is sometimes based in the position that fighting for marriage does nothing to alter the shape and form of social structures. In other words, exclusionary policies remain intact but the boundaries of who is covered by those policies slightly expand. For example, under marriage reform, health care remains tied to marriage for many; more people can access health care if they are able to get married, but health care is not viewed as a fundamental human right available to all regardless of their social relationships, so the system is not transformed.

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