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Hegel's Political Theory and Philosophy of History

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I. Hegel’s historical and political thought can best be understood if we understand its relationship to Rousseau’s political theory and Kant’s philosophy of history.

Hegel’s conception of the modern state closely resembles Rousseau’s ideal community which was based upon rational freedom realized through a general will and reinforced by custom and tradition which shaped the character and interests of the citizens. However, Rousseau’s community was utopian—it could not be realized in the modern world. It was incompatible with commerce and trade which promote particular interest and thus corrupt custom and erode the general will. These matters will be discussed in Section III.

To explain the possibility of the ideal state in the modern world, Hegel turns to Kant’s philosophy of history where commerce, trade, and conflicting particular interests themselves lead to what morality—the categorical imperative or the general will—would demand. Kant’s ideal state, however, completely lacks custom, tradition, and community—what Hegel calls “Sittlichkeit.” These matters will be discussed in Section II.

Hegel’s goal, then, is to combine three things: (1) rational freedom of the sort realized through a general will or categorical imperative, (2) a theory of historical development in which conflicting particular interests lead to a moral society, and (3) custom, tradition, or Sittlichkeit. To do this Hegel will have to reject certain aspects of the thought of Rousseau and Kant and he will have to explain how custom, tradition, and community instead of being corrupted by particular interests can come to be compatible with them. The key to this will be Hegel’s concept of spirit. These matters will be discussed in Section IV. Let us begin with Kant.
II. In the “Idea for a Universal History,” Kant claims that individuals motivated by inclinations, desires, and particular interests, nevertheless further, without realizing it, a common but unknown purpose. The key to this historical purposiveness is what Kant calls “unsocial sociability.” Humans have an unsocial propensity toward self-interest, but they also have a social propensity to associate with others in society. These two factors produce competition, conflict, and even war. However, competition and selfishness also drive us to accomplish things, and they drive us toward the fullest development of our powers and capacities. This development, for Kant, will eventually lead to a society of peace and morality.

So also, for Kant, there is an unsocial sociability between nations. The unsocial assertion of national self-interest drives nations toward aggression and war. But there is also an important form of sociability between nations—their concern with commerce and trade. As conflicts and wars become more destructive and expensive, they come into conflict with trade. As nations become more commercially interdependent, war poses an ever greater threat to the smooth functioning of the international market. Other nations will intervene to prevent war, and thus, for Kant, we move toward peace, justice, and a league of nations.

For Kant, there are two forces at work in history. The first is the conflict of particular interests. The second is morality. And both, for Kant, lead to the very same end—peace, justice and a league of nations. Conflicts and wars, Kant says, are leading toward what moral reflection would have demanded from the start (UH, 18-19. PP, 112-13).

For Kant, the categorical imperative requires us to act only on maxims which we could will to be universal laws. Morality is based upon reason, not interest. We must rationally analyze our maxims—ask if they can be universalized without contradiction—in order to separate our interests or inclinations about a particular act from our abstract rational assessment of what is moral in general. Only if we follow reason are we free, self-determined, and moral. If we act upon our interests, we are determined heteronomously by natural forces and we are not free.

The categorical imperative would demand just laws, an end to wars, and a league of nations (PP, 100). We could not will to universalize war, unjust laws, and international lawlessness. Moreover, the other force at work in history drives us to the very same point that morality does. Both morality and the conflict of particular interests converge toward the same end—one consciously, the other unconsciously (UH, 18-19. PP, 111-13).
The notion that conflicting self-interests lead toward what morality demands, Kant gets, I think, from Adam Smith. In a market economy, for Smith, self-seeking not only produces a common good, but it does so more effectively than if individuals had consciously and cooperatively sought this good. It produces a national capital—a common good—through an "invisible hand," that is, behind our backs and despite our intentions.5

For Kant too we find such an invisible hand operating within society:

many say a republic would have to be a nation of angels, because men with their selfish inclinations are not capable of a constitution of such sublime form. But precisely with these inclinations nature comes to the aid of the general will established on reason. . . . Thus it is only a question of a good organization of the state. . . . whereby the powers of each selfish inclination are so arranged in opposition that one moderates or destroys the ruinous effect of the other. The consequence for reason is the same as if none of them existed, and man is forced to be a good citizen even if not a morally good person. (PP, 112)

While Hegel, unlike Kant, does not think that world history is leading to peace, a league of nations, or international law,6 nevertheless, Hegel, very much like Kant, relies on an invisible hand argument both in his philosophy of history and in his theory of civil society. For Hegel, particular interest or passion is the active force in history which gives rise to the universal. Human passions and the universal Idea are the warp and the woof of world history.7 Hegel says, The particular interests of passion cannot . . . be separated from the realization of the universal. . . . Particular interests contend with one another . . . But it is from this very conflict and destruction of particular things that the universal emerges, and it remains unscathed itself. For it is not the universal Idea which enters into opposition, conflict, and danger; it keeps itself in the background, untouched and unharmed, and sends forth the particular interests of passion to fight, and wear themselves out in its stead. It is what we may call the cunning of reason that it sets the passions to work in its service, so that the agents by which it gives itself existence must pay the penalty and suffer the loss. (IPH, 89)

World history, for Hegel, occurs as the universal Idea is realized through the conflict of particular interests—a conflict which produces effects quite different from what the individuals consciously intended to accomplish (IPH, 82, 75).

So also, in his discussion of civil society in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel, much as for Kant, follows Adam Smith. Civil society is a system of economic interdependence where self-seeking unconsciously produces the satisfaction of the needs of all. Competitive self-seeking produces
a common capital from which each struggles to gain their share. Conflicting particular interests lead to the universal. Moreover, for Hegel, a state is well constituted when the private interests of the citizens coincide with the general end of the state (PR, 127, 129-30. IPH, 73).

So far, the views of Hegel and Kant are quite similar. Now we must look to the differences. In the first place, for Hegel, we cannot say that there are two different forces at work in history—the conflict of particular interests and morality—as for Kant. “The particular interests of passion cannot . . . be separated from the realization of the universal” (IPH, 89; my italics). We can begin to understand Hegel’s views on this matter if we look to the section of the Phenomenology entitled “Virtue and the Way of the World.” Most commentators on the Phenomenology think that this section refers to Don Quixote. None of them, that I am aware of, see what it really refers to, which is so very clearly Kant’s philosophy of history.

In this section, Hegel’s description of “virtue” clearly indicates that he has Kant’s ethics in mind. Virtue is the consciousness that law is essential and that individuality—which is to say, particular interest—must be sacrificed to the universal. Virtue wills to accomplish the good which is not yet actual; the universal is an “ought” which must be realized. It can be realized only through virtue’s nullifying of individuality. For the “way of the world,” on the other hand, individuality takes itself to be essential and it pursues self-interest. It seeks its own pleasure and enjoyment, and in doing so it subordinates the universal to itself. For Kant, both morality and the conflict of particular interests converge toward the same universal end. So also, for Hegel, the way of the world, through the conflict of particular interests, achieves the universal—the same universal that virtue seeks (PS, 228-29, 235). For Kant, it was morality’s task to guide the historical conflict of particular interests and to hasten it toward its end. For Hegel, virtue too attempts to assist the way of the world to realize the universal. At this point, however, Hegel’s disagreement with Kant begins. Hegel argues that, in fact, virtue’s assistance is unnecessary; the way of the world is quite capable of realizing the universal on its own. Virtue’s assistance is a sham (PS, 230-32). Virtue wants to bring the good into existence by the sacrifice of particular interest. But the conflict of particular interests is what actually realizes the universal. Virtue wants to realize the universal as something that ought to be rather than as something which is. The way of the world is our first dim view in the Phenomenology of Sittlichkeit—morality which appears not merely as an ought, but which is. Hegel says:

Virtue in the ancient world has its own definite sure meaning, for it had in the spiritual substance of the nation a foundation full of mean-
ing, and for its purpose an actual good already in existence. Consequently, too, it was not directed against the actual world as against something generally perverted, and against a "way of the world." But the virtue we are considering has its being outside of the spiritual substance, it is an unreal virtue, a virtue in imagination and name only, which lacks that substantial content. (PS, 234; the last italics are mine)

Thus, for Hegel, we must drop the idea that virtue exists only as a principle, an ought, which as yet has no actual existence and which is brought into existence through the sacrifice of individuality, particular interest, or passion. Hegel's objection to Kantian morality, or "virtue," is that it is abstract, outside the world, an ought, and it believes that only it can realize morality. It has severed itself from the concrete actual world of interest and passion, and it faces it as an other. From this superior position it wants to direct the world. Instead, morality must be rooted in the world. Or to put this another way, the point Hegel is making here is that Kant's philosophy of history and his ethics are written from the perspective of individual consciousness—the perspective that there are only individual consciousesses. Morality, for Kant, is a matter of individual will abstracted from the concrete actual world. Certainly, for Kant, inclinations and interests, which are part of the actual world of natural causality, are to be carefully separated and excluded from the realm of the individual moral will if the individual is to be self-determined and thus free. This separation is what Hegel objects to. Kant has no notion of spirit or Sittlichkeit, which are beginning to emerge here in the Phenomenology. Sittlichkeit is morality embedded in a concrete spiritual world. For Hegel, virtue and the way of the world, particular interest and the universal, morality and the concrete world, are not separate opposed realities externally related to each other. They are internally related as parts of a single spiritual reality which already exists, not something which merely ought to be realized. For Hegel, individual consciousness is the internalization of the social world and the social world is the outcome of the actions of individual consciousesses. Each develops in interaction with the other, and each transforms the other. They are two parts of one spiritual unity.

Hegel agrees with the Kantian and Smithian notion that a conflict of particular interests leads to the universal. What Hegel does not accept is that this can be understood merely at the level of individual consciousness. It must be understood at the level of spirit. Spirit explains how individual interest—the concrete way of the world—is connected to virtue. This will become clearer in Section IV, but here we can at least say that conflict between particular interests gives rise to a set of institutions, a world, which comes to have a life of its own, and which reacts back upon and molds those individual
consciousnesses and thus leads them to virtue. Particular interests and virtue are not two eternally separate realms external to one another. They are internally related as two interacting parts enclosed within a single spiritual unity, and each produces the other. Virtue is simply mistaken in thinking itself independent and outside of this spiritual reality, superior to it, and thus able to guide particular interests from above. In fact, for Hegel, we cannot guide history at all as Kant thinks we can. History is not a matter of individual will, but of spirit. Individuals are unconscious tools of world spirit. Moreover, there is no ought that the individual will can independently set out to realize. Morality already exists as this spiritual unity which encloses us and is our very being. Hegel's task is to reconcile us to what is by allowing us to correctly understand what is. His aim is to transform our understanding of reality so that we accept it, not to transform reality in accordance with an ought (PR, 11-12. IPH, 170-71).

To understand this critique of Kant more clearly, we must notice that Hegel distinguishes between two forms of morality—Moralität and Sittlichkeit. Moralität begins with Socrates and reaches its high point in Kant. Moralität is individual, rational, and reflective morality based upon individual autonomy and personal conviction. One must rationally decide what is moral and do it because it is moral—because our rationality tells us that it is the right thing to do. This rational and reflective component is absent in Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit is best represented in the Greek polis before the rise of Socratic Moralität. Sittlichkeit is ethical behavior grounded in custom and tradition and developed through habit and imitation in accordance with the objective laws of the community. Personal reflection and analysis have little to do with Sittlichkeit (IPH, 97). Sittlichkeit is ethical life built into one's character, attitudes, and feelings.

Furthermore, Moralität involves an "ought"—morality ought to be realized. This "ought" is also absent from Sittlichkeit. For it, morality is not something we ought to realize, something we ought to be. Morality exists—it is. Morality is already embedded in our customs, traditions, character, attitudes, and feelings. Here there is no opposition between particular interest and the universal. There is no opposition between subject and object. The objective ethical order exists in, is actualized in, is the essence of, the subject (PR, 109. PS, 212-16).

What Hegel wants for the modern world in neither traditional Sittlichkeit nor modern Moralität. He wants a synthesis of Sittlichkeit and Moralität which, though at times confusing, he also calls Sittlichkeit. This higher Sittlichkeit combines the rational and reflective side of Moralität with the transcendence of the ought characteristic of Sittlichkeit. Rational
reflective morality is concretely embedded in the customs, traditions, character, and feelings of individuals. We have a reflective consciousness of the ethical substance (PS, 216).

*Sittlichkeit* without *Moralität* is adequate for Hegel. So also, Hegel rejects Kantian *Moralität* without *Sittlichkeit*. This was implied in "Virtue and the Way of the World," but it becomes clearer in following sections of the *Phenomenology* where Hegel goes on to argue that Kantian *Moralität* shorn of *Sittlichkeit*, in fact, is impossible. He argues that one cannot discover one's moral obligation in Kantian fashion simply by analyzing abstract principles to see if they are universal and noncontradictory. For example, private property as well as its opposite—common ownership—are equally universalizable and noncontradictory. Without *Sittlichkeit*—without an immediately given, objective, ethical substance embedded in custom and tradition which actually is rather that merely ought to be—it is impossible to discover through analysis one's moral obligation. *Moralität* gets its content from *Sittlichkeit* (PS, 257-61. PR, 36, 90. IPH, 80).

Moreover, *Moralität* without *Sittlichkeit* would leave us with an inadequate form of freedom. For Kant, individual subjectivity alone is free. Individuals are free when practical reason determines their action. The individual, however, is not necessarily free to realize this moral action. The objective world may well present obstacles to the carrying out of the action, without, for Kant, affecting the individual's moral freedom in the least (F, 10, 16. CPrR, 71). For Kant, such empirical factors, whether they be obstacles or aids, must be completely ignored. They are irrelevant to freedom. Nor do feelings or inclinations play a role here. They need not support the action; nor is our freedom affected if they are opposed to the moral action. For Hegel, on the other hand, freedom is realized only when the objective external world and our feelings fit, agree with, and support the subjective rational freedom of the individual. Laws and institutions, feelings and customs, as well as the rationality of the individual must form a single organic spiritual unity. Thus, for Hegel, freedom requires three things: (1) that the individual be self-determined by universal and rational principles, (2) that rationality have been objectified in the laws and institutions of the state such that in obeying civil laws we obey the laws of our own reason, and (3) that interests, feelings, and customs have been molded so as to agree with and support these rational laws such that particular interests are satisfied and yet lead to the universal.

For Kant, the possibility of freedom required that the transcendental self not be located in the natural, causally determined, phenomenal world. Another—a noumenal realm—was required. A
sphere apart from the natural sphere was necessary as the source of self-determined, free action \((F, 69-73, CPrR, 28, 50)\). In rejecting the existence of an unknown thing-in-itself,\(^{12}\) Hegel rejects the existence of this separate noumenal realm. Rather than locate a transcendental self in a realm apart (as virtue was opposed to the way of the world), he denies that there are such different realms. Instead, there is a single spiritual realm split into two parts—an individual subjective realm and an objective substantial realm. These two sides react against each other and each produces the other. Ultimately the natural objective element is absorbed into the conscious subjective element. In this way the object is no longer alien or other. Individual action and interests give rise to an objective worldly reality which then turns upon the individuals, molds them, and lifts them to the level of universality. The subject does not confront the object as a heteronomous other. The object is the outcome of the subject’s own activity, the realization of the subject’s essence, and thus the object is compatible with the subject’s freedom. The subject is not externally related to the object, but internally related to it as its own essence.

Individuals work on their world through history and transform it to fit themselves \((IPH, 64)\), just as the world transforms individuals so that they conform to it. In confronting their world, individuals confront and discover themselves. For Hegel, they confront their own rationality objectified in the world. This fit between the subjective rationality of the individual and the objective rationality of the world when supported by custom, tradition, and feeling, is the basis of Sittlichkeit. To pursue this further, we must now turn to Rousseau.

III. Rousseau wants to design an ideal state in which the general will can manifest itself. It can do so, given four conditions which Rousseau lays out in the Social Contract, but not neatly all in one place. The four conditions are the following: (1) All citizens must vote as individuals on all questions or laws. (2) All questions put to these citizens must have an abstract and universal form; they must not name a particular person or fact. (3) The question put must always and only be, “what is the general will on this matter?” You must not address the citizens as individuals and ask them what their particular interests are. (4) All laws must be rigorously and equally enforced, and everyone must realize when they are voting that this will be the case.\(^{13}\)

The point here is to address only an individual’s abstract, reflective, rational interest, not their personal, particular, selfish interest. Citizens are made to reflect upon what it would be like if everyone always acted in a specific way. We get them to consider the action
as a universal and necessary principle—as a categorical imperative in Kant's terminology.

If they do so, even thieves would vote against theft. If we were only to address the particular interest of thieves, we might well get some quite convincing justifications of those particular acts of theft. But if we address the abstract, reflective, rational interest, even of thieves; if we ask whether in general, in all cases, everyone should be allowed to steal by laws which are rigorously and equally enforced for all; then even thieves would vote against theft.

The difference between Rousseau and Kant is that for Rousseau the citizens are expected to vote their interest in the general abstract case—their long-term interest as citizens of a community rather than their immediate interest as particular persons. For Kant, we must avoid interest altogether. Hegel, who, as we have already seen, is critical of Kant's abstract opposition of morality to particular interest, in this respect would be closer to Rousseau.

Furthermore, for Rousseau, the general will must be reinforced by what Hegel would call Sittlichkeit. Citizens are only free if the customs which shape inclination and feeling accord with the general will and reason. Rousseau says, "To these . . . laws is added . . . the most important of all; which is not engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of the citizens . . . I am speaking of mores, customs, and especially of opinion—a part of the laws unknown to our political theorists, but on which the success of all the others depends."14

Custom and tradition would be reinforced, for Rousseau, by a civil religion which combines simple, inner, personal commitment with a sentiment of sociability and respect for laws. And these healthy customs, traditions, and public opinion would be maintained by a censorial tribunal which, though incapable of creating, changing, or reestablishing customs and traditions, merely declares what they are in an attempt to preserve them and to slow down their corruption (SC, 123-31).

For Rousseau, there is a tendency for the customs and traditions of any community to become corrupted. Rousseau argues in the Discourse on Inequality that in simple, healthy, egalitarian communities, as soon as agriculture and metallurgy develop and surplus production occurs, society is plunged into inequality, conflict of interests, and the corruption of customs.15 Moreover, Rousseau thinks that once healthy customs have been corrupted, all is lost. They can never be revived (SC, 70. DI, 80). Wealth, unequal property, and commerce are the main causes of this corruption. They promote self-interest and erode the citizen's commitment to the public good. They corrupt custom, tradition, and patriotism which then will no longer be able to rein-
force the general will. Moreover, they can even erode the general will directly. They will make it all the more difficult for the citizens to transcend their immediate interests and to concern themselves with abstract questions, or to ask "what is the common good?" or "what is the general will?" instead of "what do I want?" (DI, 199-200).

Thus Rousseau is a utopian. He does not think his ideal state is possible in the modern world. It is incompatible with commerce, trade, particular interest, and the corruption they produce. And once customs and traditions have been corrupted, all is lost. They cannot be revived. For a decent society to be possible, healthy customs and traditions must simply be given in a traditional and premodern society.

Hegel certainly wants a state which realizes the universal or the general will, and he wants it reinforced by custom, tradition, and Sittlichkeit. But he also wants such a state to be possible in the modern world and thus compatible with wealth, commerce, and trade. He therefore needs a theory that will explain how custom and tradition, without becoming corrupt, can develop and be maintained in a changing modern society involving commerce and trade.

To understand this theory, we must notice that Hegel differs from Rousseau in that for him customs and traditions are not simply given conditions—the groundwork—upon which the institutions of a state are to be established. Rather, Sittlichkeit, that is, custom and tradition, the feelings and attitudes of the citizens, are continually being produced by social and political institutions. Patriotism, for example, which Hegel sees as a sentiment that "habitually recognizes that the community is one's substantive groundwork and end," is "simply a product of the institutions subsisting in the state" (PR, 163-64). It thus follows that different states or a state as it changes historically will produce different customs and traditions. This production requires that mind pass through a process of education (Bildung) and this education is a discipline (PR, 165). For example, in discussing the rise of modern Germany out of the Middle Ages, Hegel says:

The two iron rods which were the instrument of this discipline were the Church and serfdom. The Church drove the "Heart" to desperation—made Spirit pass through the severest bondage. . . . In the same way serfdom, which made a man's body not his own, but the property of another, dragged humanity through all the barbarism of slavery. . . . It was not so much from slavery as through slavery that humanity was emancipated. . . . it is from this intemperate and ungovernable state of volition that the discipline in question emancipated him.16

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel puts it in more general terms: "Mind attains its actuality only by creating a dualism within itself, by submitting itself to physical needs and the chain of these external
necessities, and so imposing on itself this barrier and this finitude, and finally by educating (bildet) itself inwardly even when under this barrier until it overcomes it and attains its objective reality in the finite."17 In the modern state, civil society is one of the most important institutions which provide this discipline or education. In the first place, it produces in individuals the habit of work. At the same time, it makes individuals dependent upon one another for the satisfaction of their needs. Finally, as we have seen, it turns self-seeking into a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of all such that self-interest leads to the universal (PR, 129-30).

But still, how can commerce, trade, and wealth, which are generated in civil society, avoid corrupting custom and tradition and become compatible with Sittlichkeit? Hegel is certainly aware of Rousseau’s argument that particular interest destroys custom and tradition. In fact, in the Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel’s general picture of the historical course of nations is quite similar to Rousseau’s. For Hegel, nations in their youth create their own ethics, customs, and religion, and individuals assimilate themselves to them. The nation actively struggles to realize itself in the actual world and to make itself what it is. Once this has been accomplished, the nation starts to become inactive, self-indulgent, and it stagnates. At this point, “[Individual interests seize control of the powers and resources which were formerly dedicated to the whole.]” “Individuals withdraw into themselves and pursue their own ends, and this [...] is the nation’s undoing.” As the nation declines, a new higher principle emerges, but always in another nation (IPH, 58-63). Thus, for Hegel much as for Rousseau, particular interests cause the downfall and corruption of nations.

But in the Philosophy of Right, while Hegel admits that particular interest or subjectivity destroyed the ancient world, he nevertheless insists that particular interest is an essential part of freedom (PR, 10, 123, 160. IPH, 70), and he claims that the “principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself” (PR, 161). In other words, the key here is that wealth, commerce, and trade as well as the particular interests they promote do not ultimately erode custom, tradition, and Sittlichkeit, as Rousseau argued, because in civil society particular interest is not only compatible with the universal, it actively generates the universal. Rousseau could not see this.
Hegel recognizes that customs and traditions change as they are molded by changing social and political institutions, and he develops a theory which allows us to understand this change without concluding that it will lead to corruption. He takes up Kant's philosophy of history and Adam Smith's concept of an invisible hand to show that particular interests and the customs and traditions formed by the discipline of civil society lead unconsciously to the common good. Far from being opposed to the common good and leading to corruption as for Rousseau, they lead to and reinforce the universal and thus are perfectly compatible with Sittlichkeit.

We have seen that Hegel objects to Kantian morality because it was abstract—cut off from the concrete world. He instead wants a morality rooted in the world of custom, tradition, feeling, passion, and interest. He wants Sittlichkeit, not Moralität. In this respect he is like Rousseau. But, as we have also seen, Rousseau's ideal society is a utopia where healthy customs and traditions simply must be given and where wealth and particular interest are a main source of their corruption. Thus, Hegel also appeals to Kant's dynamic philosophy of history so that he can envision the realization of an ideal state that can be compatible with wealth, commerce, and trade in the modern world. Hegel is able to make this very important connection between Kant and Rousseau because he is able to see two things: first, that given the socioeconomic interdependence of each upon all, particular interests can lead to the universal, and second, that social institutions, especially civil society, through education and discipline, produce customs and traditions that reinforce the tendency of particular interests to realize the universal. Thus, this Kantian dynamic not only leads to the universal, but is now concrete, that is, tied up with particular interests, passions, and activity which will produce a discipline that shapes customs and traditions as well as molds feelings, sentiments, and particular interests together with the universal common good.

Thus, we have three things: (1) morality which exists concretely in the world tied up with interests and passions. It exists there before us. We have Sittlichkeit, not an unrealized ought. (2) Yet this Sittlichkeit does not just have to be given or presupposed in utopian fashion as for Rousseau. It develops and is dynamic without becoming corrupted. And (3) it realizes the universal—the general will or the categorical imperative—not by a "virtue" which exists outside the concrete but in and through concrete interests and individuality.

While Hegel certainly accepts that part of Rousseau's concept of the general will which holds that individual interests realize the universal, he is nevertheless quite critical of other aspects of Rousseau's concept of the general will. Hegel says that Rousseau
takes the will only in a determinate form as the individual will, and he regards the universal will not as the absolutely rational element in the will, but only as a "general" will which proceeds out of this individual will as out of a conscious will. The result is that he reduces the union of individuals in the state to a contract and therefore to something based on their arbitrary wills, their opinion, and their capriciously given express consent; and abstract reasoning proceeds to draw the logical inferences which destroy the absolutely divine principle of the state, together with its majesty and absolute authority.18

Most commentators misunderstand what Hegel is saying here. They think he is criticizing Rousseau for understanding the general will as a particular will or the will of all.19 Rousseau certainly does not do this and Hegel is not claiming that he does. By "individual will," Hegel does not mean "particular will." Hegel is here making much the same sort of criticism of Rousseau that, as we saw in Section II above, he made of Kant. Hegel is claiming that Rousseau understands the general will only from the perspective of individual consciousness—that for Rousseau only individual consciousnesses exist. Thus, for Rousseau, the general will is seen as the outcome of individual wills willing the common good rather than as the outcome of spirit. It follows from this that the individual wills must vote, that they are responsible for establishing the laws of the state, and thus that individuals rule. Hegel does not believe that all individuals should vote and he certainly does not believe that they should rule.20 He believes that this sort of thing led to the French Revolution. Moreover, while the individual will, for Rousseau, does realize the universal or general will, it sustains only an external relation to the general will much as virtue was external to the way of the world for Kant (PS, 358-59, NL, 85-89).

For Hegel to be able to reconcile the Kantian-Smithian principle of conflicting interests with Rousseauian custom, tradition, and Sittlichkeit, self-interest must not be thought to produce a universal external to itself. Self-interest must be understood to sustain an internal relation to the universal as its own essence. It must implicitly be the universal. For Rousseau, particular interest is seen as external to the universal much as interest or inclination were seen as external to and thus incompatible with morality and freedom for Kant. Thus, for Rousseau, in a society in which particular interest is powerful, it will be impossible to achieve the universal—the general will. Particular interest will appear to erode the ethical basis of the state—it will erode custom, tradition, and Sittlichkeit. Since particular interest and the universal are external and opposed to each other, the realization of one excludes the realization of the other. Particular interest is heteronomous. If viewed from the perspective of individual will where individuals sustain
an external relation to the universal, Hegel agrees that one would have
to come to the conclusion, much as Rousseau did, that particular in-
terest erodes the universal. After all, Hegel himself admits that par-
ticular interest destroyed the ancient community. For Hegel, we must
transcend the perspective of individual consciousness. Particular in-
terests and the universal must be viewed as internally related—as two
interacting elements of one spiritual reality, each molding and form-
ing the other. The universal must be seen as the essential manifesta-
tion of the individuals and individuals as disciplined by the universal.
Then particular interests—wealth, trade, and commerce—will not be
seen as heteronomous. They will be seen as compatible with the univer-
sal and with freedom. Individuals will be related to their own essence
within Sittlichkeit and community. To make this clearer, however, we
must say a good deal more about spirit as well as about its relation-
ship to the state and to the individual citizens.

IV. Hegel's concept of spirit is most difficult to understand, let alone
accept. In this section, I simply wish to explain this concept as clearly
as possible without getting lost in details so that we can understand
the political and historical views that depend upon it. I do not expect
to persuade anyone of, nor am I persuaded by, every single thing
involved here. At any rate, in the Phenomenology, Hegel discusses the
rise of the modern state, and here we find a most important treat-
ment of how spirit develops through alienation and estrangement (PS,
295-321). The development of the modern state and of culture occurs
through a dialectical interaction that takes place between individual
self-consciousness and the objective world. The very existence and
development of this objective world, as well as the actualization and
development of individual self-consciousness, depend upon the fact that
self-consciousness alienates itself. Both sides here, which have become
split and self-opposed, are in reality two sides of one spiritual unity.
This fact, however, is not recognized by either side (PS, 294-95).
Individual self-consciousness, for Hegel, alienates itself—it gives up
its very essence—and thus objectifies itself in the world in the form
of the state. The individual must alienate itself, in other words, it
must serve, recognize, and obey this state. The state only becomes
actual by gaining this recognition, obedience, and service. Through
this objectification, individual self-consciousness gains concreteness and
universality. It sets itself up as the universal spiritual substance (PS,
306ff.); the state, for Hegel, is nothing but the objectified essence—
the recognition, service, and sacrifice—of individual self-consciousness.

Individual self-consciousness creates its world through alienation,
but at the same time its world takes on a life of its own and appears
independent of individual self-consciousness. The objectified state power turns upon individuals. It becomes estranged. It dominates and controls them. It demands their obedience and recognition. In this way it molds, disciplines, and educates individuals. It demands that they conform themselves to this universal substance. As individual self-consciousness alienates itself, conforms itself, recognizes, and serves this state, the state gains reality; it becomes universal, accepted, and recognized. The more power this state gains, the more power it will have to mold and discipline the individual subjects and make them conform to this universal reality.

The subject is being constituted by and as a universal actual substance. The state gains in reality by embodying and institutionalizing the reality, the essence, the service of the subjects. The subjects gain reality in being disciplined by, in conforming to, and in being recognized by the universal reality of the state. The state is the subject's own reality—its essence, its self. At the same time, the state disciplines its subjects, educates them, and lifts them to universality.

Both individual self-consciousness and the objective world of the state are at the same time parts of, and are constituting, a single spiritual unity—a single cultural world which is divided and self-opposed. But this unity goes unrecognized. Moreover, it must go unrecognized. If either side were to understand this mutual process, their development would falter. If individual self-consciousness saw that the state was its own alienated essence, it would cease to take the state as essential or to respect and serve it. If the state were to see its dependence on its subjects, the state would also cease to take itself seriously. It would cease to take itself as essential and universal, and thus it would lose the power to effectively mold and discipline its subjects toward this universality (PS, 310-13).

What is occurring here, despite the fact that it is estranged and goes unrecognized, is that individual self-consciousness is being related to and rooted in the objective substantial world, not in the sense of being related heteronomously to something other and outside itself, but, in the sense that the other, the objective, is its own essence, is itself objectified. Moreover, this other—which is its essence—is the universal. It has the universal and rational form of the state and its laws. Individual self-consciousness is thus establishing itself as the universal.

Ultimately, for Hegel, this estrangement and lack of recognition must be overcome. To be free, individual self-consciousness must come to see that the objective order is its universalized essence, and it must consciously will to serve and obey that universal, rational, and objec-
tive order rather than be dominated and coerced to do so. This recognition, for Hegel, can only be gained after self-consciousness has been raised to the level of religion. As we see in following sections of the *Phenomenology*, religion, the relationship between individual self-consciousness and God which embraces the totality of things, develops through a dialectical process of interaction much like that between individual self-consciousness and the state. Each establishes and realizes the other (*PS*, 329-54, 453-78). Religion, for Hegel, is spirit’s self-consciousness. Religion is the spirit of a people or of a culture reflecting upon itself, understanding itself, and committing itself to its mission and its truth. Only at this level do we gain a consciousness with sufficient scope and universality to see that individual self-consciousness and the objective state are simply two interacting parts of one spiritual unity, and only then can we consciously will to serve and obey that objective order which we see is our own essence.

In the last section of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel says, this “alienation of self-consciousness . . . has not merely a negative but a positive meaning . . . on the one hand self-consciousness itself alienates itself; for in doing so it establishes itself as object, or, by reason of the indivisible unity characterizing self-existence, sets up the object as itself.” This is the process of alienation establishing the state that we have just discussed. Hegel continues:

there is also this other moment in the process, that self-consciousness has equally superseded this self-alienation and objectification, and is thus at home with itself in its otherness as such. . . . The cultivated self-consciousness, which has traversed the world of spirit in self-estrangement, has, through its self-alienation, produced the thing as its own self; it retains itself, therefore, still in the thing, and knows the thing to have no independence.21

Thus, when self-consciousness realizes that the object has no independence, that the object is the result of its own alienation, self-consciousness knows the object as itself and is no longer estranged. Estrangement, from the beginning, meant that the subject and the object were two sides of the same spiritual unity. They had become split and self-opposed such that this unity went unrecognized. When this unity is recognized, the estrangement is overcome. Even objectification has been overcome. The object no longer appears as an independent other. It appears as one’s own essence.

Hegel’s political aim is not to change or remake the world, but to reconcile us to it by allowing us to grasp it in thought fully and adequately (*PR*, 11-12). Estrangement is overcome by recognizing what it is. Individual self-consciousness does not cease to alienate itself; it simply recognizes that it alienates itself. It recognizes that the state
is its own essence. It then continues to alienate itself, to serve and conform itself to the state, its own essence, but now it does so consciously and thus becomes free.

To understand these matters more completely, we must discuss their metaphysical and epistemological background. Hegel's Introduction to the Encyclopaedia, while interspersed with a discussion of other matters, attempts to review the history of philosophy. Hegel indicates the strengths and weaknesses of past philosophical systems and indicates what in them must be preserved as philosophy develops. Later philosophical systems, for Hegel, are always the outcome of previous philosophical systems (L, 23). Hegel certainly views his own system this way.

For Hegel, the strength of traditional (pre-Kantian) metaphysics, and what must be preserved from it, is its lack of any antithesis between subject and object. Traditional metaphysics believes that it brings universal objects before the mind as they really are. It takes the laws and forms of thought to be the laws and forms of things. Thought grasps the very nature of things; it directly grasps absolute, objective, universal reality (L, 60-61).

On the other hand, modern empiricism abandons metaphysics and turns to experience. For empiricism, whatever is true must be a particular in the actual world and immediately present to sensation. Individuals must feel themselves present and involved in every fact of knowledge they accept. While the object is merely subjective experience, nevertheless, this experience is immediately present and completely certain to consciousness (L, 12, 76-78).

Kant's critical philosophy also considers experience to be the sole foundation for cognition. Moreover, all experience, for Kant, presupposes a transcendental unity of self-consciousness. The multiplicity of diverse sensations is brought into a unity only within a unified self-consciousness. These sensations are constituted into an object by this self-consciousness (L, 82, 87-89). Thus, Kant's strength is the same as empiricism's strength; an object must be my immediate experience for knowledge to be possible. But also, for Hegel, Kant's strength lies in the most important notion that the object is constituted by self-consciousness.

Hegel's philosophical system combines and synthesizes the strengths of these three previous philosophical systems. It combines the direct grasp of universal objective reality characteristic of traditional metaphysics with the Kantian and empiricist principle that all experience is immediately mine within consciousness, and it combines these with the Kantian principle that all objects are constituted within
a single unified self-consciousness. Hegel’s system is a reorganized synthetic unity of the positive achievements of all previous philosophy.

To achieve this synthesis, Hegel must abandon Kant’s unknown thing-in-itself, which he very clearly finds unacceptable in any case (L, 91-92), and he must abandon the perspective of individual consciousness.

Since Hegel rejects the unknown thing-in-itself but still holds that experience is constituted by self-consciousness, he clearly cannot hold that self-consciousness constitutes mere phenomenal appearance cut off from a noumenal thing-in-itself which remains unknown. If we constitute experience and if the thing-in-itself is not to be unknown but known, then, for Hegel, we must constitute reality.

But if it were only individual self-consciousness that constituted reality we would be plunged into a subjectivist chaos. What is required is an absolute self-consciousness (L, 93-94)—the consciousness of God, or a consciousness which has raised itself to the absolute perspective of God, which is to say, for Hegel, the religious self-consciousness of a developed culture. Here we have a total and universal consciousness which in constituting reality (as for Kant) would have reality immediately present to itself within consciousness (as for Kant and empiricism), and since it includes all reality—there being no reality outside such a consciousness—it would also have that immediate grasp of objective reality characteristic of traditional metaphysics. The subjective principle of modern philosophy is compatible with the objectivity of traditional philosophy only for an absolute consciousness. God’s subjectivity, because of its totality, is objective and absolute. Thus, in overcoming estrangement, as we have seen, cultural or religious self-consciousness faces all of reality constituted by itself and immediately present to itself as its own essence.

We must notice that what we have just said here describes at the metaphysical and epistemological level exactly what we earlier said about freedom in the moral and political sphere. Hegel’s view that the subjective rationality of the individual must fit with the objective rationality embedded in the laws and institutions of the state is the same as his claim that the objective reality of traditional metaphysics must be immediately grasped within the subjective consciousness of individuals. This identity of subject and object is possible because the subject has constituted the object as its own essence through a dialectical process of alienation. Moreover, the fact that freedom requires that this identity of subjective and objective rationality be reinforced by custom, tradition, and feeling is the same as Hegel’s insistence that our grasp of objective reality be brought home to the personal and particular experience of the individual that we find in empiricism.
Furthermore, as particular interests come into conflict, they lead to the universal—to rationality objectively embedded in our world in agreement with subjective rationality, that is, to the objectivity of traditional metaphysics. That they do so without being external to the universal (as self-interest was external to the general will for Rousseau or as Kantian virtue was external to the way of the world) can now be more clearly understood because it has become clear how individual interests and the universal are two interacting parts of one spiritual unity that constitute each other. The universal is produced as the alienation of the particular actions of individuals. The universal or the state is the individual’s essence—its self—alienated and objectified. Particular interests and the universal are not heteronomous. They appear to be external to each other only if we adopt the perspective of individual consciousness.

Moreover, from what we have already said, we can also begin to understand more clearly the higher form of Sittlichkeit that Hegel wants for the modern world. This Sittlichkeit combines the rational reflective component of Moralität with the transcendence of the ought found in traditional Sittlichkeit. This higher Sittlichkeit is rational reflective morality concretely embedded in the customs, traditions, character, and feeling of individuals—the objective ethical substance of traditional metaphysics (the identity of subjective and objective reason) embedded in the personal experience of the individual (as for empiricism). This connection is possible because of the dialectical process by which individuals constitute their substantial ethical world as their own essence and then are disciplined and educated by it.

All that we have said so far in this section will also help us to understand the transition from civil society to the state as it appears in the Philosophy of Right. Critics often object that Hegel is not a liberal, that he in fact subordinates individuals to a powerful and authoritarian state. This, at least in part, is very misleading. In the first place, civil society is the realm in which individual will has its rights, the realm where particular interests legitimately claim their satisfaction, and this is a crucial element of freedom of Hegel.

In civil society, particular interests are viewed, much as for Kant and Rousseau, from the perspective of individual consciousness and therefore individual will appears to remain external to the universal. Particular interests do lead to the universal, but they do so only unconsciously. Thus, for Hegel, we must move to the level of the state where consciousness transcends the realm of individual will and enters the realm of spirit. Here the rationality implicit in civil society (the unconscious tendency of particular interests to realize the universal) is posited and administered as law and thus becomes conscious,
is recognized, and made actual (PR, 134-36). Here individual self-consciousness and the universal are not external to one another. Estrangement from the objective and universal states that power has been overcome and thus individuals consciously will the universal and become free.

Hegel continuously tells us in the *Philosophy of Right* that the relationship that is established between the individual citizens and the ethical substance—the laws and institutions of the state—is such that individuals are related to their own essence, their own substance. Indeed, we have now seen what Hegel means here. The state is the alienated essence of the individual citizens. The state is constituted by them, but not as an other—not as heteronomous. The state is their own essence objectified and universalized. Hegel does indeed subordinate individuals to the state, but thus only to their own essence—to themselves. This, then, is a form of objective self-determination because the subjective reason of the individual accords with the rationality objectively embedded in the laws and institutions of the state.

For freedom to be realized, particular interests cannot lead to the universal unconsciously as they do in civil society; the state cannot be one’s own essence in an estranged form without this being consciously recognized; and subjective and objective reason cannot accord unconsciously. All of this must occur consciously. We must recognize that particular interests do lead to the universal and begin to consciously pursue the universal in pursuing our own interests. We must recognize that the state is our own essence and subordinate ourselves to it consciously and intentionally. We must recognize that subjective and objective reason accord and act consciously for the sake of objective as well as subjective reason—for the sake of the rational laws as well as our own rational maxims. Moreover, the objective rational laws of the state immediately present to the subjective rationality of the individual give rise to a discipline which molds the customs, feelings, and interests of the individual so that they too consciously support the universal. Thus we have *Sittlichkeit* in the modern state (PR, 105).

Hegel wants to combine the subjectivity of the modern world with the objectivity of the ancient world. Both civil society and the state are crucially important here. Without civil society, there would be no individualism and no realm for the satisfaction of particular interest which is so important as an element of freedom. There would be no conflict of interests as an actual force leading to the universal either within the state or in history. And there would be no rootedness in concrete interests, passions, property, trade, and commerce. Without civil society, the realm of the state and spirit would float into abstrac-
tion. On the other hand, without the state, individuals would never rise above particular interests; they would never get beyond an unconscious tendency toward the universal. They would never get beyond subjective reason to reason embedded objectively in their laws and institutions. They would never confront their own essence objectified and thus could not be free in obeying the state. In short, they would not reach spirit.

To reconcile modern subjectivity with traditional objectivity, two things are necessary: (1) the objective must be absorbed within the subjective, not exist independently outside it. And (2) the subjective must gain enough scope and universality to be objective and absolute. It must embrace the totality of things like a God whose subjectivity is objective because it is total.

By lifting individual self-consciousness to spirit we see that the state is our own essence, that subjective and objective reason are identical, that the objective reality of traditional metaphysics is immediately grasped within subjective consciousness. The objective world is not other or heteronomous, but is absorbed within subjective consciousness. But subjective consciousness at this point is no longer merely an individual consciousness. It has been molded and disciplined by the objective substantial power of the state. It has become the cultural consciousness of a people. It has been lifted to the universal, to objective ethical rationality. At the level of the state, this consciousness becomes the final highest authority—the sovereignty of the state constitutes consciousness as sovereign. In this way, subjective consciousness gains scope and universality.

Hegel is certainly not an authoritarian, let alone a totalitarian. As Avineri has shown, there is even a strong element of pluralism in Hegel's thought.²⁵ Hegel also endorses freedom of the press and of speech, and he advocates social mobility (PR, 132, 205). The state is also very definitely concerned with the protection of individuals, their property, and their particular interests, but these are not the ultimate aims of the state (PR, 71, 156, 209). The ultimate aim of the state is to lift its citizens to spirit, to their own essence, and to the Divine. Only at this level is the individual fully realized, at home with itself, and rationally self-determined.

Hegel wants to avoid a sovereign like that of Hobbes who is external to the citizens and wields power over them. Nor will he accept a state like that of Rousseau, for whom the people are sovereign. Just as much, he wants to avoid Kant's autocrat who is external to the citizens and wields power over them as much as for Hobbes despite the fact that the autocrat gives the people the laws they would have given themselves.²⁶ For Hegel, the citizens do not give themselves their
own laws by voting on them as for Rousseau. The citizens, however, do get the sorts of laws they would have given themselves, but they are not given to them by an autocrat as for Kant. The laws and institutions of the state, for Hegel, arise through the historical development of spirit in which the subjective rationality of individuals accords with the objective rationality embedded in the laws of the state—the laws of the state are the laws that subjective rationality would give itself. Through alienation the citizens create the state as their own essence and are molded by their state. For Hegel the government or the state is not external to the citizens; it is their own essence. For Hegel, sovereignty must be understood not at the level of individual will—the individual will either of a people or a government—but at the level of spirit. Hegel’s view of sovereignty is thus quite new.

No one of the powers or agencies in the state is sovereign for Hegel. They have no independent authority, but are grounded in the Idea of the whole (PR, 179-80). Certainly the monarch is not sovereign. Any state simply requires an agency with the authority of final decision, otherwise disputes could continue eternally. This authority of final decision rests with the monarch. But this just means that the monarch has “to say yes and dot the ‘i’.” Generally speaking, Hegel’s monarch is rather weak. Hegel does at times speak of the monarch as sovereign (PR, 182, 186), but by this he means that the monarch is a figurehead who represents sovereignty. On the other hand, at least in home affairs, Hegel is willing to say that sovereignty resides in the people, not the people as an aggregate of individual wills but the people as the whole of the state (PR, 182-83). Sovereignty lies in the organic whole bound together by Sittlichkeit at the level of spirit. It does not lie either with the government or the people understood as individual wills. It lies in this spiritual totality as a whole. This possibility is due to the cohesion of this whole which is bound together by the integration of particular interests embedded in property, commerce, and trade which nevertheless lead to the universal. The whole is also bound together by custom, tradition, and Sittlichkeit which embed this universal in individual feeling and character. It is bound together in that subjective reason and objective reason are identical and in the sense that the state is one’s own essence. For Hegel the sovereign is not to be seen as an entity which wields power over others from outside. Rather, Hegel is concerned with power and authority which binds people together, makes them cohere, lifts them to their own essence at the level of spirit, and makes them rationally self-determined. They are not ruled by the subjective rationality of either the government or the people, but by the objective rationality embedded in the state as a whole which, however, accords with the
subjective rationality of each. To return to individual will, to insist upon voting or subjective rationality, in Hegel’s opinion, would be to break this spiritual whole and to move toward making individual will sovereign, either the individual will of a government or that of the aggregate of the people. If one chooses the latter, then as for Rousseau, we would have to give up wealth, commerce, and trade and thus the ideal society would be impossible in the modern world.

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Notes
11. PR, 12, 32-33, 90-91, 163-64. IPH, 70, 97, 146. Aesthetics, 1:98, 182-83.
17. *PR*, 125; translation altered by changing "maturing (bildet)" to "educating."


25. Avineri, 167-75. Hegel advocates pluralism in religion and even the toleration of dissenting sects that are allowed to maintain their own customs, traditions, and religious views; *PR*, 168-69.


27. *PR*, 181, 288-89. Though the monarch does command the army; *PR*, 212.

28. For example, he is bound by the decisions of his counsellors; *PR*, 288.

29. At least not in domestic affairs, though this might be true in foreign relations; see *PR*, 212-13.