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Class, Race, and Political BoundaryLimits of Community andPolitical Challenges



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Class, Race, and Political Boundary Limits of Community and Political Challenges

Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, Editor
Department of Sociology
Santa Clara University

Acknowledgements

The Sociology Department would like to express our heartfelt appreciation to our colleague Dr. Marilyn Fernandez for producing another outstanding issue of *The Silicon Valley Notebook*, our flagship journal of undergraduate research. Since its inception, Dr. Fernandez has edited every issue of the journal with the love and dedication that only she knows how to generously share. In appreciation, we obsequiously dedicate this issue to Marilyn upon her retirement.

Cover art *“Spring Interlude”* by Susan Babbel, Department of Sociology, Santa Clara University.

Enrique S. Pumar
Fay Boyle Professor and Chair
Department of Sociology

Dedication to Dr. Marilyn Fernandez

It is with great collegial affection and gratitude that the Department of Sociology dedicates this issue of the research annual ***Silicon Valley Notebook*** to Professor Marilyn Fernandez. Dr. Fernandez, who will be retiring at the conclusion of the 2018-2019 academic year, has been a major contributor to the Department of Sociology throughout her years and Santa Clara. Among Dr. Fernandez's many other contributions, she was singularly responsible for launching ***Silicon Valley Notebook*** and has guided its development ever since. It is therefore quite fitting that the volume of ***Silicon Valley Notebook*** should be dedicated to Dr. Fernandez.

To inspire and edit a research journal devoted to publishing work of students in a discipline and at a university (which is similar to what Emile Durkheim had intended when he first established ***L'Année Sociologue***), a person must have many qualities including commitment to students, excellent command of written language, and facility in helping people articulate a thesis, marshal and assess evidence, and hone logical arguments. It also helps to be an outstanding researcher who can serve as a good role model. Dr. Fernandez is a first rate researcher who has helped shaped current sociological understanding of a number of important empirical topics, including domestic violence and social mobility in the 21^{st} century. And as a methodologist, her collaborative work (along with Dr. Stephen Fugita) yielded what is certainly one of the most careful longitudinal research studies to explore complex relationships between behavioral and attitudinal factors over a long course of time. Her other methodological contributions include (along with Dr. Charles Powers) development of new methodological approach for quantifying and measuring meso-level features of organizational structure and culture.

As a teacher, mentor, and editor, as well as in her own research, Dr. Fernandez has demonstrated extraordinary methodological versatility. She has, furthermore, consistently stressed the necessity of keeping theoretical premises at the center of the research design process, the necessity of selecting methodological strategies appropriate to the topic being studied, and the desirability of employing multi-method research design (informed by a combination of quantitative, qualitative, and historical inquiry) whenever it is practical to do so. All these qualities of mind and intellectual approach have helped to make Dr. Fernandez an excellent role model for Santa Clara students for almost three decades, with her serving as editor or associate editor of ***Silicon Valley Notebook*** for the majority of those years.

Marilyn Fernandez has been more than a researcher at Santa Clara. She has also been a deliberative and effective contributor within the department and on campus, serving three different tours of duty in the demanding job of department chair. Arguably her most important new initiative in her years as chair, and certainly the initiative which Professor Fernandez cared about most, was launching ***Silicon Valley Notebook*** as a vehicle of professional socialization, to provide many students with a meaningful opportunity to benefit from steady guidance while honing their research and writing skills, and to encourage students to engage in meaningful professional work informing sociological understanding of important topics.

Many of us who have worked with Dr. Fernandez feel we are better people as well as more fully prepared as professionals as a result. We ask that, whether or not you have worked on a previous issue of ***Silicon Valley Notebook***, you take this moment to think about Dr. Fernandez, and consider sending her any personal comments you might wish to share (mfernandez@scu.edu).

Dr. Fernandez remains dear to the hearts of many who have been have been associated with the department since her arrival at Santa Clara University in 1992. The department is profoundly grateful for all of her many contributions and is profoundly lucky to count her as a member and a colleague. And we all know we can look forward to more informative research and thoughtful analyses in the future, as Dr. Fernandez turns her attention to studying and writing about the sociological processes which unfold people make major life-stage transitions.

Dr. Charles Powers
Professor
Department of Sociology
Santa Clara University

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Class, Race, and Political Boundary Limits of Community and Political Challenges

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR OF
Silicon Valley Notebook, Volume 17
Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, Professor of Sociology

The Sociology Department at Santa Clara University is proud to present, in this volume of *Silicon Valley Notebook*, four research papers written by students from the class of 2019. As in the past years, the substantive, theoretical, methodological, and applied content of the Sociology curriculum at SCU are reflected in these papers. Originally prepared as part of the Research Capstone course (Sociology 121), the student authors further refined their work during the following quarter for inclusion in this volume.

Taken together, the authors addressed a classic sociological issue, the tensions between social structure and personal agency in exploring the boundary limits of environmental issues, community ownership, institutional trust, and socioeconomic success. Each student used a mixed methods research design integrating survey and qualitative analyses. They conducted rigorous quantitative analyses of national secondary survey data to test predictions grounded in sociological theoretical traditions and reflected on their potential social applications. Narrative interviews with sources knowledgeable about their respective topics and content analyses of documents were used to supplement their quantitative findings.

Student authors in the first set, “Class and Race Boundaries of Community Challenges”, explored the socio-economic boundaries of carbon footprints and community ownership. **Erin Jessica Ronald** starts this section with her paper “Creating Low-carbon Communities: Evaluating the Role of Individual Agency and Systemic Inequality in San Jose, CA.” The respective roles that human agency and systemic inequalities (dimensions of Gidden’s Structuration model) played in carbon emissions was the central theme. Concentrated wealth intensified the propensities of upper class and dominant race groups to create larger carbon footprints while individual and demographic agency played minor roles, mainly in less wealthier communities. She used the 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard data of city blocks and 2013 ACS survey, supplemented with interviews with eight climate action-oriented community engagement professionals in the South Bay, to illustrate the need for customizing interventions to communities with varied socioeconomic and racial concentration. **Elizabeth Namakula Kamya** rounds off the section with her paper titled, “A Community to Call Mine: Supportive Community Environment and Citizen Actions?” She identified the social class boundaries of strategies for improving resident attachment using the 2010 Soul of The Community Survey as well as narrative insights from community development professionals and community initiatives. Taking ownership of their communities meant having a supportive social fabric to residents of thriving communities (supporting Solari’s Affluent Neighborhood Persistence Model) while residents in poorer communities prioritized political action and a strong social fabric (per D’Maggio and Powell’s New Institutionalism). Her scholarly contributions to the boundary limiting conditions of community development also highlighted the need for tailored community strategies.

Shifting the focus internationally is **Noor Darwish** in her paper titled, "The Middle Eastern Societies: Institutional Trust in Political Turmoil and Stasis'. She documented the political boundaries of citizen trust surpluses and deficits in institutions in the North African and Levantine regions in the Middle East. Her analyses of the 2016 Arab Barometer, supplemented with qualitative insights from two Middle East scholars and content analyses of journalistic accounts, revealed the trust deficit caused by governmental dysfunction, balancing out the trust surplus created by government functionality. Trust deficits were particularly acute in North Africa, a region rife with political turmoil, in contrast to the Levantine region with its political stasis amidst economic inequality. Weber's political legitimacy along with Mosca's elite theory offered the theoretical foundation for her analyses of the contested citizen-government relationships.

Finally, **Anna Paris Heider**, in her longitudinal examination of the socioeconomic success of Americans in their youth and in early adulthood, identified some racialized limits of home and school resources for success theorized by Bourdieu, Coleman, Lareau, and Massey and Denton. For her analyses of the "Racialized Resource Models of Socioeconomic Success: A Mixed Methods Analysis of White and African American High School Students," she used the 2002-2012 NELS survey data, in which 16,197 10th graders were followed up over the course of ten years. The statistical findings, along with narrative commentaries from education professionals and content analyses of journalistic/documentary evidence, pointed to racialized resource pathways to success. While resources in the home, and to a lesser extent in the school, were critical to the early educational success of both blacks and white youth, black young adults, unlike whites, could rely only on their home socioeconomic resources for their later socioeconomic success.

As a collection, the student research presented in this volume, continue to exemplify the evidence based social science curriculum offered by the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. The social issues and their boundary limits explored have important policy and programmatic implications. These applications resonate with the University's mission to prepare students, of competence, conscience, and compassion, who will help fashion a more just, humane, and sustainable word.

Class and Race Boundaries of Community Challenges

Creating Low-carbon Communities
Evaluating the Role of Individual Agency and Systemic Inequality in San Jose, CA

By
Erin Jessica Ronald[1]

ABSTRACT. Following a scholarly need to test compelling community level sociodemographic representations of environmental behaviors and outcomes, a sequential mixed method approach was used to evaluate the connections of human agency and systemic inequalities with carbon footprints. Statistical analyses of the 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard data of city blocks and 2009 - 2013 ACS survey data were supplemented with interviews with eight climate action-oriented community engagement professionals in the South Bay. Boundary limiting socioeconomic conditions for systemic inequalities and human agency, dimensions of Gidden's Structuration model, were specified. Partially supporting structural inequality theories, socioeconomic resources, primarily, and to a lesser extent dominant race concentration, were associated with larger carbon footprints, particularly when wealth was concentrated. Both human (time driven alone) and demographic (senior and mid-aged blocks) agencies were also in part at play in shrinking or even enlarging carbon footprints, in wealthier communities. These findings not only contributed to the literature on climate action, but also highlighted the need for targeted interventions in communities of different socioeconomic standing.

INTRODUCTION

Mitigating climate change is a profound and complex global challenge that requires immediate reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Cities produce 70% of these global emissions, making them critical sites for solving the climate crisis (Churkina 2016). Yet, while cities produce intense emissions, they can also be laboratories for change. Change can be initiated at the municipal level, with top-down policy solutions and/or it can manifest through mass behavior change. No matter who the primary initiator of change is, addressing climate change involves a bottom up approach to communities changing behaviors and reducing their carbon footprint. However, the ability of individuals to reduce their carbon footprint is both enhanced and limited by their own individual agency as well as structural forces, and both must be evaluated when identifying steps to create low-carbon communities.

[1] Acknowledgements: I would like to foremost express appreciation to my professor Dr. Marilyn Fernandez for guiding me through this project, as well as my capstone cohort and the SCU Sociology Department for their support and community. I would also like to extend gratitude to the interviewees that shared with me their stories, and visions for a better future.

Carbon footprints include direct emissions created through burning fuel as well as indirect emissions generated by energy used and created from activities and resources consumed. However, there is a scholarly gap in understanding how community carbon footprints are shaped by individual agency and or systemic inequality. Findings from this study will extend the literature on climate action and provide additional insights into successful measures for community level change to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Environmental scholars, in their explorations of sustainable choices and behaviors, have focused, even if separately, on the place of human agency, in its many dimensions, as well as structural circumstances, to understand the environmental options available to the individual as well as communities. Their findings can be categorized into two broad themes: options and actions that stem from human agency as well as community structures. Human agency environmental scholars examined preexisting socio-demographic characteristics as they dictated environmentally friendly choices and the need for targeted interventions to overcome the human barriers. Another stream in the environmental scholarship embedded individual behaviors in the broader community, with a focus on the importance of social practices in cultural and political contexts, the role of community social capital in changing behavior, and the need to design structural interventions to address barriers.

Human Agency in Sustainable Lifestyles

Human agency for environmental change is foremost rooted in individual's concerns for the environment, their corresponding behaviors, and the outcomes that stem from these behaviors. However, the connection among these three concepts is complex. As noted in the reviewed literature, there is a disconnect among concerns, behaviors, and outcomes, which can be partially understood by examining socioeconomic and demographic features of families and households.

Environmental Concerns, Behaviors, and Outcomes

There is a complex set of connections between orientation that people have towards or away from sustainable choices and environmental outcomes, which requires that socioeconomic, demographic, and personal motivational factors be understood. For example, in Hal and Allen's (2014) secondary data analysis of surveys of the Scottish population with 944 males and 933 females, energy use increased with income and number of children in the household. However, higher education did not necessarily affect energy consumption behavior, despite the more educated identifying themselves as environmentalists. The educated environmentalist model was also confirmed by Patel, Modi, and Paul (2017), in their multivariate analysis of micro-level behaviors (ascertained using a questionnaire survey) of a "convenience sample of 256 consumers" (p. 192). Married and "mid-age" consumers in the Patel et al. study were more likely to display pro-environmental behaviors, especially if they were highly educated. However, engagement in pro-environmental behaviors did not necessarily effect overall consumption. Relationships of more energy use with more income, children, and older age groups were documented by Abrahamse and Steg (2011) in their study of energy consumption in 199 randomly sampled Dutch households. In fact, they found these socio-demographic variables to be better predictors of energy use than the established psychological variables of “tradition/security, power/achievement, and openness to change” (p. 38). In sum, in this stream of scholarship, scholars illustrated life circumstances that create inconsistent (pro and anti) pre-dispositions towards environmental behaviors.

Socioeconomic circumstances of households have been useful in reconciling the disjuncture, noted above, between environmental concerns, behaviors, and carbon footprint outcomes. Using a multivariate regression analysis of 1203 households in the Providence of Alberta, Kennedy et al. (2013) offered insights into the “differential impacts of education and income on attitudes and behaviors” (p. 224). Those who had higher levels of education typically cared more about the environment and were more likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviors, while their less educated counterparts were less aware of environmental issues. Yet, higher education also generated more income which was associated with a larger carbon footprint. In other words, those who are “more educated and affluent, and may in some cases actually engage in more PEBs [pro-environmental behaviors[2]] also produce larger emissions” (p. 228). The authors hypothesized that affluent individuals engaged in low-impact pro-environmental behaviors in order to compensate for the large carbon footprint created by their other lifestyle choices. In other words, the large negative impact of high SES lifestyle choices and consumption significantly outweigh any positive impacts created by “private sphere PEBS in which these well-educated, more affluent households engage” (p. 230). Regardless, there is still a small, but significant ways in which individual’s pro-environmental knowledge, concerns, and behaviors can reduce overall carbon footprint.

Scholars have further specified the socioeconomic boundaries of the disconnect between pro-environmental concerns and reduced greenhouse gas emissions outcomes. For example, Wilson, Tyedmers, and Spinney (2013) analyzed socioeconomic and well-being status of 1,971 households living in Nova Scotia, Canada using multivariate analyses and found that indirect greenhouse gas emissions jumped significantly at higher income levels, while direct greenhouse gas emissions were decoupled from income. They hypothesized that such income shifts occurred because there is a limit on the amount that members of households can consume, and once basic needs have been met, income can then be directed towards “buying the bigger home, traveling more, or having more electronic gadgets, thus explaining the jump at higher income levels” (p.888). Younger and married households also had lower carbon footprints while affluent households produced higher greenhouse gas emissions. Interestingly, those who were more affluent, and correspondingly produced more emissions, were not any happier or healthier than their less affluent counterparts. That household incomes dictate carbon footprints, regardless of environmental concerns, is

[2] Elaboration of the acronym added by authors in brackets.

critical in understanding the complex ways in which individual agency does or does not influence greenhouse gas emissions.

Engaging the Public in Environmental Practice

The environmental concerns-behavior-outcomes disconnect has critical implications for how to engage individuals in sustainable practices. Critical to the process of citizen engagement in creating low-carbon communities is the dual need for improving citizen's understanding of climate change as well as their capacity to take action. For example, in a stratified random sampling of 589 residents from six wards on the south coast of England, Whitmarsh (2009) found a duality in public understanding of climate change. While most of these respondents knew climate change was happening, few considered it a personal risk and understood the impacts of climate change in only a removed, general sense. Only a small percentage associated climate change with personal energy use, and most focused on the structural incentives that the government could provide to encourage pro-environment action, rather than their personal responsibility.

In an article published two years later, Whitmarsh and her colleagues (2011), in their survey of over 551 citizens in two UK cities on their abilities and motivation to reduce emissions, continued to observe similar disconnections. UK citizens were very aware of climate change, but often misunderstood its main causes and the effect they, as individuals, had on the natural world. Instead they associated climate change with activities that they could not control and those removed from their personal life, disregarding critical individual actions such as the reduction of meat consumption, travel, and shopping. Like other researchers, reviewed above, Whitmarsh and her colleagues highlighted a serious value-action gap; their UK respondents were quite knowledgeable about climate change but took few personal actions or responsibility to address the climate problems. To bridge this gap and to inspire grassroots action, it is important, they said, to address structural factors, such as enhancing the "availability and attractiveness" (p. 63) of low-carbon options, as well as highlighting the personal benefits of actions, and anchoring options within "pre-existing cognitive frameworks" (p. 58). In both sets of the Whitmarsh studies, the general public's understanding of climate change was found to be very limited and most inaction came from a lack of personal connection to environmental problems.

Unlike the prolific human agency-sustainability research in Europe and even emerging societies, there was not similar US scholarly attention discernible to the author. In a survey study of 802 respondents in the United States conducted for the Annual American Climate Perspectives Survey, it was found that there was a, "waning urgency for climate change solutions" (American Climate Perspectives 2018:2) among women over 50 years of age compared to previous years. However, within this group, minority women were the most concerned. Latinx women reported the "highest sense of urgency for reducing pollution" (p. 2), along with "higher agency in their [personal] ability to reduce it" (p. 2). This group also discussed climate challenges more frequently with their social groups, though African American women were most active in contacting voted officials to make changes, such as increasing the walkability and bikeability of neighborhoods. While women were more engaged in sustainable actions than men, Latinx and African American women drove the majority of the engagement as white women reported the lowest levels of climate engagement out of survey participants. In other words, engagement in environmental behaviors, along with concern for the environment, was driven heavily by minority women.

Structural Facilitators and Barriers to Sustainability

Though the majority of scholars reviewed above focused on individual behaviors and the importance of personal environmental motivation, others have addressed the structural factors that facilitate or impede, as the case might be, pro-environmental orientations and actions. Social networks, shared understanding, and community interventions are some of the structural facilitators of environmental actions that have been considered. However, even when a community is pro-environment in their thinking, the absence of effective technological options as well as weak political leadership and support impede meaningful progress.

Structural Facilitators of Sustainable Lifestyles

The critical role of social structure, particularly social capital, the networks and connectedness in a community, in understanding environmental behaviors in a community, was the focus of Sungchul and Hyeongsik's (2017) research. Using a "spatially stratified, random sampling telephone survey" (p. 293) of 1,324 individuals along the Han river in China and multilevel regressions, Sungchul and Hyeongsik discovered that social capital embedded in networks, through increasing the flow of "local-specific" (p. 305) information, encouraged pro-environmental actions inside and outside the home. Others, as Heiskanen et al. (2009), through their in-depth case studies of four emerging low-carbon communities, elaborated on the structural nexus of environmental challenges. They concluded that no matter the scale of the community, it was shared "interests, practices and structures" (p. 7593) that were crucial to the creation of low-carbon communities. Having a community that is inclusive and had a shared idea of place, provided the social infrastructure for cooperative community resource management and sustainable behaviors.

Research by Jiang, Dong, Zhu, Alimujiang, Zhang, and Ma (2018) further support the need for community and structural interventions to shape environmental choices, particularly in regard to institutional encouragement and priority setting. In their analysis of electricity data from a survey of 191 students from Fudan University in China, Jiang et al. found that both external social conditions and intrinsic motivation shaped behavior needed for engagement in low carbon communities. In short, community and external initiatives are needed to support the creation of social capital that can shape individuals' pro-environmental beliefs and motivations.

Structural Barriers to Environmental Interventions

No matter the citizens' dispositions towards environmental behaviors, large barriers can still exist at the community levels, inhibiting effective transitions to lower carbon footprints. In a study of over 100 governmental and non-governmental energy-use intervention programs in Australia, Moloney and her team (2009) found that while attitudinal resistance can be a barrier to adopting energy efficient technologies, the lack of energy efficient technology was an even more serious barrier even for those with strong pro-environmental attitudes. This underscored the need for a context-specific "socio-technical approach" (p. 7614) that addresses both limited availability of energy efficient technology and attitudinal barriers for the success of community and government initiatives. Socio-cultural factors, specifically "structural/operational, regulatory/ legislative, cultural/behavioral, and contextual factors" (Burch 2009:7584) can also function as barriers, holding communities back from environmentally conscious decisions. Burch's analysis of three cities in the British Columbia, Canada, offered instructive illustrations of political leadership. Those with a conservative policy hindered communities in their environmental progress, while strong leadership created ambitious policy and dictated success. Political leadership must be combined with technological advances and a large organizational capacity to involve citizens. When innovative technologies are combined with initiatives to engage citizens, what was once cultural and contextual barriers can be overcome to aid a community in the transition to a smaller carbon footprint.

Suggestions for Future Research

Researchers, whose work was reviewed above, emphasized the importance of considering both human agency and structural factors in understanding as well as addressing environmental concerns and behaviors, but not outcomes. There were at least two sets of constraints in these studies. The first was that the recorded self-reported values and behaviors analyzed were explicitly connected to environmental issues. Scholars suggested that data collected from individuals, not primed for environmental values, might offer more accurate portrayal of human agency and structural forces. Second, few researchers have weighed the relative influences of individual actions and structures on carbon footprint outcomes, a critical component in creating environmental programs.

In the research presented in this paper, I used a variety of data sources to ascertain individual actions as well as community characteristics that could have environmental consequences. For example, in the American Community Survey conducted by the US Census Bureau (a data source used in this analysis), respondents were not primed to report questions about "environmental behavior," thereby minimizing a potential environment related bias. Using data that was not explicitly collected to measure environmental impact can improve the accuracy of individual behavior. In this study, I also focus specifically on a comparative evaluation of structural and human agency factors that directly influence carbon emission outputs of communities, a topic that has received limited attention in previous research.

RESEARCH QUESTION

To expand our understanding of community carbon footprints, I used city blocks in San Jose, CA as a case study in which to explore the respective influences of human agency and systemic inequalities on community level carbon footprints. San Jose was an ideal site because of its participation in the USA Sustainable Cities Initiative. The initiative supported, “SDG [Sustainable Development Goals] achievement strategies in three US cities by building on ongoing municipal sustainable development planning efforts” (SDSN 2017[3]) Collaboration with universities was a critical part of the process in developing these strategies in cities. A partnership between the City of San Jose, Stanford University, and San Jose State generated the data on carbon footprints for block groups in San Jose.

There is agreement in the scholarly circles that carbon footprints are both products of individual/household choices and/or systemic pressures that limit consumption choices. A comparison of the respective roles of systemic inequalities and human agency (individual actions and demographic agency) can provide insight into their respective influences on high carbon footprints. Results from such an analysis can inform evidence based approaches intended to target individual as well as community environmental practices. To investigate how carbon footprints were shaped in San Jose, CA area, the formal research question was posed as: What are the relative impacts of individual agency and systemic inequalities on carbon footprints in San Jose blocks, disaggregated by the communities’ socioeconomic wealth? Carbon footprints represented the dependent concept while individual agency and systemic inequalities were independent concepts. The analysis was additionally disaggregated by the socioeconomic status of communities. Though it is well known that socioeconomic standing influences carbon footprint, evaluating the human agency-structures dynamics separately in low income, middle class and upper class[4] statuses helps to highlight the effects of wealth concentration or lack thereof.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis of carbon footprints can be theorized through both structural and individualistic perspectives. Both systemic inequalities and individual agency (actions and demographies) influence choices communities are able to make, constraining or empowering choices that create either sustainable or unsustainable behaviors. Giddens suggested that both structure and agency are equally important in influencing the action

[3] http://unsdsn.org/news/2017/05/02/building-an-sdg-data-dashboard-for-san-jose-california/

[4] Throughout this paper, the terms upper class, middle class, and lower class will be used interchangeably with terms low SES, middle SES and high SES. The blocks were evenly disaggregated into thirds representing lower class, middle class and upper class.

of an individual in his theory of Structuration (Oppong 2014). No doubt, an individual's choices are constrained through structural forces. For example, Power's concept of market adjustment (Powers 2006) is useful in explaining how unequal access to resources compel those in poverty to affordable choices, and primes the elite to increase consumption. However, individuals are still able to have agency for their own consumption, albeit within the constraints imposed by the greater structural forces. When they exercise their agency, they are often guided by their core beliefs and values. Mead's (1934) Core-Self and Stern and his colleague's Value-Added Theory (1999), framed within a symbolic interactionist paradigm, captured well this notion of self-agency in individual behavior.

Structural Inequalities

Powers had posited that even though mainstream economic thinking assumes that the free market will create "efficient utilization" of resources to meet the needs of the individual, this is not entirely true. Capitalism is traditionally seen as a tool to combat inequality, as "the invisible hand" is expected to serve the common good. However, forces, such as protectionist policies and the lack of discretionary income for the poor, prevents the capitalist market from creating "socially rational" (Powers 2006) outcomes. In fact, as the level of inequality in a society increases, the market typically adjusts in favor of the few, taking resources away from many (poor) and instead providing luxuries for a few. In other words, relative poverty pushes people to the most affordable options, while wealthier people are able to make extravagant choices, engaging in excessive consumption, and resulting carbon footprints since it is within their means.

Moreover, societies are stratified by more than just class inequalities. Racial and class inequalities are often intertwined, even though both operate independently to promote and limit the life options people have and choices they can make. On the one hand, racial inequality operates like the caste system, a "ritualized, body of customs, endogamous and hereditary, which circumscribed contacts and mobility by race" (Conyers, 2002:252). But scholars have also seen racial inequality as capitalistic relations, creating a split labor market where, for example, black and white workers work against each other, lowering the cost of goods. In this colonial model of class-racial inequality, black or minority groups are the oppressed nation(s), represented by the "black ghetto" (p.253), controlled by a white ruling class that continues the oppression by using the colony as a form of cheap labor. "Political oppression, self-determination, and liberation" (p. 253) are key elements of a class based racialized society. These histories of oppression have been theorized to manifest in the ways that minority groups choose to consume, in ways that distinguish themselves from the dominant groups. If consuming and living a high carbon lifestyle is symbolic of dominant power, then minority groups, because of their potential awareness of their history of oppression, may choose to avoid dominant choices. Their history of oppression may also make minority groups more aware and empathetic of environmental justice issues because they are disproportionately affected by environmental degradation.

Drawing from the structural class and racial inequality perspectives, it was expected that systemic inequalities in San Jose blocks will have stronger net impacts in creating larger carbon footprints than individual actions or demographic agency (Hypothesis #1). And in a class based racialized society, class inequalities were predicted to have a stronger impact, than race inequalities, in increasing emissions (Hypothesis #1A).

Human Agency, Core Self Concept, and Value-Belief-Norm Theory

However, as Giddens postulated, even within the constraints posed by societal systems, individuals are still able to exercise their own agency. In his concept of core-self, Mead (1934) and other sociologists in the Iowa school of self-concept, also saw individual actions as an outcome of their core belief and values. These beliefs are deeply engrained within the individual and are continually inserted into their interactions with others. In the Iowa school model, one's core-concept, or idea of self, shapes interaction in a stable and predictable direction. Stern elaborated on Mead's theory as he applied the values, beliefs and norms inherent in self-concept to environmentalism. Value-Belief-Norm Theory (VBN) (Stern et al. 1999) framed individuals as consciously having the ability to regulate their impact on the world. In the VBN framework, pro-environmental behaviors are created by the, "acceptance of particular personal values…and from beliefs that actions initiated by the individual can help alleviate the threat and restore the values" (Wynveen et al. 2015: 86). Like Core Self-Concept theorists, VBN proponents claimed that individual values are stable and applied throughout an individual's life, shaping their, "environmental worldview" (EWV) (p. 86). On balance, individuals, informed by a core sense of self, values and norms, are able to have and exercise agency to control and mitigate their environmental footprints. Following these understandings, it was predicted that agency, both individual actions and demography, will have a stronger net impact in reducing high carbon footprints than systemic inequality (Hypothesis #2).

Boundary Limiting Conditions

In order to specify further the contexts in which human agency and structural inequalities might operate in impacting carbon footprints, boundary limits (Powers 2012: 76) of their impacts were also considered. Since socioeconomic status has been known to have significant influence on consumption, thereby increasing carbon footprints, the wealth status of communities was considered. In addition to focusing on the entire San Jose area, the effects of agency and structure were re-tested separately, in low socioeconomic status (SES), medium socioeconomic status, and high socioeconomic status communities, to assess whether concentration of wealth in blocks pointed to a major boundary limit.

METHODOLOGY

A mixed methods approach was used to test the comparative relevance of individual agency and systemic forces to climate footprints in San Jose. Quantitative secondary data on carbon footprints per census block were drawn from the SDG San Jose Dashboard (Ouyang 2016). Additional quantitative secondary data from the 2009-2013 American Community Survey (ACS) were relied on to measure community-level forces that might influence carbon emissions (Department of Commerce 2013). Qualitative primary interviews with experts in the field of sustainability and climate change mitigation conducted provided examples, context and possible solutions, grounding the statistical results.

Secondary Data Source

The San Jose Dashboard (SDG) served as the primary source of estimates of carbon emissions for 524 census block groups in San Jose. The emissions were categorized by energy, goods, food and transportation. In the SDG Dashboard, data on expenditures and resources consumed were gathered from available geospatial and census datasets. These pieces of information were totaled to represent carbon emissions per block.

To supplement the carbon emission data, other relevant block level community information was gathered by the author from the 2009-2013 ACS. ACS data are collected on a yearly basis, principally by the United States Department of Commerce and the Census Bureau from a 1% sample of the U.S population. For this paper, information on socio-demographic and sustainable choice behaviors came from the 2009-13 ACS. The SDG and ACS datasets were merged to investigate the research question and corresponding hypothesis.[5]

Primary Qualitative Interviews

The statistical analysis of the combined ACS and SDG San Jose Dashboard was elaborated on with qualitative interviews with eight professionals knowledgeable about climate mitigation and environmental community action. These eight interviewees, who were found through LinkedIn search engine and snowball sampling methods, were interviewed over the phone for approximately 25-45 minutes each. They were asked questions about on ways to overcome the challenge of engaging community members in environmental action. The interviewee consent form and protocol are available in Appendix A.

Interviewee #1 is a Program Director of a local environmental non-profit organization that focuses specifically on energy and climate, leading programs on green energy in the home, electric vehicles, and recognizing businesses that go above and beyond to implement sustainability. Additional insights were added from the Co-founder (Interviewee #2, Co-founder) of an initiative at a Global Business Consulting Firm and Incubator, supporting cities and local governments to adopt the UN Sustainable Development Goals and accelerate actions to help meet the Paris Climate Agreement.

[5] The original collector of the data, San Jose SDG Dashboard, and U.S. Census Bureau or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.

In this position, the Co-founder worked with both the city of San Jose and Stanford University to help grow community engagement in the city's climate action plan (titled "Climate Smart San Jose"). They also helped to created playbooks for residents and building owners, assisting the city in community engagement strategic planning, and helping to mobilize resources for these initiatives. The third Interviewee is the Executive Director of a Community Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3, Executive Director), a nonprofit that aims to help its city reach carbon neutrality in 10 years. The Climate Director at the City of San Jose, a fourth interviewee (Interviewee #4, Climate Director for San Jose), provided a municipal perspective. This interviewee discussed their work in implementing the Climate Smart San Jose Plan, providing strategic guidance, and obtaining funding from partners in order to create initiatives for residents.

Other professional interviewees included environmental leaders in the community. A longtime volunteer and leader for a grassroots initiative (Leadership Team for Grassroots Initiative) was the fifth interviewee. This interviewee created this organization over ten years ago, aiming to inspire action to increase community sustainability. The Leadership Team member now leads advocacy campaigns and initiatives to engage residents. An ex-Executive Director of an environmental non-profit (Interviewee #6), who now serves as a consultant to the organization (Special Project Consultant), was also able to provide insights, specifically on the topic of energy conservation. This interviewee helps to engage residents in behavior change, and has decades of experiences in energy conservation, and engagement of businesses and community members. The seventh professional interviewee (Interviewee #7) is an engineer, architect, and professor, who works on creating sustainable buildings and sites (Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar). He has helped to start an urban systems graduate program, leading community-based partnerships with cities to meet environmental challenges, and specifically connect them to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. Finally, the current committee chair (Interviewee #8) for a large environmental conservation non-profit focusing on land use (Land-use Expert) shared his long experiences working in biking and pedestrian non-profits and advocacy groups.

DATA ANALYSES: SURVEY and QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS

To analyze the quantitative data and answer the posed research question, three levels of data analysis were used, first for the entire city of San Jose, and then for three groups of blocks separated by their aggregate SES. Descriptive analysis provided a baseline environmental story of San Jose's blocks. Initial relationships between systemic inequality, individual agency and high carbon footprints were then explored using bivariate correlational analysis. These relationships were then retested in the multivariate analysis to estimate the net influences of systemic inequalities versus individual agency on high carbon footprints and to specify the socioeconomic conditions in which these environmental dynamics operate.

Operationalization and Descriptive Analyses

Individual agency and systemic inequalities each are expected to uniquely influence levels of carbon footprints. Individual agency was defined as the choices that individuals and households make, consciously or unconsciously, to lower the emissions they produce. Demography is an additional force in human decisions, and is treated as a part of individual agency. However, systemic inequalities within which humans are confined, also determine the choices they make, and consequently the emissions they produce.

Several patterns were noted in the descriptive analysis of San Jose's blocks. Overall, there were fairly high levels of emissions produced in blocks (Table 1.A). There were also moderate levels of systemic inequality in blocks, in terms of socioeconomic resources and dominant race composition (Table 1.B). Besides, households in San Jose blocks registered low levels of sustainable choices (low proportion of solar use and sustainable commute modes to work) and moderate levels of unsustainable choices (lengthy times driven alone to work Table 1.C). Finally, while there was an equal distribution of males and females in the blocks; they also had a more youthful than older population (Table 1.D).

As noted earlier, the city blocks were evenly disaggregated into thirds representing lower class, middle class and upper class. It is noteworthy that systemic wealth and dominant race concentration were the most pronounced in the wealthiest communities. Differences in human agency, be it individual or demographic, by SES standing of blocks were mixed, in expected and paradoxical ways.

<u>High Carbon Footprint</u>

To represent total carbon emissions, or carbon footprint, Scope Two and Three emissions were used. Scope Two includes emissions purchased and controlled by an outside organization, namely electricity emissions. Scope Three emissions are other indirect emissions which includes food emissions, transportation emissions and the emissions created by the consumption of goods (US EPA 2017). Scope Two and Three emissions were presented in Table 1.A. Together, Scope Two and Scope Three emissions, represent the total amount of CO_2 emissions produced for each block. The average SJ city block had a moderate carbon footprint of 8,226.75 pounds of CO_2 on average (with a range from a minimum of 1406.50 pounds of CO_2 to a high of 15,425 pounds of CO_2) (See Table 1.A).

More specifically, there was a moderate amount of electricity emissions produced annually in San Jose, an average of 6,031.04 pounds of CO_2 (emissions ranging from 1,134-11,634 pounds of CO_2 annually). Transportation emissions were also fairly moderate, with an average of 14,625.64 pounds of CO_2 annually out of all sectors, (ranging from 2,406 pounds of CO_2 to 28,622 pounds of CO_2). It is interesting to note that the Transportation emission sector produced the most emissions out of all sources. The Land-use Expert (Interviewee #8) corroborated this fact, describing the large contribution that car congestion makes to carbon emissions. This is particularly bad in

San Jose due to the large urban sprawl in and outside the city. The Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee #7) additionally emphasized this point, describing the extended commutes that most Silicon Valley professionals have to engage in getting to work, driving from homes in the suburbs to company city headquarters. There were also moderate amounts of goods emissions, with an average of 5,249.26 pounds of CO_2 produced annually (these emissions ranged from 834-11,664 pounds of CO_2) but, were the lowest of all sources. Food emissions were also reasonably moderate, an average of 7,001.09 pounds of CO_2 produced annually (with a range of 1,252 pounds of CO_2 to 12,892 pounds of CO_2).]

TABLE 1.A. High Carbon Footprint
SDG Dashboard for San Jose, 2016 (n=523)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values	Statistics			
				Total	Low SES	Medium SES	High SES
High Carbon Footprint	Scope 2	Electricity Emissions (lbs of CO_2)	Mean (SD) Min-Max	6031.04 (1552.11 1134-11634	4621.39 (993.07) 1134-8135	6222.79 (1190.64) 3689-9752	7253.89*** (1152.19) 4573-11634
	Scope 3	Transportation Emissions (lbs of CO_2)	Mean (SD) Min-Max	14625.64 (3870.84) 2406-28622	10564.6 (2103.45) 2406-18080	14931.02 (2001.61) 8585-20603	18391.44*** (2419.98) 14343-28622
		Goods Emissions (lbs of CO_2)	Mean (SD) Min-Max	5249.26 (1504.016) 834-11664	3690.50 (802.529) 834-5927	5333.19 (688.61) 2760-7058	6727.13*** (1031.28) 5038-11664
		Food Emissions (lbs of CO_2)	Mean (SD) Min-Max	7001.09 (1635.89) 1252-12892	5448.22 (1043.99) 1252-9349	7210.38 (1175.426) 4564-10464	8348.85*** (1145.49) 5611-12892
	Index of High Carbon Footprints[1]		Mean (SD) Min-Max	8226.75 (2080.38) 1406.50-15425.75	8226.75 (2080.38) 1406.50-15425.75	8424.35 (1193.61) 5022.50-11902.50	10180.33*** (1311.42) 7558.50-15425.75

[1] Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions + Food Emissions. Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .797** to .993** at the .000 significance level.

Many South Bay climate professionals, including the Leadership Team for Grassroots Initiative, Urban Systems Analyst/Scholar, and the Land-use Expert verified the large carbon footprint of San Jose. The often-repeated reason for these high emission levels was the large levels of wealth present in the city, which drives a society of consumption; wealth permits citizens to own large homes in the suburbs far away from amenities to which they have to drive to access (Interviewee #5, #7, #8).

A disaggregation of each carbon emission indicator by lower class, middle class, and upper class communities revealed a linear relationship between carbon footprints and their socioeconomic standing. The wealthiest blocks were responsible for the highest amount of carbon emissions for both Scope 2 and Scope 3 dimensions. The poorest blocks had the lowest and the middle group fell in between.

Systemic Inequalities

Systemic inequalities were hypothesized to influence block group's carbon behavior. This concept was represented on a community/block by the per capita income, high educational attainment, and percentage of white households to non-white households (dominant racial concentration). Overall, San Jose city blocks had fairly low levels of socioeconomic status ($\bar{x}$=1,456,282.68) compared to the overall range (0-8,265,753.47) on the Socioeconomic Status Index (See Table 1.B). The dominant racial composition was also moderate, suggesting that blocks are reasonably racially diversified ($\bar{x}$=48.49%, range of 0%-97.87%).

TABLE 1.B. Systemic Inequality
American Community Survey, 2009-2013

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values	Statistics			
				Total	Low SES	Medium SES	High SES
Systemic Inequality	Socio-Economic Status	Per Capita Income-Past Twelve Months	Mean	$34178.2	18647.9	32121.87	51796***
			(SD)	(16469.7)	(5348.9)	(6022.8)	13958
			Min-Max	6253-131809	6253-55673	13167-49860	32227-131809
		Percent High Education Attainment per capita[1]	Mean	35.29%	170.96	394.115	678.6***
			(SD)	(19.02)	(114.75)	(186.68)	(422.63)
			Min-Max	0-90.2	655-394.16	74-1090	192-3489
		Index of Socio-economic Status[1]	Mean	1,456,283	140653.7	561457	1483919***
			(SD)	(1315238)	(780783)	(156760)	(569644)
			Min-Max	0-8,265,753	0-293385	297021.9-847487	848059.4-4132876.7
	Dominant Racial Compositi-on[3]	Percent of White Households to Non-White Households	Mean	48.49%	39.72	48.7188	57.2055***
			(SD)	(20.52)	(14.889)	(20.664)	(21.549)
			Min-Max	0-97.87	0-80.63	6.57-86.68	4.23-97.87

[1] High Educational Attainment was categorized as percent Bachelor Degrees, Masters Degrees, Professional Degrees, and Doctoral degrees.
[2] Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate per capita income in the past twelve months in 2013 infla. Possible range: 0 - 8,265,753.47 Correlations among these indicators were .799** at a .00 significance level.
[3] Dominant Racial Composition is the ratio of white households to non-white households = number of white households per block divided by non-white households.

The low socioeconomic status in San Jose's blocks was mainly due to the fairly low average income of $34,178.20 (ranging from $6,253 to $131,809) per block (Table 1.B.). However, though the average income was low, residents in the average San Jose block had a moderate level of educational attainment; percentage above a college degree was 35.29% ranging from 0-90.17%. Together, these two variables represented the moderate Socioeconomic Standing of blocks and are a significant part of systemic inequalities that might influence household decisions. Yet, the wide gap between very high and very low economic well-being in San Jose were underscored by some of the professional interviewees. The Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar elaborated on the class tension stating that the incredible poverty in San Jose is often "masked by how wealthy other people are" (Interviewee #7), and depending on the measure of well-being, this inequality can be easily ignored. Predictably, socioeconomic status, in education and income, was concentrated in the wealthy ($\bar{x}$ = 51796; range of 32227-131809) and less so in the poor communities ($\bar{x}$ = 18647.9; range of 6253-55673). All the professional interviewees concurred, naming wealth driven consumption as the major reason for large carbon footprints.

The predominance of whites over other non-white groups is an additional systemic inequality; while the individual resident typically does not have much control over, it systemically influences people's consumption and carbon footprints. The dominant racial composition linearly varied by the wealth of blocks. That is, the wealthier blocks had higher concentration of whites/non-whites ($\bar{x}$ = 57.2%; range = 4.23% - 97.87%) than the poorer blocks ($\bar{x}$ = 39.72; range = 0 - 80.63).

Individual Actions as Agency

It is theoretically axiomatic that even when subjected to systemic inequalities, individuals and households have agency to make choices that can lower their carbon footprint. This is can be seen through actions taken by individuals or households and their demographics. The three measures chosen to represent the extent of sustainable, or unsustainable, choices made by households were: the proportion of households in a block that used solar energy (of all energy sources available), the percent of sustainable modes of transportation to work, and the amount of time to work by those who drive cars in single occupancy. Environmentally relevant demographies considered in this analysis were the age and gender composition of blocks.

Sustainable Household Choices. The proportion of households that heated their homes with solar energy in the average San Jose block was low ($\bar{x}$ = 0.17 with a range from 0-.93); that is, households were less likely to choose solar energy or had the ability to make the solar choice of all the energy choices they had (Table 1.C.). The percent of sustainable transportation to work, another sustainable choice, was also low in San Jose. The percentage of households that used sustainable modes of transit for their commute was fairly low ($\bar{x}$ = 34.01, with a range from 0-147.62). Most used high carbon emission methods such as driving a car alone. These findings were also reinforced in the professional interviews. In the words of the Executive Director of a Community Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3), for most regular people, making environmental choices, even when it is to save money, is a "research project." Even if people "lean green", said this environmental leader, there is frequently a lack of time and awareness to make sustainable choices.

A third, and more pointed, indicator used to measure the prevalence of unsustainable choices in transportation to work was single occupancy drivers (as a proportion of all drivers) driving for longer periods. The opposite of carpooling for shorter times which were designated as sustainable choices. The average San Jose Block had households with more sustainable commutes than not; the mean time driven to work alone was 600.22 on a range of 0-2285.88. And even though taking sustainable modes of transportation to work was not widespread, block residents who had high levels of sustainable commutes to work were less likely to drive to work alone for a significant amount of time ($r=-.175^{***}$).

TABLE 1.C. Individual Actions: Sustainable Choices
American Community Survey, 2009-2013 (n=518-523)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values	Statistics			
				Total	Low SES	Medium SES	High SES
Individual Actions	Sustainable Choices	Proportion of Solar Energy Use[1]	Mean (SD) Min-Max	.0006 (.0044) 0-.06	.0004 (.003) 0-.03	.0002 (.002) 0-.01	.0012 (.00693) 0-.06
		Percent Sustainable Transport to Work[2]	Mean (SD) Min-Max	34.01 (15.81) 0-147.62	39.517 (18.409) 5.3-147.6	32.6466 (13.7) 0-76.8	30.244^{***} (13.714) 0-78.32
	Unsustainable Choices	Time Driven Alone[3]	Mean (SD) Min-Max	600.21 (308.6) 0-2286	575.886 (286.8) 0-1570.9	601.086 (285.7) 108-1968.7	623.975 (350.106) 154-2286

[1] Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy.
[2] Percent Sustainable Transportation to Work= ((Estimate Carpooled in a car truck or van + Estimate 2 person carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 3 person carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 4 person carpool in a car truck or van Estimate 5-6 person carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate 7 person carpool in a car truck or van + Estimate public transportation excluding taxicab + Estimate bicycle + Estimate walked + Estimate other means + Estimate worked at home)/Total Transportation).
[3] Time Driven Alone = Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work measured as (Estimate drove alone in a car truck or van / Estimate Total Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time.

There was a mixed picture that emerged when differences in sustainable choices by community wealth were examined. Wealthier communities were more likely to use solar ($\overline{x}$ = .0012 versus $\overline{x}$ = .0004 in the poorest blocks) but less likely to use sustainable transportation to work (wealthy $\overline{x}$ = 30.244 versus $\overline{x}$ = 39.517 in the poorest blocks) and drive long distances to work alone (wealthy $\overline{x}$ = 623.975 versus poor blocks $\overline{x}$ = 575.886), though the community difference were not always statistically significant. The Executive Director of a Community Climate Neutrality Initiative and the Climate Director for San Jose illustrated this paradox; "there are progressive green people with lots of money who can afford to buy Tesla and solar, they can help drive the [environmental] movement" (Interviewee #3). Low income households, on the other hand, often live in energy inefficient houses with high energy and utility bills (Interviewee #3) as they don't have the resources to make the needed change (Interviewee #4) to sustainable choices. Limited resources also prevent members of low-income households from driving, and make them more likely to use public transportation to work, a sustainable transportation choice.

Demography as Agency. In addition to sustainable choices that people can adopt, demography can also be a source of agency in reducing or increasing carbon footprints. Specifically, women (Hal and Allen 2014) and consumers aged 35-50 (Patel et al. 2017) have been known to make more environmentally friendly decisions than men. In San Jose, the blocks had primarily young residents, below the age of 35 (47.81% young, 36% middle age and 16.08 senior). Besides, blocks with older residents had more socioeconomic resources than the more youthful blocks. However, there were no noticeable differences in block wealth status by gender composition of blocks, which was roughly equal.

TABLE 1.D. Demographic Profile of San Jose Blocks

American Community Survey, 2009-2013 (n=518-523)

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values	Statistics			
				Total	Low SES	Medium SES	High SES
Age	Young Blocks	Percent aged 0-34[1]	Mean (SD) Min-Max	. 47.81 (10.48) 17.56-93.3	53.794 (9.319) 28.4-93.3	47.5984 (9.47) 17.8-74.7	42.05*** (9.3) 17.6-72.8
	Mid-age blocks	Percent Ages 35-59[2]	Mean (SD) Min-Max	36.1 (6.92) 5.6-55.9	33.0479 (6.956) 5.6-55.3	35.5717 (6.307) 14-49.47	39.7*** (5.863) 20.66-5.09
	Senior Blocks	Percent Aged 60+[3]	Mean (SD) Min-Max	16.08 (7.37) 0-51.9	3.1582 (6.107) 0-39.2	16.8299 (7.533) 2.9-51.9	18.3*** (7.5) 1.7-44.7
Female Gender Compos-ition		Percent Female	Mean (SD) Min-Max	49.8% (5.08) 25-65	49.48% (5.1) 25-61	49.87% (5.4) 26-64	50.17% (4.8) 36-65

[1] Percent aged 0-34 (Young Blocks) = ((Estimate Male Under 5 years + Estimate Male 5 to 9 years + Estimate Male 10 to 14 years + Estimate Male 15 to 17 years + Estimate Male 18 and 19 years + Estimate Male 20 years + Estimate Male 21 years + Estimate Male 22 to 24 years + Estimate Male 25 to 29 years + Estimate Male 30 to 34 years + Estimate Female Under 5 years + Estimate Female 5 to 9 years + Estimate Female 10 to 14 years + Estimate Female 15 to 17 years + Estimate Female 18 and 19 years + Estimate Female 20 years + Estimate Female 21 years + Estimate Female 22 to 24 years + Estimate Female 25 to 29 years + Estimate Female 30 to 34 years) / Total Population).

[2] Percent Ages 35-59 = ((Estimate Male 35 to 39 years + Estimate Male 40 to 44 years + Estimate Male 45 to 49 years + Estimate Male 50 to 54 years + Estimate Male 55 to 59 years + Estimate Female 35 to 39 years + Estimate Female 40 to 44 years + Estimate Female 45 to 49 years + Estimate Female 50 to 54 years + Estimate Female 55 to 59 years) / Total Population).

[3] Percentage Senior = ((Estimate Male 60 and 61 years + Estimate Male 62 to 64 years + Estimate Male 65 and 66 years + Estimate Male 67 to 69 years + Estimate Male 70 to 74 years + Estimate Male 75 to 79 years + Estimate Male 80 to 84 years + Estimate Male 85 years and over + Estimate Female 60 and 61 years + Estimate Female 62 to 64 years + Estimate Female 65 and 66 years + Estimate Female 67 to 69 years + Estimate Female 70 to 74 years + Estimate Female 75 to 79 years + Estimate Female 80 to 84 years + Estimate Female 85 years and over) / Total Population).

[4] Female Gender Composition = Estimate Female / Total Population.

Bivariate Analysis

In order to test the preliminary empirical relationships between Systemic Inequalities, Individual Agency and High Carbon Footprints, bivariate analyses were conducted. As noted below, not only were there multiple connections that structural and human agency had with carbon footprints, but these connections varied across the communities divided by wealth (Table 2 in Appendix B).

Overall, the wealthier (r=.790***) and more white dominated (r=.417***) a block in San Jose was, the more carbon emissions they produced. Driving alone on a longer commute also contributed to the high emission levels (r=.106***), even if to a lesser extent than structural sources. On the other hand, the more sustainable commute choices to work made (r=-.238***), the fewer emissions blocks produced. Finally, the more mid age (r=.379***), senior (r=.313***), or female (r=.088*) a block was, the higher the carbon footprint. That is, in blocks that had more mid age individuals, seniors, and women there were more unsustainable choices made.

Other relationships among the structural and individual agency indicators worth noting were as follows. The higher socioeconomic status of a block, the more likely they were to be white (r=.345***) and to use solar (r=.109**), but less likely to use sustainable forms of transportation (r=-.213***). Blocks that were predominately white were less likely to use unsustainable forms of transportation (r=-.112**) but less likely to drive long distances to work alone (r=-.178***). Understandably, those who drove longer periods of time alone to work were less likely to commute using sustainable methods (r= -.175***). And mid age (r=-.234***) and senior aged block groups (r=-.186***) were also least likely to use sustainable modes of transportation to work.

More poignant were the differences in racial composition and demographies by wealth standing of blocks. The more wealth was concentrated in blocks, the more carbon was emitted. For example, the SES-carbon footprints connection was the strongest in high SES blocks (r=.544***), followed by mid-SES (r=.481***) and low SES (r=457***) blocks. Additionally, there were parallels, even if not linear, in the wealth and dominant race composition in blocks. The medium SES blocks had the highest white concentration (=.457***) followed by the high SES blocks (r=.199**). But, race and SES were not connected in the poorest blocks. Interestingly, demography had the potential for agency in carbon footprints only in the medium and low SES communities. The more senior aged residents there were in medium SES blocks (r=.198**) and low SES blocks (r=.235**), the larger the block's carbon footprint. Additionally, concentration of mid-aged individuals in low SES blocks (r=.244***), the higher the carbon emissions.

In sum, these bivariate findings indicated that systemic inequalities might have a greater impact on high carbon footprints than individual agency. And that the wealthier the communities, the bigger the carbon impacts of structural inequalities. On the other hand, demographic agency might be more relevant to carbon emissions in the poorer communities. The robustness of these potential relationships with carbon footprints were tested using multivariate analysis and are presented in the next section.

Multivariate Analyses

To isolate the unique effects of structural inequalities and individual agency on carbon footprints, two sets of one-step multivariate analyses were conducted. In the first set, the net comparative effects of systemic inequalities and individual agency on carbon footprints were assessed for the entire sample. In the second set, the net effects on carbon footprints were disaggregated by the SES concentrations in blocks to pinpoint the boundary limits of the wealth concentration and carbon footprint relationship,

As seen in Table 3, systemic inequalities were the strongest predictors of high carbon footprints. For example, the wealthier and educated residents of a block were, the larger was their carbon footprint (β=.651*** in Total Sample). Similarly, even if to a lesser extent, concentrations of whites in blocks were associated with larger carbon footprints (β=.180***), apart from the wealth of their residents.

As for individual agency factors, whether measured in actions or demography, their net effects in enlarging, or shrinking, as the case may be, carbon footprints were smaller than the structural impediments and inconsistent at best. Longer commute times to work, and that too, in single occupancy vehicles, had the net effect of enlarging carbon footprints (β=.145***) but home solar use or commutes using sustainable modes of transportation did not register an impact. And, of the demographic agencies, age composition of blocks was the only factor that was relevant. For example, mid-aged blocks (β=.096***) and senior-aged blocks (β=.114***) had net higher carbon footprints than youthful blocks. In other words, blocks with younger residents, on balance, made more environmentally friendly choices than older resident blocks.

It is widely known, in both the practice and scholarly communities, that socioeconomic standing is the prime driver of large carbon footprints. A fine grained boundary analyses of the wealth limits of structural inequalities and individual agency on carbon footprints, separately in the lower class, middle class, and upper class blocks, revealed several interesting patterns. While socioeconomic status remained a strong predictor of high carbon footprints, irrespective of the socioeconomic foundation of blocks, the impacts of money and education in raising carbon footprints was most concentrated in the upper class blocks (Beta =.550***) and fairly equal between middle class (Beta =.324***) and lower class (Beta = .366***). Interestingly, dominant racial concentration was the most influential predictor of bigger carbon footprints (surpassing wealth concentration) in middle class blocks (Beta= .477***) but was not the case in the poorest blocks. Upper class blocks, in addition to their wealth, added to their carbon footprints with their dominant race concentration (Beta .228***).

TABLE 3. Regression Analysis of the Relative Impacts of Systemic Inequality and Individual Agency on High Carbon Footprints; Beta (β) Coefficients[1]
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and American Community Survey 2009 - 2013

	Beta Coefficients			
	Total sample	Low SES	Medium SES	High SES
Systemic Inequality:				
Socioeconomic Status	.651***	.366***	.324***	.550***
White to Non-White Concentration	.180***	-.025	.477***	.228***
Individual Actions as Agency:				
Proportion of Solar Use	-.032	-.026	.033	-.003
Percent Sustainable Transit to Work	-.006	.094	.106	-.025
Time Driven Alone	.144***	.139	.194**	.129
Demography as Agency:				
Mid aged blocks	.095***	.179*	.089	-.124
Senior aged blocks	.113***	.162*	.205***	-.098
Female blocks	.034	.100	.074	.019
Model Statistics:				
Constant	3076.627***	2224.190*	2941.338***	87222.690***
Adjusted R^2	0.673***	.239**	.447***	.342***
DF 1 & 2	8 & 514	8 & 164	8 & 165	8 & 165

***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05

[1] Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions + Food Emissions. Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75.;
Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate Per capita income in the past twelve months in 2013 infla. Possible range: 0-8,265,753.47;
Percent White to Nonwhite = White households per block/non-white households. Possible range: 0 - 97.87;
Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy. Possible range: 0-.06;
Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work= (Estimate Car truck or van Drove alone / Estimate Total Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time Possible range: 0-2286;
Percent Mid Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 35-59;
Percent Senior Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 60 and above;
Female Blocks= Proportion of self-identifying females.

As for human agency, whether individual actions or demography, it was not only less relevant (than wealth) in its net contribution to bigger carbon footprints, its potency was evident only when wealth was not too concentrated (particularly not in the wealthiest blocks). For example, when blocks had medium wealth, solo driving time to work (Beta= .194**) and concentration of senior aged residents (Beta = .205***) raised emission rates. The poorest blocks also created more emissions when their residents were senior-aged (Beta= .162*) or middle-aged (Beta=. 164*).

It was also possible to identify additional conditions of wealth concentration (or lack thereof) under which the structure versus human agency dynamics in carbon emissions played out (Table 3). For one, when wealth was the most concentrated, in high SES blocks, it was the only predictor of carbon emissions; human agency did not factor in at all. On the other hand, when wealth was the least concentrated (as in low SES blocks), socioeconomic standing, followed by older age compositions were the main emission contributors. However, there was a different combination of structural and human agency contributors to high carbon emissions when there was a medium amount of wealth concentration in blocks. For example, not only did Mid-SES blocks produce more emissions when they had dominant race concentration (even more than wealth) but time driven alone to work and presence of seniors in their midst added some to their carbon footprints.

The professionals interviewed for this paper offered valuable ground-level insights into the wealth-high emissions paradox outlined in the statistical findings reported above. Many spoke to contradictions between lifestyles enabled by wealth and environmental motivations for reducing emissions. Speaking about how wealthier and predominantly white communities might create high carbon footprints, the Program Director of an environmental nonprofit (Interviewee #1) noted that in the outreach programs she conducted, people who came to engage with and learn about sustainable and cost-saving behaviors were typically either already low energy users, or seniors with fixed incomes, “who were watching their bill” (Program Director). In contrast, engaging and maintaining the attention of a majority of other groups, particularly high-income individuals, in sustainable behaviors was difficult, as wealthier individuals can afford more utilities and higher levels of consumption. Since finances are not pressing for wealthier households they do not regularly think about possible savings, and some may not be aware of personal consumption levels, particularly with energy. Besides, for consumers without cost concerns, a desire to maintain a certain lifestyle often outweighs environmental impacts.

The idea that consumption, is the “biggest problem” when it comes to carbon footprints was underscored by one of the professional interviewees who is a Leadership Team Member for Grassroots Initiative (Interviewee #5). That is, even if people are environmentally motivated, life styles made possible by wealth can stand in the way. Some of the other environmental professional interviewees offered specific illustrations of wealthy life styles creating high carbon emissions while triumphing pro-environmental motivations. In the experience of the Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee #7), consumption stems from wealth and associated privileges of education and time, and with this, comes the ability to do a lot more. One can be more selective with where they live, they can afford to buy a car and expand the boundaries of where they go. If wealth gives residents the freedom to travel, they “will get on the freeway to drive home to the suburbs away from the city, investing in a single-family size home and filling that home with lots of stuff”. But, even if high income individuals are “interested in environmental issues” and can even afford to make changes, said Interviewee #6, an Energy Conservation Special Project Consultant, it is difficult to engage these households in sustainable behaviors. As the Leadership Team Member for Grassroots Initiative noted, much of the high value placed on environmental issues “is just talk” (Interviewee #5). The Co-founder of a Global Business Incubator (GBI, Interviewee #2) also underscored the wealth-carbon footprints contradictions while speaking about the difficulties in engaging high-income households in sustainable behaviors. A unique approach that includes incentives, restrictions, and a new emission mentality must be used to address these barriers (See the Lessons in Environmental Practice section below for more details).

A contrasting scenario about carbon emissions in low-income communities was painted by many in the interview community. Low income households, they noted, were significantly more motivated to reduce costs. In fact, “households in East Palo Alto [a lower income community] spend 20% of their income on utilities, compared to 7% in Palo Alto” (Program Director, Interviewee #1), and are much more likely to feel the negative effects of environmental degradation. These stressors render lower income communities to be more motivated to cut costs and protect the environment, thereby reducing their carbon footprints. Low income communities are also more likely to be communities of color, they noted, supporting the regression findings about the connections between minority race composition and lower emissions.

Yet, even though low-income communities might be more motivated to reduce carbon footprints by their limited disposable income and a corresponding desire to save money, the interviewees emphasized the difficulties of reaching low income areas in their environmental practice. Poor communities do not have resources to implement sustainable alternatives (per the Co-founder, Interviewee #2), and are less likely to trust programs originating from people outside their community (Program Director, Interviewee #1). In the final analyses, even with fewer resources to implement eco-efficient changes, low income communities have smaller carbon footprints, both opined, compared to wealthier communities which either are unaware of, or disconnected from, environmental issues.

CONCLUSIONS

In this concluding section, empirical and theoretical findings were synthesized and suggestions for environmental practice were recommended based on the study findings. Further, suggestions for future research were proposed to advance the field of climate science and action.

Empirical Summary

Analysis of data from the 2009-13 ACS and 2016 SDG San Jose Dashboard and narrative commentaries provided critical insights into the unique effects of individual agency and systemic inequality on high carbon footprints in San Jose, CA. As expected, socioeconomic wealth of blocks, specifically measured by income and education, had the greatest impact on their high carbon footprints. The wealth-high emission connection was the most pronounced when wealth was concentrated as in the high SES blocks. To a lesser extent, concentration of dominant (white contrasted with nonwhite) households in blocks were also associated with high emissions, particularly when there was medium to high wealth concentration. While human agency was overall less relevant (than class or racial structures) in creating large carbon footprints, they were particularly important when wealth was not concentrated. For example, driving longer distances to work in single-occupancy cars led to bigger carbon footprints only in medium SES blocks. Similarly, older blocks (with more seniors or middle-aged residents) produced more carbon emissions in low and medium SES blocks. Qualitative commentaries from eight professional interviewees corroborated these findings; high income, thereby usually whiter, communities have higher carbon footprints. However, they also emphasized the challenges faced by low income communities to engage in sustainable practices, even though their carbon footprint was typically lower than in wealthier areas.

Theoretical Implications

Theoretically speaking, wealth concentration was an important moderator of the respective roles that structure and human agency played in carbon footprints (Figure 1). There was empirical support for the structural inequality perspective (Hypothesis #1) as seen in the strong connections between socioeconomic wealth and high carbon footprints, followed by dominant racial composition, particularly when wealth was concentrated. Following systemic inequality predictions, Hypothesis #1A was also supported, as class inequalities had a stronger impact than race inequalities in enlarging carbon footprints. However, there was not much direct support for Mead's Theory of Core Self-Concept or Stern's Value-Based Norm Theory (Hypothesis #2), as sustainable choices were not significant predictors of carbon footprints. The limited role played by individual agency in carbon emissions did not fully support Gidden's theory of structuration as the influence of individual agency, albeit modest, was second to that of systemic inequalities.

Figure 1. Empirical Model of the Impacts of Systemic Inequality and Individual Agency on High Carbon Footprints; Beta (β) Coefficients[1]
SDG Dashboard for San Jose (2016) and American Community Survey (2009 - 2013)



1. Refer to Table 3 for index coding.

Lessons in Environmental Practice

The privilege-high carbon emissions connections documented in this research underscored the need to create targeted solutions to reduce carbon footprints. As such, the privilege disparities in emissions, at the structural and agency levels, could be valuable to organizations that work to create solutions on both the macro and micro levels. The programmatic discussion, of challenges and solutions, below relied on the valuable experiences of practitioners interviewed for this project.

Macro Level Challenges and Solutions

Similar to the statistical findings, the professional interviewees were almost unanimous in their educated opinion that a significant portion of challenges in reducing consumption and carbon footprints stem from the macro level. Drawing from their experiences on the ground, they discussed macro policy issues and challenges, be they setting and enforcing environmental policies or reducing inequalities.

Policy Solutions. Before any sustainable changes can be introduced, said the Urban Systems Analyst (Interviewee #7, there must be a “democratic [governance] structure where [macro] stakeholders hold themselves accountable to hitting targets, and milestones to meet goals”. Beyond the governance structure, politicians must be ready to set targets specifically for carbon reduction, something sorely lacking in America’s current political system. However, with targets in place, mandatory policy changes and pressures will be needed if we are to reduce the collective carbon footprint. Foremost, carbon and consumption taxes can be implemented to create pressure on individuals and corporations to reduce consumption and mandate reductions (Interviewees #5, #7, #8). These taxes can be used to pressure industries to change their production patterns and create more sustainable options (Interviewee #4). These prescriptions to reduce unsustainable behaviors must be coupled with incentives, said the Co-founder (Interviewee #2); incentives could be tax breaks for residents engaging in environmental behaviors, such as driving electric vehicles and upgrading to energy efficient appliances and machines (Interviewee #2). Broader structural changes are also needed to allow sustainable options to be the easiest choice that residents can make. The Executive Director of Community Climate Neutrality Initiative (Interviewee #3) underscored the need for cities to “step up and change zoning, as well as power procurement.” Both the Executive Director and the Urban Systems scholar added that cities must also change their building policies, retrofit affordable housing, invest in public transportation and electric vehicles, (Interviewee #3), to “solve regional issues” (Interviewee #7).

Macro Level Inequality Challenges and Solutions. Inequality, be it socioeconomic and racial, was a running theme in this research on carbon footprints. Low income households are trapped without the resources to make environmental changes, nor do they have the privilege of time to think about environmental choices. While limited in their ability to exercise agency, it is these groups that are impacted most by climate change. In juxtaposition, high income households and corporations drive climate change through excessive consumption, whether that be of land or natural resources. This growing gap between the rich and poor only continues to escalate, as does the United States carbon footprint. Several professional interviewees also identified social and racial inequality as part of the problem. In fact, the Co-founder and Climate Director for San Jose, both who work on Climate Smart San Jose, the climate action plan to help the city of San Jose reach carbon neutrality, stated that plans to change cities “must address inequality in regard to race and income” (Interviewee #4, Director of

Climate Change). However, addressing inequality is not part of the environmental solutions currently being considered. The Director stated that the city currently does not “dive into income and racial inequality” when working on climate solutions. Climate Smart San Jose, “is not designed to explicitly address the issue of equity in San Jose” (Climate Smart San Jose 2018 p. 105). Instead, it is left to be covered in San Jose’s General Plan, a plan for overall city development, removed from climate action solutions.

To their credit, officials within the environmental department focus more on “meeting people where they are at through outreach” (Interviewee #4). This means directing individuals with high socioeconomic status towards more eco-efficient options provided by technology (Interviewee #4) but not necessarily changing consumption patterns.

<u>Micro Level Challenges and Solutions</u>

On the individual level too, interviewees emphasized the challenges in creating more sustainable changes. In many communities there is limited environmental progress, whether it is because people are often too busy to make sustainable changes or that residents do not always think collectively, nor can they easily see a collective impact on environmental progress (Special Project Consultant, Interviewee #6). However, macro structures will not change, unless “consumers demand it,” said the Climate Director for San Jose (Interviewee #5). To this Director, who works to create a policy link between communities and cities, policies for change will not work unless they have support from constituents. In other words, stakeholder engagement is key, specifically that of community grassroots organizations.

On balance, the leaders of the environmental community interviewed for this paper, be they the Program Director (Interviewee #1, Co-founder (Interviewee #2), Climate Director for San Jose (Interviewee #4), Leadership Team Member for Grassroots Initiative (Interviewee #5, or Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar (Interviewee #7), all emphasized the importance of programs that focus on community engagement, collective choices and neighborhoods associations. Enhancing social capital through friendly competitions, community-based decision-making, and peer-to-peer information exchange, they felt, could facilitate pro-environment behavior-change programs such as driving electric vehicles, upgrading to energy efficient appliances and machines, switching to solar, and overall reducing energy consumption.

However, based on the boundary setting limits of wealth identified in this analysis, engaging low income communities will require a significantly different approach than engaging high income communities. In order to inform and equip low income communities with resources that initiate change, community leaders must lead the process, and initiate peer-to-peer information exchange, said the Program Director at a local environmental non-profit (Interviewee #1). This Director has seen this method be particularly successful in the context of community house parties hosted dually by a community leader with an environmental program leader.

Yet, the professionals were quick to point out that initiatives intended to reduce consumption in a capitalistic society, which is “based around consumption” (Climate Change Director, Interviewee #4) pose a significant challenge. The Director, along with others, emphasized the importance of connecting environmental values with human values, showing how the two are inextricably intertwined. In San Jose’s climate action plan (“Climate Smart San Jose”) this mindset is emphasized through the promotion of the “Good Life.” In this document, a connection is made between happiness and sustainability, helping people to understand and accept the benefits sustainable actions can have on their whole life. Some benefits include urban walkability, multi-use development, apartment living, being close to work, adopting a healthy, and plant-based diet. Making this connection helps individuals to “identify with what they want their life to look like” (Interviewee #4) and in doing so reduces their environmental impact.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Despite these valuable empirical, theoretical, and practical findings, like most research, this study did not offer a complete analysis on factors that influence high carbon footprints in San Jose, CA. The study had a narrow scope, and did not evaluate other factors, such as airplane travel, access to transit nodes, waste generated, etc. that could influence carbon footprints. Most significantly, the data used to measure carbon emission output per block group were extrapolated from available geospatial data. No doubt, it is also almost impossible to perfectly track all carbon emissions created by block group activities.

In this analysis, 67% (Adjusted R^2=0.673***) of high carbon footprints (and much less in the poorest communities (Adjusted R^2 = .239**) was explained by structural and human agency factors. Future research could be more comprehensive by evaluating factors that directly measure environmental choices and emissions. For example, the Leadership Team Member for Grassroots Initiative stated that cities do not take into account total consumption when measuring carbon footprint. Often, analysis is limited to energy use, waste, transportation, and water, not on high-carbon activities, “such as meat, purchasing clothing or flying” (Interviewee #5). This evaluation leads to a “skewed perception of carbon footprints” (Interviewee #5). The importance of establishing a good baseline measurement was also emphasized by the Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar, stating that is necessary to use these “key environmental metrics” (Interviewee #5) in order to reliably predict carbon emission outcomes (Interviewee #7). Measuring these factors is difficult, but critical for future researchers to look at to secure a complete and accurate measurement of carbon footprints. Additional research should also continue to explore systemic inequality. Evaluating the current availability of infrastructure in communities, such as recycling or composting services as well as distance to transit nodes (Interviewee #2), will be critical. Such evaluative assessment will be critical for the discussions of effective structural changes in land-use policy that has to be built on a more accurate portrayal of resident ability to make sustainable choices. The be more effective, these structural changes will also have to take into consideration the links of wealth and racial inequality with carbon footprint; that is, systemic environmental changes will have to enhance equality and environmental sustainability.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Interview Protocol and Consent Forms

Consent Letter

Dear____:
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on community carbon footprints in San Jose. _

You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of sustainable development, and environmental community action.

I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about factors that influence community environmental actions. The interview will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please email me at erinjronald@gmail,com or Dr. Fernandez at mfernandez@scu.edu

Sincerely,
Erin Ronald

Please send an electronic message denoting consent, or electronically sign below. By signing below or providing an email, you are giving consent to participate in the above study.

______________________ ____________________ ____________
Signature Printed Name Date

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Guideline Interview Questions

Supplemental Qualitative Interviews for Thesis Sociology 195, Fall 2018 and Winter 2019
Interview Date and Time:
Respondent ID#:

1. What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution where you learned about (and/or worked) with this issue?
2. Can you tell me about your position?
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
4. Based on what you know of climate mitigation, how do you get people to adopt pro environmental behavior that actually reduces their carbon footprint?
5. In your opinion what are some factors that contribute to high carbon footprints in San Jose?
6. I found that carbon footprints are higher in areas where there are concentrations of high socioeconomic status and white communities. Has this been true in your experience?

7. Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be contacted at eronald@scu.edu Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.

Appendix B

TABLE 2A. Bivariate Analyses:-All Blocks and High SES Blocks
Correlation Matrix: Indices of High Carbon Footprint, Socioeconomic Status, White to Non-white Concentration, Proportion of Solar Use, Percent Sustainable Transit to Work, Time Driven Alone, Mid-age Blocks, Senior-Aged, and Female Blocks
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and 2009 - 2013 American Community Survey (n=517-523)[1, 2]

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
A. Index of High Carbon	1.0	.54***	.2**	.04	-.15	.09	-.001	.03	-.001
B. Socio-economic Status	.79***	1.0	.12	.09	-.06	-.04	.14	.17*	-.002
C. White to Non-white concentration	.42***	.35***	1.0	.14	-.1	-.38***	.2***	.34***	.14
D. Proportion of Solar Use	.06	.11**	.08	1.0	.11	-.09	.09	.07	.06
E. Percent Sustainable Transit to Work	-.24***	-.21***	-.11**	.05	1.0	.02	-.24***	-.01	-.08
F. Time Driven Alone	.11***	.05	-.18***	-.03	-.18***	1.0	-.28***	-.42***	-.16*
G. Mid-age Blocks	.38***	.39***	.17***	-.08	-.23***	-.09	1.0	-.78***	-.25***
H. Senior-aged Blocks	.31***	.29***	.20***	.03	-.19***	-.260**	-.75***	1.0	.16***
I. Female Blocks	.09*	.05	.04	.04	-.10*	-.07	-.16***	.06	.16***

***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05

1 Index of High Carbon Footprints = Electricity Emissions + Transportation Emissions + Goods Emissions + Food Emissions; Possible range: 1406.50-15425.75;
Index of Socioeconomic Status = Percentage High Education * Estimate Per capita income in the past twelve months in 2013 infla; Possible range: 0-8,265,753.47;
Percent White to Nonwhite = White households per block/non-white households. Possible range: 0 - 97.87;
Proportion of Solar Use = Solar Energy/Total Energy; Possible range: 0-.06;
Single Occupancy and Distance of Drive to Work= (Estimate Car truck or van Drove alone / Estimate Total Transportation) * Estimate Total Travel Time Possible; Possible range: 0-2286;
Percent Mid Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 35-59/total population in a block;
Percent Senior Aged Blocks = Men and women aged 60 and above/total population in a block;
Female Blocks= Proportion of self-identifying females/total population.

2 Correlations above the diagonal of 1.0 refer to High SES blocks ; Below 1.0 refer to All blocks.

TABLE 2B. Bivariate Analyses: Medium (below the diagonal) and Low (above the diagonal) SES Correlation Matrix: Indices of High Carbon Footprint, Socioeconomic Status, White to Non-white Concentration, Proportion of Solar Use, Percent Sustainable Transit to Work, Time Driven Alone, Mid-age Blocks, Senior-Aged Blocks and Female
SDG Dashboard for San Jose and 2009 - 2013 American Community Survey (n=517-523)[1, 2]

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
A. Index of High Carbon	1.0	.46***	-.06	-.04	-.07	.14	.24***	.24**	.10
B. Socio-economic Status	.48***	1.0	.02	-.04	-.16*	.20**	.26***	.21**	-.02
C. White to Non-white concentration	.53***	.24***	1.0	-.13	.004	.03	-.09	-.16*	-.15
D. Proportion of Solar Use	.04	.009	-.05	1.0	.05	.95	.54	.10	.66
E. Percent Sustainable Transit to Work	.04	-.16*	-.02	.02	1.0	-.36***	-.12	-.21**	.02
F. Time Driven Alone	.05	.03	-.18*	.17*	-.14	1.0	-.09	-.1	-.06
G. Mid-age Blocks	.13	.19*	-.005	.02	-.16*	.03	1.0	.01	-.08
H. Senior-aged Blocks	.2**	.15*	.04	-.03	-.16*	-.30***	-.07	1.0	.19*
I. Female	.12	.08	.02	-.04	.24**	.01	.08	.1	1.0

***p≤.001; **p≤.01; *p≤.05
[1] See Index names and coding in Table 2A.
[2] Correlations above the diagonal of 1.0 refer to Low SES ; Below 1.0 refer to Medium SES.

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Interviewee #2. November 19, 2018. Program Director. Environmental Non-profit.

Interviewee #3. January 28, 2019. Executive Director of Community Climate Neutrality Initiative.

Interviewee #4. February 11, 2019. Climate Director for San Jose.

Interviewee #5. February 13, 2019. Leadership Team Member for Grassroots Initiative.

Interviewee #6. February 26, 2019. Energy Conservation Special Project Consultant.

Interviewee #7. February 26, 2019. Urban Systems Analyst and Scholar.

Interviewee #8. March 6, 2019. Land-use Expert.

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A Community to Call Mine
Supportive Community Environment and Citizen Actions?

By
Elizabeth Namakula Kamya[1]

ABSTRACT. To what extent are supportive Community Environments and Citizen Actions needed to strengthen community attachment? The answers were explored among three distinctive communities across America (Thriving, Struggling, and Suffering) using a mixed methods design; analyses of secondary survey data from the 2010 Soul of The Community Survey were supplemented with qualitative insights from four community development professionals as well content analysis of select community development and affluent neighborhood initiatives. As predicted using Solari's Affluent Neighborhood Persistence Model, members of thriving communities were more likely to take ownership when there was a supportive social environment. But, citizen action, particularly through political activism, was most useful for community development mainly in suffering communities, partially supporting Powell and DiMaggio's New Institutionalism. These findings, corroborated with the narrative commentaries, contributed to the literature in the Sociology of communities as well community development and highlighted the need for tailoring tools for communities of different levels of affluence. Future research is warranted to identify and prioritize community initiatives around social fabric and political activism in community development practice.

INTRODUCTION

At the heart of communities are the residents who call an area home. Community ownership is best encapsulated by an African proverb, "I am because we are." Collectively, individuals indeed make a community rich in beauty, character, and diversity. In the words of a Community Psychologist (Interviewee #4), with the idea of common goals and purpose, neighborhoods create cohesiveness to work together, thrive together, weep together, and celebrate together. The goal for every community should be to improve and prosper in the interests of their residents. However, figuring out how to build sustainable growth remains a puzzling challenge for many public officials, community organizers, and social workers.

[1] Acknowledgements: I would like to start by thanking my fearless Professor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez who offered me endless guidance and support. I want to express gratitude to the professionals I interviewed that took time out of their day and provided me with strong insightful information. Lastly, I extend my thanks and appreciation to my parents who have continuously encouraged my growth and exploration. It is because of them that the flame of passion for learning stays lit within me.

Currently there is not one set of best practices available to improve and transform communities into more prosperous environments. Besides, neighborhoods are uniquely varied and change is slow occurring over decades. The homology or cohesion between people, the built environment, and community symbols are an evolving set of processes. For example, changes, as in gentrification of communities, that seem apparent, emerge through multiple, uneven steps (Deener, 2012). Communities have diverse structures and are dense with opportunities, even if untapped, for fostering identity and attachment. Persistently affluent neighborhoods work to protect, maintain and renovate their structures to sustain their economic and social resources. In contrast poor neighborhoods are at a disadvantage and their capital is very much pulled apart through trying to make ends meet. As a result, understanding the complexity of communities, in which no two are exactly the same, is challenging.

In this research, an attempt was made to learn more about factors that foster residents' community attachment amongst communities of varied levels of affluence. Specifically, the comparative relevance of strength of community social fabric and citizen actions in nurturing attachment in thriving, struggling, and suffering communities were assessed. While members and activists in suffering communities are typically interested in community development those in more affluent communities focus on maintaining the status quo. These wealth disaggregated research findings will be of interest not only to academics of community development, but also to local government leaders, community organizing agencies, and others working in the field to engage communities. Because of the diversity of communities, there is need for context specific evidence on which to generate new methods and/or strategies tailored to building stronger communities.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A community is a sociological construct in which shared meaning and cultural understanding are cultivated through interactions and attachment among its members. And communities grow, change, or persist by their own sets of principles. Resident participation in the community can be expected to be based on mutual expectation, values, beliefs, and shared perceptions within a community. Because of the resulting multidimensional complexity of communities, it is not easy to predict specifically how each community will respond to challenges they encounter. However, scholars have identified some common themes and related strategies in the lives of communities. Be they a strong social fabric or citizen participation in community life, the goal has been to unpack and understand the multidimensional glue that can hold a community together.

Community Attachment

Community attachment has been an important area of study in which scholars have attempted to understand why individuals choose to live in a certain community, choose to stay, or sometimes move. The word attachment has become synonymous in its definition with satisfaction, sentiment, and bond to the community, and as such has been used interchangeably. Irrespective of the diverse terminology, community attachment is viewed as the emotional and personal bond that ties a person to the collective. The satisfaction residents have with their neighborhood encompasses feelings of kinship, a sense of sodality, and measures community embeddedness (Boulianne and Brailey, 2014).

In an effort to conceptualize community attachment, Cross (2013) examined how a few dozen residents, in Nevada county, California, described their sentiments about the community in which they live. Four aspects stood out as distinguishing features of attachment: resources that make for an ideal community, experiencing a sense of belonging, identifying with a place or region, and plans for the future. Cross concluded that community attachment can be more than having an emotional connection to a place; identifying with the place was also key. Of course, not all residents are attached to, or identify with, the same dimensions, say social and/or physical, of a community. Besides, community attachment is multidimensional; residents, in Hidalgo and Hernandez's (2001) study of 177 people in communities in Spain, were attached to both the social and physical dimensions of places as well as their ability to develop different degrees of dependence, cognitive preference, satisfaction, and identification with their neighborhoods.

But community attachment is not only an outcome but also a process. Jaques (2008), who studied citizens in rural communities of Colorado, concluded that binding to a community is a basic social process of how people engage and fuse into an environment. From the collective experiences of citizens varying in ages 26-82, retrieved by Jaques from Glaser & Strauss, 1967, five stages of the social process were documented. Two particularly important stages were: first the processes by which people became involved and integrated into a community and second, the process by which people continued interaction through practicing community norms and rituals.

In short, any substantive exploration of communities should account for subjective and objective measures of community attachment. Subjective attachment was described by Garland (in a 2013 study of 400 adults) as an individual's sense of belonging in their community, which could be influenced by the individual's length of residence, involvement in their community, and the connections they have with other community members. Objective attachment refers to the more physical or tangible items in a community, as in police presence or an abundance of parks and areas for outdoor activity.

Keys to Community Attachment: Social Fabric and Citizen Engagement

Although sociologists have tended to describe communities in terms of the strength of resident satisfaction or attachment, they have, in their more recent research, expanded their analyses to include the social environment of communities as a key to unlocking community attachment. The social fabric includes social ties with family, friends, and the degree of integration into other social networks, and a resulting sense of safety that support attachment. "The struggle over the direction of the country is not just about economics or politics. It is a spiritual struggle over who we are and how we are connected" noted a Community Organizer interviewed for this research by the author (Interviewee #2). Researchers have also studied the active community residents, be it in their engagement in the political and/or civic life of their communities to strengthen and reinforce community life.

Strength of Community Social Fabric

There is a fair amount of agreement in the scholarly and activist circles that satisfaction with one's neighborhood is a result of both attitudinal and behavioral connections to the area. For example, strong social cohesion within a community has been found to have both direct and indirect positive effects on neighborhood attachment. Dassopoulos and Monnat (2011), in their analyses of the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, suggested that perceptions of cohesion within one's neighborhood was important because solidarity can become a tool to effect positive change through both formal and informal community organizing and problem-solving. These researchers, however, did not explore the mediating roles of social support and social control in the relationship between community participatory action and satisfaction. It would be advantageous to explore the type of events, places, and opportunities that allow individuals to socialize with one another and deepen their bonds.

Sense of Safety. Community satisfaction is also described as the product of feeling safe in the social location where one feels at home (Cross, 2013). For example, Dassopoulos and Monnat (2011) captured the link between security and satisfaction as follows: Los Angeles residents who reported that they feel safe in their neighborhood had 4.5 times the odds of being in a higher community satisfaction category (exp1.540 = 4.66) than those who reported not feeling safe in their area. In other words, perceptions of safety significantly and substantially increased satisfaction with their community. Collective levels of satisfaction were also lowest in communities characterized by residential mobility, urbanization, a density of youth, a high victimization rate, and most importantly high levels of fear and distrust about local safety (Sampson, 1988). Fear of crime, among the 10,905 residents from England and Wales that Sampson studied, appeared to have negative consequences for collective community attachment and social participation. One socially adverse effect of perceived danger was that those who perceived crime to be high reduced their active leisure activities.

Citizen Actions: Civic Engagement Versus Political Activism

Even if the social fabric and other structural elements of communities are vibrant, the many social, environmental, cultural, and safety challenges that communities face require the active attention and involvement of residents and their allies. Through citizen actions, as in collaborating with others, and getting engaged politically, residents can seek to address challenges, create sustainable communities, and subsequently uplift their sense of community ownership.

Of course, not all community members can be expected to be equally engaged in all matters of their communities. For example, in a literature review of civic engagement and citizen participation in local governance, those with more socio-economic resources and personal as well as social capital were more politically active or civically engaged (Olimid, 2014). In the same vein of variability in citizen actions, the goals of citizen action can also vary. For example, in a study of 577 individuals who sought volunteering and community roles, Nix (2011) was able to relate the motivational desires of idealism and social status to members' desire to engage in a community to reaffirm and strengthen community values. Similarly, using data from 28 countries in four continents, a positive relationship between political activism and self-transcendence values with and openness to change were found (Vecchione et al., 2015).

There is also a case to be made for distinguishing between subjective (satisfaction) and objective (actions) measures of citizen actions as they contribute to community attachment. In a study of community attachment and citizen actions, in a random sample of 2000 students enrolled in a Canadian University, objective measures of community attachment were found to increase the possibility of voting but not of volunteering (Boulianne and Brailey, 2014). But when these researchers used subjective measures (agree or disagree responses) of community attachment, along with objective criteria, there was a positive relation between resident satisfaction and volunteering as well as voting (political actions). They made a case for more measurement accuracy by looking at both subjective and objective measures of community attachment. In the final analyses, the different mechanisms of resident involvement indicated that civic engagement and political activism must be treated as separate concepts rather than one unitary concept. As such, distinct initiatives are required to combat low rates of civic engagement and political activism.

Civic Engagement. Civic engagement can take many forms, with the two most common being volunteering (active engagement) and other passive involvement such as monetary donations (Olimid, 2014). Volunteering or doing service around one's community is a demanding form of civic engagement (Uslaner, 2002). It asks more of the individual than just donating money or being a shirker in an organization. Instead, volunteering requires sacrifice of time and dedication to the cause (Garland, 2013). Although many people associate their community engagement and work with organizations with their religion, researchers, like Uslaner (2002), explain that the most critical predictor of volunteering is the perception of a common bond or attachment with other people. But, even when accounting for perceptions of social cohesion and support, participating in a local business or civic organization was not associated with neighborhood satisfaction among 1,912 respondents in the Los Angeles County (Dassopoulos & Monnat, 2011).

Active involvement in the local community also provides residents with a sense of control (Dassopoulos and Monnat, 2011); individuals in Wales and England who were socially integrated into their communities were more likely to trust other individuals. And involvement in community groups and organizations, as well as having a social network and attachment to one's community, improved community satisfaction (Wasserman, 1982).

Political Activism. Political activism, another form of citizen action, takes citizen actions to a different level, both in its locus as well outcomes. When political activism is collective, this form of activism in communities puts pressure on the local government to improve the quality of life for all residing in the area, including the less advantaged. Political activism can also strengthen collective efficacy, by activating or converting social bonds among community members in order to accomplish common goals. Communities with a higher average of collective efficacy usually share more of consensus about issues and challenges in the local area (Brunton-Smith, Sturgis, and Leckie, 2018). As with civic engagement, motivations for political activism also vary. In a study of the motivation for political activism in sample of 125 social work students, depending on whether they were liberals and conservatives, belonging to a community of activist and maintaining activist identities were crucial to different modes of activism. However, subjective measures of collective efficacy only influenced activism for electoral campaigns in a select sample of students (Swank, 2012).

With a political mind frame, people can be active participants and change agents for their constituencies on the issue for their wellbeing, noted a Community Based Psychologist who was interviewed for this paper (Interviewee #4). Community concerns in a global economy demand solutions, like, among others, political activism and collective efficacy, to bring about change (Glaser, Yeager, and Parker, 2006). Their comparisons, of responses of 5,970 registered community voters favoring Neighborhood-Based organizations with others in favor of Government based solutions, suggested that political activism amongst community members was a strong powerful way to create change instead of latently waiting on their local leaders to enact it. Community members' actions can work either in line with the government or in opposition to government. In any event, because political actions can drastically shift the lives of those less fortunate, it is just as important as civic engagement.

Summary and Suggestions for Future Research

In conclusion, scholars have argued that creating a vibrant social fabric, political activism and civic engagement are effective strategies for communities to address the growing stressors they face and strengthen them (Henkin and Zapf, 2006-2007). But there was little research found in which citizen actions (political activism and civic engagement) were simultaneously evaluated with community social fabric for their unique impacts on fostering belongingness, attachment, and satisfaction with community. Besides, because of varied socioeconomic contexts of communities, there is a need to investigate the differential roles of citizen action and community social fabric in improving member satisfaction in communities with varying levels of economic growth. Further, political activism, that very often get categorized as civic engagement, need to be treated as a distinct form of citizen action. To this effect, the relative net effects of community social fabric, social networks and social cohesion, on community satisfaction of residents will be assessed among thriving, struggling, and suffering communities.

RESEARCH QUESTION

In this research, I investigated the differential impacts that social fabric, civic engagement and political activism have on an individual's community attachment in three distinctive sub groups of communities. These insights will add to previous research that showed a positive relationship of residents' civic engagement (helping others, volunteering, etc.) and political activism (voting and exhibiting local leadership) with community attachment (as in Boulianne and Brailey, 2014). I want to expand on this extant research by investigating how civic engagement, and political actions might differentially affect community attachment of residents living under different wealth constraints or access as the case might be. In addition, the role of community social fabric in shaping or altering this attachment will be explored, an issue that has not received full attention.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analyses, presented in this research, of strategies and resources for differential community attachment in thriving, struggling and suffering communities was framed within Giddens' Social Structuration (as outlined in Tagarirofa and David, 2013), neighborhood persistence, and the new institutionalist (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:150; Powell and DiMaggio, 2012: Chapter1) community development paradigms. Community environment, in its dimensions of social fabric and sense of security, as well as citizen action, as they might color a resident's level of community satisfaction, are best understood within Giddens' social structuration framework. Giddens posited that the bases of structure and agents in social systems are neither absolute nor abiding and that social structures limit the actions of individual agents. That is, structure and action evolve in a manner that are mutually constraining. However, context specific variations in the importance of protecting the social environment and citizen actions to enact changes in the community are best addressed using Solari's Affluent neighborhood persistence (2012) and DiMaggio and Powell's New Institutional (1983:150) models for community development.

As per the Affluent Neighborhood Persistence model tested by Solari (2012), thriving communities protect and strengthen their affluence through a complex infrastructure of resources, protection, and social networks. These structural benefits create a supportive community environment that promotes a process of cumulative advantage. As affluent residents collectively build their community environment, they protect access to social spaces, strengthen neighborhood safety, and improve residents' overall wellbeing. The resulting supportive community environment in the affluent communities work to elevate residents' feeling ownership of their community.

Ironically, persistent affluence in some neighborhoods comes at the expense of economic segregation, growing inequality, and persistent poverty in others at the other end of the economic spectrum. In the face of entrenched systemic poverty in communities, community development theorists have advocated for social action and community participation as potent tools to promote development that ensures more inclusive access to and equitable distribution of economic resources and power. However, citizens involvement in their local communities has to go beyond an interest in local involvement and also require actions that seek to confront, impede, promote or raise awareness about an issue or set of issues at different (external to the community) levels. DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in their theory of New Institutionalism (elaborated from Max Weber's conceptualization of the iron cage), came to understand that for civic actions to be effective they should be founded on an acknowledgement of community organizational structures and bureaucratic institutions in the government and state. Effective institutional change has to stem from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by organizations that also fit the cultural expectations in society. To overcome the iron cage like constraints that communities face, organizations and communities can find attractive solutions to the problems they face through means of collective community effort and even sheer force. That is, coordinated citizen actions might be an effective tool available to enact community change and development. The resultant improvements in the social, environmental, economic and cultural infrastructures within their communities can ignite community members' passion and loyalty toward their place of residency.

Drawing from these theoretical paradigms, two sets of boundary-specifying hypotheses were postulated. In Hypothesis #1, a supportive community environment, more than citizen action, would be more relevant, on balance, to community attachment in thriving communities (Affluence Persistence). On the other hand, following New Institutionalist expectations, Hypothesis #2 would be that citizen actions (more than supportive community environment) would be the unique key to community attachment in the suffering communities. Both hypotheses were evaluated net of community member's socioeconomic status, age, sex, and length of residence.

METHODOLOGY

A sequential mixed method design, of secondary quantitative data drawn from a secondary data source combined with primary qualitative narratives, were used. These mixed methods findings will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the research question posed in this paper. Supplemental qualitative information was gathered through interviews with professionals knowledgeable about citizen actions and a supportive community environment, as well as experiential infield experience working to strengthen community attachment.

Secondary Data

The secondary quantitative data set I used to answer my research question was called the Soul of the Community; this data came from a 2010 study conducted by Gallup, Inc. of the 26 Knight Foundation communities across the United States. It was a purposeful survey to identify the factors that connect residents to their communities and the role of community attachment in an area's economic growth and well-being. Researchers used Random Digit Dialing (RDD) to reach a representative selection of private household telephone numbers in each of the defined areas; the adult interviewee (aged 18 or over) in each sampled household was also randomly selected. A random sample of at least 400 residents, aged 18 years and old in each of the eight resident communities in Akron, OH; Charlotte, NC; Detroit, MI; Macon, GA; Miami, FL; Philadelphia, PA; San Jose, CA; and St. Paul, MN. The total number of respondents for 2010 was 20,271[2].

Community groups were categorized by Soul of the Community into Thriving, Struggling, and Suffering depending on the residents' rating of their life at the time of the survey and in the future. A person was considered to be living in a Thriving community if she/he rated both their life at present time and future to be positive. On the other hand, if individuals rated both their life at the present time and the future to be very low, they were classified as living in a Suffering community. In between were respondents who lived in Struggling communities[3].

By design, the three communities varied substantially in the socioeconomic standing of their members (Appendix A). Residents of Thriving communities were the most educated and had the highest incomes. Half of individuals in the thriving communities' group had graduated college, or were pursuing post graduate work, and/or had achieved a post graduate degree. In contrast, a 1/3 in the suffering communities listed their highest educational achievement as completing high school.

In Thriving communities, over 40% of the respondents had an annual income of $75,000 - $99,999 or higher; with 2/3rds of them reporting six figures or more. On the other hand, in Suffering communities, almost 37.5% reported annual income below $25,000. According to the United States Census Bureau, the 2010 poverty income threshold for a family of 4 with no children under 18 years of age was $22,541, while for a family of 4 with 2 children under 18 it was $22,162. A sizeable portion of respondents

[2] The original collector of the data, NADAC, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.

[3] A respondent lived in a Thriving community if the ranked response to QN1A (Rating of life at present time: Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel? Is 7 or higher and the response to Q1B (Rating of Future Life: Just your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say about five years from now?) is 8 or higher. A respondent is considered to be Suffering if the response to both QN1 and QN1B is 4 or lower. A respondent is considered to be Struggling if they have not been classified as thriving or suffering based on the stated criteria (NADAC 2010). The response rates were not available for this survey.

in suffering communities lived in poverty. Struggling community residents fell in between; a plurality (39.5%) of residents in Struggling Communities had incomes in the range of 25,000 - 54,999 that matched their education; 53% had completed high school or some college. Aside from the deep socioeconomic disparities, the three communities did not differ much in their demographic composition. Men and women were equally represented in all three communities. The residents of the community tended to be older; about 2/3 was 55 and older.

Qualitative Data

I conducted four semi structured interviews over the phone with professionals who had expertise in the area of community development. The interviews were around 20 minutes long and as seen in Appendix B, voluntary participation and confidentially were assured. The first interviewee (Interviewee #), found through personal connections at an East Coast university, is a Social Work Professor who has been teaching the macro level of social work for over 20 years. Prior to becoming a professor, she was engaged in communities in her work at a public works organization in Boston. It is through this organization that she began to grapple with and help with the challenges facing different local neighborhoods. The second interviewee is the Director of an international community organizing nonprofit and started his career doing faith-based action in Oakland. I became acquainted with this Community Organizer through working in this nonprofit. As with Sociologist Interviewee #3, they have a vast knowledge in immigrant communities and how to create for a healthy environment. The last interviewee #4 was a psychologist based in Boston. This psychologist teaches at a local university and is specialized in peace and conflict mediation in communities across the globe.

It was important to include content analysis of case studies of different communities, personal experiences, and annual reports that were gathered. One case study centered in Los Angeles and mapped out the diverse framework of the Venice neighborhood in the County (Deener 2012). The author's personal experiences from time spent in LA (Kamya 2017) were another source, although the location was Boyle Heights. The annual report reviewed for this paper highlighted a suffering community in Michigan that is working to be a thriving neighborhood (UNI 2017). These sources of real and current community work helped to strengthen the methodology and theoretical framework in an effort to illustrate the impact of community attachment.

DATA ANALYSES: SURVEY and QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS

Three levels of analyses, univariate, bivariate and multivariate were utilized to answer the research question posed above. In keeping with the research design, I disaggregated the analyses by the three types of communities, Thriving, Struggling, and Suffering communities, in which residents lived.

Operationalization and Descriptive Analyses

A sense of community is important for determining a good and healthy lifestyle, opined the Sociologist interviewed for this research (Interviewee #3). Levels of resident community attachment, supportive social environment and citizen actions, varied, by the type of community in which they lived. Residents in thriving groups were most attached to their communities, reported the most supportive social fabric and highest levels of participatory activities, be they political action or civic engagement. Suffering communities were at the opposite end; not only were residents less attached than the more affluent residents, they did not have as supportive of a social fabric nor were as engaged in the civic political life of their communities. The descriptive findings pointed to clear boundary limiting conditions amongst thriving, struggling, and suffering groups, underscoring the need for accounting for conditional limitations of attachment in each community.

Community Attachment

Community attachment can be defined as the thoughts and feelings of ownership an individual has towards the place in which they reside. The psychology professor (Interviewee #4) described it in simpler terms: “Attachment is like glue. When communities lack this glue, or their glue is spread too thin, a detachment from a common goal that would bring people together is created.” Recommending their community to others and one’s pride in their community all indicate satisfaction and creates the “glue” leading people to feel attached to their communities.

As see in Table 1.A, American's living in thriving communities, compared to suffering communities, were more attached to their community; The thriving communities group had the highest index of community attachment with a mean of 16.18 (sd=28.01) on a range of 4 – 100, followed by those that resided in struggling communities. The Suffering group had the lowest mean attachment index score of 37.01 (sd=31.99). For example, almost half the respondents living in thriving communities strongly felt proud to live in their community (48.5%), more than double the proportion that reported pride in suffering communities (22.4%). Also, more than 2/3s of people in both thriving and struggling communities reported high levels of satisfaction living in their communities; the corresponding proportion in suffering communities was only 1/3 (36.3%). In short, the descriptive data shed light on the disparities among the three communities. A plurality (40%) respondents in suffering communities reported extreme dissatisfaction and would not at all recommend their community to others (39.1%).

Table 1.A. Community Attachment/belonging
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Responses	Statistics		
				Thriving (n=9458)	**Struggling (n= 5513)**	**Suffering (n= 379)**
Community	Community	QCE1	1. Not at all	3.2%	5.7%	19.3%***
Satisfaction/	Loyalty	recode:	2	4.8	8.2	19.3
Belonging		Community	3	20.1	25.1	25.1
		as a place	4	39.5	34.4	19.6
		to live: How	5. Extremely	32.5	26.6	16.7
		Satisfied?	(n)		(10314)	
		QCE2	1. Not likely at all	6.9%	15.1%	39.1%***
		recode:	2	6.3	11.6	11.9
		Recommend	3	17.4	22.3	16.4
		community	4	29.7	26.2	15.6
		to others	5. Extremely likely	39.7	24.8	17.2
	Community	Q3A	1.Strongly disagree	4.3%	8.7%	29.8%***
	Passion	recode:	2	4.4	10.2	15.0
		Proud to live	3	15.3	24.0	19.3
		in this	4	27.4	25.9	13.5
		community	5.Strongly agree	48.5	31.2	22.4
		Q3B:	1.Strongly disagree	6.1%	13.3	35.1%***
		Community	2	7.3	14.5	16.5
		is perfect for	3	17.5	23.5	17.6
		me	4	30.0	25.4	12.0
			5.Strongly agree	39.1	23.2	18.9
		Index of	Mean ($\bar{x}$)	66.18	52.09	37.01***
		Community	Std. deviation (s)	28.01	29.42	31.99
		Attachment[1]	Min-Max	4 - 100	4 – 100	4 - 100

[1] Index of Community Attachment = (QCE1+QCE2)*(Q3A+Q3B). The correlations among these indicators were: suffering communities between .858*** and .735***; in the struggling communities between .799*** and .668***; in the thriving communities between .802*** and .682***; *** p <=.001.

Community Environment

One potential explanation for stronger attachment in some communities and less so in others considered in this analysis was the social environment. A supportive community environment is important for residents to feel satisfied with their local communities. An important principle to distinguish in community development work is creating a social fabric that fosters self-reliance. For example, an environment that fosters a caring and safe group context where residents can come together to exchange knowledge, skills, and life experiences allow people to reach their own personal goals is an essential building block for attachment. In this supportive environment, community members can build connections and not feel isolated.

For example, a community that uplifts community members, regardless of their background or varying ability, will address individual and local needs through informal interactions. By finding a place where people can actually meet, even if it is just once a week, residents are offered a forum for engagement and is a market place for ideas. A community that emphasizes inclusion will address safety issues by acknowledging that men and women may feel differently walking home alone. Identifying members' different needs to feel secure is instrumental in informing the planning and development of activities and programs.

<u>Social Fabric</u>, the first component of community environment considered here, involves formal and informal methods of networking. To develop connections within their local communities, residents align, collaborate, and work with individuals, groups and other agencies. In addition, the strength of the social fabric can also be distinguished by access and equity. A strong community will have centers that are accessible and welcoming; accessibility to particular social spaces and social events promotes equity and improves the social, environmental and cultural infrastructures within their communities. The social fabric of a community can be assessed using these distinguishing characteristics and by community participation.

As seen in Table 1.B, availability of events and spaces that allowed for social cohesion were of varying rates of quality in the three communities. Some examples are noted to identify these community differences. For example, a plurality of residents in the thriving communities rated the frequency of social community events offered to the community as very good (37.2%). On the other hand, more than half (54.8%) in suffering communities thought the availability of social community events to be average or worse. About ¼ (25.6%) in struggling communities expressed that the availability was okay.

Another example of the social fabric is the social settings in which people meet one another. Almost 2/3^{rds} (63.7%) of residents in thriving community reported that their community had an above average vibrant night life and more than 2/3^{rds} (68.3) said their community is a good place to meet people and make new friends. Corresponding ratings in suffering communities was only 39% (above average night life) and 36.5% (good place to meet people) respectively; for struggling communities it was 53% and 51.8% respectively. On balance, the social fabric was rated by residents to be the strongest in Thriving communities ($\bar{x}$ on the social fabric index score was 27.79*** on a range of 6.0 - 60.0 while weakest in Suffering communities ($\bar{x}$ = 26.39***)

Table 1.B. Social Fabric
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community

Concept	Indicators	Responses	Statistics		
			Thriving (n=8852)	Struggling (n=5153)	Suffering (n=345)
Social Fabric	Q7P:Availability of social community events	1. Very bad	2.0%	4.7%	9.3%***
		2	5.4	10.0	17.3
		3	19.5	25.6	28.2
		4	35.9	33.4	26.3
		5. Very good	37.2	26.3	18.9
				4.2	10.2
	Q7A: Availability of parks and playgrounds	1. Very bad	2.0%	8.7%	12.4%***
		2	5.4	20.8	23.9
		3	15.1	32.7	28.0
		4	32.8	33.6	25.5
		5. Very good	44.6		
	Q7O: Availability of arts and cultural opportunities	1. Very bad	3.5%	6.6%	14.2%***
		2	7.8	11.4	14.2
		3	20.7	23.2	27.9
		4	33.2	32.4	20.9
		5. Very good	34.9	26.4	22.8
	Q7I: Good place to meet people and make friends	1. Very bad	3.0%	6.7%	21.2%***
		2	6.8	12.0	14.5
		3	21.9	29.5	27.7
		4	37.4	31.7	22.3
		5. Very good	30.9	20.1	14.2
	Q7H: Vibrant nightlife - restaurants, clubs, bars, etc.	1. Very bad	4.3%	7.3%	17.7%***
		2	8.7	11.9	16.6
		3	23.4	27.7	26.2
		4	33.1	29.8	20.4
		5. Very good	30.6	23.2	19.1
	Q7M: People care about each other	1. Very bad	4.8%	9.5%	20.6%***
		2	9.9	16.7	22.0
		3	32.2	35.7	28.5
		4	36.5	27.2	19.5
		5. Very good	16.7	10.9	9.5
	Q22F: Attended a local event	1.Yes	78.2%	68.1%	56.8%***
		2. No	21.8	31.9	43.2
		Mean ($\overline{x}$)	27.79	27.48	26.39***
		Std. deviation (s)	10.61	11.36	12.05
		Min-Max	6.0 - 60.0	6.0 - 60.0	6.0 - 60.0

[1] Index of Social Fabric= Q7O + Q7P + Q7A + Q7H + Q7I + Q7M + DummyQ22F. The correlations among these indicators were: suffering communities between .586*** and .281***; in the struggling communities between .510***and .045***; in the thriving communities between .522*** and .037***; *** p<=.001

<u>Sense of Safety, is the second component of community environment considered in this analyses (Table 1.C).</u> In Thriving communities over a 1/3 of respondents reported feeling completely safe walking alone at night near their house (34.2%). But, about a 1/3 of respondents in suffering communities reported the opposite and shared that they did

not feel safe at all (29.3%). While the level of crime in the community generated little variance in the responses across the three groups, those in struggling and suffering reported a slightly higher level of crime. Other safety characteristics that helped distinguish these three groups was the change in local crime rates in the past year. While the majority of respondents in each community group said crime rates stayed the same, over 1/3 of respondents in both the struggling and suffering groups noticed an increase in crime (32.8% and 44.5% respectively). Besides, residents of suffering community reported that the effectiveness of the police was very bad (17.6%) which was 5 times more than reported in the thriving group (3.3%) and more than two times those in the struggling group (6.8%). On balance, the Sense of Safety was rated by residents to be the strongest in Thriving communities ($\bar{x}$ on the social fabric index score was 12.98*** on a range of 4.0 -18.0 while weakest in Suffering communities ($\bar{x}$ =10.57***)

Table 1.C. Sense of Safety
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Responses	Statistics		
				Thriving (n=9242)	**Struggling (n=5392)**	**Suffering (n=365)**
Sense of Safety	Feeling safe	Q18: Feel safe walking alone at night near your home	1. Not safe at all	9.2%	16.0%	29.3%
			2	8.7	13.4	13.9
			3	17.0	20.2	17.6
			4	30.9	27.5	19.7
			5. Completely safe	34.2	22.9	19.5
	Crime Activity	Q19: Level of Crime in your Community	1. extremely high	7.2%	8.9%	15.1%
			2	12.2	15.9	17.5
			3	27.1	33.4	30.8
			4	30.2	26.7	21.5
			5 Extremely low	23.4	15.1	15.1
		Q20: Change in local crime level in past year	1. Increased	23.6%	32.8%	44.5%
			2. Stayed the	65.7	58.1	48.2
			3. Decreased	10.7	9.1	7.3
	Law Enforcement	Q7N: Effectiveness of Local Police	1. Very bad	3.3%	6.8%	17.6%
			2	5.9	10.0	16.0
			3	20.2	25.3	24.1
			4	40.1	35.5	25.7
			5. Very good	30.5	22.4	16.6
			Mean ($\bar{x}$)	12.98	11.83	10.57***
			Std. deviation	2.64	2.78	3.23
			Min-Max	4.0 -18.0	4.0 -18.0	4.0 - 18.0

[1] Index of Sense of Security = Q7N+Q18+Q19+Q20. The correlations among these indicators were: suffering communities between .391*** and .196***; in the struggling communities between .327*** and .131***; in the thriving communities between .335*** and .156***; *** p<=.001.

Citizen Actions

Human beings are political animals and as such they participate in various forms of civic engagement (Interviewee #4). The term citizen action was used to capture civic engagement and political activism; they both involve and require an individual to voluntarily participate and collaborate in a social system to create some form of change. A person can be involved politically and partake in actions to ignite community growth and a person can also be involved civically and use voluntary actions to help others around them. With both types of engagement, residents enact their civic duty and are called to action, but the type of actions being executed and the types of outcomes will be quite different.

Civic Engagement, is an important component of Community Attachment because it is through service and dedication that residents can enact changes and make community member feel better about and become more connected to their neighborhood. Civic engagement is important for any healthy community because it can also strengthen and sustain the areas that need attention. For instance, volunteering and working with local organizations can be a form of engagement that individual partakes in to help others around them (Table 1.D). As might be expected, the thriving communities group had the highest levels of civic engagement with an engagement mean of 7.72 (on a range of 4-15) followed by the struggling communities. Suffering communities showed the lowest mean of civic engagement with a mean of 7.39 (sd= 1.38).

Table 1.D. Citizen Action: Civic Engagement
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics		
			Thriving (n=9400)	Struggling (n=5488)	Suffering (n=373)
Civic Engagement	Q22A: Performed local volunteer Work	1.Yes 2.No	58.7% 41.3%	49.2% 50.8	37.3%*** 62.7%
	Q22D: Worked with others to change community	1.Yes 2. No	44.3% 55.7	37.9% 62.1	36.8%*** 63.2
	DummyQ22G: Donated money to help a local organization	1.Yes 2. No	17.9% 82.1	26.8% 73.2	35.8%*** 64.2
	Q22_A: Residents' impact on improving community	1. No impact at all 2. A small impact 3. Moderate impact 4. A big impact	2.5% 18.9 43.9 34.6	6.2% 29.4 42.7 21.6	17.0%*** 39.0 28.4 15.6
	Index of Civic Engagement[1]	Mean ($\overline{x}$) Std. deviation (s) Min-Max	7.72 1.20 4.0 - 15.0	7.60 1.21 4.0 - 15.0	7.39*** 1.38 4.0 - 14.0

[1] Index of Civic Engagement = Q22A + Q22D + Q22_A + DummyQ22G. The correlations among these indicators were: suffering communities between .409*** and .130*; in the struggling communities between .344*** and .156***; in the thriving communities between .339*** and .143***; *** p<=.001; * p<=.05.

Some specifics on civic engagement activities in the three communities: In Suffering communities, residents (37.3%) were far less likely to engage in local volunteer work as opposed to those who lived in thriving communities (58.7%). However, in all three communities more than half did not attend local public meetings (62.7%, 66.1%, and 68%). When asked how often they worked with others to enact change in communities, more than half indicated infrequently. However, those in Thriving communities were the most evenly split, with a little less than half working with others to change the communities (yes=44.3% vs. no=55.7%). Besides, more than half the residents in the suffering group felt they can make a little to no impact in improving their communities (56%).

<u>Political Activism</u>, the second dimension of Citizen Actions, is also human empowered and offers people a voice against dominant political and societal structures. Citizen's participation and involvement in local government are essential for community attachment because it places responsibility both on the individual and on the collective. In the process of political activism, people come together, hold each other accountable, understand the complexity of problems, and find innovative strategies. Individuals' feelings about their local government and leaders paint a potential picture of past and present experiences living in the community. Political activities are ones that get people to think about their civic duties and change the dynamics and make-up of the community. The type of political activity in which individuals engage may vary depending on the individuals' level of trust and whether or not they have local leaders representing their interests. Voting and being registered to vote is one form of activism that has the potential to bring about developmental change within communities.

As seen in Table 1.E, political activism, that ultimately shapes the fate of a community, varied by whether the community was thriving, suffering or struggling. The thriving communities had the highest index of Political Activism at 19.33, on a range of 6 – 68, followed by the struggling community group. At the other end was the group of suffering communities which had the lowest index of political activism with a mean of 14.59 (sd = 8.31). But, all three communities had high proportions who had registered to vote (close to or over 90%). Additionally, all three groups had a high turnout rates in their local election. Those in Thriving communities had the highest turnout rate (80.3%) followed by the struggling community group (76.9) and then the suffering group (73.6%). Despite the uniformity in voting patterns, perceptions of local government and leaders conjured varied openness across communities. The majority of those residing in Suffering communities hardly ever had trust (44.8) in the local government, almost 3 times more than those in thriving communities who felt the same (14.7%). Also, two thirds in suffering communities admitted that local leadership was bad or very bad and a plurality strongly felt that their leaders failed to represent their interests (41.2%).

Table 1.E. Citizen Action; Political Activism
NADAC, 2010 – Soul of The Community

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Values and Responses	Statistics		
				Thriving (n=9302)	Struggling (n=5411)	Suffering (n=370)
Political Activism	Assessment	Q7L: Local leadership of elected officials	1.Very bad	10.8%	19.7	40.9%***
			2	15.7	20.0	19.5
			3	33.7	31.9	19.2
			4	28.5	20.6	14.9
			5. Very good	11.3	7.8	5.4
		Q10A: Level of trust in local govern-ment	1. Hardly ever	14.7%	23.9%	44.8%***
			2. Only some of the time	41.3	47.4	39.8
			3. Most of the time	37.7	25.8	12.2
			4. Just about always	6.4	3.0	3.2
		Q15AB: Local leaders represent my interests	1.Strongly disagree	10.4%	10.4%	41.2%***
			2	17.1	17.1	25.0
			3	37.2	37.2	19.9
			4	26.0	26.0	8.2
			5. Strongly Agree	9.2	9.2	5.6
	Actions	Q21Registered to vote	1. Yes	92.6%	90.4%	87.9%***
			2. No	7.4	9.6	12.1
		Q22C: Voted in the local election	1. Yes	80.3%	76.9%	73.6%***
			2. No	19.7	23.1	26.4
		Q22B: Attended a local public meeting	1.Yes	37.3%	33.9%	32.0%***
			2.No	62.7	66.1	68.0
		Index of Political Activism[1]	Mean ($\overline{x}$)	19.33	17.29	14.59***
			Std. deviation (s)	7.77	7.84	8.31
			Min-Max	6.0 - 68.00	6.0 - 56.0	6.0 - 44.0

[1] Index of Political Activism = Q7L + Q15AB + Q10A + DuummyQ22C + DummyQ21 + DummyQ22B. The correlations among these indicators were: suffering communities between .691*** and .197***; in the struggling communities between .580*** and .030*; in the thriving communities between .667*** and -.047***;
*** p<=.001; * p<=.05.

Bivariate Analyses

In the second analytical step in the process of answering the empirical and theoretical questions raised in this paper, the empirical relationships of community attachment with supportive community environment and citizen actions were evaluated (Table 2 in

Appendix C). Based on these preliminary results, community social fabric had the strongest likelihood of strengthening residents' ownership of their communities, irrespective of whether they lived in struggling ($r=.61^{***}$), thriving ($r=.61^{***}$) or suffering communities ($r=.61^{***}$). Sense of security was possibly a second, even if weaker than social fabric, predictor in all three communities; but, security was more important to community ownership in suffering communities ($r=.45^{***}$), followed by residents in struggling communities ($r=.39^{***}$), and least in thriving communities($r=.37^{***}$).

Of the two types of citizen actions considered, political activism appeared to have a stronger potential for strengthening community attachment than civic engagement. For example, political activism was most important to residents' attachment in suffering communities ($r=.58^{***}$); thriving community residents ($.49^{***}$) followed by struggling communities ($r=.52^{***}$) seem to have used political activism to strengthen attachment to their communities. Civic engagement was also an important tool, even if less so than political activism, to strengthen community ownership first in suffering communities ($r=.17^{***}$), followed by struggling ($r=.15^{***}$) and last in thriving ($r= .12^{***}$).

But, which of these mechanisms are the most effective in engendering community ownership? The unique roles that each of these tools played in strengthening community ownership were tested using multivariate analyses and are laid out in the next section. In keeping with the research design, the analyses were disaggregated by whether residents lived in Thriving, Struggling, or Suffering communities.

Multivariate Linear Regression Analyses and Qualitative Insights

A series of one-step multivariate analyses were used, separately for the three community subgroups, to test the robustness of the correlational analyses and the research hypotheses; see Table 3 below. Overall, a supportive social environment was the strongest predictor of how satisfied their residents were in all three communities. However, not all environments were equal nor were they equally effective in different communities. A vibrant social fabric took precedence over members' sense of security. For example, the more supportive the social fabric was the more attached their members of the communities were ($\beta=.45^{***}$ in Thriving, $\beta=.41^{***}$ in Struggling, and $\beta=.34^{***}$ in Suffering communities respectively). As per the Psychologist interviewee (Interviewee #4), when community members have a supportive environment, full of inclusion and security, they feel recognized, have a sense of purpose, and feel that their contributions to the community are actually elevated and noticed. These feelings, are a buy-in, and has a valuable impact on the communities as it creates a sense of commitment. Without a supportive environment, resident don't feel a buy-in and when their contributions are dismissed, they feel alienated. Such disjointedness ends up hurting the very people that live there.

Table 3. Regression Analysis of Community Attachment[1]
NADAC, 2010 – Soul of The Community. β Coefficients

	Community Attachment		
	Thriving	**Struggling**	**Suffering**
Community Environment:			
Social Fabric	.45***	.41***	.34***
Sense of Security	.11***	.13***	.14**
Citizen Actions:			
Political Activism	.19***	.23***	.32***
Civic Engagement	.03**	.03*	.07
Demographics:			
Age	.09***	.09***	.04
Gender	.04***	.03*	-.05
SES	-.01	-.04***	-.05
Length of residency	-.01	-.01	-.03
Model Statistics:			
Constant	2.36***	2.87***	10.68***
Adjusted R^2	.43***	.45***	.46***
DF 1 & 2	8 & 7534	8 & 4347	8 & 281

***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05

[1] Index of Community Attachment = Community as a place to live + Recommend community to others + Proud to live in this community + This community is perfect for me. Possible Ranges: 4 -100 for all groups;
Index of Social Fabric = Availability of social community events + Availability of parks and playgrounds + Availability of arts and cultural opportunities + Good place to meet people and make friends + Vibrant nightlife - restaurants, clubs, bars, etc. + People care about each other + Attended a local event; 6 - 60 for all groups;
Index of Sense of Security = Feel safe walking alone at night near your home + Level of Crime in your Community + Change in local crime level in past year + Effectiveness of Local Police; Possible Ranges: 4-18 for all groups;
Index of Political Activism = Registered to vote + Voted in the local election + Leadership of elected officials + Local leaders represent my interests + Level of trust in local government + Attended a public meeting; Possible Ranges: 6 - 68 for thriving groups, 6 - 56 for struggling groups, 6 - 44 for suffering groups;
Index of Civic Engagement = Performed local volunteer work + Worked with others to change community + Donated money to a local organization + Residents' impact on improving community. Possible Ranges: 4 -15 for struggling and thriving groups, 4 - 14 for suffering groups:
Female (1) versus Male (0);
Age: 1 = 18-24, 2 = 25-34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45-54, 5 = 55-64, 6 = 65 and older;
Index of Socio-economic Status = Income Range * Highest level of education completed; Range: 1- 48 for all groups;
Length of Residency = 1-97 years.

Similarly, even though to a lesser extent, the more secure residents felt in their communities, the more satisfied they were with their communities (Suffering β=.145**, Struggling β=.13*** and Thriving β =.11***). That is, residents felt more ownership in communities that were secure (supported by Interviewee #4). However, community context, whether thriving or not, also mattered. Of the different mechanisms considered here, a strong social fabric was the most important for residents of thriving communities[4]. And security was more relevant to member attachment in the Suffering (β=.145**) and Struggling (β=.13***) communities than in Thriving communities (β=.11***).

In addition to a supportive community environment, citizen actions were also a necessary set of options for strengthening community attachment. Civic Actions, particularly political activism but not civic engagement, was a critical element in member's satisfaction, most in Suffering communities[5] (β = .32***). Political activism was less relevant in the Struggling (β= .23***) and Thriving (β= .19***) in that order.

Two other noteworthy patterns were evident in the comparisons among the three communities. For one, of the three tools for building community attachment, strengthening the social fabric was by far the most important to members of Thriving (β=.45***) and Struggling (β=.41***) communities. On the other hand, members of the Suffering communities equally valued a strong social fabric (β=.34***) and political activism (β=.32***). Second, members of all three groups equally valued sense of security in their commitment to their communities (Thriving β=.11***, Struggling β=.13***, and Suffering β=.14**). But priorities in suffering communities were strong fabric and political activism.

While having a supportive social fabric is important for community attachment, significant differences across the three communities indicated that an affluent, lack thereof, social context matters. While affluent community conditions are prime for more social interactions (as in the Thriving Communities), others, as the Suffering group, have limited resources and opportunities to engage in social events. No doubt, residents in the Suffering communities, that have a large percentage living below the poverty line, also desire to cultivate in social connections. Nevertheless, their priorities to work and provide for their families might be more pressing. Advocating for their material needs and making sure their voices are heard is equally as important as the social fabric in their community, whereas in thriving communities there is less of a need for political activism perhaps because they are already being listened to. And while sense of security is important in all of the communities it is not a primary concern when looking at community satisfaction as compared to political activism and social fabric.

Political activism is critical because it is one of the most important ways individuals in a community can feel a sense of belonging and knowledge of how to access political leadership. It is important for any healthy community to discuss, critic their situation, and do some problem solving. In the process of having these conversations, a person is able to understand that some of the challenges they face can be addressed with some

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[4] Z Scores of the differences in unstandardized regression coefficients among all 3 groups were statistically significant at the .05 level.

[5] Z Scores of the differences in unstandardized regression coefficients among all 3 groups were statistically significant at the .05 level.

activism. “If you feel you are not alone and have some power to exercise your rights and access political influence you will feel better about you self and better about your neighborhood when it comes to change (Social Worker, Interviewee #1).” Feeling better about your community through political activism is confirmed from the multivariate findings. It’s strong positive influence on community attachment comes from the demands that political activism places on individuals to collaborate and interact.

The opportunities to interact is present a bit in civic engagement as well, but only in thriving (β=.03**) and struggling (β=.03**) communities. Civic engagement was not a viable option to strengthening community attachment in the suffering group; there was no empirical relationship to support civic engagement. Inquiring into why civic engagement might not be an appropriate strategy for strengthening community attachment in suffering communities, the Community Organizer (Interviewee #1) had this to say: with a sense alienation in some communities, there is less connection, and fewer opportunities, and consequently community attachment stays stagnant. This does not necessarily mean that they are avoiding a collective bond; it just indicates that it is not a priority amidst the financial stress and challenges of providing for their families. Civic engagement strengthened community attachment in thriving and struggling communities, but their economic conditions were less dire in these communities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the concluding sections, a synthesis of the study findings with theoretical premises and practical applications were explored. Some suggestions for future research, specifying additional conditional boundary limits of communities, were also outlined.

Empirical and Applied Implications

There were clear boundary limiting conditions in what made residents of thriving, struggling, and suffering communities felt attached to and took ownership of their communities. In thriving communities, a supportive social fabric was the most important predictor of community attachment; political activism and sense of security were a distant second. In contrast, politically active residents along with a supportive social environment were the keys to strong sense of belonging for residents of suffering communities. Notable differences were also observed in the respective ranking of the three critical priorities in community attachment. In suffering communities, a resident’s sense of security can come only after a supportive social environment is established and citizens become politically engaged. On the other hand, in both thriving and struggling communities’ sense of security is less as priority than a strong social fabric. The sociologist (Interviewee #3) interviewed for this research placed these boundary limits in perspective thusly: If a community is very tight-knit, in the sense of offering ample opportunities for socialization, their residents can “socialize and thrive by introducing good lighting on the streets, creating open areas or spaces where people talk, and making sidewalks large enough for conversations to occur amidst the foot traffic. The way we design cities creates socialization and a deep sense of pride, but additionally can control for deviance”. He went on to explain that with a bustling social fabric, it inadvertently reduces crime because criminals are not naïve; they are cognizant that if they are visibly seen or can't assure a quick escape then they will be caught. Therefore, security is less of a priority in these thriving communities considering that their social fabric mostly insulates residents from crime.

These findings about boundaries of community attachment could be useful to interested stakeholders, such as local government officials, social workers, and community organizing nonprofits/organizations, in developing tailored strategies for boosting community attachment amongst their citizens. Community attachment is conditional; one first must identify whether the community is thriving, struggling or suffering because the community building strategies or approaches to address any particular issue would and should be prioritized differently in each community. In all three groups, but particularly in suffering groups, political activism is a tool that stakeholders, including community residents, can use. No doubt, encouraging civic engagement by residents in struggling and thriving groups is important but until their socioeconomic conditions improve, especially in struggling communities, developing attachment through civic engagement will be a challenge. For example, in Suffering Communities, where a considerable percentage of their population live in poverty, unless their economic poverty situations are addressed, attempts at impactful changes will be of limited effectiveness.

One community organization that has already been taking efforts to strengthening the social fabric of their neighborhood is Michigan's Urban Neighborhood Initiative (UNI Annual Report, 2017). This non-profit's mission is to work with communities to develop safe and thriving environments, in the hopes that everyone will feel attached to the place where they work live and play. By taking on various projects in the town of Spring Wells and Detroit, Michigan citizens have seen their neighborhoods transform before their eyes. In their annual report they address targeting issues of youth development, land use economic development, and education. "By collaborating with the resident they reveal their attachment to the community and each other. Spring Wells and Detroit vacant lots, streets, and sidewalks were filled with memories of joy and love, and by tapping these residents on the street knowledge, these places are filled with hope and promise! (UNI Annual Report, 2017)" Testimonials like these provide a glance of the power that communities have when addressing major impactors of community attachment.

Theoretical implications

From a theoretical point of view (Figure 1), the affluent persistence model was conditionally supported in this analysis; a supportive community environment was the most critical tool for attachment in the more affluent communities but not so strong in the less affluent neighborhoods. The wealth in a neighborhood shapes the opportunities, security, and social networks of the residents, which, in turn, improves their quality of life and overall wellbeing (Solari 2012). It is this overall satisfaction, independent of personal and family status, that generate and sustain strong ties towards their collective community. Indicators of affluence are expressed not only in the high economic status of the neighborhood but also its unattainability for those on the outside. One of the clearest visual cues of social exclusion are gates and walls bordering wealthy communities. Affluent communities maintain their exclusive position and status of their neighborhood through social exclusion (Deener, 2010). In contrast, persistently poor neighborhoods, are not primarily concerned with the maintenance and renovation of their community. It is to be expected that their residents' attention is, first and foremost, to their families. While deteriorating buildings, increased crime, and disinvestment persist in suffering communities, so does the need for members to provide for their children. As a result, living in chronically distressed areas creates disadvantages that makes it increasingly difficult not only to exit poverty but also to build community attachment.

Figure 1. Empirical and Theoretical Model of Community Attachment: Impacts on Civic Engagement and Political Activism NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community[1,2,3]



[1] Key: Thriving = Struggling = Suffering =
[2] See Table 3 for index coding.
[3] Controls and Civic Engagement were not modeled because they did not have significant effect on community attachment.

Additionally, there was conditional support for the New Institutionalist theory in the most disadvantaged communities. Even if citizens in persistently poor neighborhoods might lack political power, they may find a collective identity and attachment through engaging in political activism. The Boyle Height Los Angeles community offers an excellent example (Kamya, 2017). In a community that suffers from a heavy presence and concentration of gang violence, the mothers came together as a community to address the issue of their children's safety on the streets. In a community forum, one mother recounted her story of spending the night lying on the street with the rest of the community. They laid on the ground where a child had previously been shot in a drive by and engaged in this protest to demand that the city of Los Angeles paves a speed bump on the road (a request that was multiply denied prior). Eventually the demand was met, demonstrating that when people connect to a mission, their community attachment and sense of ownership can be fostered and deepened.

However, while politically active citizenry was one of two most instrumental in creating community attachment in suffering communities (as per the Institutionalists), it might not be sufficient. There is also the need for a supportive social environment to foster community ownership. Even though residents in suffering communities might be interested in volunteering and contributing to the public good, their primary focus is on maintaining taking care of their families (e.g., paying the bill, mortgage, and providing for family). It is these competing priorities in suffering communities that might explain why civic engagement was not a relevant factor to community attachment.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

While the theoretical and empirical models of supportive environments and community actions considered in this analysis offered a coherent explanation (Adjusted R^2 = over 0.40) of community ownership in communities, irrespective of their affluence or lack thereof, there is still much to be learned. Theoretically and programmatically, community engagement and ownership are also built on shared beliefs and traditions, both spiritual and ethnic. The Social Worker (Interviewee #1), interviewed for this research, noted the potential for local churches, neighborhood rituals/practices, and shared traditions to strengthen community attachment. More research is called for on how belonging to an ethnic niche, rich in traditions or to a community with similar (and divergent) religious beliefs and practices can encourage political activism, strengthen social fabric, and in the long run, build community attachment. Additionally, professional interviewees also pointed to race and immigration in communities; how do individuals of color and immigrants connect to their communities and how can those connections be strengthened?

Theoretically, further elucidation of the functional and power dynamics involved in creating and sustaining conditional boundaries of community ownership can offer advances in the field of sociology of communities. If societies and social systems are not equally functional or resilient in facing challenges and dealing with conflict (Powers

2004), it is a theoretical and programmatic imperative of scholars to clarify the internal (to the community) and external dynamics that facilitate or hamper healthy communities.

APPENDICES

Appendix A. Demographic and Socioeconomic Controls

Demographics: Sex and Age (Controls)
NADAC, 2010– Soul of The Community

Concepts	Indicators	Values OR Responses	Statistics		
			Thriving	**Struggling**	**Suffering**
Demographics	SEX of Respondent	0. Male	42.5%	44.6%	48.9%***
		1 Female	57.5	55.4	51.1
	Age Range of Respondent	1. 18-24	7.4%	2.9%	3.7%***
		2. 25-34	9.0	5.1	5.0
		3. 35-44	12.6	12.2	7.4
		4. 45-54	17.3	20.0	20.5
		5. 55-64	21.3	23.2	27.1
		6. 65 and older	30.9	34.5	33.2
	Educational Achievement	1. Grade school or less.	0.8%	1.5%	3.2%***
		2. Some High school	3.4	4.2	8.0
		3. High School	16.4	21.1	24.1
		4. Some College or Technical School	28.1	31.8	32.6
		5. College Graduate	26.3	23.7	18.7
		6. Post Graduate work or degree	25.0	17.8	13.4
	Annual Income	1. under 15,000	5.2%	9.6%	19.2%***
		2. 15,000 to 24,999	6.9	11.9	18.3
		3. 25,000 to 34,999	9.7	14.7	15.5
		4. 35,000 to 44,999	9.8	13.0	11.9
		5. 45,000 to 54,999	11.1	11.8	7.9
		6. 55,000 to 74,999	16.2	14.9	11.3
		7. 75,000 to 99,999	13.9	10.6	6.7
		8. 100,000 or over	27.1	13.5	9.1
	Index of Socio-Economic Status[1]	Mean	26.36	20.52	15.98***
		Standard Deviation	13.74	12.98	12.51
		Minimum - Maximum	1-48	1-48	1-48
	Length of Residency	Mean	32.93	35.18	38.28***
		Standard Deviation	24.01	24.53	24.80
		Minimum - Maximum	1- All my Life	1- All my Life	1- All my Life

[1] Index of Socio-Economic Status = (QD9 * QD7). Among These indicators correlational values are between .45*** to .48*** (***p <= .001).

Appendix B. Interview Protocol and Consent Forms

Letter of Consent

Dear _______________:

I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on the differential impacts of community attachment in thriving, struggling and suffering communities.

You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of community development.

I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about civic engagement, political activism, and community attachment. The interview will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.

If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at ___ or Dr. Fernandez at mfernandez@scu.edu

Sincerely,
Elizabeth Kamya

By signing below, you are giving consent to participate in the above study. (If the interviewee was contacted by email or phone, request an electronic message denoting consent).

______________________ ____________________ ____________
Signature Printed Name Date

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews

Interview Date and Time: ____________
Respondent ID#: __

1. What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution (NO NAME, please) where you learned about (and/or worked) with this issue: Establishing community attachment in thriving, struggling, and suffering communities?
2. What is your position in this organization? ___________________________
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization? ____________________________
4. Based on what you know of community development, how crucial is attachment of community members? That is, typically, how attached are members to their communities?
5. Based on your experience what are some reasons why some community members are very attached while others are not? Could you expand a bit more?
6. How important are citizens actions to improve community attachment?
7. Could engagement improve resident's attachment to their communities? How so?
8. How important is a supportive community environment in regard to improving attachment?
9. In your opinion what makes for a supportive community environment?

10. In your opinion, what are some reasons that contribute to this problem (issue or concern)? (PROBE with: Could you expand a bit more?).
11. [If the respondent does not bring up your independent concepts as potential causes), PROBE:
    a. How about Social Fabric
    b. How about Sense of Security
    c. How about Political Activism
    d. How about Civic Engagement
12. Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be contacted at ekamya@scu.edu. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu.

Appendix C Table 2. Correlation Matrix (r)
Table 2A.
Correlational Matrix of Thriving and Suffering communities: Indices of Community Attachment, Supportive Community Environment, Citizens Actions, Gender, Age, and Socio-economic Status, Length of Residency[1,2]

	Index of Community Attachment	Index of Social Fabric	Index of sense of security	Index of Civic Political Activism	Index of Civic Engagement	Sex	Age	Index SES	Length of residency
Index of Community Attachment	1.00	.61***	.45***	.58***	.22***	-.02	.13**	.01	.04
Index of Social Fabric	.61***	1.00	.44***	.55***	.21***	-.01	.07	.12*	.09
Index of Sense of Security	.37***	.40***	1.00	.43***	.17***	-.20***	.04	.100	.06
Index of Political Activism	.49***	.52***	.39***	1.00	.20***	.12*	.15**	.01	.04
Index of Civic Engagement	.12***	.13***	.12***	.13***	1.00	.03	.04	.07	-.01
Female vs. Male	.08***	.07***	-.12***	.09***	.041***	1.00	.10	-.11*	.02
Age	.17***	.12***	.02	.17***	.015	.06***	1.00	-.02	.13**
Index of SES	-.02	-.03**	.13***	0.0	.02	-.13***	-.07***	1.00	-.12*
Length of Residency	.03**	.04***	-.04***	.05***	.00	.06***	.30***	-.18***	1.00

***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05

[1] Index of Community Attachment = Community as a place to live + Recommend community to others + Proud to live in this community + This community is perfect for me. Possible Ranges: 4.0-36.0;
Index of Social Fabric = Availability of social community events + Availability of parks and playgrounds + Availability of arts and cultural opportunities + Good place to meet people and make friends + Vibrant nightlife - restaurants, clubs, bars, etc. + People care about each other + Attended a local event. Possible Ranges: 6.0 - 60.0;
Index of Sense of Security = Feel safe walking alone at night near your home + Level of Crime in your Community + Change in local crime level in past year + Effectiveness of Local Police; Possible Ranges: 4.0 -18.0;
Index of Political Activism = Level of trust in local government + Local leaders represent my interests + Registered to vote + Voted in the local election. Possible Ranges: 6.0 - 68.00;
Index of Civic Engagement = Performed local volunteer work + Donated money to a local organization+ Worked with others to change community + Residents' impact on improving community. Possible Ranges: 4.0-12.0;
Sex: Male = 0, Female = 1;
Age: 1 = 18-24, 2 = 25-34, 3 = 35-44, 4 = 45-54, 5 = 55-64, 6 = 65 and older;
Index of Socio-economic Status = Income Range + Highest level of education completed; 1- 48 for all groups;
Length of Residency = 1= 1-5, 2= 6-10, 3= 11-20, 4= 21-30, 5= 31-40, 6=41-50, 7=51-60, 8=61-75, 9= 76 or more;
[2] Correlations above the value of 1 refer to suffering communities and correlations below the value of 1 refer to suffering groups.

Table 2A.
Correlational Matrix for Struggling communities: Indices of Community Attachment, Supportive Community Environment, Citizens Actions, Gender, Age, and Socio-economic Status, Length of Residency[1,2]

	Index of Community Attachment	Index of Social Fabric	Index of sense of security	Index of Civic Political Activism	Index of Civic Engagement	Sex	Age	Index SES	Length of residency
Index of Community Attachment	1.00								
Index of Social Fabric	.61***	1.00							.
Index of Sense of Security	.39***	.43**	1.00	.		-			
Index of Political Activism	.52***	.54***	.38***	1.00	.				
Index of Civic Engagement	.15**	.15***	.11***	.15***	1.00				
Female vs. Male	.06***	.06***	-.13***	.10***	.03*	1.00			
Age	.21***	.14***	.05***	.21***	.05**	.03**	1.00		
Index of SES	-.04**	-.01	.12***	-.00	.02	-.14***	-.00	1.00	
Length of Residency	.05***	.03**	-.03*	.08***	.00	.03**	.29***	-.12***	1.00

***p≤.001;**p≤.01;*p≤.05
[1] Refer to table 2.A for Index Coding

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Interviewee#2. November 20, 2018. Community Organizer, Oakland Non-Profit.

Interviewee #3. February 28, 2019. Sociologist, University in California.

Interviewee #4. March 1, 2019. Community Based Psychologist, in Massachusetts.

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Trust in Institutions: International Political Boundaries

The Middle Eastern Societies Institutional Trust in Political Turmoil and Stasis

By
Noor Darwish[1]

ABSTRACT. There is a general lack of citizen trust in governmental institutions in the Middle East, especially because of changing of governments and resulting turmoil. Sequential Mixed Methodology was used, in which data from the 2016 Arab Barometer were supplemented with qualitative insights from two professionals knowledgeable about the political climate in the Middle East and content analyses of relevant journalistic accounts. A comparison of North Africa (characterized by political turmoil) and the Levant (political stasis) countries in how government functionality (efficacy, stability, and corruption), as perceived by their citizens, differentially colored trust in governmental institutions was used to illustrate the citizen-government dynamics that resulted in citizens questioning the legitimacy of government authority. Predictions, based on Max Weber's theory of Political Legitimacy and Gaetano Mosca's Elite Theory, that, on balance, functional governments will garner more citizen's trust in the Levant than in North Africa, while corruption will have a more corrosive effect were supported. A trust surplus occurred as a result of governmental functionality, balancing out the trust deficit created by government dysfunctionality. These findings contributed to existing theoretical and empirical literature on the contested relationship between citizens and their governments. Additional research on sectarian and ethnic conflicts and types of government (monarchy, authoritarian, democratic) in the region as they have shaped citizen trust is warranted.

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East is a hard region to define, primarily due to the wide range of countries, the many languages or dialects, cultures, and traditions, it encompasses. Even though the region has no standardized definition, it can generally be split into three groups. The first group is comprised of the Gulf countries (Gulf Cooperation Council) which include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar. The second group, referred to as the "Levant", is comprised of, but not limited to, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. The third is the "North Africa" group which includes Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The latter two is the focus in this research paper.

The Gulf countries have enjoyed economic success in the last few decades and are considered powerful Middle Eastern countries on a global scale. But, over the last couple of decades, many countries in the North African and Levantine regions of the

[1] Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Dr. Marilyn Fernandez for her guidance, encouragement and patience. In addition to thanks to my interviewees, who provided valuable insight into my research.

Middle East have experienced turmoil as a result of multiple wars, including civil wars and revolutions. Others look more static, even if in their extreme class inequality. For example, among the Northern African countries, Egypt has gone through a revolution and a political coup. Even though Algeria and Morocco have not recently been through governmental turmoil, they are characterized by poverty and instability. In the Levant camp, Syria is currently fighting a civil war and dealing with a huge refugee crisis, Palestine is under military occupation of the Israeli army, and Jordan is in political stasis but characterized by class inequality.

The Middle East is a region that is always featured in the news, often under the section involving war, disaster and terrorism. Yet there is very little coverage and research regarding the effects of the turmoil and dramatic change in governments and war on citizens' lives. Such lacunae are especially acute in the United States whose foreign policy in the Middle East has greatly affected the political dynamics of its current landscape. Consequently, the level of trust Middle East citizens have in their governmental bodies have decreased over the last couple of decades.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is much scholarly literature on the politico-historical events that have occurred over the last few decades in the Middle East, specifically in the Levant and North African regions. Another stream in the Middle East scholarship has been about the economics-citizen trust equation, and the relationship between corruption and trust.

The New Arab Order and Political Trust

The 2011 uprisings that occurred across the Middle East created a "New Arab Order." But soon after, the hopes of new democratic reform to replace autocratic regimes vanished. The uprisings were a result of citizen frustration with their countries stagnant economy and lack of political freedom (Lynch 2018:120). In the end, regimes were either overthrown as the byproduct of popular uprisings, or remained standing, as a result of the failure of popular uprising, or did not experience any popular uprisings. In either event, a shift was created in which traditionally strong powers such as Egypt[2] have collapsed and are now "barely functional states" (Lynch 2018:116). On the other hand, Gulf countries, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for historical and unique global economic reasons, have been able to maintain a strong political and economic presence in both the Middle East and worldwide; these Gulf countries were not part of the Arab Barometer survey, and are not included in this research.

On the world stage, the Middle East has become a playground for both Western major powers and other powers such as Russia, to achieve their own political and economic goals. Power in the Middle East operates through "influence peddling and proxy

[2] Which were included in the 2016 Arab Barometer Survey, the source of survey data for this paper.

warfare" (Lynch 2018:116). As a result, there is great sense of insecurity among the citizenry of the Middle East; for example, citizens are unsure of the likelihood of another uprising or civil war. In this volatile political climate, academics, politicians and others have posed important questions about the impacts of failed states, unresolved crises of governance, unrest and the resulting turmoil on the political attitudes of citizens.

For one, the protests that swept through the North African and Levantine regions of the Middle East changed "two key civic attitudes, trust and tolerance", fundamental to well-functioning democracies (Spierings 2017:4). Niels Spierings synchronized over 40 Arab Barometer and World Values Survey conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen, from before and after the uprisings. Using macro-level analysis, Spiering associated a fall in political-institutional trust with the uprisings in countries that went through democratic reform or regime change. Politics became less trustworthy to citizens as a result of "misbehaving" politicians and unsuccessful social reform policies.

<u>North Africa and the Origins of the Arab Spring</u>

The North African region of the Middle East includes Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia, and Algeria. Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring in 2011, when Mohammed Bouzaizi, a street vendor, set himself on fire as a form of protest. His action was a catalyst for the wider Arab Spring. Since then, democracy and reform have become the focal point of pride in a region that needed it (Bremmer 2019). Protesters demanded that the government tackle rising corruption, reduce income inequality, create jobs, and increase wages. However, Bremer claimed that even though a democratic regime replaced the former president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, it has not been a successful transition. For example, almost ten years later, Tunisia 's unemployment rate is 30%, GDP per capita is low, wages are stagnant, and there is heavy dependence on financial support from the International Monetary Fund. Amidst such economic chaos, almost 11,000 demonstrations took place in 2018.

Like Tunisia, Egypt, also saw the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and in 2012, Mohamed Morsi, who represented the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected president. However, the democratic period in Egypt only lasted till 2014, when a military coup, spearheaded by Abed Fattah el-Sisi, led to the return of an authoritarian regime. The military coup used disorder of the popular protest to assume power (Ketchley 2018). Currently, Abdel Fattah el- Sisi's push towards a presidential term extension, by changing the constitution, is indicative of the corruption and illegitimacy of his reign.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco, the third country in the North African region, did not experience a change in government. However, in 2011, a new constitution was introduced that aimed to improve democracy and the rule of law (Al Jazeera and Agencies 2011). In addition, a stronger separation of powers within governmental branches was created, giving the prime minister and parliament more executive authority and ultimately reducing the authority of the King Mohammed VI. The referendum on constitutional reforms, held on July 1st 2011, was approved by 98.49%

of voters, legitimizing the authoritative governing system in Morocco (No Author[a], *BBC News* 2011). Yet, despite the reforms, and increased transparency, corruption remains a major problem within the country, and elected officials power to change policy is heavily constrained (No Author[b], *Freedom House* 2019).

Algeria the fourth country in the North Africa region, suffered through a civil war during the 1990's, which resulted in the death of 100,000 Algerians (Algiers, *Economist* 2012). On May 10 1992, a general election was held. However, the electoral change was not deemed as revolutionary, especially considering that the 1992 elections were hijacked by the army in order to stop the Islamic Salvation Front from winning (Algiers 2012). On January 12, 2011 26-year-old Mohamed Aouichia set himself on fire in Algeria. The next day, January 13, 2011, Mohsen Bouterfif also set himself on fire. The two suicides were followed by many others causing hundreds of protesters to take to the streets. In response, a National Coordination for Change and Democracy was created with the aim of seeking systemic change. However, these protests notwithstanding, Algeria remained unaffected by the Arab Spring, mostly because it was recovering from the civil war and Algerians were fearful of further instability (Daoud 2015).

The Levant

The Levantine region of the Middle East, the second considered in this paper, includes Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Israel; the region is sometimes extended to include Cyprus and Turkey. This region has faced intractable sectarian and ethnocentric conflicts, including, but not limited to the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, the independence struggle of the Kurds, and the rise of ISIS. The Levant is a volatile region that is deeply affected by broader Middle Eastern conflicts. The geopolitical clash between the Iran-led and Saudi-led camps, the ideological conflict among the Muslim Brotherhood groups, and other religious conflicts has led to the internal fragmentation of the Levant (Dalacoura 2018:32). Global actors, such as the United States and Russia, have also contributed to the prolonged instability and vulnerable state of the region.

Lebanon, with its fairly longstanding constitutional system, was not affected by the Arab Spring, much like its Levantine neighbors (Di Peri 2014). Yet, Lebanon experienced its own "spring" in 2005, following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Al Hariri. His death was a catalyst of political change, which ultimately led to the end of Syrian military occupation of Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Lebanon, typified by confessionalism[3], faces continued conflict in its civil society primarily because of the power imbalance among the various religious, ethnic, and associated political communities. But, even though the opportunity to change its political structure of

[3] Confessionalism is a consciational system of government that proportionally allocates political power among a country's communities according to their percentage of the population (Harb 2006). Per consciationalist governing principles: there is a proportional (numerical representation) allocation of political posts among communities with a grand coalition between community leaders on common policies that serve all. But there is communal autonomy and freedom for each community to determine its own affairs (as in personal status laws and mutual veto power on any decisions deemed detrimental by any community.

consciationalism, presented itself during the Arab Spring, it was lost because of deepening sectarian divide and politics.

The legitimacy of the rule of Jordan's monarchy was based on its rentier system (Muasher 2018:114). A social contract, imposed from the top down, through public spending rather than political participation, secured support for governmental and elite rule. "In return for their patronage, states expected citizens to leave governing to a small elite, which, over time, became more and more isolated from the general population" (p.115). Unlike Lebanon and other Levantine countries, the instability in Jordan is more economic than political. For example, the 2011 protests in Jordan began as a fight against unemployment, inflation and corruption. A real constitutional monarchy and electoral reforms were demanded by the people. In response, economic reforms were introduced to address the holes in the social contract. But with no political changes, the economic reforms, of privatization of state-run industries and liberalizing trading systems, only ended up benefiting the elite as opposed to the general population. In the end, the economic reforms were associated with the self-enrichment of elites (p. 116-18). In the last decade, Jordan's patronage system has been threatened as a result of the declining financial support from oil-producing countries and the United States. While Jordan has taken steps to pacify the protestors, such as firing three prime ministers and reforming a third of the constitution after the 2011 protests, these measures have not led to more power sharing between the monarchy and the judicial and legislative branches of the government (Muasher 2018:121). In the long run, by buying the support of its elite class, the monarchical government is able to operate, even if inefficiently, and maintain is legitimacy.

The Palestine, another Levantine country, has been strife with economic and political instability, primarily because of external political actors and internal strife. The Palestine-Israeli conflict can arguably be said to be one of the main reasons for regional distress in the Middle East. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 has been the source instability both in Palestine and in the broader Middle East. The West Bank is currently under military occupation; Gaza remains under military siege, and there have been numerous bombings in the last decade. Yet, there has been no political change, nor was the area directly affected by the Arab Spring in 2011. The Hamas government has been the de-facto governmental institution in Gaza since its election in 2006, with Mohamoud Abbas as the president of the State of Palestine and Palestinian National Authority. However, instability and resulting dysfunctionality, both as a result of external forces, mainly Israel, and internal corruption, has become almost permanent. Elliott Abrams, an American Diplomat, stated that "corruption is an insidious destroyer, not only of Palestinian public finance but of faith in the entire political system" in his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia (Elliot, *CFR* 2012).

In short, starting in 2011, the Middle East region has seen an uneasy mix of great political turbulence and stasis. Even though the Levantine countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine, are characterized by political stasis but without major upheavals, they were still affected by the neighboring uprisings and wider Middle Eastern instability.

On the other hand, Northern African countries, except for Algeria, have witnessed immense political turmoil. In either case, whether political stasis or turmoil, citizen trust in the political institutions in the region has been shaky at best. In fact, according to Global Corruption Barometer, despite half a decade since the Arab Spring, there is still “widespread public dissatisfaction with government efforts to curb public sector graft” (Pring 2016:5). Sixty-one percent of citizens in the region perceive corruption to have increased in the last year.

Economic Vitality and Trust in Government

Aside from political volatilities and the resulting shattered citizen trust, scholars have identified economic instability or lack of economic vitality as two other sources of citizen discontent and distrust. Two distinct dimensions of economic instability, material instability and perceptions of economic instability, have been noted for their eroding influences on citizen trust.

Material Economic Instability and Trust Erosion

Economic stability, which has been scarce in the Middle East, particularly since 2011, is an important element in the trust equation. Economic stability refers to stable, material conditions in which a country offers its citizens job opportunities, opportunities for civil and political involvement for its citizens, and flowing economic activity (Hashemi 2017:87). And sustained economic stability is expected to lead to a higher standard of living for citizens. On the other hand, when there is economic instability in a country, the socially and economically marginalized, especially its youth, feel frustrated and powerless. Often, citizens hold the country’s government and/or its corporations responsible for their economic security. Under these unstable conditions, it is not surprising that youth participate in insurgency or political militant movements, further deepening regional instability (p. 83).

Ironically, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region benefited from the wealth created by the increase in oil prices in the1970s. However, failure to create employment opportunities for the expanding labor force led to a deterioration in economic conditions. Non-oil economies in the region rely heavily on “aid, capital flows, and worker remittances” from the oil- producing Middle Eastern countries (Abed and Davoodi, *IMF* 2013). “Political fragmentation, recurring conflicts, and authoritarian rule have hampered the development of democratic institutions and remain major obstacles to economic reform” (Abed and Davoodi, *IMF* 2013). High-tariff barriers, imbalanced exchange rate policies, limited advancement of human capital, and poor provision of basic public goods and services are few of the many factors that have contributed to material or objective lack of economic growth within the region (Abed and Davoodi, *IMF* 2013).

The material or objective strength of the economy is widely accepted to be directly linked to citizen trust in institutions (Eccles 2015:17). Eccles referenced Nye’s (1997) research which showed that governments who were unable to reduce unemployment, increase economic growth and provide social services were unable to gain trust from citizens. Increased globalization has provided citizens with access to more information, allowing them to be more aware of their rights and demand more from their governments (Eccles 2015:19). Also, over the last few decades, “social modernization” has led to the transformation of the relationship between citizens of the state and its governmental body. The growing distrust and skepticism of younger, more educated citizens has led to a new style of politics in which, as quoted by Eccles, there is “… less deference to authority, more assertive styles of action, and higher expectations for the democratic process” (p. 18). For example, Algerians protested against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s decision to delay the April 18 presidential election despite announcing that he will not continue his presidency of 20 years for a 5th term. However, Bouteflika’s move to step down did not guarantee that the ruling elite, consisting of his brother, the army and several industrial bosses, would relinquish their power (Nossiter 2019). Besides, while Algeria has natural gas reserves, the common citizens have seen very little economic gain, leaving the youth very concerned about the lack of job opportunities (Adamson and Charlton 2019).

Amidst such economic stagnancy, access to information has allowed citizens to more accurately assess the income inequality in their country. If governments are responsible for providing regulations that ensure stability, it follows that citizen trust in the efficiency of governments will be measured through the type of policies and regulations implemented as opposed to simply the quantity (Siems and Schnyder 2014). In fact, these authors argued that since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, there has been a worldwide call for more government intervention, “ordoliberalism”, to restart the market economy so that citizens’ benefits, and interests can be furthered. Citizen awareness of the unfair distribution of wealth within the country was commented on by an Executive Director who was interviewed for this research (Interviewee #1). There is a pronounced difference, she said, between the lifestyle of government officials and that of regular working-class citizens. The government officials and leaders are always of the upper class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with notably fewer material possessions and wealth. Therefore, citizens are demanding fair processes from their governments. On balance, it is not surprising that over the last few decades, public trust in government has been declining worldwide, including in the Middle East.

<u>Perceptions of Government (In)Efficacy and Citizen Trust</u>

A second stream in the literature on governments’ responsibility for economic stability and trust is the public’s perceptions of government efficacy and of their wellbeing. According to Tom van der Meer and Armen Hakhverdian (2016), while trust is based on the merit of governmental bodies, it is not based on actual policy performance but on the “perceptions of performance, accountability, impartiality, corruption” (p. 82). Meer and Hakhverdian, in their study of 42 countries in Europe (51,255 respondents) also showed that difference in process (greater accountability and impartiality), as opposed to macro-economic outcomes, explained variations in political trust, measured by “satisfaction with democracy” and “confidence in national political institutions” (p. 98).

Other researchers who studied political trust have documented similar themes. According to Kong (2013), based on the archival data of 7,182 citizens in the Asia Barometer survey (2004), trust in government was contingent on government goodwill, namely their intentions and purposes and the extent to which the governmental systems operated in the best collective interest of the people. Institutional trust is also competence-based, which directly links to the performance and the system's ability to deal with problems. Trust in government is vital in order to have economic development and progressive public policy (p. 847). Kong found that the more goodwill and competence-based trust citizens had in their governments, the more satisfied they were (p.854).

Corruption and Trust

Corruption is an extremely negative version of government efficacy. According to the authors of the 2016 Arab Barometer (AlKhatib et al. 2018), financial and administrative corruption was the second (17.2%) most important challenge that citizens felt their country faced. Experts also posited that authoritarianism and corruption were two of the three most important challenges facing the region as per the “Arab Voices” survey conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Forty-eight out of the one-hundred-and-three experts surveyed stated that corruption is among the most pressing issue. Corruption takes many forms in the Middle East, including the use of security and armed forces to quell uprisings, which helps maintain leaders in their positions, derails the fight against political, minority and gender inequality and allows for religious and minority oppression and prosecution (Aman 2017:172). Another 2016 Carnegie report titled “Arab Fractures: Citizens, States, and Social Contracts” also underscored the fact that political and economic control is linked to cronyism and corruption in the Middle East (Cammack et al. 2016). This linkage, they posited, must be broken if sustainable private-sector economic growth is to emerge.

Restoring of Trust

Broken trust (interpersonal and political) can be both a cause and consequence of corruption. Researchers have shown that countries characterized by corruption are stuck in a circle, where corruption creates a climate of distrust which, in turn, generates and nurtures more corruption. Restoring trust can be difficult since distrust “fosters a tolerant or acquiescent attitude toward corruption and, by creating the expectation of corrupt behavior among others, feeds individual participation in corruption” (Morris and Klesner 2010:1260). The normalizing and tolerance of official wrongdoing creates the casual expectation of negative conduct. Corruption erodes regime legitimacy, noted Morris. According to 2016 Global Corruption Barometer of MENA, nearly one third of citizens paid a bribe in the last year, approximately 50 million people. One in 3 people paid a bribe to the courts, while 1 in 4 paid a bribe to the police. Despite this, citizens feared retaliation if they spoke out about corruption, and 2 in 5 who did report corruption suffered retaliation. The unfair distribution of services through bribery, which undermines law and order, creates a negative environment that does not incite change. Morris went on to argue that the mutual causality between distrust and corruption make it difficult to fight corruption; since distrust undermines citizen's belief in governmental promises to fight corruption and undermines governmental effort to mobilize society to fight corruption. As a result, citizens tend to be cynical about politics therefore tend not to participate in the political process as they believe that their actions will not have an effect. As he Professor who was interviewed by the author (Interview #2) noted, feeling of helplessness and the lack of empowerment to fight against government corruption leads to not only lack of trust, but unwillingness to change the status quo.

No doubt, it is worthwhile, despite the declining levels of citizen trust, for societies and their citizens, to ask how the broken trust can be restored. Chris Eccles (2015), in a 2005 survey of Canadian Citizens, documented that, in, despite the trend of declining trust in governmental institutions, trust can be restored when public organizations provide good leadership and management (50–65% impact), equal and ethical treatment (10–15% impact), quality services (10–20% impact) and services that meet citizens' and community needs (10–25% impact). In other words, the more citizens believed that governmental institutions benefit them, the more trust they had in the institutions.

Suggestions for Future Research

Economic Vitality (or lack thereof) and corruption have had tremendous negative impacts on citizen trust in the Middle East. The Arab Spring of 2011 dramatically changed the political landscape of many countries. While some countries, such as Libya, Sudan, Iran and Yemen, were not surveyed in the Arab Barometer, general political trends can be found within countries in North Africa versus the Levant regions. Many countries in North Africa experienced a change in regime type while in others governmental systems remained the same. Further research is needed in order to understand why certain governmental types, such as monarchies, despite corruption, were able to retain power and legitimacy using top-down social contracts and access to natural resources, while other governments and leaders were overthrown. Additionally, ethno-sectarian tensions exist within many countries, and across border lines in the region. For example, there has been an on-going religious Sunni and Shiite power struggle which has divided the populations, challenged political boundaries, and fueled terrorism and civil war. The polarization of identity groups has gravely affected stability in the region. These factors need to be examined to assess the extent of which internal conflict has affected citizen trust in governmental institutions and affected their perceptions of their government's ability to ensure the country's stability and the personal safety of all identity groups.

RESEARCH QUESTION

In this research, an attempt was made to compare the level of trust that citizens in North Africa and the Levant region had in their governments' functionality. Three dimensions of functionality were measured: perceptions of citizen's stability, government efficacy, and corruption. Stability was indicated by feelings of personal safety and economic stability. Perceptions of government efficacy covered areas of economy, employment, security and health. The third factor was corruption, based on perceptions of level corruption, government efforts to combat it, and cronyism. The following question was posed: “How does government functionality, as perceived by their citizens, differentially affect their trust in institutions in North Africa and Levant?” The control variables used in this research was level of education and gender to neutralize their potential confounding effects on trust in the government.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to theoretically explain why and how perceptions of government efficacy and stability, in particular personal economic stability and safety, as well as corruption affect the level of trust citizens have in their governments in the both North Africa and the Levant, political legitimacy and elite theory will be used. This analysis was theoretically framed using a synthesis of conceptual ideas offered by Weber (1964) and Dahl’s (1971) political legitimacy and Gaetano Mosca’s elite theories (1965).

Elite Political Legitimacy and Related Hypotheses

Political legitimacy refers to the right and acceptance of an authority, thereby giving the authority figure, or institutions as the case might be, the right to exercise power. The legitimacy of rulers or governments is derived from the population’s belief that the governing power appropriately uses the country’s laws and the constitution. To quote Max Weber “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber, 1964:382). Robert A. Dahl expanded on Weber and compared legitimacy to a reservoir, where as long as the water is at a specific level, political stability is maintained, while if it drops below the specific level, political legitimacy is endangered (1971:124-88). Therefore, functional institutions, including perceptions of government efficacy and stability, will legitimize their authority and cultivate a trust surplus among its citizens.

Gaetano Mosca in his elite theory outlined in his “The Ruling Class” (Meisel 1965), added more detailed nuances to the political legitimacy of elites. It is a given that political legitimacy is needed for governing and that there is always those who are rulers and those who are ruled. But, “the first class, always the less numerous” performs all political functions, monopolizes power and favour the benefits that accompany such power. On the other hand, the masses are directed and controlled by the ruling class, “in a manner that is now more or less legal” (p. 50). But, Mosca argued that power is not exclusively justified by the de facto possession of it, but states that those in power find a moral and legal basis for it, further legitimizing and deeming it a “necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs” that are already recognized and accepted in societies (p. 71). However, the isolation of lower classes, and their lack of accessibility to the ruling class can lead to political upheaval (107). The consequent pressure arising from the discontent of the masses, who are swayed by their passions, can influence the policies of the ruling class (p. 51). In other words, those who rule must garner the support of the masses in order to maintain their power (p. 51). Such support is gained through the consideration of the majorities' beliefs and sentiments. Besides, in order for the minority to remain in power, they must be organized and efficient so that they can overcome the unorganized majority. Following Mosca's elite political legitimacy arguments, it can be argued that when governments are seen to be functional, they will garner more citizen's trust than otherwise. However, corruption can create a trust deficit, by corroding the trust that governments have garnered through their efficient provision of providing functional services to their citizens.

Applying these theoretical arguments to the citizen-elite dynamics in the Levant and North Africa, elites in the Levant could be expected to garner more citizen trust than the North African elite because Levantine elites have maintained political stasis or stability, even if not economic progress. On the other hand, North African countries are not only ridden with economic equalities but also have been in political turmoil, and have experienced regime change which despite the hopes of many, did not bring about the expected economic and social change. Against this background, the first hypothesis tested in this study was: Functional governments will garner more citizen's trust in the Levant than in North Africa, net of corruption, level of education and gender" (Hypothesis #1).

However, when citizens perceive corruption in their government their trust will be shaken, creating a trust deficit. And given the volatile political histories of the North African region (because of the numerous changes in types of governments or rulers), the trust deficit caused by corruption is expected to be higher in North Africa than in the Levant. The Levant, on the contrary, has been characterized by political stasis, with stagnant governments and rulers, despite persistent economic inequality. Countries in North Africa, on the other hand, have experienced leader and government changes as a result of the Arab Spring yet also are burdened with economic and political turmoil. Therefore, we can hypothesize that corruption will have a more corrosive effect on citizen trust in North Africa than in the Levant. The many changes in the government elite in North Africa and to the extent there continues to dysfunction in each new government, there will be more net trust deficit, in North Africa than in the Levant (Hypothesis #2).

METHODOLOGY

Sequential mixed methodology was used, where statistical analyses of survey data were followed up with narrative accounting by journalists and other professionals to further interpret the statistical findings. Secondary survey data from the Middle East were used to measure and test the hypotheses about levels of trust in governmental institutions in the North African and the Levantine regions of the Middle East. Two narrative assessments provided by an Executive Director of an NGO in Lebanon and an international studies professor at an academic institution were supplemented with journalistic commentaries on the Middle East.

Secondary Data source

The “Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was a public survey conducted to assess citizen attitudes about public affairs, governance, and social policy in their countries of residence in the Middle East. Questions about the political, social, religious, and cultural life of respondents were posed throughout the survey. In addition to some general questions, respondents were asked to evaluate their political institutions and political attitudes, elections and parliament, the media, democracy, social, religious and cultural topics, the Arab world and international relations, and current affairs. The Arab Barometer is vital to understanding key issues in the lives of ordinary citizens in Arab society so that governmental and nongovernmental bodies can use the information to base their solutions to the specific problems faced within specific countries and the region as a whole.

“Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was carried out by eleven principal investigators (AlKhatib et al. 2018). Interviews were conducted in Arabic in the respondent’s place of residence to ensure a higher response rate and more truthful answers. The sample was drawn with the use stratified multi-stage sampling to cover a nationally representative of non- institutionalized adults aged 18 and above. In most countries the sample size was 1,200 citizens. Furthermore, 300 Syrian nationals living in Jordan and Lebanon were interviewed. As shown in Appendix A, 49.9 % of the of the respondents were female and 50.1% were male in all countries except Egypt and Palestine. In Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia 30.9% of the respondents had completed a secondary level of education while in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine 28.9% of the respondents did so.

Narrative Commentaries

Several journalistic accounts in newspaper outlets, that offer commentary on current and past news in the Middle East, were used to ascertain on-the-ground perspectives on government functioning and citizen responses. The newspaper outlets included “The Economist,” “The New York Times” and “Al Jazeera.” In addition, two interviews were conducted with professionals who have deep knowledge about the functioning (or dysfunctions) of governmental institutions in North Africa and the Levant. The first interviewee (Interviewee #1, Professor) is an international studies professor at a university. Her specific focus is the Middle East. The second interviewee was an Executive Director (Interviewee #2) at an NGO in Lebanon, and has worked directly with the ministry of education to make education accessible to all children. She has volunteered for the NGO for 10 years, and has been the executive director for three years.

DATA ANALYSIS

Three types of statistical analyses, disaggregated by North Africa and Levant, were used in order to explore the validity of the hypotheses. Univariate analysis was, first, used to describe the sample using trust in institutions, perceptions of government efficacy, stability and corruption. Second, to explore the primary empirical relationship of level of trust in governmental institution with perceptions of government efficacy, stability, and corruption, bivariate correlations were used. Finally, multivariate analysis was used to assess the net impact of perceptions of government efficacy, stability and corruption on trust in governmental institutions. Illustrative examples of trust surplus and deficits in North Africa and the Levant were drawn from the narrative commentaries offered by journalists and professionals.

Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis

Overall, there was a low level of trust in governmental institutions in both regions. And as might be expected in low citizen trust environments, the governments in both regions were also judged to be less functional in their efficacy, their ability in maintaining stability and had high corruption ratings. However, there were notable differences in the two regions on trust as well as the functionality and dysfunctionality of their governments. North Africans perceived their governmental institutions to be more efficacious, stable, and less corrupt than their Levantine counterparts. More specifically, citizens in North Africa rated their governments to be more efficient in operating three of the four sectors considered; the economy, employment and security sector. It was only the health sector that Levantine nation citizens found to be more efficacious than the North Africans. An interesting note: even though citizens in the Levant believed that there was more corruption and cronyism in their respective countries than their counterparts in North Africa, the latter (North Africans) believed there was less crackdown on corruption and bribes.

<u>Trust in Institutions</u>

Given the recent turmoil in the Middle East, the low trust in institutions in both regions was to be expected. According to the Professor (Interviewee #2), economic hardship, instability, lack of accountability and high level of corruption amongst government institutions are the main factors that create trust deficits. The Executive Director (Interviewee #1) added, in order for there to be a surplus of trust, there must be a high level of ethics, transparency and accountability. However, for historical reasons discussed at the start of this paper, citizens of North African nations trusted their institutions a bit more than the Levantine citizens. The lower level of Levantine trust was captured in the Trust index mean ($\overline{x}$) of 9.01 on a scale of 6-14, in contrast to the mean ($\overline{x}$) of 10.16 in North Africa.

Table 1.A. Trust in Institutions
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Responses	Statistics	
				North Africa (n=4277)	**Levant** (n=3405)
Trust in Institutions	Legislative System	Q2011. Trust in government (council of ministers)?	1. No trust at all 2. Not very much trust 3. Quite a lot of trust 4. A great deal of trust	27.8% 27.7 29.3 15.3	47.1%*** 21.3 22.2 9.4
	Judicial Branch	Q2012. Trust in the courts and legal system?	1. No trust at all 2. Not very much trust 3. Quite a lot of trust 4. A great deal of trust	23.9% 27.9 29.5 18.7	32.9%*** 23.9 28.2 15.0
	Executive Branch	Q2013. Trust in the elected council of representatives (the parliament)?	1. No trust at all 2. Not very much trust 3. Quite a lot of trust 4. A great deal of trust	41.7% 29.0 20.2 9.1	55.1%*** 23.0 16.1 5.8
	Army	Q2016. Trust do you have in the armed forces (the army)?	1. No trust at all 2. Not very much trust 3. Quite a lot of trust 4. A great deal of trust	3.9% 9.2 22.2 64.8	12.6%*** 12.1 21.7 53.6
		Index of Trust in Institutions[1]	Mean ($\bar{x}$) (sd) Min-Max	10.16 (3.01) 4-16	9.01*** (3.05) 4-16

[1] Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.62*** to 0.18***; Levant 0.64*** to 0.11***; *** p<=.001.

Some examples of the specific points of regional divergence in trust and mistrust are worth noting. Citizens of both regions registered "a great deal of trust" in armed forces; 64.8% citizens in North Africa even if only 53.6% of Levant citizens. But there was more distrust than trust in all the other sectors considered here, particularly in the Levant nations. For example, in the Levant, 41.7% had "no trust at all" in the councils of ministers as opposed to only 27.8% in North Africa. Citizens in the Levant also distrusting of their courts and legal system; 32.9% of the citizens stated they had "no trust at all" compared to the 23.9% in North Africa. A similar pattern of low Levantine institutional trust (55.1% "no trust at all") continued to the level of council of representatives (in contrast to the 41.7% of North African citizens).

Functional Governments

Trust in governmental institutions was hypothesized to be a product of the government's functionality and dysfunctionality as evaluated by their citizens.

Governments were considered to be functional based on how efficacious they were perceived to be and how stable the citizens felt their lives were. On the other hand, corruption was used to identify dysfunction within governmental institutions. According to the Professor (Interviewee #2) there are negative perceptions of government efficacy. Limited efficacy is a result of the lack of accountability leaders and governmental institutions. In a sense, they are above the law. Whether leaders and governmental institutions carry out their responsibilities efficiently or not, they will almost never be punished or voted out of office.

Perceptions of Government Efficacy. Perceptions of Government Efficacy was measured by how effective the citizens thought their governments were in managing their respective countries. Citizen's evaluated the performance of their own government's ability to effectively grow the economy, creating employment opportunities, providing security, and offering health services. As illustrated in Table 1.B governments were perceived to be less efficacious, than not, in both regions; the mean ($\overline{x}$) efficacious index score in North Africa was only 10.7 (on a scale from 5-20) and 10.2 ($\overline{x}$) in the Levant region. With the exception of providing security, both sets of governments were rated negatively (bad or very bad) than positively, and more so in the Levant. It is only in providing health services that the Levant governments were rated to be more effective than the North African governments.

The case of Lebanon is illustrative. In Lebanon, 34.5% of citizens believed that government was not effective at managing the economy. Even though "Banque du Libyan," the government run central bank in Lebanon, has strived to preserve the two-decade old currency peg, the economy remained stagnant. The high interest rates have increased the risk within the financial system and is "strangling an already depressed economy" (Barrington 2018). Lebanon is currently the world's third most indebted state but needs urgent fiscal reform to help the economy. According to Barrington, regular citizens are feeling the effects of the weak economy as annual growth rates has decreased to 1-2%, lending is down, business activity is falling, and prices are falling in the real estate sector, the pillar of the Lebanese economy.

Table 1.B. Perception of Government Efficacy
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Responses	Statistics: North Africa (n=2076)	Statistics: Levant (n=3350)
Perception of Government Efficacy	Economy	How would you evaluate: Q2041. The current government's performance on managing the economy?	1. Very Bad 2. Bad 3. Good 4. Very Good	25.5% 37.7 33.6 3.2	34.5%*** 35.5 27.0 3.0
		Q2043. The current government's performance on narrowing the gap between rich and poor?	1. Very Bad 2. Bad 3. Good 4. Very Good	44.1% 37.4 16.3 2.2	45.7%* 37.8 15.1 1.4
		Q2042. The current government's performance on creating employment opportunities?	1. Very Bad 2. Bad 3. Good 4. Very Good	42.0% 37.5 18.4 2.1	50.1*%** 35.5 13.3 1.0
	Security	Q20421. The current government's performance on providing security in the country?	1. Very Bad 2. Bad 3. Good 4. Very Good	7.6% 12.6 54.6 25.2	23.6%*** 20.0 33.4 23.0
	Health	Q2044. The current government's performance on improving basic health services?	1. Very Bad 2. Bad 3. Good 4. Very Good	28.4% 34.4 33.7 3.5	26.5%*** 30.9 38.0 4.6
		Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy [1]	Mean ($\bar{x}$) (sd) Min -Max	10.73 (2.97) 5-20	10.25*** (3.32) 5-20

[1] Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 + ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2043; correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.49** to 0.25***; Levant 0.56** to 0.36***
*** p<=.001.

Stability. *G*overnments in both regions fared a bit better (but not by much) in offering their citizens stability (Table 1.C). But, as with trust and efficacy, North African citizens felt more stable in their lives; on a summative index scale that ranged from 6-25, the North African mean ($\bar{x}$) was 14.83 compared to 13.93 in the Levant. Citizen's based their perceptions about their stability on country's economic stability and their personal safety. For example, in North Africa 59.3% believed that their household economic situation was "good" in comparison to only 48.9% of citizens in the Levant. Additionally, 52.4% of citizens in North Africa reported that the future of their own personal as well as their family's safety was ensured; only 35.3% of citizens in the Levant felt the same. Additionally, citizens in the Levant were more concerned with a terrorist attack (13.3%)

or of being harassed in the street (25.9%) than North African citizens (4.3% and 7.3% respectively). In short, even in relatively unstable circumstances, North Africans felt that there was more (than the Levantines) economic stability in their country and experienced a higher degree of personal safety.

Table 1.C. Stability
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Responses	Statistics: North Africa (n=4586)	Statistics: Levant (n=3536)
Stability	Economic Stability	How would you evaluate: Q101. The current economic situation in your country?	1. Very Bad 2. Bad 3. Good 4. Very Good	29.7% 35.0 32.3 3.1	31.7%*** 38.1 27.6 2.6
		Q101a. The economic situation in your country five years ago (before the Arab uprisings) compared to the current situation?	1. Much worse 2. Somewhat Worse 3. Almost the same as the current situation 4. Somewhat better 5. Much better	8.5% 11.9 26.8 30.4 22.4	8.6%*** 11.1 18.5 39.3 22.5
		Q102b. Your current household economic situation?	5. Very Bad 6. Bad 7. Good 8. Very Good	10.3% 26.4 59.3 4.1	15.8%*** 30.2 48.9 5.1
	Personal Safety	Q105. Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family's safety and security are ensured or not?	1. Absolutely not ensured 2. Not ensured 3. Ensured 4. Fully ensured	7.6% 14.9 52.4 25.1	10.6%*** 24.9 35.3 29.3
		To what degree are you worried about: Q1072. A terrorist attack in your country.	1. Very much 2. Much 3. Not much 4. Not at all	79.6% 11.7 4.3 4.3	58.0%*** 22.4 6.7 13.0
		Q1074. Being harassed or threatened on the street.	1. Very much 2. Much 3. Not much 4. Not at all	69.3% 16.7 6.6 7.3	38.6%*** 13.3 22.2 25.9
		Index of Stability[1]	Mean (sd) Min-Max	13.93 (2.78) 6-25	14.83*** (3.49) 6-25

[1] Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B + ReversedQ105 + Q1072 + Q1074; correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from -0.02*** to 0.60***; Levant -0.01*** to 0.55***
*** p<=.001.

While stability is crucial to citizens of the Middle East, democracy is not necessarily perceived to be the solution (Interviewee #2). According to the Professor, in a state of instability and lack of personal safety, democracy and civil rights are considered a luxury. As a result, citizens are willing to settle for an ineffective government if its leader is able to guarantee, verbally at least, safety and economic security. In the Middle East, history has shown that citizens have a preference for tough leaders over democratic states and are willing to compromise on accountability and democracy in return of survival.

Government Corruption as Dysfunction

In addition to assess the functionality of governments, citizens were asked to evaluate the extent of corruption in their countries. Specifically, their perception of corruption within state agencies, cronyism in employment, and the extent to which corruption was being remedied was addressed. As shown in Table 1.D, both regions were marked by high levels of corruption, but corruption was more rampant in the Levant; the mean ($\bar{x}$) corruption index score was 10.09 (range of 4-12) in the Levant and 9.61 in North Africa. Two examples to illustrate regional differences in corruption levels. One, there was a notable difference in the level of cronyism; while 75.3% citizens in the Levant believed that obtaining employment through connections is “extremely widespread,” only 61.5% of citizens in North Africa thought so. Second, more than half (57.2%) of Levant citizens believed that there was corruption in their state agencies to a “large extent” in comparison to the 55.2% of North Africans. But, Levantine governments (35%) were more likely to be seen as cracking down on corruption than the 25.2% of North Africans. That is, even though corruption was more rampant in the Levant than in North Africa, the former governments were doing more to combat corruption.

Once again, according to the Professor (Interviewee #2), high levels of corruption stem from the ability of politicians, with the use of the country’s resources and the international support, to push certain agendas and create divisions within the country. Many citizens see governmental institutions as compromised or corrupted, and too tied up in politics. For example, the people that are chosen to take high positions within governmental institutions are based on political ties, as opposed to merit (Interviewee #1). Adeel Malik, a professor at Oxford University, mentioned in Kassab’s article “The cost of cronyism under Mubarak,” found significant cronyism between the late 1990’s and 2001 in 385 companies in Egypt that had been associated the former president, Hosni Mubarak. Similarly, 497 companies in Lebanon and 662 in Tunisia had strong ties to the political regimes in place, while 370 in Morocco were owned by holding companies indirectly controlled by the King (Kassab 2019). Besides, Kassab noted that companies in Egypt that were politically associated with the regime received more benefits. For example, they received 92% of the total loans granted to the private sector, despite not having higher profitability compared to non-politically connected firms.

Corruption, as shown in Table 1.D., had a more corrosive effect on citizen trust, creating more trust deficit, in Levant than in North Africa. The empirical data from The Global Corruption Barometer are illustrative. According to the Barometer 92% of citizens in

Lebanon, 75% of Jordanian citizens and 70% of Palestinian citizens believe corruption had increased. On the other hand, citizens in North Africa did not believe corruption had increased as drastically as in the Levant. While 64% of citizens in Tunisia and 51% of Algerians thought that corruption had increased, this was a stark contrast to the 28% of Egyptians and 26%of Moroccans who held the similar belief.

Table 1.D. Corruption
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016

Concept	Dimensions	Indicators	Responses	Statistics: North Africa (n=4360)	Statistics: Levant (n=3334)
Corruption	Perceptions	To what extent do you think that: Q210. There is corruption within the state agencies and institutions in your country?	1. Not at all 2. To a small extent 3. To a medium extent 4. To a large extent	2.7% 10.0 32.1 55.2	3.7%*** 8.4 30.6 57.2
		Q211.The governments working to crackdown on corruption and root out brides?	1. Not at all 2. To a small extent 3. To a medium extent 4. To a large extent	12.9% 34.1 27.8 25.2	10.2%*** 28.9 25.9 35.0
		Q213. How to get a job[1].	1. I do not know of any relevant experiences 2. Employment is mostly obtained without connections 3. Employment is sometimes obtained through connections 4. Obtaining employment through connections is extremely widespread	7.5% 3.5 27.5 61.5	2.0%*** 2.6 20.0 75.3
		Index of Corruption[2]	Mean (sd) Min-Max	9.61 (1.80) 4-12	10.09*** (1.65) 4-12

[1] Some people say that nowadays it is impossible to get a job without connections (wasta) while others say that jobs are only available to qualified candidates. Based on a recent experience (or experiences) you are personally aware of, do you think that…?

[2] Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.36*** to- 0.20***; Levant 0.40*** to 0.20***

*** p<=.001

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Bivariate analysis

A preliminary exploration of the connections of citizen trust with government efficacy, stability, and corruption were conducted using bivariate correlations (Table 2 in Appendix A). In North Africa, the more efficacious the government was perceived to be, and the more stable their personal life was, the more likely they were to trust governmental institutions (Efficacy $r=0.47^{***}$, Stability $r=0.31^{***}$). On the other hand, perceived corruption reduced trust in North African societies ($r= -0.47^{***}$). Similar patterns were evident in the Levant region. For example, the more efficacious ($r=0.59^{***}$) and the more stable their lives were ($r=0.36^{***}$), the more trusting they were of their governments, but corruption led to less trust ($r= -0.48^{***}$). As illustrated in Table 2, the level of trust in institutions was more reflective of government efficacy, stability and corruption in the Levant than in North Africa. Also, in both regions, the more educated citizens were, the less trust they had, particularly in North Africa (North Africa $r= -0.15^{***}$, Levant $r= -0.08^{**}$). Some gender differences were also evident, with men being more trusting than women (North Africa $r= -0.06^{***}$, Levant $r= -0.05^{**}$).

Linear Regression Analysis

In order to test the robustness of the hypothesized regionalized connections of citizen trust with functional-dysfunctional assessments of their governments and consequent trust deficits, two linear regressions were run, one each for the two regions. The functionality of governments was indicated by perceptions of government efficacy and stability, while corruption levels represented dysfunctionality in governmental institutions (Table 3).

In North Africa, on balance, perceptions of government efficacy were the main reason for increased levels of trust ($\beta= 0.25^{***}$). While citizen trust in their governments was reduced by the corrosive negative effects of corruption ($\beta=-0.29^{***}$), governments were able to combat the negative consequences of corruption, with functional services and stability. There was a parallel functionality-corruption-trust dynamic in the Levant. That is, functional Levantine governments engendered much more citizen trust ($\beta=0.41^{***}$) than the negative trust consequences of governmental corruption ($\beta=-0.23^{***}$).

Two additional trust connections, even if not as prominent as that of efficacy and corruption, were noted. Economic and personal stability contributed some to cultivating more trust in governments in both regions, even if more so in Northern Africa; Stability β in North Africa = $0.10^{***}$and 0.07^{***} the Levant. And educated North African citizens were less trusting of their governments ($\beta = -0.12^{**}$than their Levantine counterparts ($\beta = -0.04^{**}$).

Another look at the regional differences in the functionality-corruption balance in engendering citizen trust revealed interesting lessons in trust surplus and deficits. In the Levant, governments were able to cultivate a trust surplus; that is, the trust deficit caused by corruption (β=-0.23***) was more than compensated for by functional governments (Efficacy β=0.41***and stability β=0.07**combined). While in North Africa, citizen trust that efficacious governments and stability were able to garner (Efficacy β=0.25***and stability β=0.10) were just about sufficient to make up for the corrosive effects of corruption (β=-0.29***). In other words, the trust surplus created in the North African region was significantly smaller than the trust surplus in the Levantine region.

Table 3. Regression Analysis of Trust in Government
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; Beta (β) Coefficients[1]

	Regression Coefficients (β)	
	North Africa	**Levant**
Functional Governments:		
1. Perceptions of Government Efficacy	0.25***	0.41**
2. Stability	0.10***	0.07***
Dysfunctional Governments:		
1. **Corruption**	-0.29***	-0.23***
Education and Gender:		
1. Level of education	-0.11***	-0.04**
2. Gender	-0.02	0.03
Model Statistics:		
Constant	11.19***	8.79***
Adjusted R^2	0.24****	0.38***
DF 1 & 2	5 & 3410	5 & 2955

[1] Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; range 4-16;
Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 + ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20;
Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074; range 6-25;
Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12;
Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above;
Gender: (0) Male - (1) Female.
*** p<=.001.

CONCLUSIONS

In this concluding section, the theoretical and political implications of the empirical findings were reviewed. Some suggestions for future research to advance scholarly understanding of the contested relationships between Middle Eastern citizens and their governments were outlined.

Empirical and Theoretical Implications

The quantitative findings indicated that a trust surplus in governmental institutions in the Middle East was a result of positive perceptions of government efficacy, and stability. On the other hand, corruption eroded citizen trust. However, while both the North African and Levantine regions were able to garner an overall trust surplus, said surplus was significantly smaller in North Africa than in the Levantine region. Educated Middle East citizens were less trusting of their governments in both regions.

Some specifics of the trust dynamics between citizens and their leaders were found in the narrative commentaries of professionals and journalistic accounts. For example, The Professor (Interviewee #2) offered this scenario. Sectarian leaders are supported by foreign leaders and are historically from wealthy families. Therefore, in return for loyalty from their voters, they are able to provide tangible services, such as government jobs, education to voter’s children in specific prestigious schools. The strong influence of leaders on the citizens make it difficult to mobilize against leaders, because voters are very dependent on these leaders. According to the Executive Director (Interviewee #1), the dependent voter-politician relationship is harmful. Citizens prefer working in the government public sector than in the private sector, because staying within the system grantees them benefits they would not achieve otherwise. The reinter system, coupled with corruption, allows for the elite class in the Middle East to continue controlling resources and solidify their power. According to the Executive Director, the economic differential between ordinary citizens and elites is vast; the government officials and leaders are always of the upper class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with fewer material possessions and wealth.

In the Professor’s experience, there is no motivation for governmental institutions to help and support citizens who do not have the ability to change the level of power of leaders, because of both the lack of accountability and dependency of Middle Eastern citizens on their leaders. Neither are the government agents motivated to facilitate economic growth. Lack of accountability also contributes to the little confidence in leaders and government agents, and ultimately leads to government inefficacy. Additionally, widespread corruption, that goes hand in hand with lack of accountability, is quite evident in the Middle East.

Citizens feel that the government is inefficient because they are corrupt. Yet, many do not feel they can make a difference, although this sense of powerlessness is not widespread throughout the region. As per the Global Corruption Barometer 2016 (Pring 2016) citizens in Tunisia felt empowered to help fight corruption, and believed ordinary people are able to incite change (71%). Citizens in Jordan and Palestine, also had positive outlooks on the ability for citizens to make a difference (66%). On the other hand, half of the citizens in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon and Egypt felt disempowered to fight corruption. If left unaddressed, as the empirical findings presented in this paper has shown, corruption in both regions will erode the trust surplus in government institutions.

Theoretical Implications

From a theoretical standpoint, there was support in the linear regression findings (Figure 1) for predictions that were grounded in Max Weber and Gaetano Mosca's Elite and Legitimacy theories. As expected in first hypothesis, functional governments garnered more citizen's trust in the Levant than in North Africa, net of level of education and gender. The economic equalities combined with the political turmoil that has roiled the North African region, and the unmet expectations of economic and social change offer an explanation. The legitimacy of governments (measured by trust surplus garnered by government efficacy and stability versus trust deficits derived from corruption was also higher in the Levant (Hypothesis #2) as a result of Levantine elites maintaining political stability, even if not economic progress.

Figure 1: Empirical (Beta (β) Coefficients[1]) and Theoretical Models of the Impacts of Perceptions of Government Efficacy, Stability and corruption on Trust in Government Institutions in North Africa and the Levant[2]



[1] Refer to Table 3 for index coding

[2] Data source: Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; *** p <=.001.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Despite the valuable insights presented in this research there is much left to be uncovered about citizen trust in government institutions in the Middle East. The fact that the adjusted R^2 in North Africa was only 0.24^{***} and the Levantine R^2 was 0.38^{***} indicated that there is more to the citizen-government dynamics than citizen perceptions of government efficacy, stability, and corruption.

Further research on civil participation in politics of the region will be valuable. In the Executive Director's (Interviewee #2) perspective, citizens expect solutions to social problems to come from the government, as opposed to a collaboration between citizens, NGO's and the government. The prevailing ethos in the Middle East is that because the leader or government agency was elected, the responsibility lies completely with them, without acknowledging the citizens' role in the challenges they face. For example, 150,000 children of Syrian refugees have entered Lebanon in the recent years, exerting extra pressure on the public schools. A proactive citizenry and support for these schools could enhance the efficiency of existing governmental institutions. A bottom up approach, through civil empowerment to participate and change the politics in favor of citizens, will create a ripple effect, said the Professor (Interview #1).

The ethnocentric and secretariat conflicts that persist in the Middle East is another issue that deserves more scholarly attention. According to the Professor, religion is manipulated and used by government officials to maintain their position of power. Besides, specific ethnic and religious minorities are discriminated against and are kept out of political power or autonomy. Ethno-sectarian conflicts are more visible in the Levantine region, especially in Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon. Based on the turmoil of the last decade, and the growing insurgency and terrorist groups, such as ISIS, their effects on corroding trust in governments in the Levant and North Africa need scholarly attention.

APPENDICES

Appendix A. Demographic Controls: Gender and Level Of Education
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016[1]

Concepts	Indicators	Responses	Statistics	
			North Africa	**Levant**
Gender	Male or Female	(0) Male	50.1%	49.7%
		(1) Female	49.9	50.3
Education	Level of Education[1]	Mean (sd)	3.42 (1.67)	3.70 (1.31)***
		Min-Max	1-7	1-7
		(n)	(4787)	(4200)

[1] Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above.

Appendix B: Table 2. Correlation (r)
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 [1,2]

	Trust In Government	Perceptions of Government Efficacy	Stability	Corruption	Level of Education	Gender
Trust In Government	1	0.589*** (n=3201)	0.358*** (n=3350)	-0.479*** (n=3187)	-0.075*** (n=3405)	0.049** (n=3405)
Perceptions of Government Efficacy	0.471** (n=3741)	1	0.495*** (n=3293)	-0.545*** (n=3117)	-0.060*** (n=3350)	0.050** (n=3350)
Stability	0.305*** (n=4127)	0.413*** (n=3944)	1	-0.319*** (n=3284)	-0.019 (n=3536)	-0.063*** (n=3536)
Corruption	-0.473*** (n=3959)	-0.535** (n=3802)	-0.310 *** (n=4191)	1	0.004 (n=3334)	-0.060** (n=3334)
Level of Education	-0.152*** (n=4266)	-0.052** (n=4065)	0.052*** (n=4573)	0.113*** (n=4360)	1	-0.012** (n=4200)
Gender	0.063*** (n=4277)	0.067*** (n=4076)	-0.024 (n=4586)	-0.099*** (n=4586)	-0.164*** (n=4586)	1

[1] Correlation below the diagonal of 1 is North Africa, while the correlation above is the Levant

[2] Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; range 4-16;

Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 + ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20;

Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074; range 6-25;

Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12

Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above

Gender: (0) Male - (1) Female.

*** p<=.001.

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Racial Boundaries of Success in the U.S

Racialized Resource Models of Socioeconomic Success: A Mixed Methods Analysis of White and African American High School Students

By

Anna Heider[1]

ABSTRACT. Racial differences in the types of social resources that White and African American students need to complete high school and be successful in young adulthood were assessed using the 10-year longitudinal data on 10th graders from the 2002-2012 NELS survey. Racial limits of home and school resources for socioeconomic success were theorized using Bourdieu, Coleman, and Lareau's social capital theories in the context of Massey and Denton's residential segregation. Qualitative interviews and content analyses of journalistic and of select documentary evidence were used to illustrate the statistical analysis. Not only was completing high school essential, for both groups, to succeed socioeconomically as adults, access to resources in their homes was a critical element of early success in high school. But only Whites were able to activate academic and home resources to their benefit in their later success. African Americans continued to rely only on their home resources in their adulthood. These racialized resource models added to the social capital literature on the racialized pathways to economic success, but more research attention is warranted on the future success pathways of African Americans.

INTRODUCTION

That a critical tool for economic success in modern America, high school completion and even a college degree, is not equally available to all youth has been well documented. It is also well established in the field of education that supportive resources in the home and at school can help students on their way to finishing high school and becoming economically successful in their adulthood. Educated parents often expect their children to follow them in their educational trajectories, guide them in high school and even in their later lives. Schools, their resources, teachers, and school peers, are additional important assets to children in their high school and later careers. Unfortunately, the contours of educational opportunities and success in the U.S. are racially defined.

Part of the racialized success is due to differences in access to resources in the home and in schools. But, even when resources are available to both African American and White students, how useful or accessible are they at different points in their socioeconomic

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careers? What are the racial differences in the career supportive resources? Pinpointing the types of supportive resources and the career points at which they are most useful could highlight inequalities in the education system as well in later economic success, and offer evidence for identifying ways of bridging the gaps in options available to African American and White students.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars have explored racial/ethnic differences in the roles that families, teachers, schools, and communities play in the academic aspirations and achievements of youth. The plethora of resources hypothetically available to young students can be categorized into those in the home and in the school. On the home front, parents' educational and economic backgrounds are two well established assets that guide their children for success in high school and later in their lives. Once children enroll and attend schools, race/ethnic variations in perceptions of school climate and of teacher-student relationships, as well as school resources, have found to shape their academic achievements.

Support for Education in the Home

Parents and other family members are key to the educational trajectories of their children. More often than not, parents model the value of education for their children, are involved in shaping their aspirations, goals and school activities, and continue to support them as they pursue their careers.

Parents: Academic Expectations and Involvement

Scholars have recognized numerous ways families influence and support their children's academic achievements. For example, students whose parents were very involved with the school, did better academically, in a sample of 15,240 from NELS of surveys (Benner, Boyle, and Sadler 2016). Gordon and Cui (2012) also drew a similar conclusion, from two waves of the Add Health longitudinal study (Wave I sample: 20,745 and wave IV: 15,701). In the Gordon and Cui analyses, parents' high educational expectations for their children and general support were what led to their children's academic achievement.

Structural Class Resources in the Home

In addition to parent activities and motivations for their children's future, social class can affect how parents support their children. Socioeconomic structural assets available to parents and children in the home have been documented to be salient for their children's academic success. For example, Lareau (2014) noted differences between how middle class and lower class/poor parents approached educational support, expectations, and general support for their children. Lareau, who observed a sample of 88 families (White and African American), found that middle class parents were involved in the school and were also more willing to challenge the teachers. In contrast, lower class/poor parents were less involved with the school, listened to everything the teachers said about their child's education, and did not try to change what goes on at the school (even if they disagreed). In fact, in a survey study done by Dixson, Roberson, and Worrell (2017), with a sample of 105 high achieving (GPA > 3.0) African American students, family socioeconomic background was a stronger predictor (accounted 17% of academic variance) of academic achievement than student psychosocial status.

Race, a moderator. The connections between the resources at home and school success are mediated by the racial background of children and their families. For example, in a study of parenting behavior and financial stress by Dotterer, Iruka and Pungello (2012) with 164 mother-child dyads of African American and White ethnicity, the effectiveness of parenting behaviors was found to be different according to racial group. Maternal sensitivity did play a role in the link between SES and school readiness only for White families. But, the maternal negative/intrusive behaviors link operated similarly for both African Americans and whites; for example, lower SES was associated with negative/intrusive maternal behaviors, and in turn, the children had lower pre-academic knowledge than their counterparts.

Academic Resources: Structural, Engagement, and Race

Schools and teachers, with race/ethnicity and gender as central organizing principles, are additional areas around which the complex interplay of academic expectations and outcomes of high school students are played out. Race/ethnic variations in perceptions of school climate, of teacher-student relationships, and school resources, as they affected academic achievements, has been another central theme in the extant research.

School Climate

Much research has been done on racial variations in how school climate is perceived by students and the connections to student academic success. In one study, teachers in schools with positive climate and strong discipline had positive relationships with their students and high expectations for their students (Konold, Cornell, Shukla and Huang 2016). In turn, these students, who participated in an anonymous survey of 48,027 students in 323 schools, were highly engaged in their academics. Yet, African American students in the survey (in contrast with White students) perceived the teachers to be less supportive, but more demanding academically. African American students also perceived the discipline at the school to be less structured and less fair. In yet another longitudinal study (from the 7th grade in 1991 all the way through 11th in1996), Diemer, Marchand, Mckellar, and Malanchuk (2016) looked more specifically at relationships between teachers and African American students and the effects on students' achievement in math. Not only did teacher's differential treatment negatively predict relevant math instruction during 8th grade, it also acted to "corrode the salutary benefits of relevant instruction on students' self-concept of math ability and task value" (p.1221).

Similar racialized findings were available in a study done by Voight, Hanson, O'Malley, and Adekanye (2015), using multilevel regression analyses of "school climate." In a middle school, the African American and Hispanic students, in contrast to their White classmates, had less favorable experiences of connectedness, safety, opportunities for participation, and relationships with adults. Besides, when the racial climate gaps were wider, the racial achievement gap was also larger and vice versa. An example of this racial divide in the Denver public school system was highlighted by an online journalist, Asmar (2019), in "Black student excellence: Denver school board directs district to better serve black students." Illustrating the disproportionate treatment of African American students in public schools, Asmar quoted one student: "Teachers, specifically white teachers, don't know how to act around me…do not know how to have respectful conversations because they're afraid of being offensive or because they're not educated in the right terminology" (https://chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2019/02/22/black-student-excellence-denver-school-board-directs-district-to-better-serve-black-students/).

Another aspect of school climate is teacher support as perceived by the students, particularly students of color. Mary, Calhoun, Tejada, and Jenson (2018), in their phenomenological study of 25 African American students, found that despite negative messages and stereotypes, African American students living in low-income communities, had high academic expectations when they were surrounded by supportive teachers, parents, and community programs/afterschool programs. At the other end of the spectrum was academic dis-identification or a disconnect between academic self-concept and achievement. African American youth, particularly males, in Cokley, Mcclain, Jones, and Johnson's (2012) research with 96 African American students, had better academic performance when they had strong academic self-concept. These authors found that African American males, more than female youth, were likely to perceive school as a hostile environment associated with discipline and corporeal punishment.

SES and Minority Composition of Schools

In addition to school climate, in its many dimensions, the class and race contexts of schools is another important element in student success. In a meta-analysis of research on the socioeconomic status-academic achievement connection published over a ten-year span (1990-2000), Sirin (2005) found that school SES, defined by parent's education, parental income, and parental occupation, was positively connected to student achievement, but primarily for white, and less so for minority, students; their sample included 101, 157 students at 6,871 schools from 128 different school districts. On balance, Sarin concluded that SES of neighborhoods and schools exerted more of a powerful negative effect on minority students than on white students.

Student Responsibility: Free Time Use

When all is said and done, students also have responsibility for their success. Wolf, Aber, and Morris (2015) focused on how 504 African American and Latino students used their discretionary time and its connections to their academic achievement. Students grouped in the academic cluster (in discretionary time use) had higher levels of academic achievement compared to those in the social cluster; that is, students who focused less on academics in their outside time were more likely to do worse academically.

Success in Later Life

Unlike the plethora of research on student success in high school, there is not much attention that has been paid to the connection between high school education and success in later life. Most scholars have focused on adult socioeconomic attainment as it has been shaped by life-time educational achievements, occupational status, and family/community backgrounds. For example, Wilson (2017) looked at birth cohorts, of Whites versus African Americans and men versus women, from the successive decades from 1910 to 1979. The scholar defined occupational attainment as "occupational returns to education and "earnings returns to occupation" (p. 387). African American and Whites, both men and women, did improve their occupational attainment over those of previous birth cohorts. However, African American men, of both the baby-boom and generation X, were not as successful in moving forward in their occupational trajectories as White men of the same age. Yet, African American women did seem to have made occupational gains relative to White women, even if the gains fluctuated over decades.

Another stream of research on the economic success trajectories has addressed the socioeconomic and privilege contexts in which student grew up. For example, the connections between family/community background, race/ethnicity and young adult socioeconomic attainment was explored by Wickrama, Simons, and Baltimore (2012) using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. African American youth that came from a low SE (socioeconomic) background and lived in disadvantaged communities were more likely to have significantly lower levels of earnings, assets, and job quality as young adults. However, educational attainment of young adults helped to buffer the limiting influences of family SE background on later achievements and helped accentuate the positive influences of family resources. There is also a "success sequence" with nuanced racial differences in the outcomes. In their reexamination of Isabel Sawhill and Ron Haskins' data, Reeves, Rodrigue, and Gold (2015) used a similar definition of the "success sequence", namely graduating high school, maintaining a full-time job or having a partner who does and having children while married and after age 21, should they choose to become parents. While Sawhill and Haskins' found the African Americans who followed these three "norms" to the middle class were still worse off than their white counterparts, the reanalysis went even more in-depth: "…blacks and white who follow the three norms have about the same likelihood of ending up near the middle, with incomes three to five times the federal poverty line…But white norm-followers have better odds than their black equivalents of ending up in a more affluent household" (https://www.brookings.edu/research/following-the-success-sequence-success-is-more-likely-if-youre-white/).

Summary and Suggestions for Future Research

Numerous valuable lessons were identified in the scholarly research reviewed above on the racial dimensions of high school academic success as it was impacted by support, or lack thereof, in the home and school. It was clear that a high school diploma is critical for later success. However, there was little longitudinal assessment found of how resources that were effective in students' success in high school completion continued to be available to youth to be tapped into later in life and whether there are racial dimensions to the resources accessible and activated by youth. The researchers reviewed above also expressed the need for larger sample sizes, especially ones that include more African American students.

RESEARCH QUESTION

To address some these gaps in the extant research, a mixed method approach was used to outline, first, the potentially racialized social capital resource (academic and home) models of high school completion of White and African American youth. Second, if high school completion is a key to future socioeconomic success, which of these early resources continued to help White and African American youth in their adult socioeconomic success? The formal research question posed was, "How were academic and home resources differently activated by White and African American youth in their progress toward high school completion and, in turn, their future socioeconomic achievement in young adulthood?" These findings will contribute to an ongoing conversation about mechanisms to reduce racial inequalities in early life chances and later success.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

An understanding of racialized resource models for high school completion and later success explored in this study were framed within Bronfenbrenner's (1974) ecological approach and social capital theoretical frameworks (Bourdieu 1977, Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, Coleman 1987, and Lareau 2014). Of the many ecologies that affect youth as they grow and develop their academic and economic self- concepts, the home (micro system) and school (meso system) are the most relevant. It is the economic and socio-cultural capital that these two systems offer and are potentially activated by youth that could theoretically demonstrate how these ecologies shaped youth as they worked toward their early academic later socioeconomic (flexible self) success, Mead 1934). However, because of racial inequalities in access to critical resources (Bourdieu and Lareau), racialized resource success models were anticipated for whites and African Americans.

Ecological Systems and Social Capital

Two important ecologies in which a person grows, develops, and succeeds are the home micro-system and the school meso-system (Bronfenbrenner 1974). It is in these two ecologies that children first develop their core self-concept (Kuhn and Mcpartland 1954) and it is through these two ecologies that children learn how to access the economic, social and cultural capital resources that will have to be activated for later life success. It is well known that family economic resources are a major determinant of the quality of schools in which American children are educated (Smelser, Wilson, and Mitchell 2001). In addition, the home and schools are critical sources of sociocultural capital resources. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) outlined the cultural beliefs, traditions, and the norms that one learns at home and in environments outside the home, such as at school, that play an important role during youth development. These resources were linked by Coleman (1987) to successful outcomes for children. To Coleman, parent's value, expectations, beliefs, and their own behavior play a role in a child's life outcomes; that is, the ways they parent their children shape children's academic and later socioeconomic achievement.

Race and Socio-Cultural Capital

However, Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and later Lareau (2014) also theorized access to resources to be unequal by race and by other inequality markers. White Americans hold a clear advantage over African Americans in terms of income, wealth, health, education, and many other important resources. A compelling social capital explanation for this white advantage is how social and cultural resources are used or activated by a dominant white group in order to exclude others from jobs, social resources, and other life chances (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Whiteness itself is a form of cultural capital; that is, as the dominant racial group in American society, whites are able to set the normative standards for appropriate values, beliefs, and behaviors necessary for success. Besides, cultural capital often leads to valuable additional social capital, as in the resources and knowledge, gained through one's social networks. It is these forms of knowledge, behaviors, and preferences that help individuals, Whites in this case, gain an advantage in the specific social contexts of education, employment, and wealth. For example, Massey and Denton (2003) demonstrated how residential segregation in the US has become one of the main perpetuators of urban poverty among African Americans. They spoke about how segregation has created the "black ghetto".

There is much scholarly writing on the origins of racial segregation in the US and how the social isolation of African Americans was intensified by social policies that supported red-lining in the real estate markets and associated home financing industries. Massey (2003; Chapter 2) located the beginnings of racial segregation, and the formation of the "black ghetto" in the early 20th century, when African Americans left the south and moved to northern cities. However, partly because of the racial violence that erupted, neighborhood organizations and other institutions instituted policies that had the de facto effect of confining African Americans to ghettos and socially insolating them from the white communities. For example, neighborhood improvement organizations got white landowners to sign convenants that specifically prohibited African Americans from owning, or occupying, or leasing properties. Also, an earlier code of ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Brokers stipulated that " '…a Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood….members of any race or nationality…whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood…'" (p. 37). Confined to such institutionalized segregated contexts, African Americans were limited in, and unable to accumulate for future generations, the types of transferrable social, cultural, and economic capital that need to be accessed to enter and succeed in the broader dominant (White) educational system and workplace.

Lareau (2014) specifically connected the racial inequalities in social and cultural capital faced by black families to educational inequalities. She found that social capital, derived from class status of middle class and working/poor class parents, mediated the connection between parenting style and school performance. Concerted Cultivation was the parenting style used by most in middle-class families; in the concerted cultivation style, parents teach their children to question authority, develop a large vocabulary, and make them comfortable enough to have discussions with authority figures. In contrast, children in lower or working-class families were exposed to a more natural growth parenting. In this type of parenting, parents tell their children what to do rather than negotiate with them; they also encourage putting trust into authority figures and encouraged children to play on their own. While such natural parenting practices encouraged children to be independent at a younger age they also set them up for jobs, mainly working-class jobs, where those in authority were to be followed and respected. These two differing approaches to parenting shaped the types of socio-cultural capital that children could or could not access, depending on their class and/or racial origins.

As youth grow intro young adulthood, these racial differences, and even inequalities, in socio-cultural capital continue to play key roles in the types of social networks that they can activate in the requisite social interactions and connections for finding and succeeding in the workplace. Such racialized social connections more often than not tend to segregate African Americans into certain jobs. Even when they find jobs, Bell, Nkomo, and Hammond (1994) documented the stereotypes that African American workers encounter in workplace settings, leading to feelings of isolation and alienation. In fact, much of the social divide in the workplace has been attributed to differences in the social and cultural capital between African Americans and their coworkers. Such unequal evaluations of racialized capital, that initiated the divide, also continued into the workplace and shaped the types of jobs African Americans were assigned.

Given the racially segregated living, learning, and working environments in the U.S., it is logical to expect that race does shape the kinds of, and access to, resources -- economic, social, and cultural capital – that would be helpful for success in schools and later in in the workplace. If societal evaluation of the value of home and school resources are racialized in favor of white students, it can be predicted that home (economic and sociocultural) and academic resources would be more useful, on balance, to White students in their chances of high school completion than of African American students (Hypothesis #1). Under this white privilege scenario, home and academic resources will continue to be net beneficial to Whites (more than African American youth) in their later SE success (Hypothesis #2). Besides, faced with a racialized landscape that has disadvantaged African Americans outside their homes, home resources were predicted to help African American students complete high school, but not succeed necessarily socioeconomically in their adulthood (Hypothesis #3).

METHODOLOGY

In order to capture a more holistic picture of the racialized resource models, a sequential mixed methods design was employed. First, quantitative secondary survey data was utilized to test the hypotheses. In the second step, narrative insights from experts in education inequality as well documentary evidence about racial inequalities were used to illustrate and to explain the statistical results.

Secondary Survey Data Analysis

The survey data set used in this paper were drawn from the NCES (National Center for Education Statistics), collected from 2002 until 2012. At the beginning of the study (Base Year) in 2002, the youth (n=16,197) were in the 10th grade. The first follow up in 2004 was done when the youth were in 12th grade. And two additional follow ups were conducted, one in 2006 and six years later in 2011-12. The NELS data included interviews and surveys with the school administrators, parents and students; test scores and transcripts were also documented. The NELS sample in the base year was made up of 50.5% men and 49.5% women; and 81.1 % were White and 18.9 % African American. In keeping with the research design of racialized resources models, the analyses were disaggregated by White and African American youth; sex of the respondent was controlled.

Qualitative Methodology

In order to gain first-hand insights on how home and academic resources influenced socioeconomic achievement, qualitative interviews were conducted with two education professionals. The first interviewee is an Associate Provost for Research (Interviewee #1) and the second a Senior Associate and Head of Faith Formation Interviewee #2); both have worked in and on education issues for their whole careers. These educators were selected for their well-recorded views of education and home resources that contribute to academic success and socioeconomic success. The Interview Protocol and Consent Forms are available in Appendix A. To set an additional context for the quantitative analyses and expand on the interview comments, content analysis of select journalistic and documentary evidence were also conducted. Some examples were: “Following the success sequence? Success is more likely if you’re white”[2];“Black student excellence: Denver school board directs district to better serve black students” by Asmar 2019[3]; “Columbus State wins award for boosting student success, reducing gaps”[4]; and the HBO documentary, “Class Divide” by Levin (2015)[5]

[2] https://www.brookings.edu/research/following-the-success-sequence-success-is-more-likely-if-youre-white/
[3] https://chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2019/02/22/black-student-excellence-denver-school-board-directs-district-to-better-serve-black-students/
[4] https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190220/columbus-state-wins-award-for-boosting-student-success-reducing-gaps.
[5]https://play.hbogo.com/feature/urn:hbo:feature:GV7xUvQFq08JfPwEAAAFa?reentered=true&userProfileType=liteUserProfile&autoplay=true.

DATA ANALYSES

Three different levels of analyses, disaggregated by White and African American backgrounds, were conducted for this research. First, univariate analyses were used to build a profile of the students sampled at the time they were in 10th grade and again 10 years later when they were young adults. Bivariate analyses were then used to search for the preliminary differential (by race) associations of socioeconomic achievement and high school completion with home resources and academic resources. These relationships were then tested once again by using a two-step multiple regression analyses, to assess the net effects of resources (home and academic) first on high school completion and then on SE achievement. In keeping with the research design, the regression analyses were disaggregated by White and African American students. Finally, comments from the qualitative interviews and content analyses were used to illustrate the multivariate analysis findings.

Descriptive Analysis

White young adults were more economically successful and were more likely to have completed high school than African Americans, despite having approximately similar access to academic resources. As for home resources, African American youth had fewer (than whites) economic resources, but were advantaged in some types of sociocultural resources vis-á-vis their White counterparts.

Socioeconomic (SE) Achievement

Socioeconomic achievement, the first success indicator used in this research, was measured using a scale that included educational achievement and employment income 10 years after completing high school. As seen in Table 1.A, on balance, White students (Mean SES = 0.16 on a range of -1.41 – 9.17) had overall higher socioeconomic achievement than African American students (Mean SES = -0.17 on a range of -1.41 – 5.99).

Table 1.A Socio-Economic Achievement as of 3rd Follow-up (2012) Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012

Concept	Dimensions	Variables	Values	Statistics	
				White	African American
SE Achievement	SES	F3SES Sample member's socioeconomic status as of F3[1]	Mean (Sd)	0.16	-0.17***
			Min-Max	0.74	0.68
				-1.41 – 9.17	-1.41 – 5.99

[1] F3SES is the average of 3 standardized components, namely 2011 earnings from employment, the prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most recent job, and educational attainment. For more details, please refer to: hhttps://nces.ed.gov/OnlineCodebook/Session/Codebook/d61960c5-287f-4edc-812a-3d5326a325d4.

*** p<= .001.

High School Completion

High school completion, the second indicator of success, presented in Table 1.B indicated the following: A vast majority, over 75% of both groups had completed high school on time. However, slightly more White students (89%) were likely than African Americans (78.7%) to have completed High school on time. And, although in small proportions, African Americans (9.4%) were more likely to have had no GED or equivalency than Whites (5%). In short, there was a difference between African American and Whites in their achievement; African American students were less likely to achieve high school education at the same level as White students.

Table 1.B High School Completion as of 2nd Follow-up (2006)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012

Concept	Dimension	Variable	Responses	Statistics	
				White	African American
High School Completion	Completion	F2HSSTAT High School Completion status in 2006	1. No GED or equivalency, no plans to pursue	5.0%	9.4%***
			2. Working towards GED or equivalency	1.5	5.5
			3. received GED or equivalency	2.9	3.5
			4. completed HS summer post 2004	1.3	2.9
			5. completed HS on time, 2004	89.3	78.7
			(n)	(8682)	(2020)

Academic Resources

Two types of academic resources, school resources and peer academic culture, were considered as potential explanations for success in high school completion. As seen in Table 1.C, both African American (AA) and White (WA) students felt supported in their schools and had resources available to them; the index of school resources was high at about 28 (on a range of 17 – 34) for both African Americans and Whites. For example, a majority of schools did have libraries for both African American and White students (at about 95%) and both groups of students rated the libraries as mostly useful (AA:52.8%; WA:58.7%). But both sets of students were split between disagree (AA:25.8%; WA:34.1%) and agree (AA: 44.2%; W:46.4%) on whether their teachers expected success of kids in school.

Interestingly, the racial differences in school resources, when noted, were in favor of African American students. For example, more White students (56.9%) were likely to feel put down by professors in the classroom than African Americans (50.6%). And, school counselor's expectations for students to go to college were slightly higher for African American students (88.3%) than for White students (84.9%); with less than 20% saying their students would do anything but go to college (AA: 11.7%; WA: 15.1%). On balance though, both groups were fairly equal in the available academic resources and support felt in their schools, even if African American students registered more support.

Table 1.C School Resources of Base Year (2002)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012

Concept	Dimensions	Variables	Responses	Statistics	
				White	African American
Academic Resources	Expectations	BYS66E School Counselor's desire for 10th grader after high school	0. anything but college	15.1%	11.7%
			1. go to college	84.9	88.3
			(n)	(5757)	(9677)
		BY27H Teachers expect success in school	1.strongly disagree	7.6%	6.7%
			2. disagree	34.1	25.8
			3. agree	46.4	44.2
			4. strongly agree	11.8	23.3
			(n)	(8258)	(1890)
	Resources	BYS50 School has library media/resource center	0. no	4.2%	5.0%
			1. yes	95.8	95.0
			(n)	(8192)	(14238)
		BYS52 How useful are school library reference materials	1. don't use the school library	11.4%	14.5%
			2. not useful	8.3	6.2
			3. useful	58.7	52.8
			4. very useful	21.7	26.5
			(n)	(7687)	(1656)
		BYS20F Teachers are interested in students	1. strongly disagree	3.0%	5.6%
			2. disagree	18.5	23.4
			3. agree	59.4	52.7
			4. strongly agree	15.2	13.5
			(n)	(8682)	(1966)
		BYS20H In class often feels put down by teachers	1. strongly disagree	27.4%	31.8%
			2. disagree	56.9	50.6
			3. agree	9.4	9.9
			4. strongly agree	2.2	2.9
			(n)	(8621)	(1994)
		BYS27A Classes are interesting and challenging	1. strongly disagree	7.7%	5.6%
			2. disagree	37.2	29.4
			3. agree	44.7	46.5
			4. strongly agree	6.5	13.9
			(n)	(8631)	(1995)
		Index of School[1] Resources	Mean	28.17	28.60
			(sd)	2.45	2.48
			min-max	16-34	17-34

[1] Index of School Resources=Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library Usefulness Recoded + School Counselor Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H + Teachers are Interested in Students Recoded + Classes are Interesting and Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34; Correlations among these indicators ranged from 0.033**- 0.456**($p<0.01^{**}$) for Whites and from 0.008*-0.385**($p<0.01^{**}$) for African Americans

As for the peer academic culture that students were immersed in, the following similarities and racial differences were noted. African American students' friends were more academically influential than friends of their White counterparts. For example, when asked if it was very important to their friends to get good grades, 60.8% of African American students said so compared to only 48% of White students. Even though it was equally very important to friends of both groups (76.1% WA and 77.1% AF) to finish high school, more African American youth (62.7%) compared to Whites (57.8%) had friends who wanted to continue their education past high school.

Table 1.D Peer Academic Influence of Base Year (2002)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012

Concepts	Dimensions	Variables	Responses	Statistics: White	Statistics: African American
Academic Resources	Peer Academic Influence	BYS90A Important to friends to attend classes regularly	1. not important 2. somewhat important 3. very important (n)	3.5% 31.1 40.2 (6489)	2.5% 22.0 30.7 (1116)
		BYS90B Important to friends to study	1. not important 2. somewhat important 3. very important (n)	11.2% 55.8 33.0 (6519)	9.1% 49.6 41.3 (10713)
		BYS90D Important to friends to get good grades	1. not important 2. somewhat important 3. very important (n)	5.8% 46.2 48.0 (2223)	6.1% 33.1 60.8 (1117)
		BYS90F Important to friends to finish high school	1. not important 2. somewhat important 3. very important (n)	3.4% 20.5 76.1 (6454)	5.6% 17.3 77.1 (1114)
		BYS90H Important to friends to continue education past high school	1. not important 2. somewhat important 3. very important (n)	6.2% 36.0 57.8 (1917)	6.1% 31.1 62.7 (1108)
		Index of Peer[1] Academic Influence	Mean (sd) min-max	12.38 2.35 5-15	12.61** 2.47 5-15

[1] Index of Peer Academic Influence=BYS90A+BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15; Correlations among these indicators ranged from 0.335**- 00.596** ($p<0.01$**) for Whites and from 0.297** - 0.693** ($p<0.01$**) for African Americans.

Home Resources

Home resources, the second type of social capital considered in this analysis, were measured by two sets of indicators: socioeconomic and socio-cultural resources. Based on families' total income (in 2001), White families had more economic resources than African American families (Table 1.E). The majority in both groups made between $25,001 and $200,000, both African American (63%) and White families (87.7%); but there was a 24.7% difference in favor of White families. White parents were also more educated than their African American counterparts. For example, 46% of white parents had completed college and even go beyond. The comparable proportion of college educated African American parents was 32.8%. On the other hand, more African American parents had either graduated high school or had earned a GED than White parents (AA: 23.3%; WA:19.4%). On balance, white youth had access to more economic resources in their homes than African American youth.

Table 1.E Home Resources of Base Year (2002)
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS 2002- 2012

Concepts	Dimensions	Variables	Responses	Statistics: White	Statistics: African American
Home Resources	SE Resources (SER)	BYINCOME Total Family Income from all sources 2001-composite	1. None	0.2%	0.8%
			2. $1,000 or less	0.3	3.1
			3. $1,001 - $5,000	0.7	4.3
			4. $5,001-$10,000	1.1	4.4
			5. $10,001-$15,00	2.5	7.3
			6. $15,001-$20,000	3.2	8.6
			7. $20,001-$25,000	4.3	8.5
			8. $25,001-$35,000	9.6	15.3
			9. $35,001-$50,000	18.8	19.0
			10. $50,001-$75,000	24.0	14.0
			11. $75,001-$100,000	16.3	8.4
			12. $100,001-$200,000	14.1	5.4
			13. 200,001 or more	4.9	0.9
		BYPARED Parents' highest level of education	1.Did not finish high school	2.0%	4.5%
			2. Graduated from high school/GED	19.4	23.3
			3. Attended 2-year school, no degree	10.8	13.3
			4. Graduated from 2-year school	11.0	12.0
			5. Attended college, no 4-year deg.	11.0	14.2
			6. Graduated from college	24.6	19.8
			7. Completed Master's degree or eq.	13.8	7.7
			8. Completed PhD, MD, other advanced degree	7.4	5.3
		Index of SE[1] Resources	Mean	14.43	12.12
			(sd)	3.46	3.80
			min-max	3-21	3-21
			(n)	(8682)	(2020)
	Socio-cultural Resources	BYHOMLIT Home literacy resources	1.Family has none of the resources	2.8%	7.6%
			2. Family has one of these resources	11.8	18.8
			3. Family has two of these resources	28.6	32.8
			4. 50+ book/daily paper/regular mag	56.9	40.9
			(n)	(7905)	(1562)
		BYP81 How far in school parent expects 10th-grader's will go	1. Less than high school graduation	0.3%	0.5%
			2. High school graduation/GED only	6.7	7.7
			3. Attend or complete 2-year college/school	13.6	11.3
			4. Attend 4-year degree incomplete	3.9	3.9
			5. Graduate from college	47.2	36.2
			6. Obtain Master's degree or equi.	17.2	18.6
			7. Obtain PhD, MD, other advanced degree	11.2	21.7
			(n)	(7370)	(1421)
		Index of Socio-cultural[2] Resources	Mean	5.05	5.43
			(sd)	1.32	1.53
			min-max	1-8	1-8
			(n)	(6738)	(1128)

[1] Index of SER= BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21; Correlations between the two indicators were 0.300**-0.450** (p<0,01**) for whites, and from 0.242** - 0.431** (p<0.01**) for African Americans.

[2] Index of Socio-Cultural Resources= By Home Lit Recoded*BYP81; Correlations between the two indicators were 0.184** (p<0.01**), and 0.075* (p<0.05*) for African Americans.

The class resource divide among neighborhoods and homes that are accentuated by gentrification are illustrated in the documentary, “Class Divide” in the Chelsea neighborhood of New York (Levin 2015). On one side of the street are the expensive schools, buildings, restaurants, while just across the street are housing projects. They are only separated by one street, but coexist in the same area. One woman interviewed in the film noted, “I feel like they’re trying to push everybody out of New York City. I don’t care what color you are, if you don’t have the big dollars they want you out.” Gentrification is a part of residential segregation, just because you have been living in one place for a long time, does not mean you will always be able to afford to live there.

As for socio-cultural resources in the home, the second dimension of home resources, the following similarities and differences were evident in Table 1. E. Parents of both groups of students had very high expectations for their educational future. More than three quarters of (WA= 75.6% and AA = 76.5%) parents expected their children to complete college and even go beyond. Similarly, both sets of parents offered their children rich literacy options in their homes; White homes were a bit more so than African American homes. A majority (51.6%) of African American homes had 1-2 reading materials (versus 49.4% WA homes); a majority (56.9%) of White homes had more than 50 resources for reading while the corresponding percentage in AA homes was 40.9%.

Summary Profile

On balance, White youth grew up in families that had more socioeconomic resources than African American youth; the mean ($\bar{x}$) index of socioeconomic resources was 14.3 for White families and 12.1 ($\bar{x}$) for AA (on a range of 3 – 21). Their socio-cultural home background was similar, in their richness, and yet different. Both groups of families had high expectations for their children’s education. But White youth had a more in their exposure to literacy in the homes.

Bivariate Analyses

In the second analytical step, bivariate correlation analyses were run between the socioeconomic achievement and high school completion with both home and academic resources (Appendix B: Table 2). As seen in Table 2, several preliminary differences were noted in the experiences of White and African American youth. For one, both both White and African American students with good home resources did moderately better when it came to completing high school. Specifically, socioeconomic resources were equally helpful to both groups (SE resources: White $r=0.18^{***}$ & African American $r = 0.17^{***}$). But, sociocultural capital played a moderately bigger role in high school completion for African American students than it did for White youth (Sociocultural: African American $r=0.27^{***}$ versus White $r=0.21^{***}$). Racialized resource differences were also noted in the utility of academic resources (school resources and peer academic influence), the second type of resource, in high school completion. Both types of school resources were more salient for White students than they were for African American students (School resources: White r=0.11*** vis-a-vis African American r= 0.05*; Peer Academic resources: White r=0.15*** contrast with African American r=0.07**). In addition, more White male (r=-0.09***) and African American male youth (r=-0.06***) were likely to have completed high school than their female counterparts.

Once they graduated high school, the high school completion certificate was very helpful to both African American and White student's future socioeconomic success. But, the benefits of high school completion were more striking for African American youth (African American r=0.32***) than for Whites (r=0.27***). And just as with high school completion, home and academic resources continued to be assets to both groups of youth in their future socioeconomic achievement. However, there were the expected racial undertones in the extent of resource usefulness. Even though both White and African American students were able to continue to activate their home resources for later socioeconomic success, White students (SE resources r=0.34*** and Sociocultural r= 0.35***) were able to do so much more than African Americans (r=0.24*** & r=0.24***). Along similar racialized lines, high school academic resources continue to be an asset for White students' socioeconomic success (School Resources r=0.13*** and Peer Academic Resources r=0.20***) but that was not the case for African Americans (r not significant).

Overall, home and school resources played an important role, both in high school completion and in the future socioeconomic success of White youth. But African American students could activate their home and academic resources only for their high school completion, but not in their pursuit of later socioeconomic success. The robustness of these preliminary racialized associations between resources and success in high school and later in life were evaluated using mutilate regression analyses.

Multivariate Analysis

The racial differences in the associations of home and school resources with high school completion and later socioeconomic success were reevaluated using a two-step multiple regression analysis for White and African American students separately (Table 3). In the first step, high school completion was regressed on home and school resources. In the second step, future socioeconomic was predicted using high school completion as well as home and school resources. Gender was controlled for in all four analyses models.

Several racialized and non-racialized patterns were evident in Table 3 in both high school completion and later socioeconomic achievement (SEA). As might be expected, both groups of youth needed similar types of resources for success at the high school and adult phases of their lives. But the resources needed for socioeconomic success in the later life stage were more racialized than for high school completion. Racial differences were also evident within each trajectory.

Table 3
Regression Analysis of School Resources and Academic Resources on High School Completion & Socioeconomic Achievement[1] (Sex as control): β Coefficients
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012

	Model 1 HS Completion		Model 2 SES Achievement	
	African American	**White**	**African American**	**White**
Home Resources:				
Index of Family SE Resources	0.22***	0.08***	0.17***	0.13***
Index of Socio-Cultural Resources	0.23***	0.15***	0.01	0.14***
Academic Resources:				
Index of School Resources	0.08**	0.05**	-0.01	0.04*
Index of Peer Academic Influence	0.04	0.06**	0.01	0.03
High School Completion			0.13***	0.13***
Control:				
Female (1) vs. Male (0)	-0.05	-0.02	-0.17***	-0.08***
Modal Statistics:				
Constant	2.03***	3.38***	-2.55***	-4.86***
Adjusted R^2	0.13***	0.05***	0.08**	0.09***
DF 1 and 2	5 & 486	5 & 3658	6 & 486	6 & 3658

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05.

1 Socioeconomic achievement: F3SES is the average of standardized 3 inputs, namely 2011 earnings from employment, the prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most recent job, and educational attainment.
High School Completion: Range: 1 (No GED) - 5 (completed HS on time, 2004);
Index of Family SES = BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21;
Index of Socio-Cultural Resources = BYHOMELIT*BYP81; Range: 1-8;
Index of School Resources = Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library2 Usefulness Recoded + School Counselor Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H +Teachers are interested in Students Recoded + Classes are Interesting and Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34;
Index of Peer Academic Influence =BYS90A + BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15;
Female (1) vs. Male (0).

First, for the racialized resource models needed for high school completion (Models 1.A and 1B): both types of resources were more useful to African American students than to Whites. For example, socioeconomic resources were of more assistance to African American youth (β=0.15*** in Model 1.A) than white youth (β=0.08*** in Model 1.B). Similarly, sociocultural resources also favored African American youth (β=0.23***) more than Whites (β=0.15***) in completing high school. In addition, there were racial differences in the effectiveness of academic resources, albeit less than home resources. School resources were a bit more useful to African American (β=0.08**) than White (β = 0.05**) high school students. And peer support assisted, even if weakly, only White youth in their high school completion prospects (β=.06**).

The second noteworthy sets of findings in Table 3 were the non-racialized resources. For one, irrespective of whether the youth were African American or White, home resources were more useful than academic resources to high school students in terms of high school completion (Models 1 in Table 3). And, both types of home resources, sociocultural and economic, were useful in the high school completion trajectories of students (Models 1 in Table 3). For example, sociocultural resources were the most critical (than socioeconomic resources) in the high school success of both sets of students (Model 1A and 1B); sociocultural effects were $\beta=0.23^{***}$ for African Americans and $\beta=0.15^{***}$ for Whites. In contrast, the effects of socioeconomic resources were only $\beta=0.08^{***}$ for White youth, even if $\beta=0.22$*** for African Americans.

In sum, youth, whether white or African American, needed sociocultural and socioeconomic resources to complete high school. But both family and academic resources gave more of a boost to African American students than to their white counterparts. In other words, African American youth needed more sociocultural and economic family support as well as school resources in their journey toward high school completion than White youth.

Once, the youth completed high school, there continued to be even more pronounced racial differences in the useful resources they could activate for their socioeconomic success, the second question posed in this paper. No doubt, completing high school was a necessary condition for later socioeconomic success, whether one is African American (AA: $\beta=0.13$*** in Model 2A) or White (WA: $\beta=0.13$*** in Model 2B). But, after African American youth completed high school, it was family socio-economics ($\beta=0.17$***, Model 2.A) and not sociocultural or for that matter academic resources, that helped them succeed as adults. On the other hand, both family SE resources ($\beta=0.13$*** Model 2.B) and socio-cultural resources ($\beta=0.14$***, Model 2B) continued to play a role in the adult economic lives of White youth. School resources ceased to be relevant for both groups in their later socioeconomic success.

A last note about of racialized gender differences. Males and female high school students were equally likely to complete high school (Models 1A and 1B). However, once they completed high school, not only did gender differences become apparent in adult socioeconomic success but the gender differences were racialized (Models 2.A and 2B). For example, net of resources, African American and White women achieved less than men. But the gender gap in achievement was much more pronounced among African American young adults ($\beta= -0.17$***) than among White youth ($\beta=-0.08$***). In other words, even with social capital, African American women were doubly disadvantaged in their adult socioeconomic success.

At first glance, it seemed as if the first hypothesis (#1), which stated that home and school resources would be more beneficial to White, than African American, students in their high school completion prospects, was not supported. However, another angle on these racialized high school completion findings could also be that African students needed more support (than White students) in the home, both economically and culturally, to achieve the same level of success in completing high school. White privilege was more noticeable in the resource models for later socioeconomic achievement. As predicted in Hypotheses #2, home resources, economic and cultural, continued to be useful to White adults. But, African American adults could translate only their family's socioeconomic, not cultural or school, resources, into later economic success (Hypothesis #3).

Both education professionals (interviewed for this paper) emphasized the importance of family socioeconomic background as important contributing factors to high school completion and future socioeconomic achievement. However, it was also clear that the value of school resources for African American students, unlike their White counterparts, stopped at the high school gate and were not transferable to their later achievements. That African American students could not rely on their high schools once they left school might be products of the limits of the support high schools can offer to their alum. If the schools from which African American students graduated were mostly located in low income communities, there were also likely to have fewer resources (than well-endowed schools) available to them (Interviewee #1). Interviewee #2 added, there is a revolving door of teachers and staff that don't stay longer than 5 years in low-income schools. If experienced teachers are hard to find at low- income school, new teachers, who are generally less prepared, have no role models from whom to learn and they too end up leaving after a short amount of time. Under these scenarios of limited school resources, it is not surprising that low-income high schools, which many African American students attend, are not able to continue assisting their alum. It is also possible that the limited school resources that African American students have access to are not transferable to work and success in the wider society.

The White students' experiences offered a stark contrast between well-resourced and under-resourced schools. Not only were white students able to capitalize on their high school resources as they graduated from school but they could continue to do so even later in life. But, that these racial gaps in education are not insurmountable was demonstrated by a community college in Ohio which took concerted action to assist students who needed extra support. Smola (2019) in their "Columbus State wins award for boosting student success, reducing gaps," highlight a school that won an award for their programs to reduce gaps not only between white and minority students, but also students who needed financial aid. The school implemented programs such as, "mandatory student orientation, a student success course, an early-alert system to identify and communicate with students who might be falling behind, and the development of a student resource hub and mentorship groups. Many of those measures have had particularly positive effects on low-income and minority students…" (https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190220/columbus-state-wins-award-for-boosting-student-success-reducing-gaps).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In these concluding sections, the theoretical and policy implications of the empirical findings were explored. In addition, a few suggestions for future research, derived from the limitations of the study, were outlined.

Theoretical and Policy Implications

Overall, based on both the quantitative and qualitative empirical findings, socioeconomic resources in the home were most effective in ensuring not only high school completion but also future socioeconomic progress of youth; this resource-success connection was true for both African American and White youth. However, only White youth were able to continue accessing their high school resources once they completed high school, endorsing the Bourdieu-Lareau-Massey/Denton theoretical reasoning (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Empirical Model of the Impacts of Home and Academic Resources on Socioeconomic Achievement of White (WA) and African American (AA) Youth Beta (β) Coefficients[1]
Educational Longitudinal Study, NELS, 2002-2012



[1] Refer to Table 3 for index coding.

Further, racial differences in the utility of family socio-cultural resources to young adults as they pursue socioeconomic success as young adults were also theoretically relevant. Family socio-cultural capital were no longer helpful for the future socioeconomic success of African American young adults. The sociocultural differences between Whites and African Americans are deeply rooted in our racial history and these differences have shaped the social structures and institutions. Since Whites are the majority and dominant group, they have been the ones to build and influence the many structures and related cultural expectations, putting their offspring in advantageous positions. For the rest of society, including African Americans, their institutional disadvantages represent major systemic hurdles that lead to inequalities in life outcomes, be they in education, wealth, health, income, or other life choices. A recent news story about wealthy parents paying for spots at elite colleges for their underqualified children is illustrative of systemic advantages for the dominant communities. Inequality in college admissions is not a new notion; with "college test prep companies, academic tutors, personal sports coaches and college admissions consultants, the family with resources can often improve their child's odds of acceptance" into an elite college reported Bahney in a recent story (2019). Donations to the school and legacy admissions suffice even if a child does not have the academic aptitude to pursue higher education. These advantages are not something that African American students typically have access to because of the history of discrimination in America and because they are disproportionately represented in lower class and poor communities.

To the extent that the hurdles faced by African Americans and other minority groups are systemic, major policy changes are needed to combat the pernicious inequalities that have been present in America since its founding. No doubt, institutional changes are difficult to achieve and will take a lot of time and effort, particularly because reform policies will have to be broad based, covering not only educational reform, but also financial (as banking reforms to curb lending biases and redlining practices) and housing practices, among others.

Educational reform in poor schools will have to ensure enough resources and better infrastructure, so that educators have the resources to help the children succeed. Teachers will also have to be incentivized to stay longer and be role models for the younger teachers. Residential reforms will also have to be an integral part of the package to address inequalities. As was noted earlier, funding for the American school system is heavily dependent on its community tax base. Desegregation of neighborhoods might need to be achieved using a mixed income model of housing, with high income homes interspersed with affordable housing. If gentrification needs to become a part of the neighborhood solution, concerted efforts will have to be made not to push low income families out of their homes and communities. These policies need to be put in place in order to help not only African Americans, but those who are in the lower/working class and in poverty (which is disproportionately African American).

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

As with any research, while new lessons were gleaned about the high school completion and future socioeconomic achievement paths of White and African American youth, there is much left unexplained. For example, while the home (and to a lesser extent school) resource model worked much better for African American youth in their high school completion success (adjusted $R^2 = 0.13^{***}$) than for White youth (adjusted R^2 was only 0.05^{***}), there is still much to be known. Similar limitations were noted in the Socioeconomic Achievement Models (adjusted R^2 for whites was only 0.09^{***} and 0.08^{***} for African Americans), although the racial disparities in models were less muted.

A fuller understanding of both educational and later economic success of youth can be achieved by examining the role that racial differences in community resources, or lack thereof, play in supporting as well presenting challenges for their youth. According to both interviewees, socioeconomic background of both home and communities play an important role in academic and socioeconomic achievement of their youth. Given the current community-based funding structures of schools in the U.S., students in well-resourced areas can be expected to do much better in high schools as well be able to tap into those community resources as they move on in their lives. More research attention is also needed on community challenges, such as neighborhood crime and violence, and how they hinder the smoother socioeconomic progress of African American and White youth. For example, a comparison of low-income, middle-income, and upper-class income schools and communities on the socioeconomic achievement of their students could shed light on the effect of structural forces that inhibit or facilitate access to certain resources required for socioeconomic success. In the final analyses, a clearer understanding is needed about of how institutional structures (communities, schools, and workplaces) facilitate or inhibit youth access to different resources as they chart their lives as adults.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Letter of Consent and Interview Schedule

Dear ____________

I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my research on socioeconomic achievement.

You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of research and education. I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about education inequality and will last about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU's Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion. If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at ______ or Dr. Fernandez at _______________

Sincerely, Anna Heider

By signing below you are giving consent to participate in the above study. (If the interviewee was contacted by email or phone, request an electronic message denoting consent).

Signature	Printed Name	Date
________________________	______________________	_____________

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Interview Schedule for Supplemental Qualitative Interviews

Interview Date and Time: ___ Respondent ID#: ____

1. What is the TYPE Agency/Organization/Association/Institution (**NO NAME**, please) where you learned about (and/or worked) with this issue:
2. What is your position in this organization?
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
4. Based on what you know of education inequality, how common is this problem (issue or concern)?
5. In your opinion, what are some reasons that contribute to this problem (issue or concern)? (PROBE with: Could you expand a bit more?).
6. [If the respondent does not bring up your independent concepts as potential causes), PROBE: a.How about home resources, such as family's socioeconomic status and parent's education, and their potential connection to academic achievement and socioeconomic achievement.

b. How about school resources, such as teacher's expectations, if they have computers, a library, etc. or not; and their potential connection to academic achievement and socioeconomic achievement.

7. Is there anything else about this issue/topic I should know more about?

Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be contacted at___. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu

Appendix B

Table 2. Correlation Matrix of SES, High School Completion, Indices of Home (Socioeconomic and Socio-Cultural), Academic (School and Peer) Resources, and Sex: (White correlations above the diagonal of 1 and African American below the diagonal of 1)[1]

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
A. F3SES:	1	0.27***	0.34***	0.34***	0.20***	0.13***	-0.01
B. F2HSSTAT	0.32***	1	0.18***	0.21***	0.15***	0.11***	-0.06***
C. Index of Family SES	0.24***	0.16***	1	0.32***	0.16***	0.06***	0.02
D. Index of Sociocultural Resources	0.24***	0.27***	0.198***	1	0.17***	0.18***	-0.10***
E. Index of Peer Academic Influence	0.03*	0.07**	-0.001	0.12***	1.0	0.33***	-0.17***
F. Index of School Resources	0.04*	0.05*	-0.09***	0.04	0.24***	1.0	-0.08***
G. Female	-0.02	-0.09***	0.02	-0.18***	-0.13***	0.001	1.0

***p<=.001;**p<=.01;*p<=.05

[1] A. F3SES: F3SES is the average of 3 standardized components, namely 2011 earnings from employment, the prestige score associated with the respondent's current/most recent job, and educational attainment; ranges: WA: -1.41 – 9.17; AA: -1.41 – 9.17
B. High School Completion: 1 (No GED) - 5 (completed HS on time, 2004);
C. Index of Family SES = BYINCOME*BYPARED*BYP84; Range: 3-21;
D. Index of Socio-Cultural Resources = BYHOMELIT*BYP81; Range: 1-8;
E. Index of School Resources = Teacher Expectations Recoded + Library2 Usefulness Recoded + School Counselor Recoded + BYS50 + BYS20H +Teachers are interested in Students Recoded + Classes are Interesting and Challenging Recoded; Range: 16-34;
F. Index of Peer Academic Influence = BYS90A + BYS90B+BYS90D+BYS90F+BYS90H; Range: 5-15;
G. Female (1) vs. Male (0).

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Interviewee #2. November 5, 2018. Senior Associate and Head of Faith Formation.

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Author Biographies

Noor Darwish is a senior at Santa Clara University will graduate in June 2019 with a double major in Sociology and Political Science and a minor in International Business. She is passionate about social justice, and plans to use the knowledge and skills she has learnt to help the Middle Eastern and Muslim communities. On a personal note, she is Palestinian and is the Co-President of “Students for Justice in Palestine” and is a member of “Advocacy for Workers on Campus” at Santa Clara University. She grew up in Dubai and speaks English and Arabic fluently. A fun fact about her is that she is a twin.

Anna Paris Heider is a senior Psychology and Sociology double major at Santa Clara University. She will be graduating in the Spring of 2019 and hopes to continue working with communities on social inequalities. In addition to her studies, she enjoys photography, and hopes to incorporate it into her future work with social inequalities.

Elizabeth Namakula Kamya is a senior who will graduate in June 2019 with majors in Sociology, psychology, and ethnic studies. She is half Ugandan and proud of her multicultural background. While she was growing up, she was fortunate enough to travel to Uganda every summer. Spending time with people who have different life experiences than her own instilled her with values, of compassion, consciousness, and cultural competence, which have guided her career choices and activities tremendously. While studying at Santa Clara University, her mentors and peers have challenged her to think creatively in response to problem-solving. Programs at SCU, with a singular focus on social justice, have helped her discover a love of learning in new cultures and being pushed to grow. Doing research on community attachment has inspired her to take what she has learned and apply it to local and international communities in order to create powerful transformations.

Erin Jessica Ronald is a fourth year Environmental Studies and Sociology double major. She is passionate about helping communities reduce social inequalities through sustainable development. After college, Erin aims to continue her vocational discernment, pursuing research with a focus on urban climate change mitigation before applying to graduate school. She is most interested in human ecology, climate change management, and international development.