The Intentionality of Reference in Husserl and the Analytic Tradition
In this work, I will explore one such issue by looking at some features of the philosophical problem of reference. While reference is generally held to be an issue studied exclusively within the domain of analytic thought, no account of reference in the analytic tradition from Gottlob Frege onward has provided a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of reference. The classic accounts have either collapsed under formal inconsistencies (Frege, 1967), left entire dimensions of the problem untreated with no program for remedying the omissions (Russell, 1993), or have shortchanged the phenomenon by ejecting or negating those components of it that do not fit their particular philosophical approach (Quine, 1961). More recent efforts have faced similar difficulties (Kripke, 1980; Searle, 1983; Devitt and Sterelny, 1999).
Intentionality: Past and Future
Vallor, S. (2005). The intentionality of reference in husserl and the analytic tradition. In G. Forrai & Kampis, G (Eds.), Intentionality: Past and Future (pp. 111–125).