11-2016

Getting Short-Changed? The Impact of Outside Money on District Representation

Anne E. Baker
Santa Clara University, aebaker@scu.edu

Recommended Citation

Baker, A. E. (2016). Getting Short-Changed? The Impact of Outside Money on District Representation*. Social Science Quarterly, 97(5), 1096–1107. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12279

Getting Short-Changed?: The Impact of Outside Money on District Representation

Dr. Anne E. Baker
Santa Clara University

Abstract

Objective. As incumbent House members increasingly recruit campaign contributions from individuals who reside outside of their districts, this raises the question of whether a dependency on outside money affects members' responsiveness and ideological proximity to district constituents. *Method*. Using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies of 2006, 2008, and 2010 as well as individual contribution data corresponding to those years from the U.S. Federal Election Commission, I examine this relationship using responsiveness and proximity models of representation. *Results*. I find a dependency on outside contributions decreases members' responsiveness to their districts and increases the members' ideological extremity. Moreover, within-district contributions only minimally improve ideological alignment between the member and the district. *Conclusion.* Donors receive additional representation from members of the House at the expense of constituents.

*Direct all correspondence to Dr. Anne E. Baker, Santa Clara University, 500 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA 95053, aebaker@scu.edu.

As the cost of American elections continues to rise, members of Congress increasingly recruit campaign contributions from individuals beyond the boundaries of their districts and states. Previous research suggests that the "donor class" reside in only a handful of congressional districts (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee, 2011; Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008) and that their policy preferences and ideological leanings are distinct from the average Democratic or Republican voters who make up House members' electoral bases of support (Bramlett et al., 2011; Brown, Powell, and Wilcox, 1995; Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox, 2003; Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox, 2005). These findings raise the question of whether a member's increasing dependency on funds from outside the district could lead to distortions in the representation provided to the district. Put another way, the less the member's financial constituency geographically overlaps with the member's electoral constituency, the greater the possibility that the member might be more responsive to preferences that do not dovetail with those of constituents.

Few studies directly test whether campaign contributions from individuals can lead to distortions in representation (for an exception see Fellowes and Wolf, 2004). Since individual contributions serve as the largest source of campaign funds for candidates contesting in federal elections (Francia et. al., 2005), this lacuna in the literature constitutes a considerable blind spot in our understanding of representative relationships. What we do have are studies that examine distortions in representation on the basis of varied responsiveness to different income groups (see Bartels, 2006, 2008) and studies documenting the demographics, motivations, and potential biases of donors (see Brown Powell, and Wilcox, 1993, 1995; Francia et. al., 2003, 2005; Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008; Page, Bartels, and Seawright, 2013). Together this work suggests the distinct possibility that individual

contributors outside of the congressional district could impact the quality of representation district constituents receive.

Using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study from 2006, 2008, and 2010 as well as individual contribution data from the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC), I examine House members' responsiveness to constituent preferences in relation to the amount of individual contributions they receive from outside of their respective districts while controlling for factors such as electoral vulnerability and member seniority. I find, regardless of their party affiliation, members' dependency on outside contributions draws them in a more extremely liberal or extremely conservative ideological direction that is counter to the ideological preferences of the district they represent. In short, outside contributions interfere with the members' responsiveness to constituents. Relatedly, I find members' reliance upon contributions from donors who reside within their districts only minimally reduces the ideological distance between the member and the district thereby suggesting that within-district donors share the ideological preferences of out-of-district donors. These tests demonstrate that both sets of donors gain additional representation from members of the House at the expense of constituents.

Distortions in Representation and Donor Biases

The literature on money in politics supplies a number of major findings that lend theoretical support to the hypothesis of interest here—namely, that individual campaign contributions from outside of the member's district might negatively impact the quality of representation the member provides to his or her constituents. Donors outside of the district are thought to seek "surrogate representation" as a means of promoting their distinct ideological, policy, or personal identity-related preferences by gaining additional representation from many

members of Congress rather than simply relying upon representation provided by their district's member (Gimpel et. al., 2008; Mansbridge, 2003). The prevalence of surrogate representation is partly a function of the fact that overtime "territorial representation" no longer reflects as many of a voter's "significant interests" (Mansbridge, 2003: 522-523). The democratic benefit of this form of representation is that it provides a way for individuals to gain some representation of their interests in the event the individual's preferred party does not win the election. The primary drawback of this form of representation is that it "embodies far more political inequality" because it devolves into a system where the "best financed ideas and interests gain representation" (Mansbridge, 2003: 524).

A growing number of studies indicate members of Congress are more responsive to the preferences of their wealthiest constituents than to the preferences of their middle class or poorest constituents (see Bartels, 2006, 2008; Gilens, 2005, 2009). Flavin (2010) finds the opinions of low-income voters do not influence responsiveness even on issues that disproportionately affect the quality of their lives, such as TANF reforms, abortion, gun control, and the death penalty. Whether the responsiveness or lack thereof that was uncovered in the aforementioned studies is the direct consequence of the ability of particular constituents to contribute to members' re-election campaigns remains to be tested.

What we do know is that if such responsiveness to the rich occurs in order for members of Congress to cultivate relationships with donors, it might prove problematic to the representative relationship between the member and constituents because the wealthy individuals, who primarily comprise the donor class, are demographically and ideologically dissimilar from average voters and hold distinct policy preferences. The donor class tends to be predominately old, white, and male (Brown et. al., 1993, 1995; Francia et al., 2003; Francia et.

al., 2005). Moreover, they tend to be more ideologically extreme than the average voter (Francia et. al., 2003; Francia et. al. 2005). Relatedly, in their survey of donors with questions replicating questions featured in surveys of the electorate, Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013) find donors' policy preferences differ from those of average voters. For instance, they support expanding fewer social welfare programs than the general public. Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013) also find demographic differences among donors made little difference in their preferences for social welfare provision or government regulation; rather, donors shared similar preferences by policy area. Geography may play a further role in compounding preference homogeneity. Several studies find that the majority of congressional campaign donors reside in just handful of congressional districts (Cho and Gimpel, 2007; Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008), where campaigns and parties recruit funds through existing social networks (Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008).

In addition to preferences that are driven by their individual demographics—specifically gender, race, and income—donors may also have geographic-based interests that are connected to their materialistic, purposive, and social goals for contributing that differ from those of the member's constituency (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee, 2011; Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski 2006). While members of the donor class might all share similar preferences that stem from their demographic profiles, donors inside the district and/or state of the member likely have different geographic-based interests than donors outside of the district (Gimpel, Lee and Kaminski, 2006). As a consequence, out-of-district donor's preferences are less likely to overlap with constituent preferences than within-district donors.

While constituent donors may still hold distinct preferences setting them apart from average voters in the district, it is possible that members' reliance upon donors inside the district may help to counteract the influence of donors outside the district. Constituent donors' preferences should carry more weight with the member and should be closer to the preferences of fellow constituents than those of outside donors. However, this relationship has never been tested. In the models presented below, outside contributions to members are predicted to lead to distortions in representation whereas contributions to members from within their districts should strengthen the ties between the member and the district.

Two models of these representational relationships are employed. Both models examine ideological representation rather than issue-specific or descriptive representation. In some sense, this choice lowers the bar for uncovering ties between the representative and constituents because perfect congruence is not anticipated. Rather, the member is evaluated by the degree to which the member's liberalism or conservativism reflects the district's liberalism or conservativism (see Achen,1977). In simple terms, if member ideology and district ideology are conceptualized as two circles on a Venn Diagram, one model measures the degree of overlap and the other measures the areas where the circles do not overlap. The first model of this relationship is a responsiveness model (see Achen, 1977; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001; Erickson and Wright, 2000) that is designed to determine how responsive member's ideological scores are to the mean ideological score for their district and whether an increasing reliance upon outside contributions disrupts that responsiveness and thereby alters the degree to which the two overlap. The second model is an ideological proximity model (see Achen, 1977; Berstein, 1991) examining the residual distance between the member's ideological score and the district ideological mean. Rather than measuring the degree of overlap in ideology, as is the case in the

responsiveness model, this model focuses upon the degree to which there is a lack of congruence between the member and the district. Greater distances are equated with less congruence. More details about variables and the precise specifications of each model are discussed below.

Data and Method

Campaign contribution data for the 2006, 2008, and 2010 election cycles are obtained from the U.S. Federal Election Commission's (FEC) publicly available candidate summary files, candidate master files, and the itemized files for contributions from individuals to candidate committees. I use congressional districts and zip codes from the National Annenberg Election Study (NAES) of 2008—the largest national survey including both variables—to complete these matches. These variables are utilized separately from individual response data and identifiers from the survey. I also use the itemized files from the FEC, which contain the zip code associated with the donor making the contribution to the candidate, coupled with the candidate master file to match specific contributions to congressional districts to ultimately determine which contributions originated outside of the member's district. I focus on 2006, 2008, and 2010 election cycles in the FEC data because I could use the NAES district-zip code file to identify the origin of individual contributions more reliably in those elections occurring prior to redistricting after the 2010 Census. Contributions outside of the member's state were identified first and then the remaining contributions are identified as originating from within or outside of the member's district using the two approaches above. I then aggregate out-of-the-district contributions to each member of Congress and divide by a thousand. The logic behind this specification is that an additional dollar may not have a meaningful effect on representation but an additional thousand dollars might. The amount of money collected from outside of the district rather than the

percentage of individual receipts collected outside of the district is also hypothesized to significantly affect representation because members vary in their dependency upon individual contributions with some being more reliant upon PAC money and others more reliant on individual receipts. One member may collect fifty-percent of individual contributions from outside of the district but these funds only amount to fifteen-percent of all receipts whereas for another member fifty percent of individual receipts coming from outside the district might constitute fifty percent of all receipts. If the percentages are used, these two members are indistinguishable. I also account for variations in members' fundraising sources in other ways that are discussed below. I follow the same procedure to aggregate contributions originating from within the district for the second set of models. Non-incumbent candidates are excluded from the analysis in both instances.

In order to test the impact of respective members' dependency on outside contributions, I utilize two different OLS regression models. One model examines legislator responsiveness to constituents and a second model measures the ideological proximity of the member in relation to constituent ideological preferences. Members from each party are analyzed separately. In order to measure constituent ideology, I use responses to the Collaborative Congressional Study's question: "Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?" Respondents selected their answer on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for very liberal to 5 for very conservative. I use responses to this question to calculate mean ideology of each district. The CCES is ideal for this purpose because the average sample size for responses to the ideology question by congressional district ranged from 171 for 2006 to as high as 213 for 2010—higher than other national surveys. Since CCES was not only conducted in election years 2006, 2008, and 2010, it was possible to compare scores from the 2007 and 2009 surveys to help

confirm and in some cases supplement the mean ideology score for districts with lower response rates.

For my measure of members' ideology, I use members' NOMINATE scores. For members in this sample who served in the 110th, 111th, 112th congresses, the NOMINATE scale ranges from - 0.73 for the most liberal member to 1.23 for the most conservative member. In the responsiveness model, NOMINATE scores make up the dependent variable and an interaction term between district ideology and outside contributions in thousands of dollars is utilized to gauge the extent to which increasing dependence on outside money impacts the influence of district ideology on the member's ideological identification. The interpretation of the interaction term is complicated in this instance because NOMINATE scores range from negative to positive values. As a consequence, predicted probabilities will be used to interpret the disruptive effect of outside funds on the member to district ideological ties. In the proximity model, the dependent variable is the residual distance between the member and district retrieved from a simple regression of the member's NOMINATE score on mean district ideology.

In both Republican and Democratic models, I control for a number of factors. Party pressure may cause a member to be less responsiveness to his or her constituents or to be more ideologically distant from them (Aldrich and McGinnis, 1989). To reflect this, I control for party leadership effects using a dummy variable that equals one if the member served as a caucus leader (e.g. Speaker, conference chair or whip) or as a committee chair and zero otherwise. Electoral vulnerability can also influence the member's attentiveness to constituent preferences. Accordingly, I include a dummy variable using *Congressional Quarterly*'s October rating of district competitiveness (*Electoral Vulnerability*). Similarly, as members achieve greater influence, electoral safety, and other incumbency advantages associated with seniority they may

be less responsive to constituent preferences depending upon the number of years they have served (Kalt and Zupan, 1990; *Chamber Seniority*). Since gender differences can have an impact on the ideology of the member, her responsiveness to constituents (Griffin, Newman, and Wolbrecht, 2012), and the extent to which the member depends upon on contributions from outside the district (Crespin and Dietz, 2010), I add a dummy variable that equals one for female members and zero otherwise (*Female*). Minority members may also attract more outside contributions due to descriptive representational functions and they are more likely to be liberal (*Minority*). To account for interest group and party influences on the quality of representation provided by the member, I control for the total amount of reported hard dollars contributions from PACs and parties to the member's campaign. These variables are highly correlated. A summary measure of these receipts reduces multicollinearity but does not change the substantive meaning of the results (*Non-Individual Receipts*). Dummy variables are added for election years with 2006 serving as the reference category.

In addition to these controls, in the responsiveness models, I account for the direct effects that relying upon individual contributions as the campaign's primary source of income and representing a rural district might have on the member's NOMINATE score. Members who are highly dependent upon individual contributions might be more ideologically extreme reflecting the influence of donors who previous studies suggest are also ideologically extreme. As a consequence, members who receive more than 50 percent of their total receipts from individuals are coded 1 and 0 otherwise (*High Individual Receipts*). Members who live in rural districts are likely to have more conservative NOMINATE scores (see McKee, 2008). To account for this effect, districts that are 45 percent urban or less according to the 2000 Census are coded 1 and 0, otherwise (*Rural*). Finally, due to the fact that many of the same members remained in office

between 2006 and 2010, both representational models feature clustered standard errors by candidate identification number.

< Table 1 About Here>

Results

The results of the responsiveness model are displayed in Table 1. The interaction terms in both the Democratic and Republican models are significant. The results of the member's predicted ideology scores in Table 2 help illustrate the interaction between outside money and district ideology on the member's NOMINATE score. In this analysis of the regression results, I examine the predicted probabilities and outcomes generated for the "average" incumbent candidate in the sample. I did this by calculating these outcomes for particular values of outside receipts while holding the other independent variables to their observed values for each case in the sample (see Hanmer and Kalkan, 2009). Confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities are calculated using the method of statistical simulation (see Hanmer and Kalkan, 2009). In Table 2, a number of hypothetical congressional districts are also listed. The district ideological means drawn from the CCES survey are used to identify a hypothetical very liberal, moderate, and very conservative district for purposes of illustration and comparison. Additionally, different quintiles of out-of-the-district contributions are shown that reflect the amount of outside support received by members of each party up to the 90 percentile rather than the maximum as a way of highlighting the effects for most of the sample rather than for the single member who depended upon outside contributions the most. Notably, while some Republicans did not collect any outside receipts, the same could not be said of any Democrats. The lowest outside contribution total for a Democratic member was $2,500 (see column 1, Table 2). The changes in the predicted liberalism or conservativism of the member in response to increases in out-of-the-district

contributions are listed in the last row. Negative values indicate increasing liberalism whereas positive values represent increasing conservativism (see Table 2).

< Table 2 About Here>

In a very liberal district, the model predicts that a Democratic representative's NOMINATE score will shift from a liberal score of -0.557 to an extremely liberal score of -0.948 in response to an increase in out-of-district contributions from $2,500 to $691,000 (see Table 2). A change from no outside receipts to the 90th percentile cut-point of $613,000 in a similarly liberal district causes a Republican representative to shift from a fairly moderate NOMINATE score of 0.272 that better reflects the district's ideological mean to a much more conservative NOMINATE score of 0.626. In a hypothetical moderate district, with the specified increase in outside receipts from the minimum to the 90th percentile, a Democratic member's predicted NOMINATE becomes more extreme going from -0.33 to -0.933. In the same district with a similar increase in outside receipts, a Republican member's NOMINATE score is predicted to rise from 0.49, which is already quite conservative, to an extreme of 1.02. In a hypothetical district with a mean ideology score that is very conservative, a Democratic member is predicted to be quite moderate. With only $2,500 in outside funding the Democrats NOMINATE score is predicted to be -0.097. However, an increasing dependency on outside funds shifts their score to a much more liberal -0.919. In the same district, a Republican member's predicted NOMINATE score rises from 0.712 to a much more conservative 1.42 with $613,000 in outside funding. While liberal Democrats are unlikely to gain seats in very conservative districts and conservative Republicans are unlikely to hold seats in very liberal districts, this analysis demonstrates that members responsiveness to district ideological preferences declines with an increasing dependency on contributions from outside the district.

Additionally, members of both parties also predicted to become ideologically extreme as a consequence of this dependency.

< Table 3 About Here>

The results of the proximity model, which utilizes the residuals generated from the member's NOMINATE score regressed on the district's mean ideology score, can be found in Table 3. In the both the Democratic and Republican models, contributions originating from within the district significantly reduce the residual distance between the member and the district's ideological scores. Monte Carlo simulations are used again to estimate the impact of within-district contributions on the representative relationship between an average Democratic or Republican House member and an average House district (see Table 4). As noted previously, there are differences between party members' reliance upon funds from individuals. Since some incumbents rely upon other sources of money, there exist just a handful of members of both parties who did not collect any contributions from individuals within their districts—such a choice is quite atypical. Nonetheless these minimums are utilized to gauge the magnitude of the effect of with-in district funds. Going from this minimum of zero within-district funds to the 90 percentile of $288,000, reduces the distance between Democratic members and their districts by 0.06 (see Table 4). Similarly, with an increase from no within-district funds to $386,000, the distance between an average Republican member and the district shrinks by 0.05 (see Table 4). Since the possible residual values generated from the dataset range from -1.13 to 0.875, a decrease in residual distance of 0.05 or 0.06 represents a reduction in the possible gap of just 2.5% or 3% respectively. As a consequence, while statistically within-district contributions significantly reduce the distance between the member and the district, the magnitude of that

effect is substantively quite small indicating any corrective effect associated with members' reliance upon within-district funds is minimal.

< Table 4 About Here>

Responsiveness and Proximity in Representational Relationships

Without exception, contributions from individual donors residing outside of the district disrupt the ideological ties between House members and their constituents. Moreover, an average member of the House will become less responsive to district ideological preferences for a very small price. Members of both parties are predicted to shift their NOMINATE scores an average of 0.07 with the receipt of only the 25th percentile in outside contributions—amounting to $90,233 for Democrats and $83,800 for Republicans in outside receipts (see Table 2). This decline in responsiveness is substantial when the fundraising profiles of the average Democrat or Republican member are considered. The average member of both parties raised a total of $1.3 million from all sources of campaign funds. Out of these average totals, Democratic members raised an average of $683,000 and Republican members raised an average of $721,000 from individual donors. This means an average member of the House will start to become less responsive to district preferences when outside contributions constitute only 6% or 7% of all campaign receipts and 12% to 13% of contributions from individual donors. When outside contributions more than 50 percent of an average member's individual contributions, their NOMINATE score responds by shifting an average of 0.33 in a more extremely liberal or conservative direction. In doing so, members do not simply become less responsive to their particular districts. As their dependency upon outside funds grows, they also become ideologically polarized.

By 2006 polarization in the House had already risen to unprecedented levels compared to those in the twentieth century (Theriault, 2008) and party polarization increased further between 2006 and 2010 (Carmines, 2011)—the years covered by this analysis. Despite the polarized context in which these representational relationships are analyzed, Democrats and Republicans who are the least reliant upon outside funding (if at all) are predicted to be more moderate than their parties' ideological medians if they represent moderate districts. In the unlikely circumstance that they win seats in districts that are more supportive of the opposition party—an outcome that is more likely for Democrats who continue to represent a wider array of districts featuring different ideologies than Republicans—those who are minimally dependent upon outside funding sources are also more likely to be moderates. To put this in perspective, the Democratic caucus' median NOMINATE score in the House varied between -0.367 in 2006 and -0.398 in 2010 and the Republican caucus' median NOMINATE score ranged between 0.618 in 2006 and 0.674 in 2010. A glance at Table 2 shows Democrats and Republicans who represent moderate districts and who have a limited dependency on outside funds, have predicted NOMINATE scores of -0.33 and 0.49 respectively and scores of -0.10 and 0.27 in districts supportive of the opposition party. However, a growing dependence on outside funds quickly causes their NOMINATE scores to shift well above both parties' medians. At the 90th percentile predicted scores are as high as -1 and 1.4 indicating that the members who receive the most outside money are likely to be the most polarized in the House. Moderate districts are the greatest losers as this dependency on outside contributions grows because moderate districts are predicted to end up with members who are completely unresponsive to and unreflective of their ideological preferences.

Fifty-five percent of members in the 110th and 112th congresses and 52 percent of members in the 111th Congress received more than 65 percent of their individual contributions from outside of their districts. While there is not enough variation in this sample to suggest that members' reliance upon outside funds constitutes a major cause of congressional polarization, the evidence does suggest that individual members are incentivized to adopt the more ideologically extreme preferences of the donor class (Francia et. al., 2003; Francia et. al., 2005) as their dependency on those financial resources grows. Otherwise, the amount of money from individuals outside of the district should not diminish the sensitivity of the member's NOMINATE score to the district's ideological mean. Although perfect congruence between the member's ideological score and the district's ideological mean is extremely unlikely, ideally these funds would have no effect or a much smaller impact on member's scores—for example, shifting them slightly closer to their party caucus' ideological medians rather than to ideological extremes. However, sharp declines in members' responsiveness with minimal amounts of outside funds coupled with ideologically polarized positioning by dependent members suggest non-constituent donors have more influence than constituents over House members' behavior and non-constituent donors are more ideologically extreme than voters.

Further, the results suggest within-district contributions only minimally reduce the lack of ideological congruence between the member and district. They certainly do not do so enough to counteract the influence of outside contributions. As previous research suggests, the lack of a corrective effect might be a consequence of the fact that the ideological preferences of donors within the district and donors outside of the district are not very distinct from one another (Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008; Page, Bartels, and Seawright, 2013). Although ideological data for all of the donors who contributed to the

House members in this sample are not available, the CCES of 2008 and 2012 include questions asking respondents if they contributed to the House candidates running in their own district or to candidates running in other districts. Responses to these questions make it possible to compare the ideologies of self-identified within-district and out-of-district donors with those of self-reported voters on the five-point ideology scale used in the models to calculate mean district ideology. The scale ranges from 1 for very liberal to 5 for very conservative. The average district in the sample features an ideology score of 3.2. Democratic voters' average ideology score stands at 2.3 and for Republican voters it is 4.2. Self-identified within-district Democratic donors have an average score of 1.9 and for within-district Republican donors the average score is 4.4. Democratic out-of-district donors exhibit an average score of 1.8, a slightly more liberal score than within-district donors and a much more liberal average score than self-identified Democratic voters. Republican out-of-district donors average ideology is 4.4, the same as Republican within-district donors, and much closer to Republican voters' average score of 4.2 than the same pair of scores for Democrats. As a consequence of the similarities in the ideological means of within-district and outside donors, the prospect of within-district contributions reigning in members seems unlikely and makes the small reduction in the residual distance between the member and the district that was uncovered more surprising.

Ideological responsiveness and the degree of ideological proximity between the member and the district hardly encompass every facet of the representational relationship but these models of ideological congruence on the one hand and ideological divergence on the other provide a minimal standard of what that relationship should look like between House members and their constituencies. The expectation is that members and districts will ideologically overlap to some extent and other influences will not undermine a basic degree of alignment (Achen,

1977). Unfortunately, the results suggest donors can incentivize members to adopt more ideologically extreme positions that are in keeping with donors' ideological preferences. In doing so, the donor class successfully gains surrogate representation (see Mansbridge, 2003) while leaving constituents short-changed when it comes to the quality of representation they are likely to receive from their members of Congress.

References

Achen, Christopher H. 1977. "Measuring Representation: Perils of the Correlation Coefficient," *American Journal of Political Science*. 21(4): 805-815.

Aldrich, John H. and Michael D. McGinnis.1989. "A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions," *Mathematical Computer Modeling*. 12(4/5): 437-450.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr. and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections," *American Journal of Political Science*. 45(January): 126-159.

Bartels, Larry M. 2006. "Is the Water Rising? Reflections on Inequality and American Democracy," *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 39(January): 30-42.

-----. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bernstein, R.A. 1991. "Strategic Shifts: Safeguarding the Public Interest?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 16(2):263-280.

Bramlett, Brittany, James G. Gimpel, and Frances E. Lee. 2011. "The Political Ecology of Opinion in Big-Donor Neighborhoods," *Political Behavior*. 33(December):565-600.

Brown, Clifford W. Jr. ,Lynda W. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. 1995. *Serious Money: Fundraising and Contributing in Presidential Nomination Campaigns*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Clifford W. Jr., Lynda W. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. 1993. "Sex and the Political Contributor: The Gender Gap Among Contributors to Presidential Candidates in 1988," *Political Research Quarterly*. 46(3):355-376.

Carmines, Edward G. 2011. "Review Symposium: Class Politics, American Style," *Perspectives on Politics*. 9(3): 645-47.

Cho, Wendy K. Tam, and James G. Gimpel. 2007. "Prospective for (Campaign) Gold," *American Journal of Political Science*. 51(April): 255-268.

Crespin, Michael H. and Janna L. Deitz. 2010. "If You Can't Join 'Em, Beat 'Em: The Gender Gap in Individual Donations to Congressional Candidates," *Political Research Quarterly*. 63(September):581-593.

Erikson, Robert S. and Gerald C. Wright. 2000. "Representation of Constituency Ideology in Congress," In *Continuity and Change in Congressional Elections*, Edited by David Brady and John Cogan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Fellowes, Matthew C. and Patrick J. Wolf. 2004. "Funding Mechanisms and Policy Instruments: How Business Campaign Contributions Influence Congressional Votes," *Political Research Quarterly*. 57(June): 315-324.

Flavin, Patrick. 2010. "Differences in Policy Preferences and Priorities Across Income Groups in American Public Opinion," Working Paper. http://blogs.baylor.edu/patrick_j_flavin/files/2010/09/Income_Preferences-22yfwtw.pdf

Francia, Peter L., John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Lynda W. Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. 2003. *The Financiers of Congressional Elections: Investors, Ideologues, and Intimates*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

-----. 2005. "Limousine Liberals and Corporate Conservatives: The Financial Constituencies of the Democratic and Republican Parties," *Social Science Quarterly*. 86(December): 761-778.

Gilens, Martin. 2005. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness," *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 69(5): 778-796.

-----.2009. “Preference Gaps and Inequality in Representation,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 42(April): 335-341.

Gimpel, James, Frances Lee, and Joshua Kaminski. 2006. “The Political Geography of Campaign Contributions in American Politics,” *Journal of Politics*. 68(August): 626-639.

Gimpel, James, Frances Lee, and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. 2008. “The Check Is in the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections,” *Journal of Politics*. 52(2): 373-394.

Griffin, John, Brian Newman, and Christina Wolbrecht. 2012. “A Gender Gap in Policy Representation in the U.S. Congress?” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 37(February):35-66.

Hanmer, M. J. and Kalkan, K. O. 2009. “Behind the curve: Clarifying the best approach to calculating predicted probabilities and marginal effects from limited dependent variable models,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, 2009, Toronto, ON, Canada.

Kalt, Joseph P. and Mark A. Zupan. 1990. “The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators,” *Journal of Law and Economics*. 33(August): 103-131.

Page, Benjamin, Larry M. Bartels, and Jason Seawright. 2013. “Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans,” *Perspectives on Politics*. 11(March): 51-73.

Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. “Rethinking Representation,” American Political Science Review. 97(November): 515-528.

McKee, Seth C. 2008. “Rural Voters and the Polarization of American Presidential Elections,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 41(1): 101-108.

Theriault, Sean. 2008. *Party Polarization in Congress*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Table 1: Responsiveness Models 2006-2010 Pooled		
DV = DW-NOMINATE	Democrats	Republicans
District Ideology	0.231*** (0.023)	0.221***(0.058)
Outside Contributions (Thousands $)	0.0001* (0.00002)	0.000005 (0.00002)
District Ideology X Outside Contributions	-0.0003* (0.0001)	0.0003* (0.0001)
Non-Individual Receipts (Thousands $)	0.0001***(0.00002)	-0.00003 (0.00003)
Female Member	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.026)
Electorally Vulnerable	0.022 (0.015)	-0.057*(0.022)
Party Leader	-0.033 (0.024)	0.010 (0.024)
Chamber Seniority	-0.007***(0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)
Rural	0.028 (0.025)	-0.115**(0.033)
High Individual Contributions > 50%	-0.025* (0.013)	0.025 (0.017)
Minority Member	-0.032* (0.014)	-0.046 (0.042)
Constant	-0.991***(0.070)	-0.161 (0.199)
R-Squared	0.567	0.177
Observations	674	588

NOTE: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; Errors clustered by candidate ID; Dummies for 2008 and 2010 not shown.

Table 2: Predicted NOMINATE Scores by District Ideology

DEMOCRATS				
Percentile	$ (Thousands)	2=Very Liberal	3= Moderate	4= Very Conservative
Minimum	2.5	-0.557 (-0.59, -0.52)	-0.330 (-0.36, -0.30)	-0.097 (-0.14, -0.05)
25th	90.2	-0.607 (-0.64, -0.57)	-0.404 (-0.42, -0.39)	-0.201 (-0.24, -0.17)
Median	198	-0.668 (-0.72, -0.62)	-0.499 (-0.55, -0.44)	-0.330 (-0.41, -0.25)
75th	419.9	-0.794 (-0.89, -0.69)	-0.694 (-0.84, -0.55)	-0.595 (-0.80, -0.40)
90th	691	-0.948 (-1.12, -0.77)	-0.933 (-1.20, -0.67)	-0.919 (-1.28, -0.57)
Change (Max-Min)		-0.391	-0.603	-0.822
REPUBLICANS				
Percentile	$ (Thousands)	2=Very Liberal	3= Moderate	4= Very Conservative
Minimum	0	0.272 (0.17, 0.38)	0.492 (0.45, 0.54)	0.712 (0.65, 0.78)
25th	83.8	0.321 (0.21, 0.43)	0.564 (0.53, 0.60)	0.808 (0.75, 0.86)
Median	186.3	0.380 (0.26, 0.49)	0.653 (0.57, 0.73)	0.926 (0.81, 1.04)
75th	353.7	0.476 (0.32, 0.62)	0.797 (0.62, 0.96)	1.118 (0.87, 1.35)
90th	613	0.626 (0.39, 0. 85)	1.021 (0.70, 1.31)	1.416 (0.97, 1.85)
Change (Max-Min)		0.354	0.529	0.704

Note: Confidence intervals in parentheses.

Table 3: Residual Distance Model		
DV = Residuals	Democrats	Republicans
Within District Contributions (Thousands $)	-0.0002* (0.0001)	-0.0001** (0.00005)
Chamber Seniority	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.008** (0.003)
Vulnerable to Electoral Defeat	0.086* (0.040)	-0.099*** (0.023)
Party Leadership Position	-0.054 (0.074)	0.035 (0.036)
Female Member	-0.210*** (0.045)	-0.013 (0.037)
Minority Member	-0.089* (0.043)	-0.196* (0.076)
Non-Individual Receipts (Thousands $)	0.0002*** (0.00005)	-0.00004 (0.00002)
Constant	0.003 (0.046)	-0.332*** (0.022)
R-Squared	0.278	0.182
Observations	676	590

Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by candidate ID; Dummies for 2008 and 2010 not shown.

Table 4: Predicted Residual Distance by Amount of Within-District Individual Contributions (Thousands $)

Republicans	$	
Minimum	0	0.293 (0.27, 0.31)
25th	50.4	0.287 (0.27, 0.30)
Median	128.6	0.276 (0.26, 0.29)
75th	258.3	0.259 (0.24, 0.28)
90th	386	0.242 (0.22, 0.26)
Change (Max-Min)		-0.051
Democrats	$	
Minimum	0	-0.026 (-0.05, 0.005)
25th	23.2	-0.031 (-0.06, -0.002)
Median	65	-0.039 (-0.06, -0.01)
75th	165.3	-0.060 (-0.08, -0.04)
90th	288	-0.085 (-0.12, -0.05)
Change (Max-Min)		-0.059

Note: Confidence intervals in parentheses.
Contributions are in thousands of dollars.